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                                                            INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
                  FOR WHAT IT’S WORTH: INCONSEQUENTIAL FRAGMENTS?  
                                                  
 
                           
                   
                             
                 
 
 
                Sept 21st 1937. 
          
                Dear Tom... 
                When I was ill I found the only thing I could read was Schopenhauer. 
                Everything else I tried only confirmed the feeling of sickness. It was  
                very curious. Like suddenly a window opened on a fug. I alway knew      
                he was one of the ones that mattered most to me, and it is a pleasure 
                more real than any pleasure for a long time to begin to understand now 
                why it is so. And it is a pleasure to find a philosopher that can be read 
                like a poet, with an entire indifference to the apriori forms of verification.  
                                                 
                                        Samuel Beckett (Foxrock, Co. Dublin.) 
                                                       
                                 
 
 
 
 
There is no doubt that the recent outpouring of personal letters, correspondence and  
 
documented conversations recording Samuel Beckett’s open enthusiasm for the writing of  
 
Arthur Schopenhauer indicates the extent to which Beckett’s relationship with Schopenhauer  
 
is carried beyond any merely intellectual assessment.
1
 For it would seem from the perspective  
 
of Beckett’s early correspondence that Schopenhauer’s writing offered  a unique space in  
 
which his own intuition towards the world could find rare accommodation. One could even  
 
presume from the elevated language Beckett uses in response to Schopenhauer, that his  
 
                                                
1
 This was at a time in which the philosopher was regarded as not only an irrelevance to modern 
thinking, but, somewhat incredibly for the 20
th
 century mind, seen as clinging to the tattered vestiges of 
metaphysical thinking: see, for example,  Nietzsche’s judgement on Schopenhauer […] ‘although the 
dogmas of Christianity have long since been demolished, the whole medieval conception of the world 
and of the nature of man could in Schopenhauer’s teachings celebrate a resurrection. Much science 
resounds in his teaching, but what dominates is not science but the old familiar ‘metaphysical need’. 
Nietzsche, F., Human, All Too Human, trans Hollingdale, R.J. (1996), Cambridge: Cambrridge 
University Press, 26. 
 2 
‘bedridden’
2
 encounter with the philosopher actually inaugurates a breakthrough in his  
 
reckoning towards himself as a future writer and artist.
3
      
 
Surprisingly, not only does Beckett acknowledge what he sees as Schopenhauer’s intellectual  
 
strength as a writer, but on a much more personal level it is revealed in his private notes, that  
 
the philosopher even elicits open affection from Beckett: 
 
 
  Irrationalism comes to full development in Schopenhauer by removal of religious 
elements. With Urgrund and Urzufall became the will-to-live and TII[Thing-In-
Itself].  Whereas this activity directed solely towards itself is with Fichte the 
autonomy of ethical self determination and with Schlegel (pfui!), the ironical play of 
fancy, with dear Arthur it is the absolute unreason of objectless will. Creating itself 
  alone and perpetually it is never satisfied, the unhappy will; and since world 
  is nothing but self revelation (objectivation) of the will, it must be a balls aching 
  world.
4
      
 
 
On the surface as a piece of writing it is fairly unremarkable; essentially it is no more than a  
 
transcribed passage from a history of philosophy text book, with the odd ribald locution  
 
thrown in for added colour. But because Beckett decides to replace the name ‘Schopenhauer’  
 
with ‘dear Arthur’ one is instantly  made aware of just how intimate Beckett’s own perception  
 
of Schopenhauer has become at this remarkably early stage in his development as a writer.  
 
Indeed such is the rarity of affection displayed towards any philosopher by Beckett, that  
 
Matthew Feldman in his examination of Beckett’s interwar notes, marks this highly unusual  
 
sentiment by italicizing ‘dear Arthur’.
5
   
 
 
                                                
2 Beckett was laid up in bed with gastric influenza, during the time of composing the letter in 1937, see, 
The Faber Companion to Samuel Beckett, ed., Ackerley, C.J. and Gontarski, S.E. (2006) London: Faber 
and Faber Ltd, 511.       
3 At this stage as a young author Beckett had published a few poems, contributed to a collective study of 
James Joyce!s Work in Progress, published a Proust monograph, along with a collection of short stories 
More Pricks than Kicks, which in part was an attempt to salvage the "wreckage! of his first novel Dream 
of Fair to Middling Women which was deemed "too literary! by the publishing world, but, - just as 
damaging from Beckett!s own perspective, - also too Joycean. It is worth noting that Beckett!s own 
Schopenhauerian revelation (“Like suddenly a window opened on a fug”) bears a striking resemblance 
to Richard Wagner!s equally emotive encounter with Schopenhauer, set out in a letter to Franz Liszt: 
“someone has come into my solitude like a gift, even if only a literary one, from heaven. He is Arthur 
Schopenhauer” :see Magee, B., Wagner and Philosophy (2000) London: Penguin Books Ltd, 149.      
4 Trinity College Dublin MS 109715/4. reproduced in Feldman, M., Beckett!s Books: A Cultural History of 
Samuel Beckett!s Interwar Notes!  (2006) London: Continuum, 49-50.  
5 The note itself forms part of a much larger transcription Beckett made from a 1901 revised edition of 
Wilhelm Windelband!s A History of Philosophy (originally published in German under the title Lehrbuch 
der Geschichte der Philosophie in 1893, see Matthew Feldman "Philosophy! Uhlmann, A., Samuel 
Beckett in Context (2013) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 305.  
 3 
   
  Schopenhauer became - leaving the weakness of his system aside - one of the 
  greatest philosophical writers because - in contrast to Hegel - he put the world         
  back in its rightful place, because he attempted to think perspicuously. One 
  reads him therefore with the admiration with which one once read Plato. Whoever 
  demands from philosophy no more than the highest conceivable perspicuity, 
  the liveliest metaphorical representation of abstract concepts, must call him a 
            tremendous thinker-poet.
6
    
 
 
The above extract from Beckett’s ‘Windelband notes’ exhibits none of the previous colourful  
 
amendments, but instantly we can see where the value of the Windelband quote lies for  
 
Beckett, in the way it leaves an abiding impression of Schopenhauer as a philosophical poet.  
 
Windelband’s idea of poet-philosopher, is clearly a description which Beckett is eager to  
 
embrace in his own personal celebration of the philosopher, remarking  that ‘it is a pleasure to  
 
find a philosopher that can be read like a poet’
7
.  
 
An earlier correspondence addressed to the same Thomas McGreevy
8
 of the above letter  
 
extract, provides further evidence as to the principal motivation behind Beckett’s reading of  
 
Schopenhauer. And again we can see philosophy is not foremost on his mind.
9
   
 
  
 I am reading Schopenhauer. Everyone laughs at that. Beaufret & Alfy
10
 etc. 
                                                
6 Feldman, M., Beckett!s Books, op.cit., 139-140. 
7 The Letters  of Samuel Beckett 1929-1940, op.cit., 550.  
8 Thomas McGreevy, Irish poet, critic, and art historian, and one of Beckett!s closest friends. Both 
Beckett and Thomas McGreevy held identical posts (Lecteur d! anglais) at the Ecole Normale 
Supérieure, at a time which saw the same institution open its doors to Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty. See, The Letters of Samuel Beckett 1929-1940 (eds.)Craig, G., Fehsenfeld, M.D., Gunn, 
D. and Overbeck, L.M. (2009) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 696-697.      
9 It is interesting to draw parallels with the way Beckett later as a playwright dismissed the suggestion 
that his own work was in any way "philosophical!, declaring that he himself had "no philosophical or 
intellectual motives!, and, in addition:  “I never read the philosophers; I don!t understand what they 
write”. And in relation to his own  "intellectual cordon sanitaire! in Paris he is recorded as saying 
"Heidegger!s and Sartre!s language was too philosophical!:see, O! Hara, J.D. Samuel Beckett!s Hidden 
Drives: Structural Uses of Depth Psychology (1997) State of Florida: University Press of Florida, 300, 
Fletcher, J., Samuel Beckett!s Art (1967) London: Chatto & Windus London, 121, and Samuel Beckett, 
the Critica Heritage., (eds.) Graver, L. and Federman, R. (1979) Routledge London, 219, respectively.        
10 Jean Beaufret was a student of Philosophy at the E.N.S in 1930 whose research interests lay in 
Fichte, Hegel, Marx and Heidegger. It comes as no surprise therefore that Beckett!s enthusiasm for the 
very philosopher who derided both Fichte and Hegel, as well as rebuffing any philosophical legacy 
arising from Hegelian thinking [“For instead of firmly and steadily directing the senses and 
understanding to the world that lies before them in intuitive perception and thus to what is really and truly 
given, [...] they know nothing except the highest abstractions, such as being, essence, becoming, 
absolute, infinite, and so on. They start from these and build systems whose contents ultimately amount 
to mere words. Thus such words are really only soap- bubbles which can be played with for a while, but 
cannot touch the ground of reality without bursting.”: Schopenhauer, A Parerga and Paralipomena, Vol 
1., trans. Payne, E.F.J. (2000) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 164.] . Alfred Rémy Péron like Beckett 
and McGreevy was a Lecteur d" anglais. Both Beckett and Péron collaborated on a French translation of 
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  But I am not reading philosophy, nor caring whether he is right or wrong 
  or a good or worthless metaphysician. An intellectual justification of 
  unhappiness - the greatest that has ever been attempted - is worth the 
  examination of one who is interested in Leopardi & Proust...
11
   
 
 
 
So it would seem not only does Beckett take up Schopenhauer with such fervour due to what  
 
previous commentators have rightly recognized as Beckett’s shared pessimism
12
, but even  
 
more importantly, I believe, Schopenhauer presents to Beckett the possibility of envisaging an  
 
aesthetic model which grows directly out of the intractable nature of suffering.  
 
It is in this context I want to propose that Beckett’s engagement with Schopenhauer is not  
 
merely a philosophical experiment which he subsequently aborts, but one configuring in a  
 
continuous process of aesthetic adjustment. Indeed I would argue it is precisely because  
 
contemporary criticism is unable to countenance the unitary metaphysics of Schopenhauer
13
,  
 
with the perception of Beckett having been properly vetted as a Modernist, that there has been  
 
so little appetite amongst critics to move the Schopenhauerian identity beyond what is  
 
regularly portrayed as youthful experimentation. It is for this reason of philosophical  
 
credibility (ironically the very pressure which Beckett himself felt under while enrolled at the  
 
E.N.S) that we often find scholars ‘refitting’ the Schopenhauerian ‘bodywork’ of Beckett’s  
 
writing with a much more amenable programme suited to the expectations of the 20th  
 
century.
14
  
 
 
 
Contesting the Schopenhauerian Crown?  
 
                                                                                                                                       
James Joyce!s Anna Livia Plurabelle in 1930: see, The Letters of Samuel Beckett 1929-1940, op.cit., 
688 and 703, respectively.                     
11 The Letters of Samuel Beckett 1929-1940, op.cit., 32-33. 
12 Mark Byron, in his essay English Literature cites the way Beckett uses not only Schopenhauer, but 
also Robert Burton, Democritus and Sir Thomas Browne in “shaping” his “singular and often ironic 
pessimism”: see, Uhlmann, A., Samuel Beckett in Context, op.cit 223. See also Mark Nixon!s comments 
on Schubert and Schopenhauer: Ibid., 101.     
13 Theodor Adorno describes Schopenhauer as the "malicious heir of the great speculators knew his 
way among the hollows and crags of individual absolutism like no other. His insight is coupled to the 
speculative thesis that the individual is only appearance, not the Thing-in-Itself.! Adorno, T.W., Minima 
Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life (Radical Thinkers) trans., Jepheott, E.F.N. (2005) Verso, 153.    
14 see, [...] he has made himself ridiculous in the eyes of the very learned young intellectuals with whom 
he had come into contact at the ENS., Anthony Cordingley "École Normale Supérieure! Uhlmann, A., 
Samuel Beckett in Context, op.cit., 50.   
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Fritz Mauthner 
15
, whose work Beckett initially read as part of a fact-finding mission
16
 on  
 
behalf of James Joyce, is usually credited as the philosopher capable of leading Beckett away  
 
from what is generally considered as an  implausible metaphysical position, towards the  
 
much more reconcilable territory of the ‘speech act’
17
.  
 
Mauthner, as a philosophical candidate for Beckett’s work, is without doubt very alluring,  
 
especially from the viewpoint of modern literary criticism. For not only does Mauthner  
 
appear to move Beckett away from Schopenhauer, transforming the ‘Willing’ subject into a  
 
‘language using subject
18
’, but it would seem he also captures the same linguistic skepticism  
 
which Beckett evokes in his own writing
19
. Importantly, though, for those critics who regard  
 
any sustained investment in Schopenhauer as bringing Beckett’s own philosophical  
 
judgement into direct conflict with the values of high Modernism, it is Mauthner who  
 
apparently can disarm any previous threat which Schopenhauer posed to this view of  
 
modernity: 
 
   
 
  The metaphysical Will is in crass opposition to that which one designated 
  by the word, ‘Will’ before Schopenhauer - unmotivated, lacking knowledge,  
  lacking   cause, completely blind, really imbecile, something which fits  
  together perfectly well with the being of the world, as  
                                                
15 Fritz Mauthner 1849-1949,  Czech empiricist, theatre critic, and novelist. Most noted for his three 
volumed philosophical critique on language: Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Srache (1901-1902). It is most 
likely that Beckett!s first reading of Mauthner occurred in the summer of 1938: see, Nixon, M., Samuel 
Beckett!s German Diaries 1936-1937 (2011) London: Continuum International Publiushing Group, 70.         
16 The fact-finding mission which Beckett participated in was specifically intended to collect material for 
James Joyce!s new literary project Finnegans Wake, see Letters of Samuel Beckett Vol 2, 1941-1956, 
ed.Craig, G., Fehsenfeld, M.D., Gunn, D., and Overbeck, L.M. (2011) Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 465.   
17 The fact that Schopenhauer!s philosophy is not primarily taken up by the issue of language does 
undoubtedly pose a huge problem for modern criticism, especially when the analysis and structure of 
language is so central to both 20th century philosophy and post-structural discourse.          
18 see, Rupert Wood!s use of Mauthner as a means of transforming the underlying character of 
Schopenhauer!s "Willing! and "knowing! subject: Wood, R.A., Aesthetics and Ascesis: Schopenhauerian 
Structures in the later prose of Samuel Beckett (1990) Cambridge: University of Cambridge. Ph.D., 5. 
Also, by bringing Mauthner into Beckett!s philosophical compass, one immediately leaves open the door 
for Wittgenstein who is widely acknowledged as exploiting many of Mauthner!s own strategies towards 
the representation of language.      
19 see, Jennie Skerl!s textural analysis of Watt in the context of Mauthner!s "ladder!: Contemporary 
Literature, Vol 15, No 4 (1974) Skerl, J. “Fritz Mauthner “Critique of Language” in Samuel Beckett!s 
Watt”, 482.    
 6 
            Schopenhauer’s pessimism perceived it. This blind and imbecile Will  
            however has now imposed a goal on life, an objective on life’s course.  
 Self-Knowledge through the poor human intellect. The blind strong  
 Will on the back of the lame,seeing Intellect. Who drew up this social  
 contract?- the blind or the lame? And whenever the seeing Intellect  
 has finally at the end thrown off the blind Will, who will remain the victor?  
 The all powerful Will lies in the mud, and the Intellect, finally completely  
 free of the Will is no longer there, for outside the Will there is nothing.
20
  
 
 
 
As we can see from the essay Schopenhauer, Mauthner takes great delight in lampooning  
 
Schopenhauer’s depiction of the intellect’s subservience to the ‘Will’. For Mauthner, the  
 
‘Will’ as it is portrayed by Schopenhauer is unconvincingly absurd, and one whose  
 
relationship with the human intellect resides in a state of squalor and impoverishment.  
 
Therefore if Beckett can be judged (in the context of developing as a writer) to be moving  
 
increasingly towards a ‘Mauthnerian’ position, it would also imply that his earlier  
 
commitment and enthusiasm for Schopenhauer would have been tempered considerably, even  
 
to the point at which it could be assumed he had actually outgrown Schopenhauer.
21
 Taken in  
 
this context, whatever  remains of Schopenhauer in Beckett’s later work is apparently  
 
rendered as farce. In fact, it does not take much effort on the reader’s part  
 
to see in Mauthner’s parody of Schopenhauer, a direct parallel between Endgame’s own lame  
 
footman Clov and his dictatorial blind master Hamm.  
 
Upon such evidence one could quite understandably take the view that Beckett, like  
 
Wittgenstein, has ‘seen to the bottom of Schopenhauer’s philosophy’.
22
 But before there is  
 
any suggestion of turning what remains of of ‘dear Arthur’ into a whipping post for  
 
Mauthner, one should be made aware, that the entire metaphorical construction of the  
 
‘intellect’ as a lame footman and the ‘Will’ as the blind master, is in fact Schopenhauer’s, not  
 
Mauthner’s. For regardless of the sarcasm behind such an image, as an image it remains  
                                                
20 Mauthner, F., Schopenhauer (1911) Munich und Leipzig bei Georg Mueller, 111-112 [trans., Sage, V.] 
21 Ulrich Pothast, the scholar who has gone the farthest in unlocking the Schopenhauerian profile of 
Beckett!s early writing, portrays Beckett!s relationship with Schopenhauer as one which ultimately will be 
discarded, eliciting from Pothast a direct analogy with Nietzsche “There is an obvious parallelism 
between Beckett and Nietzsche in that both set out with Schopenhauer!s philosophy of art and left it 
behind later in their lives.” : Pothast, U., The Metaphysical Vision: Arthur Schopenhauer!s Philosophy of 
Art and Life and Samuel Beckett!s Own way to make use of it (2008) New York: Peter Lang Publishing 
Inc., 5.     
22
 See Rees, R, Recollections of Wittegenstein, (1984), Oxford University Press, 158. 
 7 
 
above all Schopenhauerian.
23
 The case is similar when we examine what is now generally  
 
acknowledged as an image inspired by Mauthner,
24
 ie., the celebrated ‘Arsene’s ladder’ in  
 
Watt : “What was changed was existence off the ladder. Do not come down the ladder, Ifor, I  
 
haf taken it away”
25
. It emerges that the Mauthnerian ‘rungs’ on this particular stepladder  
 
have a distinctly Schopenhauerian grain: 
 
 
 
  However, for the man who studies to gain insight, books and  
  studies are merely rungs of the ladder on which he climbs to the 
  summit of knowledge. As soon as a rung has raised him one step, 
  he leaves it behind. On the other hand, the many who study in 
  order to fill their memory do not use the rungs of the ladder for 
  climbing, but take them off and load themselves with them to take 
  away, rejoicing at the increasing weight of the burden. They remain 
  below for ever, because they bear what should have borne them. 
                                                                                           (W.W.R.2, 80)         
         
 
  
As we can see quite clearly, the idea that Beckett’s interest in Mauthner should in any way be  
 
interpreted as a retreat from Schopenhauer, is somewhat misleading. For having applied  
 
himself so assiduously to Schopenhauer; not only reading Schopenhauer in French while  
 
studying in Paris, but also going to the lengths of shipping the entire works back home  
 
to Ireland while traveling through Nazi-occupied Germany, 
26
 - not to mention that small  
 
matter of reading Schopenhauer in the original ligatured gothic type – it is evident that  
  
Beckett’s personal investment and commitment towards Schopenhauer was of sufficient  
                                                
23 [...]the intellect, in so far as that is the guide and leader, like the foot-man who walks in front of the 
stranger. In truth, however, the most striking figure for the relation of the two is that of the strong blind 
man carrying the sighted lame man on his shoulders”, Schopenhauer, A., The World as Will and 
Representation, Vol 2., trans. Payne, E.F.J. (1966) New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 209.         
24For the idea that Mauther!s ladder of language underlies Arsene!s sense of existence “off the ladder”, 
see The Faber Companion to Beckett, op.cit., 360. Before Mauthner was advanced as Beckett!s main 
source for the "Arsene ladder! it was widely assumed Wittgenstein!s "ladder! at the end of the Tractatus 
was the most likely candidate: “...when he has used them - as steps - to climb up beyond them. (he 
must so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it)” see, Wittgenstein, L., Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus., trans. Pears, D.F. and Guinness, B.F. (1961) London: Routledge, 151. Also for 
an account of both Mauthner!s "ladder" and the respective shift in the logical positivist perception of Watt 
see, Skerl, J. Fritz Mauthner op.cit., 481-482.                 
25 Beckett, S., Watt (1998) London: John Calder (Publishers) Ltd.  
26 The fact that Beckett had sent the collected works of Schopenhauer in a separate consignment, 
ahead of all other books he had sent home from Germany, gives us a clear impression as to the priority 
he was giving Schopenhauer during this early period in the 1930!s. The Schopenhauerian consignment 
[4 Nov, 1936], second large consignment of books [3 Dec, 1936], see Nixon, M. Samuel Beckett!s 
German Diaries 1936-1937 (2011) London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 201.         
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character to withstand satirical attack.
27
 But most importantly we must keep in  
 
sight the fact that that Mauthner’s criticism of Schopenhauer is directed at his metaphysical  
 
assessment of the ‘Will’ . It is Mauthner’s inability to take seriously a philosophy which  
 
departs from individual human action, in which there is no recognition of individual ‘wills’,  
 
only an indivisible ‘Will’, that provokes so much sarcasm from Mauthner towards  
 
Schopenhauer.
28
 Whereas for Beckett, as we can appreciate from his private correspondence,  
 
his own enthusiasm for Schopenhauer did not rest in relation to “whether he is a right or  
 
wrong or a good or worthless metaphysician”.
29
 For it is much more  
 
likely that the appeal of Mauthner to Beckett would lie in the discovery of a writer, whose  
 
own work, like himself, had been significantly affected by his reading of Schopenhauer.
30
  
 
Clearly from a perspective such as Beckett’s, whose pursuit of Schopenhauer was cast  
 
principally in relation to an aesthetic judgement, not a philosophical one, he would detect  
 
quite easily just how much of Schopenhauer’s rhetorical style and imagery actually penetrates  
 
Mauthner’s own characterization of  language.
31
 A particularly striking example of this is set  
 
out in the finale of the first volume of Kritik der Sprache:  
 
 
  There exists no last Why behind which no new Why swings its scourge.  
  He who is condemned to philosophical thinking plunges into the alley; 
                                                
27 It was not until the publication of Arthur Hubscher!s 1937 edition of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung 
that  Schopenhauer was made available in modern German. The edition of Die Welt which Beckett sent 
home to Ireland along with Schopenhauer!s other works, was printed in Fraktur blackletter type face. For 
Beckett , who taught himself German, invariably a great deal of patience would be called upon in 
reading the works. For a chronology of the emendation of Schopenhauer!s Die Welt see, E.F.J. Payne 
introduction to W.W.R.1., [x-xi].       
28 "[...] his point of departure is the individual and actual feeling in people of a voluntary activity; and that 
it is already a metaphor - indeed the most banal metaphor of common - speech whenever now 
Schopenhauer designates as the Will, not the actual wills of people, or even more the individual 
character.!, see, Mauthner, F., Schopenhauer., op.cit., 103. [trans. Sage, V.]    
29
 Beckett, Letters, op.cit., 32-3. 
30 “Among the books I explored for Joyce there was Beiträge einer Kritik der Sprache by Fritz Mauthner 
which greatly impressed me. I have often wanted to re-read it. But it seems impossible to find.” The 
Letters of Samuel Beckett Vol.2, op.cit., 465. In evidence of the way Maunther does not bring about a 
capitulation of Schopenhauer for Beckett, Mark Nixon in Beckett!s German Diaries takes note of the fact 
Beckett transcribed Mauthner!s reference to the veil of Maya, a Vadic construct which Schopenhauer 
himself had previously exploited in own work. See Nixon, M., Samuel Beckett!s German Diaries 1936-
1937 (2011) London: Continuum International Publishing, 219.       
31 In Ben Hutchinson!s book Modernism and Style  Schopenhauer is identified as embodying "a kind of 
language scepticism! towards any writing which becomes disconnected from its "organic, 
epistemologically justified connection between signifier and signified.! See, Hutchinson, B., Modernism 
and Style (2011) Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 58-59. Also see [...] I call this degenerate kind of 
allegory Symbolism. W.W.R.1., 239.    
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  the first wounds only goad his strength; in pain and despair, he pants 
  further past ever new Whys, until he finally collapses and the optical 
  illusion of a longing for death presents him with the fantasy that the  
             pain is stopping, that the last Why has been reached. The unending  
              series used to lead further to the wherefore and to the wherefore of the  
             wherefore into the future.
32
 
                
 
 
The illusory ‘Why ?’ and the ‘Wherefore ?’ which Mauthner presents as having no substantial  
 
grounding other than sustaining needless suffering, in which death finally but misleadingly,  
 
presents itself as the ‘answer’, is instantly echoed not only in Schopenhauer’s rebuttal of the  
 
philosophical ‘Why ?’:  “ Thus we no longer consider the where, the when, the why and the  
 
whither in things, but simply and solely the what,”
33
 but it is also evident to anyone familiar  
 
with Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, that Mauthner’s final evaluation of the philosophical  
 
reach of language is a recapitulation of Schopenhauer’s own declaration towards suffering  
 
and death: 
 
 
  Dying is certainly to be regarded as the real aim of life; at the moment of 
  dying, everything is decided which through the whole course of life was 
  only prepared and introduced. Death is the result, the résumé, of life, or 
  the total sum expressing at one stroke all the instruction given by life in 
  detail and piecemeal, namely that the whole striving, the phenomenon of 
  which is life, was vain, fruitless, and self-contradictory effort, to have 
  returned from which is a deliverance. 
                                                    (W.W.R.2, 637.)       
        
 
And regarding the illusory nature of the final ‘Why’, we can see quite clearly that it is the  
 
much maligned Schopenhauer who provides the initial framing for Mauthner:     
 
 
             [...] whoever is oppressed by the burdens of life, whoever loves life 
  and affirms it, but abhors its torments, and in particular can no longer 
  endure the hard lot that has fallen to just him, cannot hope for deliverance 
  from death, and cannot save himself through suicide. Only by a false 
  illusion does the cool shade of Orcus allure him as a haven of rest. The 
  earth rolls on from day into night; the individual dies; but the sun itself  
  burns without intermission, an eternal noon. 
                                                                   (W.W.R.1, 280-281.)       
 
Even if Mauthner was unwilling to recognize Schopenhauer’s undoubted contribution to his  
                                                
32 Mauthner, F. Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache  Vol 1. (1923) Leipzig: Verlag Felix Meiner, 712-
713. [trans. Sage, V.].   
33 Schopenhauer, A., W.W.R.1., 178.   
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own positioning of language, Beckett, having throughly immersed himself in Schopenhauer,  
 
would have instantly discerned whose hand was ultimately influencing Mauthner’s.
34
  
 
So, far from seeing in Beckett’s approval of Mauthner a displacement of Schopenhauer, we  
 
can appreciate from Beckett’s own aesthetic viewpoint that Mauthner in many ways  
 
represents an attempt to confer upon language a Schopenhauerian ‘grammar’.
35
 
 
 
If Not Language, What?  
 
 
If Schopenhauer’s philosophy is not principally driven in relation to the structure of language,  
 
what is it ? 
 
The answer to this lies somewhat conveniently in the title of Schopenhauer’s main ‘Work’  
 
Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung: ‘Wille’ and ‘Vorstellung’. But it would seem that this is  
 
where the convenience ends. For we may rightly scratch our heads and ask what is ‘will’ with  
 
a capital ‘W’ and how does ‘Vorstellung’ stand up as a concept?  
 
Starting with the seemingly most difficult from an English-speaking perspective, how does  
 
one begin to address the meaning of ‘Vorstellung’ ? We could appeal, perhaps, to previous  
 
attempts at bringing ‘Vorstellung’ under the recognition of a single word. For instance we  
 
could try out words such as ‘idea’
36
 ‘representation’
37
 or even ‘presentation’
38
 all of  
                                                
34 Another philosopher equally reluctant to recognize the invaluable contribution Schopenhauer made to 
his writing is Ludwig Wittgenstein: “I think I see quite clearly what Schopenhauer got out of his 
philosophy-but when I read Schopenhauer I seem to see to the bottom very easily. He is not deep in the 
sense that Kant and Berkeley are deep.” see, Rees, R. Recollections of Wittgenstein (1984) Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 158.   
35 A fascinating discovery by Mark Nixon reveals that : “Against the backdrop of Beckett!s interest in 
linguistic skepticism, it is remarkable that one of the first passages he marked in the introduction (with a 
marginal cross in grey pencil) is Schopenhauer!s view on philosophy as a continuous abuse of 
universals or general or general concepts.”  (Frauenstädt in Schopenhauer 1923, ll). On 9 July 1937, 
See Van Hulle, D and Nixon, M., Samuel Beckett!s Library (2013) Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 144. Also, concerning the possible misappropriation of Beckett!s examination of "nominalism! in 
the context of Mauthner, rather than Schopenhauer see Ibid., 144-145.      
36 The first English translation of Die Welt, by R.B. Haldane and John Kemp bears the title inscription 
The World as Will and Idea, see Schopenhauer, A. The World as Will and Idea, Vol 1., trans. Haldane, 
R.B. and Kemp, J. (1891) second edition, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trüber,& Co, Ltd.       
37 E.F.J. Payne!s translation of Die Welt based upon the definitive 1937 German edition of Die Welt 
prepared by Dr Arthur Hübscher (President of the Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft who consulted directly  
the original manuscripts) allies itself with France and Italy, in translating Vorstellung into "representation!. 
See Payne!s "Translators Introduction! in Schopenhauer, A. The World as Will and Representation, Vol 
1., trans. Payne, E.F.J. (1969) New York: Dover Publications Inc, [ix].           
 11 
 
which have been previously sought in relation to English translations of Die Welt. There is of  
 
course, in  the event of being unable to decide on a single definition, the possibility of simply  
 
looking up ‘Vorstellung’ in a German dictionary:  
 
  
  Vorstellung die 1. (Begriff) idea: er macht sich (Dat.)  
  keine ~ [davon], welche Mühe das kostet he has no idea 
  how much effort that costs; das entspricht ganz/ nicht 
  meinen ~ en that is exactly/not what I had in mind 2. o.Pl. 
  (Fantasie) imagination; das geht über alle ~ hinaus it is un- 
  imaginable 3. (Aufführung) performance; (im Kino) showing; 
  eine   schwache ~   geben  (fig)  perform badly 4. (das 
  Bekanntmachen) introduction 5. (Präsentation) presentation 
  6. (bei Bewerbung) interview.
39
                 
 
 
Already we can see the way in which ‘Vorstellung’ moves in not one, but two directions.  
 
Firstly, that which becomes assigned to a process of mental representation, ‘idea’. And  
 
second, that which reveals the action of ‘placing in front of one’, that which is perceived:  
 
‘showing’ or ‘presenting’. It is precisely this dual aspect of Vorstellung which has led 
 
to so much contention amongst translators of Schopenhauer. For does one pursue  
 
Schopenhauer through the concept of ‘idea’, knowing that the author only uses the German  
 
Idee
40
 with reference to the Platonic Idea with a capital ‘I’? Or does one try to avoid all such  
 
confusion, and appeal directly to Immanuel Kant’s repraesentatio
41
 as in the case of the  
 
French and Italian versions of Die Welt, not to mention  E.F.J. Payne’s own 1958 translation?   
 
Yet it soon becomes apparent with further translations of Die Welt, that there is still  
                                                                                                                                       
38 Richard E. Aquila, in his 2008 translation of Die Welt, opts for the seemingly less abstract 
construction of !presentation" see, Schopenhauer, A. The World as Will and Presentation, Vol 1., trans. 
Aquila, R.E.(2008) New York: Pearson Education Inc.    
39 Concise Oxford Duden German Dictionary, Third Edition (2005) Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
40 “My readers know that I accept the word Idea (Idee) only in its original Platonic sense, and that I have 
throughly discussed it especially in the third book of my chief work [Die Welt]. The French and English 
on the other hand, attach to the words idée or idea a very ordinary yet perfectly definite and distinct 
meaning. When, however, anyone speaks to the Germans about Ideas (Ideen), especially when the 
word is pronounced Uedähen their heads begin to swim, all reflectiveness forsakes them, and they feel 
as if they were about to go up in a balloon.” Schopenhauer, A., The Fourfold Root of the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason, trans. E.F.J. Payne (1974) La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 167-168.         
41 “We are not so lacking in terms properly suited to each species of representation that we have need 
for one to encroach on the property of another. Here is their progression: The genus is representation 
in general (repraesentatio). Under it stands the representation with consciousness (perceptio). A 
perception that refers to the subject as a modification of its state is a sensation (sensatio); an objective 
perception is a cognition (cognitio).” Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Guyer, P. and Wood, A.W. 
(2000) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 398-399. See also glossary for a working definition of 
!Vorsellung" as !representation", 765.     
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unaccounted movement taking place underneath the somewhat overextended veil of  
 
‘representation’. Richard E. Aquila’s translation feels itself obliged to prepare the reader  
 
for what is yet again a revised position in response to ‘Vorstellung’, moving its identity  
 
towards the less theoretical ‘presentation’.Moreover, Aquila is prepared to discuss a further  
 
hindrance often unappreciated in response to ‘Vorstellung’, namely, that relating to its  
 
category as a ‘concept’. For as the introduction to the Aquila translation so eloquently  
 
captures, ‘Vorstellung’ is in actual fact not a ‘concept’ but rather what the German denotes as  
 
a ‘Begriff’: 
 
 
  [...] I am aware that the concept of “concept” does not correspond 
  exactly to the German Begriff, and neither does “idea”). Thus  
  even “the very best translation will at most be related to the original 
  as the transposition of a piece of music into another key is to a given 
  piece itself”; and as Schopenhauer adds, “those who understand music 
  know what that means.”
42
   
 
 
 
So, in order to present to the reader the semblance of a philosophical concept, it would appear  
 
that the ‘tonality’ which ‘Vorstellung’ carries has to be significantly weakened. It is within  
 
this tonal shift, largely imperceptible to the ears of the philosophical readership, that we  
 
witness the ‘Begriff’ taking on a ‘performative’ aspect. As our dictionary entry makes clear,  
 
‘Vorstellung’ can be used both in relation to ‘showing’ and to ‘performance’. Therefore if the  
 
primary constituent of Vorstellung ‘vor|stellen’ literally meaning “placing before” can be  
 
accessed on a much more rudimentary level, ‘Vorstellung’ itself need not only allude to a  
 
vexed physiological process located deep in human consciousness, but simply to a “theatrical  
 
presentation”
43
. For if Beckett was reading Schopenhauer “ with an entire indifference to the  
 
apriori forms of verification” one would assume, he would be quite happy to leave the  
 
philosophers squabbling amongst themselves as how to conceptualize ‘Vorstellung’.
44
 Indeed  
                                                
42 Schopenhauer, A., The World as Will and Presentation, Vol 1.op.cit. Preface to translation, Kossler, 
M,[viii].   
43 For an outline of the common usage of !Vorstellung" in a theatrical context see, The World as Will and 
Presentation., op.cit., [xiii-xiv].   
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much of the consternation which many translators experience with Schopenhauer’s  
 
‘Vorstellung’ derives largely from its unwillingness to stay in one place at any given moment: 
 
i.e.simultaneously ‘representing’, and being that which is ‘represented’. Whereas from  
 
Beckett’s own aesthetic view point, this would in fact provide a new context in which the  
 
stage, and the action represented upon the stage, could itself articulate ‘Vorstellung’ without  
 
ever needing to appeal to an intransigent vocabulary. Beckett, having now access to  
 
Schopenhauer in the original German, would inhabit a very different space to one he had  
 
previously been occupying in relation to his French translation.
45
 For now, he would escape  
 
the characteristically flat descriptive profile of ‘représentation’ and instead encounter a  
 
philosophy not only raised in response to a representing subject, but the world in which the  
 
subject was being represented.
46
  As Beckett would appreciate in the context of  
 
Schopenhauer’s ‘Begriff’, the representative aspect of ‘Vorstellung’ and the participatory  
 
aspect, that which is staged in front of the representing subject, are articulated  
 
simultaneously.
47
  
 
When Beckett enthuses in September 1937 “I always knew he was one of the ones that  
 
mattered most to me, and it is pleasure more real than any pleasure for a long time to begin to  
 
understand as to why it is so”, such feeling cannot simply be pointing to the rediscovery of  
 
Schopenhauer’s pessimism, or indeed his abiding view of the world being predicated on  
 
‘suffering’. Though clearly important to Beckett, the pessimism per se would have already  
                                                                                                                                       
44Schopenhauer at times uses !Vorstellung" to convey what he himself describes as an “exceedingly 
complicated physiological process in the brain of an animal, the results of which is the consciousness of 
a picture there.” see, W.W.R.1., [ix].   
45 !These !Werke" are the six volumes of the Sämmtliche Werke, edited by Julius Frauenstädt (Leipzig: 
F.A. Brockhaus, 2nd ed., 1923)" which as Mark Nixon points out are still among the books held in 
Beckett"s surviving private library. See, Van Hulle, D., and Nixon, M., Samuel Beckett!s Library (2013) 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 144.      
46 Due to the fact that Beckett was reading from a French translation of Die Welt whilst studying in Paris, 
he did not encounter the usual problem of having to navigate the two !Ideas" of Haldane and Kemp"s 
translation. Firstly the !idea" of !Vorstellung" (which as a result of a publishing error never carried the 
intended lower case !i"). And secondly the Platonic Idea. Instead Beckett had at hand the much more 
pragmatic stamp of !représentation" which  to the benefit of French readers established a clear division 
between !Vorstellung" and Idea.                
47 ”Our knowing consciousness, appearing as outer and inner sensibility (receptivity), as understanding 
and as faculty of reason (Vernunft), is divisible into subject and object, and contains nothing else. To be 
object for the subject and to be our representation or mental picture are the same thing. All our 
representations are objects of the subject, and all objects of the subject are our representations.” 
Schopenhauer, A., The Fourfold Root, op.cit., 41-42.  
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been assimilated through his French copy of Die Welt. It would seem, as the letter is  
 
implying, Beckett’s renewed excitement towards Schopenhauer is in fact more to do with  
 
style than with content.  
 
Reading Die Welt in the original German clearly would not have changed Beckett’s overall  
 
understanding of the general themes and ideas running through the work; what would have  
 
changed though would be the grammatical and expressive space in which they were located.  
 
It is this notion of Beckett, being able to retrieve ‘Vorstellung’ from within the newly  
 
considered framework of the original German that I personally believe has a crucial bearing  
 
on his decision to look to the theatre as a means of resolving many of the representational  
 
 issues  he felt unable to address in the genre of the novel: 
 
 
 Mrs W. Words fail us. 
 Mrs D. Now this is where a writer for the stage would have us  
              speak no doubt. 
                                    (H.W. Act. 1., 160.)              
  
 
 
If Beckett’s changing appreciation of ‘Vorstellung’ does indeed bring about a renewed focus  
 
and urgency towards the theatre, then one would naturally expect to see such an important  
 
adjustment taking shape in Beckett’s own writing.  
 
 
Dr Johnson’s Improbable Lodger.    
 
 
In fact we need only look as far as his abandoned theatrical piece Human Wishes
48
, which we  
 
now know through documented evidence was composed during the same period, in which we  
 
find Beckett knee-deep in the works of Schopenhauer. As James Knowlson identifies in his  
 
authorized biography Damned to Fame, Beckett “had been interested in Dr Johnson for many  
 
years.”
49
 But the idea of sitting down to write an actual play about him and Mrs Thrale
50
  
                                                
48 Beckett!s first intended full length play Human Wishes, the title of which is derived from Samuel 
Johnson!s Juvenalian satire The Vanity of Human Wishes. The unfinished play which survives only as 
fragments centres upon Johnson!s household in 1781 and 1784 in Bolt Court Fleetstreet, see, 
Knowlson, J., Damned to Fame, The Life of Samuel Beckett (1996) London: Bloomsbury Publishing plc, 
269. 
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seems to have occurred to him only during the late summer of 1936, before he left for  
 
Germany, or even in Germany itself.”
51
 To my mind, knowing that there is clear overlap  
 
between Beckett’s deep immersion in Schopenhauer
52
 and his devised stage play Human  
 
Wishes, would suggest as a project the two are not unrelated. Intriguingly it transpires that in  
 
preparation for his trip to Germany, Beckett had set himself the task of translating Johnson’s  
 
‘Lord Chesterfield letter
53
’ into German (or as Knowlson  adds, it could simply be he copied  
 
an existing German translation of the Chesterfield letter).
54
 Whether Beckett was solely  
 
involved in a translation exercise testing the proficiency of his German, or actually looking to  
 
impart a German sensibility to his reading of Johnson, is unclear.
55
 What remains undisputed  
 
though, is that Beckett’s own personal empathy and fascination towards Johnson rested  
 
mainly upon his ailing persona as a writer. As Knowlson remarks “The manuscript notes and  
 
his letters to his friends show Beckett grappling with two rather different themes: the love of  
 
Johnson for Mrs Thrale; but also the image of Johnson in decline, physically ill, and morbidly  
 
preoccupied with his own physical deterioration, death and dying.”
56
 Namely the same themes  
 
which are at play in Schopenhauer’s own writing. A character like Johnson who, as Beckett  
 
describes constantly reflected upon death “dreading-to-go to bed, praying-for-the dead, past  
 
living, terrified of dying, terrified of deadness” provides in many ways the quintessential  
 
cover for Schopenhauer’s animal metaphysicum:
57
 
                                                                                                                                       
49 As James Knowlson confirms in his biography, a letter from Beckett to Thomas McGreevy dated 5th 
June 1936,  in which he discusses his progress on the “Johnson project”, was wrongly dated by Beckett 
and from internal evidence was clearly written on the 5th June 1937, see, Ibid., 755.   
50 Mrs Hester Thrale, Dr Johnson!s  constant companion, diarist, and author of Anecdotes of the Late 
Samuel Johnson, written alongside her own diary entries, forms the basis of Beckett!s own research into 
Johnson!s life: “There won!t be anything snappy or wisecracking about the Johnson play if it is ever 
written. It isn!t Boswell!s wit and wisdom machine that means anything to me, but the miseries he never 
talked of[...”] see, Ibid., 270.      
51 Knowlson, J., Damned to Fame, op.cit., 269.   
52 see Knowlson, J., Damned to Fame, 268 and 271.  
53 Lord Chesterfield Friday 7 February 1755: My Lord: I have been lately informed by the proprietor of 
the World[...] see, The Letters of Samuel Johnson Vol 1: 1731-1772, ed., Redford, B. (1992) Oxford: 
Clarendon Press Oxford, 94-97.   
54 A private notebook bought in Dublin in July 1936, shows Beckett reading Johnson in August of that 
year, preparing for his forthcoming trip to Germany[...] Knowlson, J., Damned to Fame., 755.   
55 "Of Johnson!s early foreboding about Piozzi (in July 1781) Beckett notes in German “Hier Anfang, 
wenn nicht mit dem Tode Thrales, April desselben Jahres.” See Cohn, R., Just Play: Beckett!s Theater 
(1980) Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 154.    
56 Knowlson, J., Damned to Fame, op.cit., 270. 
57 Ibid, 270.  
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  Only after the inner being of nature (the will-to-live in its  
 objectification)  has ascended vigorously and cheerfully through the two spheres of  
 unconscious beings, and then through the long broad series of animals, does it  
 finally attain to reflection for the first time with the appearance of reason  
  (Vernunft), that is, in man. It then marvels at its own works, and asks itself  
  what it itself is. And its wonder is the more serious, as here for the first time  
  it stands consciously face to face with death, and besides the finiteness of all  
  existence, the vanity and fruitlessness of all efforts force themselves on it  
  more or less. Therefore with this reflection and astonishment arises the need  
  for metaphysics that is peculiar to man alone; accordingly, he is an animal  
  metaphysicum.   
                            (W.W.R.2., 160.) 
 
 
It is this depiction of Johnson living each and every day in the face of death whilst issuing his  
 
prayerful meditations, which undoubtedly would have reinforced in Beckett’s mind the  
 
Schopenhauerian characterization of human consciousness being born out of an awareness of  
 
death. But as we can also see from Schopenhauer’s writing all mortal striving is ultimately  
 
revealed in terms of hollow ‘vanity’. The word ‘vanity’ though not directly appearing in the  
 
title Human Wishes, is always implicit, as a result of Beckett’s borrowing directly from the  
 
title of Johnson’s poem The Vanity of Human Wishes.
58
 It is this emblem of Vanity which I  
 
personally believe does not just issue from Johnson in Beckett’s mind, but equally  
 
importantly, from Schopenhauer.
59
 As we know, during the period of composing Human  
 
Wishes Beckett was not only reading Die Welt, but also the essays which Schopenhauer wrote  
 
in support of his main work. Often caustic and immensely witty, the appeal of such essays to  
 
Beckett would inevitably lie in the way in which Schopenhauer’s philosophy unapologetically  
 
partakes of a style which consciously takes leave of abstract considerations. One particular  
 
essay that I believe has significant relevance to Human Wishes is the essay entitled  
 
‘Additional Remarks on the Doctrine of the Vanity of Existence’
60
. Along with its sister  
                                                
58 “Vanity of” Johnson!s poem See, Cohn, R., Just Play, op.cit., 159.   
59
 In Helen Zimmern’s biography Arthur Schopenhauer (the first comprehensive English biography 
published in 1876) she includes a letter of Schopenhauer’s addressed to the bookseller and publisher 
Carl Friedrich Ernst Frommann which explicitly links the word ‘vanity’ to the phrase ‘human wishes’. 
DEAR SIR, I must, perforce, furnish a commentary to the chapter “On the vanity of human intentions 
and wishes.” Zimmern, H., Arthur Schopenhauer: His Life and His Philosophy (1876) London: 
Longmans, Green and Co, 52.     
60 Schopenhauer, A. Parerga and Paralipomena Vol 2, trans. Payne, E.F.J. (2000) Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 283-290.  
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chapter ‘On the Vanity and Suffering of Life in Die Welt’, I strongly suspect the unspoken  
 
‘vanity’ in the title of Beckett’s abandoned play is a direct signal to this same extended  
 
survey.
61
 We need only read the Die Welt chapter in order to appreciate the extent to which  
 
Beckett would later in his artistic career push deeper into the integral fabric of  
 
Schopenhauer’s prose:
62
 
 
 
  Awakened to life out of the night of unconsciousness, the will finds  
  itself as an individual in an endless and boundless world, among innume 
  -rable individuals, all striving, suffering and erring; and, as if though a  
  troubled dream, it hurries back to the old unconsciousness. Yet till then  
  its desires are unlimited, its claims inexhaustible, and every satisfied desire  
  gives birth to a new one. No possible satisfaction in the world could suffice  
  to still its craving, set a final goal to its demands, and fill the bottomless pit  
  of its heart. In this connexion, let us now consider what as a rule comes to  
  man in satisfactions of any kind; it is often nothing more than the bare  
  maintenance of this very existence, extorted daily with unremitting effort  
  and constant care in conflict with misery and want, and with death in  
  prospect. Everything in life proclaims that earthly happiness is destined  
  to be frustrated, or recognized as an illusion. 
                                                               (W.W.R.2, 573) 
 
 
As the passage unfolds we can instantly gain a sense of how the world on show in  
 
Schopenhauer’s writing served as an imaginative refuge for Beckett, in whose identity he  
 
could seek a unique solace throughout his time as a novelist and playwright.
63
 Though what is  
 
particularly striking from a purely aesthetic view point, is the way in which Schopenhauer  
 
captures the conscious identity not just reflecting on its suffering, but being itself an  
 
expression of that very suffering. Schopenhauer’s opening description appears to break down  
 
any distinction between consciousness and willful suffering, both seemingly occupying    
                                                
61 The essay itself was designed specifically by Schopenhauer to be read alongside On the Vanity and 
Suffering of Life chapter in his chief work, hence it comprises part of the Paralipomena (matters omitted 
from the main work and added as a supplement) making up Schopenhauer!s Parerga (supplementary 
works) und Paralipomena, see introduction Ibid Vol 1.op.cit., xi.     
62 It is in this same chapter where we locate the most probable source of Pozzo!s famous remark:  
“They give birth astride of a grave, the light gleams an instant, then it!s night once more.” (W.G, 82.) 
“Lessing admired the understanding of his son. Because this son had absolutely declined to come into 
this world, he had to be dragged forcibly into life by means of forceps; but hardly was he in it, when he 
again hurried away from it” W.W.R.2., 579.       
  
63 “He!s reading Schopenhauer these days[...]” see, Charles Juliet in conversation with Bram van Velde: 
August 29, 1972, Juliet, C., Conversations with Samuel Beckett and Bram van Velde (2009) Champaign 
and London: Dalkey Archive Press, 92.  
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the same movement and space. In this sense what is being portrayed is the actual movement  
 
of conscious thought, taking its cue from ‘suffering’. It is the way in which the conscious  
 
identity moves in relation to suffering, and the manner in which ‘suffering’ creates within  
 
itself a space which is constrained neither by body or mind, that I personally suspect Beckett  
 
himself judged as an incredible, ‘poetic’ feat. So, rather than think of Beckett’s assessment of  
 
‘suffering’ in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, as merely supportive of an acutely pessimistic  
 
view towards the world, we should instead think of the way in which a particular model of  
 
suffering, that which is represented by the ‘Will’ opens up onto a potentially new aesthetic  
 
front. It is precisely in this idea of Beckett, taking from Schopenhauer his own radical cue  
 
(“Like suddenly a window opened on a fug”) moving both the novel, and - in the  
 
context of our discussion of ‘Vorstellung’ - the play, towards a new expression capable of  
 
overriding the standard emotive register currently in the service of both prose fiction and the  
 
theatre.
64
 Before we overstep the mark, and start referring directly to the stage direction of  
 
Endgame or Not I, we should return to 1937, to Human Wishes and to Schopenhauer’s ‘On  
 
Vanity and Suffering’. 
 
Having spoken about what is implicit in the title of Human Wishes, can anything be said  
 
about what is explicit?  It seems to me, that, if one were now to consider the question of  
 
what Schopenhauer actually meant by will with a capital W, then I suggest that  
 
‘Human Wishes’ does in fact capture with supreme economy the essential requisite behind the  
 
‘Will’s’ acquisition of a conscious identity.
65
 The ‘Will’ as Schopenhauer presents it is not  
 
a faculty which falls under the instruction of human intelligence, or indeed of any living  
 
                                                
64 One need only to contrast the disembodied characterization of the !subject" in The Unnamable (“...I 
could quite easily at any moment, literally any, run foul of a wall, a tree or similar obstacle, which of 
course it would be prohibited to circumvent, and thereby have an end put to my gyrations as effectively 
as by the cramp just mentioned. But obstacles, it appears can be removed in the fullness of time, but not 
by me, me they would stop dead for ever, If I lived among them. But even without such aids it seems to 
me that once beyond the equator you would start turning inwards again out of sheer necessity. I 
somehow have that feeling.”) with that of the opening paragraph of On the Vanity and Suffering of Life in 
order to appreciate just how much Beckett was attempting to bring to the page the same kind of space 
and movement he was encountering in  Schopenhauer: see, U., 319.     
65 For reasons of consistency once we leave the introduction to this thesis Schopenhauer"s !Will" will be 
presented as !will" due to the constant referral in the preceding chapters to E.F.J. Payne"s translation of 
Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.      
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individual. It remains undivided and participates blindly in all of life as a whole. So, as we  
 
can see this is most certainly not the ‘will’ of individual human agency, the kind which Sartre  
 
or Beaufret would recognize. In fact the identity of Schopenhauer’s ‘Will’ is just as capable  
 
of resisting conceptual treatment as ‘Vostellung’. The ‘Will’ is both representative of all  
 
existence and at the same time beyond representation itself. It is the inner reality which we all  
 
have access to, and yet at the same time is inexplicable.  As Schopenhauer sets out with his  
 
usual poetic facility: 
 
 
   
 
             For in everything in nature there is something to which no ground can ever  
  be assigned, for which no explanation is possible, and no further cause is to 
  sought. This something is the specific mode of the thing’s action, in other 
  words, the very manner of its existence, its being or true essence. Of course, 
  of each particular effect of the thing a cause can be demonstrated, from which 
  it follows that it was bound to act at that particular time and place, but never a 
  cause of its acting in general and precisely in the given way. If it has no other 
  qualities, if it is a mote
66
 in a sunbeam, it still exhibits that unfathomable some- 
  thing, at any rate as weight and impenetrability. But this, I say, is to the mote 
  what man’s will is to a man; and, like the human will, it is in its inner nature 
  not subject to explanation; indeed, it is in itself identical with this will. 
                                                                                                 (W.W.R.1, 124.)         
     
   
Without for the moment venturing too far in the direction of the ‘Will’s’ Kantian inheritance,  
 
something which will receive full due attention in a later chapter, it is enough to say for now  
 
that Schopenhauer actually drew no distinction between Immanuel Kant’s Ding an sich  
 
(thing-in-itself) and his own Wille. Though in  Schopenhauer’s view there was one substantial  
 
omission with regard to its philosophical profile: that which referred to its inner nature, its  
 
inner movement peculiar to itself; or as Schopenhauer himself puts it, the what of the  
 
phenomenon.
67
  It is this what which Schopenhauer restores to Kant’s Ding an sich that  
                                                
66 “Here he was not free, but a mote in the dark of absolute freedom[...] in the will-lessness, a mote in its 
absolute freedom.” Beckett, S. Murphy (2003) London: John Calder (Publishers) Ltd., 66. As we can see 
Beckett!s famous line from the sixth chapter in Murphy is specifically drawn from Die Welt in which the 
freedom to which Beckett is alluding to does not feature in Murphy!s own calculation towards himself as 
an individual, but rather that envisaged by Schopenhauer!s "Will! which is the location and source of the 
only freedom, “absolute freedom”. W.W.R.1., 124.             
67 “What is the use of explanations that lead back ultimately to something just as unknown as the first 
problem was? In the end, do we understand more about the inner nature of these natural forces than 
about these forces [gravitation, cohesion, impenetrability] than about the inner nature of animals? Is not 
one just as hidden and unexplored as the other? Unfathomable, because it is groundless, because it is 
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ultimately brings us in view of the ‘Will’. But as Schopenhauer implies, as soon as we  
 
attempt to bring a concept to hand in order to frame the ‘Will’s’ reality, then we immediately  
 
renounce the only immediate knowledge we have of what.
68
 So, even in the event of finding  
 
ourselves in what’s company, we would still have nothing to report. One can instantly see  
 
why the likes of Beaufret would scoff at the suggestion that Schopenhauer’s proposal  
 
amounted to anything like a serious philosophy, especially when the emerging priority of  
 
philosophy in the 20th century was itself trained upon individual subjective freedom. But  
 
despite what is admittedly a somewhat simplified schema of Schopenhauer’s ‘Will’ designed  
 
for the purpose of this introduction, it does in fact reveal something important about the  
 
essential character of Die Welt: that the ‘Will’ in relation to Schopenhauer’s work constitutes  
 
the very core and focus of his writing. And yet as he openly confesses at the beginning of his  
 
book it is not something he can ever bring into view of the reader. From a modern  
 
philosophical stance, the ‘Will’ would have undoubtedly courted little interest, but from an  
 
aesthetic standpoint we could say it is everything Beckett is looking for. For is this not the  
 
actual canvas on which he insists van Velde pick up his brush? 
69
  
     
 
  B.--- The situation is that of him [van Velde] who is help-less,  
  cannot act, in the event cannot paint, since he is obliged to 
  paint. The act is of him who, helpless, unable to act, acts, in 
  the event paints since he is obliged to paint.
70
 
                                                                      
  
 
As we have established already, the freedom in the context of the ‘Will’ does not transfer  
 
across to the individual, while at the same time it constitutes the reality of all individuals. We  
 
                                                                                                                                       
the content, the what of the phenomenon, which can never be referred to the form of the phenomenon, 
to the how,”[...], W.W.R.1., 125.    
68 “If, on the other hand, we subsume the concept of Will under that of force, as has been done hitherto, 
we renounce the only immediate knowledge of the inner nature of the world that we have, since we let it 
disappear in a concept abstracted from the phenomenon, with which therefore we can never pass 
beyond the phenomenon.” W.W.R.1., 112.      
69 Bram (Abraham Gerarldus) van Velde, Dutch artist living in Paris at the time of Beckett!s own 
residency in  the 1930!s. The two became very close friends “He!s [Beckett] not like me. He uses words. 
Words are powerful. I haven!t even that.” , see Conversations with Samuel Beckett and Bram van 
Velde,op.cit., 94.         
70 Beckett, S., Proust and Three Dialogues with Georges Duthuit (1999) Canada: John Calder 
(Publishers) Ltd., 119.  
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are all ultimately an act of freedom, but as individuals we have no say in such freedom. As  
 
Beckett remarks “The act is of him who, helpless, unable to act (that is as an individual) acts,  
 
in the event paints since he is obliged to paint.” Bram van Velde is obliged to paint because  
 
he is that act which brings about the painting in the first place, he is in terms of Beckett’s own  
 
description, the ‘act’ which remains outside the possibility of individual action. In other  
 
words, he is obliged to ‘act’ because he is that ‘act’ but as an individual he can claim no  
 
authorship over such action. As soon as we position the Duthuit dialogue within the context  
 
of Schopenhauer’s ‘Will’ there emerges a startling continuity. It is as if we are now party to  
 
Beckett’s own description of the ‘artist’ having to confront the full implications of  
 
Schopenhauer’s ‘Will’ in which the realm of willful action ceases to correspond to individual  
 
creative expression
71
.  Asked “Why is he helpless to paint?” by the art critic and Gallery  
 
owner Georges Duthuit
72
, Beckett replies “ Because there is nothing to paint and nothing to  
 
paint with.”
73
 Again as we can see in this answer there is no incongruity with Schopenhauer’s  
 
assertion towards the idea that the “what of the phenomenon” can never be referred to the  
 
“form of the phenomenon”. It therefore begs the question, if one were to bring such a view  
 
of the world into one’s art, where would the possibility of art arise? In the event of having  
 
ruled out willful action, i.e. the ‘act’, the only other possible area left to look must be  
 
(continuing in the language of the Duthuit dialogue) in the ‘act’ of the ‘non-act’. But as we  
 
will later discover further into the thesis ‘not’ to ‘act’ in the context of Schopenhauer’s  
 
philosophy is by no means an easy proposition. What I hope this examination of the Duthuit  
 
dialogue illustrates is just how deeply Schopenhauer’s writing has filtered through to  
 
Beckett’s own estimation of himself as a fully entrenched ‘artist’.
74
 It shows during one of  
 
Beckett’s most active and productive periods
75
 (in which he composed his first complete stage  
                                                
71 “Among those whom we call great artists, I can think of none whose concern was not predominantly 
with his expressive possibilities, those of his vehicle, those of humanity. The assumption underlying all 
painting is that the domain of the maker is the domain of the feasible[...] Ibid, 120    
72 “A personal sympathy developed between the two men that encouraged Beckett to talk very openly 
about his feelings as well as ideas to Duthuit, who over the period from 1948 to 1952, seems to have 
taken on Tom McGreevy!s role as Beckett!s main confident.”, see Damned to Fame, op.cit., 371.      
73 Beckett, S., Proust and Three Dialogues, op.cit., 120.   
74 A letter to Duthuit shows that he recognized that this was very much his [Beckett!s] interpretation of 
what van Velde was doing and was perhaps closer to his own feelings than to those of Bram., see 
Damned to Fame, op.cit., 775. 
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play Eleutheria, whilst at the same time sketching what will later become En attendant  
 
Godot, along with the bedridden peregrinations of Molloy in his Trilogy) that Schopenhauer  
 
does not just join a vast compendium of philosophical references, but is present in the very  
 
marrow of Beckett’s own aesthetic calculations.    
 
Having covered what can be described as the unfathomable aspect of Schopenhauer’s ‘Will’ it  
 
is just as important to identify its most immediate organic outward expression in  the form of  
 
Wille zum Leben or ‘will-to-life’.
76
 Put simply, the unabated desire in all living things to  
 
perpetuate the existence of the species.
77
 As Schopenhauer remarks, “The ultimate aim of all  
 
love-affairs, whether played in sock or in buskin, is actually more important than all other  
 
aims in man’s life; and therefore is quite worthy of the profound seriousness with which  
 
everyone pursues it. What it decides by it is nothing less than the composition of the next  
 
generation. The dramatis personae who will appear when we have retired from the scene are  
 
determined, according to their existence and their disposition, by these very frivolous love- 
 
affairs.”
78
 In summing up the outward movement of the ‘Will’ Schopenhauer himself creates  
 
for himself a specific palette of descriptive terms amongst which the most liberally applied  
 
throughout Die Welt are: ‘desire’, ‘act’ ‘hunger’, ‘thirst’, ‘drive’ , ‘impulse’ ‘wants’, ‘pains’,  
 
‘motives’, ‘force’ , ‘passions’ and ‘wishes’. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
75 see, Ibid, 365, 371-372. 
76 “[...] I should be misunderstood by anyone who thought that ultimately it was all the same whether we 
expressed this essence-in-itself of all phenomena by the word will or by any other word. This would be 
the case if this thing-in-itself were something whose existence we merely inferred, and thus knew only 
indirectly and merely in the abstract. Then certainly we could call it what we liked; the name would stand 
merely as a symbol of an unknown quantity. But the word will, which like a magic word, is to reveal to us 
the innermost essence[...]”, see, W.W.R.1., 111.   
77 As Christopher Janaway emphases:  “ The whole body is will in that it manifests the means of 
securing ends for the organism. The body, and each part and function within it, is an expression of the 
will to life!, Wille zum Leben. Often this term is translated as "will to live! (or will-to-live!, as E.F.J.Payne 
has it). But the translation is misleading (a) because it implicitly excludes the drive to reproduce life, and 
hence towards sexual behavior[...] and (b) because it lets in the wrong assumption that Schopenhauer is 
talking about a conscious desire [...] see, Janaway, C., The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer 
(1999) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 8-9.       
78 W.W.R.2., 534. As we can see clearly this passage captures vividly the manner in which 
Schopenhauer himself evokes the movement and language of the stage in order to frame the underlying 
motivation of the "Will! in the human "species!. We can also see that affairs of the heart such as those of 
Johnson for Mrs Thrale, need not in a Schopenhauerian sense be separated from matters relating to 
suffering and death.  
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  All willing springs from lack, from deficiency, and thus from suffering. 
  Fulfillment brings this to an end; yet for one wish that is fulfilled there 
  remain at least ten that are denied. Further, desiring lasts a long time, 
  demands and requests go on to infinity; fulfillment is short and meted 
  out sparingly. But even the final satisfaction itself is only apparent;  
  the wish fulfilled at once makes way for a new one; the former is a  
  known delusion, the latter a delusion not as yet known. 
                                                                                W.W.R.1., 196. 
 
  
        
So, when it comes to the most demonstrative expression of Schopenhauer’s ‘Will’, its  
 
identity, as we can observe, plays in the very same key as the Johnsonian title of Beckett’s  
 
abandoned play; Human Wishes. It is Beckett’s  aesthetic judgement towards both the ‘Will’  
 
and ‘Vorstellung’ which, I believe, is the primary motivation in his overall attempts to  
 
reconnect to the potentiality of the ‘play’: namely, that something as inexplicable as the ‘Will’  
 
can, through a dramatic rendering of boredom  and suffering, be given direct access to  
 
‘Vorstellung’ via the theatre. The ‘play
79
’ itself can serve as an extended manifestation of the  
 
wilful ‘desire’ bent upon the ‘artist’s’  need to ‘represent’. But, like all desire  
 
(which ultimately equates with suffering),  in a Schopenhauerian context it has to be  
 
weakened without ever having the prospect of its being destroyed outright.
80
 In this sense we  
 
can view the portrayal of  boredom and suffering as an attempt to turn the whole dramatic  
 
process against itself in order , momentarily, to reach a space in which art can be legitimately  
 
reinstated.
81
 So, despite only one act of Human Wishes surviving intact, placed alongside the  
 
McGreevy extract,  it has the potential to reveal the full depth of Beckett’s reading of  
 
Schopenhauer as a rationale for an aesthetic which could lead him out from  
 
under Joyce’s creative shadow
82
; an aesthetic, in which artistic ‘impotence’
83
 and ‘ignorance’  
                                                
79 Indeed one could equally consider the novel as an extended manifestation of willful desire to give vent 
to artistic representation, but unlike the !play" it is unable to enact the essential aspect of !Vorstellung" in 
terms of a !placing in front of one, a !show".   
80 This bind will be explored fully in the subsequent chapters of the thesis.  
81 “It is fortunate enough when something to desire and to strive for still remains, so that the game may 
be kept up of the constant transition from desire to satisfaction, and from that to a fresh desire, the rapid 
course of which is called happiness, the slow course sorrow, and so that this game may not come to a 
standstill, showing itself as a fearful, life-destroying boredom, a lifeless longing without a definite object, 
a deadening languour.” W.W.R.1., 164. Reading this passage one is clearly put in mind of a similar 
!game" set in play in Endgame.          
82 “[...] Joyce was a superb manipulator of material - perhaps the greatest. He was making words do the 
absolute maximum of work. There isn"t a syllable that"s superfluous. The kind of work I do is one which 
I"m not master of my material.[...] I"m working with impotence, ignorance. I don"t think impotence has 
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replaces the ambition of artistic omniscience. Crucially, from Beckett’s own perspective, the  
 
work of art becomes a space (the space of stage or text) situated as far as possible from the  
 
emotive reach of willful ‘action.’.
84
  
 
 
Tying Up Some Loose Ends.    
      
 
As a result of being able to identify the creative proximity between Beckett’s intense  
 
absorption of Schopenhauer and his attempts to embark upon a full-length play relating to his  
 
research on Johnson, we can now, as readers, see the way in which the dialogue of the  
 
surviving fragment actually creates for itself a comparable aesthetic space to the one  
 
encountered in Schopenhauer’s writing: 
 
 
  
 Mrs W. You are knotting, Madam, I perceive. 
 
 Mrs D. That is so Madam. 
 
 Mrs W. What? 
 
 Mrs D. I am knotting, my dear Madam, a mitten. 
 
 Mrs W. Ha! 
 
 Mrs D. The second of a pair. 
 
 Silence. 
 
 Mrs W. What book, young woman? 
 
Silence. 
 
 Mrs W. (loudly). I say, WHAT BOOK? 
 
                                                                                                                                       
been exploited in the past.”, Shenker, I., “Moody Man of Letters” Interview with Beckett, New York Times 
(6th May 1956), 3.           
83 The creative impotence of the individual in the broad Schopenhauerian scheme has its tragicomic 
embodiment in Beckett!s own characterization of Johnson “ What interests me above all is the condition 
of the Platonic gigolo [Dr Johnson] or house friend [to Mrs Thrale], with not a testicle, auricle or ventricle 
to stand on when the bluff is called. His impotence was mollified by Mrs Thrale so long as Thrale was 
there, then suddenly exasperated when the licensed mendula was in the connubial position for the first 
time for years, thanks to rigor mortis.” see, Damed to Fame, op.cit., 269.        
84 When one considers the dramatic stasis of Blind Mrs Williams meditating, Miss Carmichael reading 
and Mrs Desmoulins knitting. (even Johnson!s cat Hodge is sleeping (if possible)) it would seem Beckett 
is deliberately positioning his stage characters in such a way as to create a space of minimized 
theatrical action, see Beckett, S., Disjecta (1983) London: John Calder (Publishers) Ltd., 155.         
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 Miss C. Upon my soul, Madam, your perceptions are very fine, 
              very fine indeed, uncommonly fine in all respects. 
 
 Mrs W. I may be old, I may be blind, halt and maim, I may be 
              dying of a pituitous defluxion, but my hearing is unim- 
              paired.        
                      (H.W., 155-156.) 
   
                                                                
 
 
On the surface, one could quite easily assume that what Beckett has written stands for little  
 
more than a conversation marked by the utmost tedium; three women desperate to stave off  
 
boredom. For boredom itself is undeniably an important part of Beckett’s own aesthetic. But  
 
as soon as we begin to question why Beckett should resort to the term ‘knotting’ as opposed  
 
to ‘knitting’ it becomes apparent, from a Schopenhauerian perspective, that what is actually  
 
being presented is little short of a dramatic reconstruction of the ‘Will’s’ acquisition of human  
 
consciousness.
85
 “I perceive” is in many ways the same conscious stirrings as those which are  
 
ushered in through the opening lines of On the Vanity of suffering and Life “Awakened to life  
 
out of the night of unconscious”. Also as we can see, with extraordinary economy, Beckett  
 
has in play both the identity of Schopenhauer’s ‘Will’ (What?) and ‘Vorstellung’ (I perceive).  
 
It is true to say though, that much of this argument would lose most if not all of its durability  
 
if it were not for the signature of the ‘Knot’ occurring throughout the first act of Human  
 
Wishes.
86
 For, not only did Beckett ship back home a copy of Die Welt from his German tour,  
 
he shipped back the entire works of Schopenhauer including the very work which  
 
Schopenhauer insists in the preface to Die Welt, should be considered as the true introduction  
 
to his ‘chief work’.
87
 Knowing Beckett’s intense engagement with Schopenhauer during the  
 
time of composing the play, it is almost unthinkable that he would ignore such advice.
88
 And  
                                                
85 This construction of the !Will" acquiring a conscious identity will  be given full recognition in the context 
of Endgame later in the thesis.  
86 N.B. we must not overlook the fact that from a purely naturalistic point of view knotting exists as an 
actual technique of stitching. 
87 See ! Declaring that “although this is not a part of the book [...] it is quite impossible to understand the 
present work properly, and the subject-matter of that essay is always presupposed here as if it were 
included in the book”[...]" Preface to the First Edition W.W.R.1., [xiv].  
88 “In the later parts of that notebook [Beckett"s Whoroscope notebook] we find brief quotations from 
Schopenhauer"s Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grundes [On the Fourfold 
Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason] which Beckett seems to have studied extensively indeed[...]”, 
Pothast, U., The Metaphysical Vision,op.cit., 13.     
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it is for this reason that the image of the ‘knot’ becomes so paramount in the whole  
 
Schopenhauerian construction of Human Wishes. For it is precisely this same image which  
 
Schopenhauer himself exploits in order to articulate the inexplicable relationship between the  
 
‘subject’ designated by the ‘I’ and the World in which the ‘I’ finds itself inextricably bound:  
 
 
             From what can be said, the subject of knowing can never be  
             known or become object of representation. However, we have 
             not merely an outer self knowledge (in sensuous intuitive percep 
             -tion), but also an inner, and yet in consequence of its nature all 
             knowledge presupposes a known and a knower. Thus within us 
             the known as such is not the knower but the willer, the subject  
             of willing, the will[...] Now the identity of the subject of willing  
             with that of knowing by virtue whereof (and indeed necessarily)  
             the word “I” includes and indicates both, is the knot of the  
             world (Weltknoten), and hence inexplicable. For to us only the  
             relations between objects are intelligible; but of these, two can  
             be one only insofar as they are parts of a whole. Here on the  
             other hand, where we are speaking of the subject, the rules for  
             the knowing of the object no longer apply, and an actual identity  
             of the knower with what is known as willing and hence of the  
             subject with the object, is immediately given. But whoever really  
             grasps the inexplicable nature of this identity, will with me call  
             it the miracle “par excellence”. 
                                             (O.T.F.R., 210-212.)                                                                              
         
           
 
Once we grasp the significance of this passage, then I believe we can see just how much of  
 
Human Wishes stands as testimony to Beckett’s own first attempt to create in dramatic form,  
 
a depiction of the ‘Will’s’ attainment of consciousness. As we can see from the exchange  
 
between Mrs Williams and Mrs Desmoulins the ‘knotting’ is in fact aligned to the ‘I’  
 
perceiving:  “ You are knotting Madam, I perceive.”  
 
As soon as we establish this Schopenhauerian foothold, we are now in a position to drawback  
 
the mundane phenomenal surface of blind, cloth-eared harridans to reveal its deeper  
 
Schopenhauerian significance, along with the extraordinary ambition it represents in relation  
 
to Beckett’s own attempts to move the play vertically below the perceivable surface of the  
 
outward performance. By placing The Fourfold Root passage directly alongside the opening  
 
exchange in Human Wishes, we can begin to fully appreciate just how much movement belies  
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the seemingly static outward appearance of the scene.
89
 The ‘what’ in a Schopenhauerian  
 
context as we have already determined furnishes the descriptive core at the centre of the  
 
‘will’ the Ding an sich or thing-in-itself. And as we can see the word ‘what’ is given a  
 
heightened inflection throughout the exchange between Mrs Williams and Mrs Desmoulins:  
 
What? WHAT BOOK?, so, below the textural surface of Mrs Desmoulins’  knitting, we have  
 
the emergence of the inexplicable ‘What-Knot’ that is to say Schopenhauer’s miracle “par  
 
excellence”, in which the outer and inner self emerge as one indivisible whole. As Mrs  
 
Desmoulins retorts, “I am knotting, my dear Madame, a mitten.” 
 
As we can appreciate in a Schopenhauerian context the ‘knotting’ itself is broadcasting the  
 
‘Will’s’ phenomenal appearance into the ‘World’ and it is this knot between ‘World’ and  
 
‘subject’ which is at the centre of Schopenhauer’s miracle “par excellence”. Or we could say  
 
in an attempt to further emphasize the original German setting of the Weltknoten (knot of the  
 
world) it is broadcasting the ‘mitten’ (the middle, or centre 
90
) of  Schopenhauer’s “par  
 
excellence”. For in this one line, which was to be accompanied by the stage action of Mrs  
 
Desmoulins knitting, Beckett is able to deliver both the phenomenal surface bearing upon the  
 
world’s outer reality (literally that which is being heard and seen by the audience), as well as  
 
the ‘What’ pertaining to the inner reality of the ‘Will’ (transmitted through the action of the  
 
knitting itself) in one interwoven gesture. Therefore by allowing the action and words to  
 
move in two directions concurrently, Beckett is attempting – I suspect for the first time - to  
 
reconstruct his own theatrical version of Schopenhauer’s Weltknoten.   
 
If we continue with the exchange, we can even construe that the “mitten” being “second of a  
 
pair” is marking Beckett’s own attempt to reflect both the inner aspect of the ‘Will’, depicted  
 
outside of all phenomenal reference; hence the first mitten’s absence, while the second mitten,  
 
that on which Mrs Desmoulins reports, constitutes the phenomenal aspect of the ‘Will’  
                                                
89 “ I can!t write I!m not low enough.” Juliet, C., Conversations with Samuel Beckett and Bram van Velde, 
op.cit., 93.  
90 “To Spinoza, on the contrary, Will and Intelligence alike, along with the entire material and spiritual 
universe, are but the manifestations of an infinite Substance, which, as infinite, must necessarily be 
manifested in an infinity of ways utterly beyond our comprehension. To Schopenhauer the universe has 
a centre, and that centre is a mere blind impulse.” Zimmern, H., Arthur Schopenhauer, His Life and his 
Philosophy (1876) London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 109.           
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framed by conscious perception. Indeed it is a question of how much further we can locate  
 
our reading of Human Wishes under the immediate surface of the text. For instance, the  
 
tension which arises within a text whose surface is both concealing as well as displaying the  
 
inner movement of a Schopenhauerian subtext, opens up the possibility that, through this  
 
twofold articulation, Beckett can actually position the ‘questions’ (or the What?) as being in  
 
themselves their own ‘answer’; by virtue of the fact that that the ‘what’ is itself a notification  
 
of the Ding an sich.  
 
 Blindness here is another embedded signature of the ‘Will’. Thus the question  
 
which the blind Mrs Williams directs, ascending from soft to loud from interested to urgent,  
 
towards the partially deaf Miss Carmichael: “ what book, young woman? I say WHAT  
 
BOOK? “ is an example of a textural movement which is capable of both carrying the  
 
outward signature of the ‘Will’, (a desire trapped on the phenomenal surface and enmeshed,  
 
for Schopenhauer, between, as he puts it it,  “the where, the when, the why and the whither in  
 
things”),
91
 while below the surface of this question you have the quite different, noumenal  
 
identity of the ‘What’. So, when Mrs Williams asks WHAT BOOK? she is not only asking  
 
the question but also giving the answer; the DING AN SICH BOOK. That is,  both ‘Will’ in  
 
its noumenal sense (answer), and ‘Will’ (desire-wishes) in its phenomenal sense are  
 
represented in the different forms these questions take: i.e both Wille (Will) andVorstellung  
 
(representation). Thus, despite the discarded and incomplete nature of Human Wishes,  
 
this fragment does in fact house the murmur of a completely different approach to spatial  
 
representation in the theatre, one which , via the aesthetic reconstruction of the ‘Will’, has the  
 
potential of reconstituting stage movement. Where now the theatrical presentation  
 
(‘Vorstellung) can have access to a previously unexploited ‘verticality’, enabling the  
 
performance to weaken its attachment to the emotive action, which can no longer correspond  
 
with ‘art’ or the creative process. Through such detachment he can now establish an entirely  
 
different space in which ‘art’ can take legitimate residency. Also, as the thesis will later  
 
                                                
91 see, W.W.R.1., 178. 
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consider, the phenomenal expression of the ‘Will’ appearing, on the sensory level, as  
 
pluralistic and divided, which, when expressed as the Ding an Sich  is undifferentiated,  
 
provides within an theatrical context the possibility of creating a performative space in which  
 
the individual characterization of the subject remains in a state of permeability; allowing one  
 
performance to coexist inside the other.  
 
 
Beckett, Schopenhauer and Philosophy? 
    
 
It is important to remind ourselves that despite much having been previously written on  
 
Beckett’s own philosophical motivation, when we come to look at On Vanity and Suffering  
 
(albeit in translation) it shows what Beckett was accessing was not an impenetrable piece of  
 
esoteric thinking, but something a great deal more immediate; namely an attempt to impart a  
 
voice to the underlying suffering which shapes all conscious identities. What we have in  
 
Schopenhauer is a world whose very nature is capable of summoning any one of Beckett’s  
 
characters, reduced to the bare maintenance of existence, each desperate to call time on the  
 
misery and want which underlies their forced condition. But if we look at the piece as a  
 
whole, we can see that many of the authors and poets which Beckett had already been  
 
strongly attracted to, such as Goethe 
92
 and Leopardi
93
, need not be artificially added to  
 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy as they already cohabit in the thinking of Die Welt.
94
 This in itself  
                                                
92 For instance Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, who Beckett devotes most space to in his notebooks (see 
Nixon, M., Samuel Beckett!s German Diaries, op.cit., 65.) is given consistent praise and recognition 
throughout Schopenhauer!s writing. Also Schopenhauer can be seen to offer a direct link with Goethe, in 
that both had intimate knowledge of each other; the younger taking great pride in his apprenticeship to 
the elder: “As to myself I am Göethe!s personal scholar and first publicly avowed proselyte in the theory 
of colours.” And as to Goethe!s opinion of his young student, in his attempt to dissuade a group of girls 
from teasing him at one of his mother!s salon gatherings  he remarked “ leave that youth in peace; in 
due time he will grow over all our heads.” Ziimmern, H., Arthur Schopenhauer His Life and His 
Philosophy (1876) London: Longmans Green and Co, 61 and 59 respectively.              
93 The Italian poet Giacomo Leopardi , who Beckett strongly admired for his pessimistic address 
towards the world, is evoked by Schopenhauer at the end of On Vanity and Suffering in Die Welt  “But 
no one has treated this subject (the misery of existence) so throughly and exhaustively as Leopardi in 
our own day. He is entirely imbued and penetrated with it; every where his theme is the mockery and 
wretchedness of this existence. He presents it on every page of his works, yet in such a multiplicity of 
forms and applications, with such a wealth of imagery, that he never wearies us, but on the contrary, 
has a diverting and stimulating effect.” W.W.W.2., 588.          
94 “Beside the books mentioned, he liked[...] Goethe, Shakespeare (Polonius" speech to Laertes was his 
guiding star), Calderon, Byron, Burns and Schiller. Of novels he upheld as the best, Don Quixote, 
Tristram Shandy[...] Zimmern, H., Arthur Schopenhauer his Life and Philosophy, op.cit., 172. “Beckett!s 
commerce with the novels of Sterne was both durable and foundational to his practice as a novelist.” 
see, Mark Byron in Uhlmann, A., Samuel Beckett in Context, op.cit., 224.             
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must have struck Beckett in a deeply personal way, for what he was reading no longer stood  
 
simply in relation to a philosophical proposition but instead bore the imprint of his own  
 
instinctive judgement towards the world. Though, crucially from Beckett’s point of view,  
 
it not only provided a picture of the world that he personally recognized on an intuitive level,  
 
it positioned ‘art’ as a direct response to suffering. In my view Beckett can see in  
 
Schopenhauer’s writing, the possibility of deriving from ‘suffering’ an immutable foundation  
 
from which ‘art’ can raise itself, which unlike language  is not susceptible to deformation. In  
 
fact as we will later appreciate from our close reading of Schopenhauer, suffering never at  
 
any point loses its immediacy, it is not something that is rendered abstract by either art or  
 
philosophy.  
 
When it actually comes to broaching the subject of ‘Schopenhauer’s philosophy’ with  
 
reference to Beckett’s novels and plays, one is instantly reminded of the fact that as a body of  
 
work they overflow with a whole panoply of philosophical references and allusions.
95
  
 
Therefore any claim made in relation to Schopenhauer’s singular importance to the overall  
 
framing of Beckett’s work will understandably be greeted with considerable disquiet. For how  
 
does one explain all those allusions to a seemingly endless list of philosophical luminaries,  
 
whose number could quite easily comprise on their own an entire philosophical pantheon.  
 
Let’s take for instance, chapter six of Murphy, which has already been cited in this  
 
introduction. The actual chapter itself displays the epigraph Amor intellectualis quo Murphy  
 
se ipsum amat (the intellectual love with which Murphy loves himself). As an epigraph it is  
 
clearly derived from Spinoza’s “Deus se ipsum amore intellectuali infinito amat”
96
 (God loves  
 
himself with an infinite intellectual love). It would seem self-evident therefore that whatever  
 
significant hold Schopenhauer had over Human Wishes, when it comes to the latter work he is  
 
                                                
95 see, “[...]I shall try to consider here the philosophers who have influenced him [Beckett] in 
chronological order, from the Presocratics, to Leibniz and Hume.” Fletcher, J. Samuel Beckett!s 
Art,op.cit., 122. For an updated list of philosophical allusions consult The Faber Companion to Samuel 
Beckett along with Anthony Uhlmann!s Samuel Beckett and the Philosophical Image.        
96 Interestingly ,as C.J. Ackerley and S.E. Gontarski point out, Beckett “follows not Spinoza!s original but 
Windelband!s amor intellectualis quo deus se ipsum amat.” see, The Faber Companion to Samuel 
Beckett,op.cit., 538.   
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by no means the only philosophical voice shaping the imagery and textural character of  
 
Beckett’s writing. So where does this leave Schopenhauer?          
 
Ironically as we will see, Beckett’s own decision to open the philosophical floodgates, does  
 
not in truth undermine the strength of Schopenhauer. For, as any open and honest engagement  
 
of Die Welt will reveal, Schopenhauer never at any stage in his writing proclaims to be in  
 
possession of an original philosophy. In fact the very line which opens Die Welt “Die Welt ist  
 
meine Vorstellung”
97
 is qualified with the remark “This truth is by no means new. It was to be  
 
found already in the sceptical reflections from which Descartes started. But Berkeley was the  
 
first to enunciate it positively, and he thus rendered an immortal service to philosophy[...]”
98
  
 
Barely has Schopenhauer put pen to paper before he is conceding that his ‘philosophy’  
 
already pre-exists in  Descartes and Bishop Berkeley. Having made this concession he then  
 
goes on to reveal that Kant, Plato and, most unusually for a Western philosopher, the Hindu  
 
philosophy of the Vedanta all have recognition in his own philosophy.
99
 In this sense the  
 
whole idea of articulating a single philosophical position which Schopenhauer has a unique  
 
claim to is something even he himself would reject. But when it comes to borrowing from  
 
these pre-existing philosophies, Schopenhauer has to make one essential adjustment: 
 
  
 “After every important discovery detractors spring up to point out that the 
  same thing was already spoken of in some old chronicles; these will find 
  traces of my teaching in nearly all the philosophies of all ages. Not only 
  in the Vedas, in Plato and Kant, the living matter of Bruno
100
, Glisson and 
  Spinoza, the slumbering monads of Leibnitz, but throughout in all  
  philosophies, the oldest and the newest. Yet always in the most varied  
  dress, interwoven with absurdities that strike the eye, in the most grotesque  
  shapes, in which one can only recognise them by careful scrutiny.  
  It appears to me like finding in all animals the type of man, but so strangely 
  mauled and unfinished, sometimes stinted, sometimes monstrous, now a 
                                                
97 Beckett in his “Sottiser Notebook” under the date 23.3.81 reproduces the same opening line “Die Welt 
ist meine Vorstellung, directly under which he also copies “Die Welt ist mine Wille”:   
98 W.W.R.1., 3.  
99 !I confess, however, that I do not believe my teaching could ever have arisen before the Upanishads, 
Plato and Kant could throw their light combined into men"s minds. But truly, as Diderot says, many 
columns have stood, and the sun shone on them all, yet only Memnon"s sang." Zimmern, H., Arthur 
Schopenhauer his Life and Philosophy, op.cit., 94.      
100 It may be worth noting that many of the philosophers which Beckett"s writing mentions directly, or as 
we have already seen alludes to through parody are the same philosophers which Schopenhauer seeks 
an allegiance with at the beginning of Die Welt: “Thus it can be said that Thales and the Ionians, 
Democritus, Epicurus, Giordano Bruno[...] The Pythagoreans and the Chinese philosophy of the I Ching” 
W.W.R.1., 26-27.              
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  rude attempt and now a caricature. The presumption that dares this  
  comparison is merely a corollary of the presumption that exists in setting 
  up a new philosophic system at all; for doing so is an assertion that all 
  previous attempts are failures, and that one’s own is a success; whoever 
  does not think so, and yet thrusts a new system upon the world, is  
  necessarily a charlatan. It has been with philosophy till now as it is in an 
  auction-room, where everyone who speaks last annuls all that has been said 
  before.”
101
                                  
        
 
 
 
As we can see, the adjustment is perspectival. For Schopenhauer the whole conception of new  
 
philosophical thinking is entirely misjudged, for what exists will always exist; it is just a  
 
question of how we view it.
102
It would seem in the instance of Schopenhauer, as in so many  
 
of Beckett’s own characters, the lens through which the eye receives the world, has been  
 
deliberately warped, rendering all pre-existing philosophical positions as grotesque, and with  
 
it sacrificing all rational appearance. In fact if we go back to Mauthner’s approach of  
 
caricaturing the ‘Will’ and the ‘intellect’, it would seem after all his approach is entirely in  
 
keeping with Schopenhauer’s.  So, as we can now see parody and farce all contribute towards  
 
the essential makeup of Schopenhauer’s own address towards philosophy, something which  
 
Beckett clearly would have taken great delight in. Also, if we just consider for one moment  
 
the deformed profile, which Schopenhauer imposes upon the pre-existing philosophical  
 
terrain:  “[…]always in the most varied dress, interwoven with absurdities that strike the eye,  
 
in the most grotesque shapes, in which one can only recognise them by careful scrutiny” . it is  
 
as if we are momentarily placed in front of one of Beckett’s ‘compressed subjects for the  
 
stage’ in whose outer appearance is often an incomplete trajectory towards the human form.      
 
Having now hopefully gained the confidence of the reader to see in Beckett’s engagement  
 
with Schopenhauer not only the pessimism which sets the whole tone and character of  
 
Beckett’s outlook on the world, but a foundation on which to erect an entirely different  
 
approach towards performative space, whose movement outside the emotive framing of  
 
character corresponds to a process of legitimizing artistic expression and with it, as we will  
                                                
101 Zimmern, H., Arthur Schopenhauer his Life and Philosophy, op.cit., 93-94.  
102 Beckett!s own reluctance to validate existentialism or logical positivism, may have some baring on 
this assessment towards the charlatanism surrounding "new! philosophy.   
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see later throughout the thesis a diminution of suffering itself.  
 
 
 
 
 
Partners till Death?  
 
 
 
As one can gather from the way in which Schopenhauer is raised in connection with Beckett’s  
 
reassessment of the stage, this thesis is an attempt to reveal in a very real sense that Beckett’s  
 
drama is a reinvestment in Schopenhauer, rather than a retraction from what has previously  
 
been seen as an abandoned position represented in Proust. The manner in which this thesis is  
 
set up is deliberately designed to counter the idea that the further we locate our enquiry away  
 
from the source which exhibits the most explicit Schopenhauerian references the weaker and  
 
more diffuse the Schopenhauerian trail becomes. So, rather than derive our Schopenhauerian  
 
model exclusively from an analysis of Proust, my proposed option is to devise a Beckettian- 
 
Schopenhauerian reader, whose role is to move without the usual constraints imposed by  
 
chronology, in a way in which it is possible to collapse the space pertaining to both late and  
 
early works, while at the same time directly applying this space to a close and open reading of  
 
Schopenhauer’s writing. During this process there will be a series of attempts to look at  
 
Beckett’s reception of Schopenhauer outside the usual profile of pessimism, moving the  
 
Schopenhauerian model further in the direction of performative space. This aesthetic shift  
 
away from a purely philosophical assessment of Schopenhauer will be made possible by  
 
examining the way in which Schopenhauer’s own restitution of Immanuel Kant’s Vorstellung  
 
is brought forward in relation to a theatrical position rather than what is normally taken to be  
 
a conceptually abstract one. By reconfiguring Schopenhauer’s chief work, Die Welt als Wille  
 
und Vorstellung, in terms of a dramatic, rather than a conceptual programme, I plan to  
 
demonstrate to the reader that Schopenhauer’s own approach to philosophy provided Beckett  
 
with an aesthetic model, whose license persisted in each and every ‘What’ issued from the  
 
stage. 
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Thesis Structure.   
 
 
 
In the first chapter I plan to re-examine what undoubtedly emerges as the key starting point  
 
of any enquiry into Beckett’s relationship with Schopenhauer: the Proust monograph.  
 
Building upon Ulrich Pothast’s own thoroughly comprehensive survey of Proust, I plan to  
 
show that the aesthetic position which Beckett rehearses throughout the monograph not only  
 
connects with Schopenhauer’s theory of art, suffering and boredom, but that there is within  
 
the overall botanic framing of A la recherche du temps perdu a fundamental re-evaluation of  
 
literary and artistic style, whose movement and identity feed directly into Schopenhauer’s  
 
own assessment of the ‘Will’ as ‘inner nature’, expressed both in relation to Wille zum Leben  
 
(Will to life) and the What of the ‘phenomenon’. Also during the course of examining the  
 
Proust monograph I intend to position Beckett’s reading of A la recherche not merely as  
 
camouflage for a series of Schopenhauerian propositions, but rather I want to reveal the  
 
extent to which Beckett could appreciate through his engagement of Schopenhauer, that the  
 
Proust he had taken away from Ireland, a writer who marked a significant step in his own  
 
artistic development, had already been in open communication with Schopenhauer. In this  
 
sense we will reveal Beckett’s use of Schopenhauer, as a means to impart further definition  
 
and depth to an aesthetic position, which from Beckett’s own perspective, he already had  
 
indirect access to through Proust. Also in this chapter there will be an attempt to register a  
 
move on Beckett’s part to reconstitute the Proustian dialogue between ‘style’ and ‘form’ in  
 
terms of ‘Will’ and ‘Vorstellung’ whilst at the same time contrasting such a move with  
 
Schopenhauer’s own analysis of literature in his essay On Authorship and Style. Alongside  
 
Proust, there will also be an attempt to identify the manner in which Beckett’s early  
 
assessment of Schopenhauer (derived from his French translation procured in Paris) comes to  
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manifest itself in his first novel Dream of Fair to Middling Women. The second chapter will  
 
examine the way in which Beckett sets up within the performance of his first completed stage  
 
play Eleuthéria two very contrasting spaces: one articulating the familiar staging associated  
 
with the theatre of the ‘drawing-room’, the second falling outside the emotive design  
 
essential for harnessing dramatic plot. In an attempt to gain a broader understanding of this  
 
‘plot resistant’ space, the dramatic framing of Eleuthéria will be drawn directly into parallel  
 
with the interrogatory structure of Beckett’s last enacted stage play What Where and the  
 
televised play Eh Joe. The third chapter will be entirely devoted to a close reading of  
 
Schopenhauer’s unitary metaphysics, which will serve to provide a full account of the  
 
philosophical and aesthetic terrain of Schopenhauer’s writing. In the latter half of this chapter  
 
there will be a comprehensive examination of ‘Vorstellung’, drawing particular attention to  
 
the forced and unsatisfactory character of previous attempts to register ‘Vorstellung’ as a  
 
‘concept’. In the fourth chapter there will be an attempt to understand the performative  
 
space of Waiting for Godot and Endgame in the context of Schopenhauer’s theatrical staging  
 
of ‘Vorstellung’, coupled to the aesthetic repositioning of the ‘Will’s’  polymorphic and  
 
indivisible profile. Also in this chapter we will consider the possibility that the Weltknoten  
 
established in the context of Human Wishes is re-presented in terms of an intractable bind at  
 
the heart of subsequent character formation in Godot and Endgame. Particular attention will  
 
be given to the varied costume changes which Schopenhauer makes available to both the  
 
‘Intellect’ and the ‘Will’ while at the same time identifying within such a wardrobe not  
 
merely a range of colourful props, but in the instance of Endgame a platform on which to  
 
construct an entire performance. The representative dilemma bound up in Schopenhauer’s  
 
Weltknoten of ‘object’ and ‘subject’ will also be the focus of an extended appraisal of  
 
Beckett’s only film Film. In the fifth and final chapter we will retain the central model  
 
established in relation to Endgame in order to observe successive attempts (Happy Days, Not  
 
I, and Rockaby) to close the representative breach between ‘Intellect’ and ‘Will’, and as a  
 
result conceive a performance whose access to ‘causal’ attachment is increasingly narrowed,  
 
leading to a play whose movement of expression is registered ‘vertically’, and thus is  
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temporarily removed from the emotive structure participating in ‘suffering’. In the final  
 
chapter we will consider the possibility of Beckett in his latter compressed performances such  
 
as Not I and Rockaby not only attempting to close the representative gap between ‘Intellect’  
 
and ‘Will’, but also the dissension arising between art and philosophy, along with that which  
 
we observe in respects to Beckett’s own creative outpourings held in relation to his novels  
 
and plays.          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 CHAPTER 1
                                                         
                ‘A DEGENERATE KIND OF ALLEGORY’: BECKETT’S PROUST 
          
                       
                      What matter if they say to us: you are wasting your abilities on
                      that. What we are doing is reascending to life, smashing with all    
                      our strength the ice of reason and habit which forms immediately
                      over reality and means we never see it, rediscovering the open
                       sea.
                          Marcel Proust.     
It is widely accepted amongst Beckett scholars that Marcel Proust’s writing undoubtedly 
made a deep impression upon the young Beckett, an impression which can be traced back to 
his early years studying modern languages at Trinity College, Dublin. In fact, as James 
Knowlson sets out in his biography Damned to Fame, Beckett’s college tutor ‘Rudmose-
Brown was unusual for his time in that he actually taught and clearly relished teaching 
modern authors like Proust[...]’1 This enthusiasm which Beckett’s tutor possessed for modern 
French literature clearly played a significant role in cultivating Beckett’s early appreciation of 
contemporary French poetry and prose; so it is without any major surprise that we find 
Beckett’s first solo attempt to impose himself upon the world of publishing, having already at 
this stage proposed a French Doctoral thesis on the novels of Proust and Joyce, should 
itself be ushered in under the name of Proust.2 Proust, Beckett’s own critical appraisal of A la 
recherche du temp perdu, published by Dolphin Books at Chatto and Windus in 1931, departs 
sharply from the customary approach to literary criticism, for the insight it brings to the 
examination of Proust’s work overflows with humor and verbal agility, in a way which 
criticism rarely affords. We have only to turn to the first page of the opening address to realize 
what a work of originality it truly is:                    
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1 Knowlson, J., Damned To Fame (1996) London: Bloomsbury Publishing plc., 50. 
2 See The Letters of Samuel Beckett 1929-1940., ed. Fehsenfeld, M.D., and Overbeck, L.M., Associated 
ed. Gunn, G.C.D. (2009) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 5.   
 
 There is no allusion in this book to the 
  legendary life and death of Marcel Proust,
  nor to the garrulous old dowager of the 
  Letters, nor to the poet, nor to the author
  of the Essays, nor to the Eau de Selzian 
  correlative of Carlyle’s ‘beautiful bottle of
  soda water’. I have preferred to retain the 
  titles in French. The translations of the text
  are my own. The references are to the 
  abominable edition of the Nouvelle Revue
  Francaise, in sixteen volumes.
                                            (P., 9.)                                                                                                  
But if one were to take the view that Beckett’s mission was to extol the Proust which his 
former tutor had tried to instill in him, the Proust whose legacy marked a renewed investment 
into French symbolism, typified by Brown’s Parisian ‘vanguard’ whose ranks swelled with 
the likes of  André Gide, Léon-Paul Fargue and Valery Larbaud,3 then clearly I would suggest 
we push a great deal further into the original text.4 For as Knowlson rightly points out in his 
biography, it was Schopenhauer who made the most significant impact on Beckett’s approach 
to Proust during the intense research period leading up to the execution of Proust, rather than 
any contemporary French novelist or poet or indeed any opus by Bergson.5 It is true to say 
that a casual examination of Beckett’s Proust will reveal to the reader a number of explicit 
appeals to Schopenhauer. For instance: 
   Breathing is habit. Life is habit. 
              Or rather life is a succession of habits,                                                                             
              since the individual is a succession of 
                          individuals; the world being a projection 
                          of the individual’s consciousness (an 
                          objectivation of the individual’s will, 
                          Schopenhauer would say),the pact must be 
                          continually renewed, the letter of safe-
                          conduct brought up to date. The creation
   of the world did not take place once and for 
   all time, but takes place every day.
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3 Knowlson, J., Damned, op.cit., 50.
4 The Baudelarian unity is a unity !post rem", a unity abstracted from plurality. His !correspondence" is 
determined by a concept, therefore strictly limited and exhausted by its own definition. Proust does not 
deal in concepts, he pursues the idea, the concrete. P., 79. See also, !Beckett"s strongest objection 
against any art [...]" Pothast, U., The Metaphysical Vision, op.cit., 99.  
5 See, Knowlson, J., Damned, op.cit., 118. 
                                                   (P., 19.)      
And near the close of Proust, we have Beckett’s second petition to Schopenhauer:   
              And we are reminded of Schopen-
   hauer’s definition of the artistic procedure as 
   ‘the contemplation of the world independently 
   of the principle of reason’.
                                    (p 87.)
Culminating finally on page 91, with the third and fourth elucidation:
     
      A book could be written on the significance 
   of music in the work of Proust, in particular
   of the music of Vinteuil: the Sonata and the 
   Septuor. The influence of Schopenhauer on
   this aspect of the Proustian demonstration is
   unquestionable. Schopenhauer rejects the Leib-
   nitzian view of music as ‘occult arithmetic,’and       
   in his aesthetics separates it from the other arts,
                                                                     (p 91) 
But what will be much less obvious to those readers who only possess a nodding acquaintance 
with Schopenhauer’s philosophy, is the fact that this slender book of literary criticism by 
Beckett, is, in reality, just as much a display of Schopenhauerian inspection as it is Proustian.6 
Beckett, at the beginning of his examination of A la recherche du temps perdu sets out what 
he sees as the inner chronology of Proust’s work, namely: ‘the double-headed monster of 
damnation and salvation - Time’. This dualistic construction of time, would, like Proust’ own, 
do little to injure those claims that at the forefront of such thinking was in fact some kind of 
Bergsonian address, in which the temporal division described by Beckett distinguishes linear 
time from that of the inner life of the human subject, an inner life which is capable of 
withstanding all objective measurement, or what Bergson called durée.7 That is, if it were not
 
for the fact that the signature of ‘time’ in A la recherche actually raises in Beckett’s mind 
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6 ![...] Samuel Beckett read Schopenhauer very shortly before and probably also in the very process of 
writing his Proust. His terminology in philosophical matters is quite technical at some points and often 
differs from what we actually find in Proust"s work." Pothast, U., The Metaphysical Vision,op.cit., 95.   
7 It is interesting to note that the early 20th C. French historian of Ideas, A. Baillot identifies in his theses 
on Schopenhauer (Influence de Schopenhauer en France (1860-1900): Paris (1927) J. Vria, Librairie 
Philosophique, Sorbonne., 123-125) the way in which Henri Bergson"s phycology of mind is greatly 
indebted to Schopenhauer"s own metaphysics: !D"abord elle est due à l"admiration sincère que M. 
Bergson éprouve pour Schopenhauer :  le seul métaphysicien allemand qui ait été psychologue[...], 123.  
[trans Sage, V.].          
the image of the ‘spear of Telephus’: a weapon of classical antiquity, which had in in its 
gift the ability to alleviate the very suffering and pain that it alone was responsible for:
  THE Proustian equation is never simple. The 
  unknown, choosing its weapons from a hoard of
  values, is also the unknowable. And the quality
  of its action falls under two signatures.  In
  Proust each spear may be a spear of Telephus.
  This dualism in multiplicity will be examined 
  more closely in relation to Proust’s ‘perspectiv-
  ism.’  For the purposes of this synthesis it is
  convenient to adopt the inner chronology of the
  Proustian demonstration, and to examine in 
  the first place that double-headed monster of
  damnation and salvation - Time.
                                                 (p 11)                
Beckett’s chosen imagery of spears wounding a subject, whose wounds are healed 
through the very channels administering the pain, speaks not with a Bergsonian accent, but 
rather one which is much more in keeping with Schopenhauer. It is an image that accentuates 
Schopenhauer’s own unique perspective on human suffering, one in which suffering has the 
capacity to transmute itself into the antidote capable of breaking an individual’s attachment 
towards willing as something positive or beneficial. This is the dual function of Telephus’s 
spear. When that emergence of the antidote happens, desire (and therefore suffering) is no 
longer seen to have any profitable function within the teleological construction of life. as 
Schopenhauer puts it:
 
                                                                                               
  Therefore in most cases the will must be broken by the greatest 
  personal suffering before its self-denial appears. We then see the man 
  suddenly retire into himself, after he is brought to the verge of despair 
  through all the stages of increasing affliction with the most violent resistance.
  We see him know himself and the world, change his whole nature,
  rise above himself and above all suffering, as if purified and sanctified
  by it, inviolable peace, bliss, and sublimity, willingly renounce
  everything he formerly desired with the greatest vehemence, and 
  gladly welcome death. It is the gleam of silver that suddenly appears
  from the purifying flame of suffering, the gleam of the denial of the
  will-to-live [life], of salvation.
                                 (W.W.R.1., 392-393.)          
As we can see, Beckett’s ‘Telephusian’ binary, offering both the possibility of ‘damnation’ 
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and of ‘salvation’, fits neatly into a Schopenhauerian register; but having said this, one may 
rightfully ask: how does all this reflection on suffering square up with Proust’s own model of 
time?     
The truth is of course, that the ‘will’ which Schopenhauer regarded as interchangeable with 
music, is itself free from spatial representation.8 So in this respect the ‘will’ is essentially a 
manifestation of pure temporality, which escapes all empirical pressure; for as Lydia Goehr 
remarks in her essay Schopenhauer and the Musicians, ‘Music is pure temporal process, the 
dynamics of which directly correspond to the flow of the Will’s emotional life.’9 It therefore 
becomes increasingly evident that Beckett’s own examination of time in Proust, is in part an 
examination of the Schopenhauerian ‘will’ by proxy. Once we immerse ourselves in Die Welt, 
it will become much easier to identify the Schopenhauerian syntax which underwrites a great 
deal of this Proustian inquest:       
   As a writer he is not altogether at liberty to 
  detach effect from cause. It will be  necessary, 
  for example, to interrupt (disfigure) the luminous 
  projection of subject desire with the comic relief 
  of features. It will be impossible to prepare the 
  hundreds of masks that rightly belong to objects 
  of even his most disinterested scrutiny.
                          (pp11-12.)        
Immediately we can see the way in which Beckett compresses a significant tally of 
Schopenhauerian principles within a relatively short paragraph. Beckett at the beginning of 
his essay appears to have already begun to think about the misgivings of literature generally, 
when it comes to its inability to completely break the chain of cause and effect and as we see, 
it is in the context of ‘desire’ that he chooses to give ‘effect’ and ‘cause’ further ‘illumination’. 
From this, I believe, we should consider the real possibility that Beckett is thinking about the 
weakness of literature in terms of its inherent tendency to promote ‘willful’ desire, and with 
respect to the novel, we should measure its achievement in relation to disrupting this 
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8 ![...] music is by no means like the other arts, namely a." copy of the Ideas, but a copy of the the will 
itself." W.W.R.1., 257.  
9 Schopenhauer, philosophy and the arts, ed., Jacquette, D. (1996) Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 206.  
‘willful’ mechanism. For as Beckett says ‘it will be necessary, for example, to interrupt 
(disfigure) the luminous projections of subject desire with comic relief of features.’  Which is 
to suggest that if one is to have any genuine value as a writer, then really one should be 
composing work in such a way as to bring about a derailment of ‘desire’, i.e. the causal chain, 
regardless of whether it is sustainable or not. In fact it is clear from the opening paragraph 
that despite Beckett’s ideal vision of literature dismantling ‘cause’ from ‘effect’ in its entirety, 
he is under no illusion as to the possibility of this assignment to a novelist. Therefore even 
at this early stage of his writing we can already see evidence of Beckett’s underlying premise, 
that as a writer or artist we are destined to fail before we have already picked up the pen or 
brush; but that failure in itself does not present itself as reason to abandon art, but only that art 
must be produced in complete recognition of its failure. So, when Beckett alludes to the 
failings of Proust as a writer, which is to say literature in general, it would seem that this 
whole notion of failure has been framed in recognition of Schopenhauer’s aesthetic principles. 
For I would suggest that what Beckett has in mind when he is thinking about the deeper 
purpose of art, remains entirely consistent with the Schopenhauerian ideal of art revealing 
itself in disinterested terms:
  When, however, an external cause or inward disposition suddenly 
  raises us out of the endless stream of willing, and snatches knowledge      
  from the thraldom of the will, the attention is now no longer directed
  to the motives of willing, but comprehends things free  from  their    
  relation to the will. Thus it considers things without interest, without
  subjectivity, purely objectively; it is entirely given up to them in so
  far as they are merely representations, and not motives.  Then all    
  at once the peace, always sought but always escaping us on that 
  first path of willing comes to us of its own accord, and all is well
  with us. It is the painless state prized by Epicurus as the highest 
  good and as the state of the gods; for that moment we are delivered
  from the miserable pressure of the will. We celebrate the Sabbath 
  of the penal servitude of willing; the wheel of Ixion stands still.
                                                                                            (W.W.R.1., 196)   
In fact as we can see from this opening excerpt from Proust, the term ‘disinterested scrutiny’ 
enters Beckett’s discourse when he considers the impossible feat of laying out within the 
pages of the novel, the numerous representative masks which stand in for the object. So, 
essentially, what I believe Beckett is identifying here, is that the novel, even one which is as 
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accomplished as A la recherche, will fall short of the full representative vocabulary of the 
‘will’. And not only this, but Beckett sees a further weakness residing in Proust’s writing, 
although to be truthful it is a weakness which all novels are susceptible to: that of objective 
representation:
  He accepts regretfully the sacred ruler and 
  compass of literary geometry. But he will 
  refuse to extend his submission to spatial 
  scales, he will refuse to measure the length 
  and weight of man in terms of his body
  instead of in terms of years.
                                        (P., 12.)  
         
But unlike most writers, Beckett identifies in Proust’s novel a genuine resistance to the 
customary practice of centering the dramatis personae in bodily terms, instead preferring, it 
would seem, to push his characterization beyond the regimen of spatial enclosures and onto 
the much broader expanse of time. This need to liberate one’s characters from a commitment 
towards space is clearly something which Beckett is determined to advance in relation to his 
own early writing in Dream:     
  
  The real presence was a pest because it did not give
  the imagination a break. Without going as far as Stendhal,  
  who said- or repeated after somebody- that the best mu-
  sic (what did he know about music anyway?) was the music
  that becomes inaudible after a few bars, we do declare and
  maintain stiffly (at least for the purposes of this paragraph)
  that the object that becomes invisible before your eyes is,
  so to speak, the brightest and best. 
                                                   (D.F.M.W., 12.)    
For as we know, once you eliminate all trace of the object, you also take with it any cognized 
space which the object was purporting to occupy; so ultimately there is nothing for the 
the novel’s ‘sacred ruler and compass’ to chart.  Also, in my opinion, it would be 
appropriate to see in Dream’s ‘dark and rather disagreeable letter’ the means by which 
Beckett, as an author, seeks to quarantine those aspects of the novel which would otherwise 
raise the ‘toxicity’ of his literary project beyond any manageable level of disinterested 
aesthetic containment: 
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                                                “Il est si beau, ton ami,si
  franchement casse-poitrinaire,  que je suis prêt à 
  I’aimer. Est-il maigre et potelé là et là où il faut ?
  Vulgaire ? Lippu ? Ah ! vulgaire lippue chaude chair !        
  Gratte-moi”  vociféra-t-il, en nage pour toi, “ardente
  cantharide, gratte je te l’ordonne  !” Je gratte, je
  caresse, je me dis : ce jugement est par trop indigne
  de cet esprit,vu que P. ne s’ arrache à nul moment de
  I’axe glaireux de son réel.” [ Your friend is so handsome, 
 so chest-breaking [ argot:commonly, ‘rot-gutter’; used also 
             as a euphemism for “the active partner in  homosexual fellatio”.10], 
 that I am ready to love him. Is he skinny and plump where 
 it’s needed? Vulgar? Thick lipped? Oh vulgar, thick-lipped 
 and warm flesh! “Scratch me”, he yelled, dripping with 
 sweat, “ardent cantharide, scratch Icommand it!” I Scratch, 
 I stroke, I say to myself: this judgement is not (too) 
 worthy of this mind, given that P. never extracts himself 
 from his phlegm-like axis.” [trans., Laborie, L.]]             
                                                                                  (D.F.M.W., 20.) 
     
      
 For it seems in this one letter that Beckett decides to pour without any apparent restraint, a 
highly toxic description of human desire, each line literally dripping with the contents of D’ 
Annunzio’s bleeding and bursting pomegranates.11 For there can be no doubt that lines in the 
above  as: “Il est si beau ton ami ...”, are designed to fall under the D’ Annunzio category, 
evoking what Beckett previously describes in The Letters  as ‘a dirty juicy squelchy mind’.12    
This degree of investment in the body displayed in the Dream letter, stands to defeat outright 
any attempt to bring to fruition the aesthetic ideals circulating in Proust. So the fact that 
Beckett confines such outpourings to the imagined contents of a letter, which is further bound 
up in a second language, seems in my view to conjure up a thwarted effort to create some 
enforced distance between the author of Dream and the intrusive calculus of bodily desire. 
What remains artistically central both to Proust and Dream is something which is entirely 
Schopenhauerian in outlook, an aesthetic appreciation capable of extricating itself from 
willful attachment:       
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10 See, “caisse-poitrine” is not only the French phrase for “rot-gut”, as in cheap booze[...] Nicholas 
Lezard The Guardian (10 May 2014.) 20. Also see, !casse poitrine": the active partner in [...]  Beckett, S., 
Echo!s Bones., ed. Nixon, M. (2014) London: Faber and Faber, 56.  
11 See, Letters of Samuel Beckett 1929-1940, op.cit., 41.
12 See, Ibid., 41. 
        
        Proust is that pure subject. He is almost
 exempt from the impurity of will. He deplores      
 his lack of will until he understands that will,
 being utilitarian, a servant of intelligence and 
 habit, is not a condition of the artistic exper-
 ience. When the subject is exempt from will
 the object is exempt from causality (Time and 
 space taken together). And this human vegeta-
 tion is purified in the transcendental appercep-
 tion that can capture the Model, the Idea, the
 Thing-in-itself.
                   (p., 90)
In an address such as this there can be no question as to its Schopenhauerian conviction, for 
within this passage we can see Beckett using precisely the same privileged terminology as 
Schopenhauer. Here we have the complete uninterrupted cast of ‘will’,  ‘subject’, ‘object’, 
‘causality’, ‘Idea’ and ‘Thing in itself’ all taking up their positions to praise the artistry of 
Proust. As we can see, Beckett elevates Proust’s position to pure subject, the highest accolade 
bestowed upon any artist within Schopenhauer’s aesthetic scheme; recognizing that the artist 
(or, as Schopenhauer prefers to call it the genius) has been able to glimpse the world outside 
the restrictive collar of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’:13  
  Further, we do not let abstract thought, the concepts of reason, take 
  possession of  our consciousness, but, instead of all this, devote the 
  whole power of our mind to perception, sink ourselves completely 
  therein and let our whole consciousness be filled by the calm conte
  -mplation of the natural object actually present, whether it be a land
  -scape, a tree, a rock, a crag, a building, or anything else. We lose 
  ourselves entirely in this object, to use a pregnant expression; in 
  other words we forget our individuality, our will, and continue to 
  exist only as pure subject[...]
                                                                                      (W.W.R.1., 178.)              
  
There can be no mistaking the fact that what Beckett is driving towards on page 90 of Proust 
is in effect an endorsement of Schopenhauerian aesthetic apprehension; in both cases we have 
a firm rejection of the intellect being the principle condition of aesthetic appreciation, and 
instead, as we can see, both Schopenhauer and Beckett allow their thinking to be dominated 
by a singular notion of perception:
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13 P.P.2., 76. [“A genius is a man in whose head the world as representation has attained a degree of 
more clearness and  stands out with the stamp of greater distinctness; and as the most important and 
profound insight is furnished not by careful observation of details, but only by an intensity of 
apprehension of the whole, so mankind can look forward to the greatest instruction from him.” ]   
  If, therefore, the object has to such an extent passed out of all 
  relation to something outside it, and the subject has passed out 
  of all relation to the will, what is thus known is no longer the 
  individual thing as such, but the Idea, the eternal form, the im
  -mediate objectivity of the will at this grade. Thus at the same 
  time, the person who is involved in this perception is no longer
  an individual, for in such perception the individual has lost him
  -self; he is pure will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge.   
                                                                                                (W.W.R.1., 179.)
Once again it becomes obvious as to the strength of influence which Schopenhauer asserts 
over Beckett’s writing; for we need only compare the aesthetic evaluation in Die Welt, with 
that in Proust, in order to see just how close Beckett’s own estimation of Proust edges 
towards a Schopenhauerian judgement.  For instance, if we look at the way in which he 
delivers his final appraisal of ‘Proust’, it is in the end his capacity to dissociate the object 
from his own self-projected desire which ultimately for Beckett secures his artistic 
legitimacy:    
  So that there is no collapse of the will in
  Proust, as there is for example in Spencer and
  Keats and Giorgione. He sits up all night in
  Paris, with a branch of apple-blossom laid be-
  side his lamp, staring at the foam of white
  corollae until the dawn comes to redden them
  But this is not the terrible panic-stricken stasis
  of Keats, crouched in a mossy thicket, annulled,
  like a bee, in sweetness, ‘drowsed with the fume
  of poppies’ and watching ‘the last oozings, hours
  by hours’; nor yet the remote, still, almost 
  breathless passion of a Giorgione youth, the 
  spirit shattered in corruption, damp and rot-
  ting, so finely suggested by d’ Annunzio in his
  description of the Concerto[...]The Proustian stasis 
             is contemplative, a pure act of understanding, will
             -less, the ‘amabilis insania’ and the ‘holder 
             Wahnsinn.’        
                         (pp., 90-91)
It is above all the image of ‘Proust’ in A la recherche, looking at the flowering apple blossom 
next to his bed, which embodies for Beckett the furthest achievement which art can be 
directed towards, namely the bringing about of a state of contemplation, in which all 
individual attachment falls from view leaving behind an insoluble ‘Idea’ of the world: no 
longer subject to the ‘will’. The issue as to whether Beckett’s own idea of the ‘will’ is in fact 
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one which he has consciously appropriated from Schopenhauer has its answer, I believe, 
confidently etched in the preceding paragraph leading up to Proust’s designation as ‘pure 
subject’: Beckett writes:
 
   There is no question of right and wrong. 
  Homosexuality is never  called  a  vice:  
  it is as devoid of moral implications as 
  the mode of fecundation of the Primula 
  veris or the Lythrum salicoria.  And,
  like members of the vegetable world, they 
  seem to solicit a pure subject, so that they 
  may pass from a state of blind will to a state 
  of representation. Proust is that pure subject.
                                        ( P., 89-90.)
So, here we have it: not only is Beckett characterizing the ‘will’ as ‘blind’ as Schopenhauer 
does, but he also follows suit in replicating the dual formulation of ‘will’ as 
interchangeable with its English counterpart of Vorstellung. (‘so that they may pass from a 
state of blind will to a state of representation’).  Another telling sign as to Beckett’s own 
commitment towards such thinking, is the fact that unlike most of Beckett’s later 
philosophical allusions, there seems to be no effort on his part to resort to irony; something 
very rare indeed. In order to give a good example of just how deep the Schopenhauerian 
exposition runs through Beckett’s critical  appraisal of Proust, I would suggest we open out 
our enquiry much further in order to address the entire section dealing with the subject of 
flora in A la recherche. As this section reveals, Beckett is keen to emphasize that the imagery 
of A la recherche is dominated by botanical images, rather than those attached to fauna; he 
goes on to say:
  He is conscious of humanity as flora, never 
  as fauna. (There are no black cats and faithful 
  hounds in Proust.) He  deplores ‘the time one 
  wastes in upholstering one’s life with a human 
  and parasitic vegetation.’ The wife and son of 
  the Sidaner amateur appear to him on the shore 
  at Balbec as two flowering ranunculi. Albertine’s 
  laugh has the colour and smell of geranium. 
  Gilberte and Odette are lilacs, white and violet. 
  He speaks of a scene in Pelléas et Mélisande 
  that exasperates his rose-fever and makes him 
  sneeze. This preoccupation accompanies very 
  naturally his complete indifference to moral 
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  values and human justices. Flower and plant 
  have no conscious will. They are shameless, 
  exposing their genitals. And so in a sense are 
  Proust’s men and women, whose will is blind 
  and hard, but never self-conscious, never aboli
  -shed in the pure perception of a pure subject. 
  They are victims of their volition, active with 
  a grotesque predetermined activity, within the 
  narrow limits of an impure world. But shameless.
                                                                             (P., 89.)          
What is clear from this extended passage is the fact that Beckett has no interest whatsoever 
in exploring the heady scent of Le Parnasse contemporain, for the way in which these floral 
specimens are being presented makes no allowance for the usual symbolic sentiment, 
wrapped in the reverie of death. The flora which Beckett is choosing to address in Proust 
places a bar on all etherial points of entry. Though having already previously indicated that a 
decoction of fin de siècle would in all likelihood reveal trace elements of Schopenhauerian 
thinking, we can see that Beckett’s assimilation of Schopenhauer is more tangible than one 
might have expected. 
There are in fact great clumps of Schopenhauerian philosophy whose character has not been 
diluted to homeopathic levels. For if we consider the lines: ‘Flower and plant have no 
conscious will. They are shameless, exposing their genitals. And so in a sense are Proust’s 
men and women, whose will is blind and hard, but never self-conscious, never abolished in 
the pure perception of a pure subject’, there is no possibility, having now become acquainted 
with Schopenhauer’s own prose, that one would mistakenly attribute these lines to the 
influence of Bergson, Kant, or even the descendants of the ‘Heidelberg experiment’. The 
‘will’ in Beckett’s writing is not only devoid of a conscious identity, but it is also operating 
throughout the whole of nature; and therefore one should immediately reject stamping 
Beckett’s own preoccupation with the ‘will’ in ‘Sartrean’ terms. For as we can see just like 
Schopenhauer, Beckett’s own evaluation of the ‘will’ is far from the exclusive preserve of 
humans. When it comes to enforcing in the reader’s mind the non-conscious dimension of the 
‘will’ it seems that from Schopenhauer’s own perspective there is no better example than the 
Wille zum Leben in plants. For it certainly is the case that Schopenhauer observes in plants a 
much purer illustration of the ‘will to life’ than anything seen in animals or humans, 
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specifically because plants exert the ‘will’ without recourse to any conscious attribute: 
  
   
   The simplest impartial self-examination, along with the con-
  clusions of anatomy, leads to the result that the intellect, like    
  its objectification the brain, and the sense apparatus attached
  thereto, are nothing but a greatly enhanced susceptibility to
  impressions from without. But the intellect does not constitute
  our original and true inner nature; and so in us it is not that
  which is in the plant the germinating force, or in the stone
  gravity together with chemical forces; only the will proves to
  be this. 
                    (pp., 47.)
 
As Schopenhauer submits in Parerga and Paralipomena, consciousness in the form of the 
intellect or its immediate objectification, the brain, does not constitute our true inner nature, 
unlike that which lies at the heart of the germinating plant or the falling stone, for as he insists 
‘only the will proves to be this.’ But as we will see, Schopenhauer is keen to push even further 
the integrity of the plant, setting it firmly against that of the humans:  
 
               On the contrary, the intellect is in us that which in the
 plant may promote or hinder its mere susceptibility to external  
 influences or to physical and chemical impressions, and what-
 ever may affect its growth and success. In us, however, that 
 susceptibility is so greatly enhanced that, on the strength of it,
 the entire objective world, the world as representation, mani-
 fests itself and so to this extent originates as object. To make this
 clear, let us picture to ourselves the world without any animated
 beings. It is then without perception of any kind and so object-
 ively does not really exist at all; however, let this be assumed.
 Now let us imagine a number of plants that have sprung up 
 from the ground close to one another.  They are now affected
 by influences of many kinds, such as air, wind, the ousting of
 the one plant by another, moisture, cold light, warmth, electrical
 tension and so on.  Now let us enhance ever more in our             
 thoughts the susceptibility of these plants to such influences; it
 then finally becomes sensation accompanied by the ability to
 refer this to its cause; and so in the end it becomes perception.
 But the world stands out at once, manifesting itself in space,
 time, and causality; yet it remains a mere result of external 
 influences on the susceptibility of plants.  
                                                              (P.P.2., 47.)       
Plants for Schopenhauer do not just provide a convenient way to frame the will, but do in fact 
reveal themselves as complete working models of our own essential disposition; as we can 
see, Schopenhauer uses plants to picture the inner anatomy of our willful character, essentially 
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marking out humans as botanical in nature with the added addition of intelligent perception. 
This image of human intercourse being reducible to geo- and phototropic movement in plants, 
as well as the arresting manner in which Schopenhauer collapses both the human and plant 
identity into one homogeneous structure, tells me that Beckett’s own decision to highlight the 
role of plants in A la recherche is responding not only to Proust as a writer, but also to 
Schopenhauer. For the way I see the botanical passage in Proust, is that, Beckett is 
not simply responding to the floral imprint left behind in the work of Proust, but that he is 
also consciously acknowledging the plants as a prominent signature which punctuates 
Schopenhauer’s work. I believe Beckett’s decision, to follow his comment about ‘flowers 
having no conscious will’ with the sentence ‘They are shameless, exposing their genitals.’ is 
entirely motivated by the Schopenhauerian idea that the locus of the will is in the genitals of 
the human species, and not in the brain. I would even go so far as to say that for Beckett, 
Proust’s A la recherche in one respect is being read in terms of a vast ‘Schopenhauerian 
garden’.  Plants, flowers and their offspring fruit at times appear to dominate Beckett’s own 
framing of Proust, and all are to some extent it seems, imbued with their own distinctive 
Schopenhauerian aroma.14 Even when Beckett is directly quoting Proust, it seems he is also in 
his own way consciously paraphrasing Schopenhauer:
 
  ‘Man,’ writes Proust, ‘is not a building that can 
  receive additions to its superficies, but a tree 
  whose stem and leafage are expressions of 
  inward sap.’
                                        (P., 66) 
Clearly for a writer who has been consulting the works of Schopenhauer during the period 
leading up to Proust (ie before the 5th of August 1930) Schopenhauer says defunctus is a 
beautiful word-as long as one does not suicide. He might be right.) the image of the ‘sap’ in 
this excerpt would have resounded strongly with the Schopenhauerian picture, Beckett would 
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14 For Nicholas Zurbrugg the heady aroma of Schopenhauer clearly comes at the expense of Proust: 
“Having read rather too much Schopenhauer, and rather too little of A la recherche du temps perdu, 
Beckett reaches the astonishing conclusion that all of Proust!s characters resemble such foolish, 
formless, unconscious matter. Conceiving of Proust!s men and women as hopelessly and helplessly 
amoral vegetation, and claiming that "assimilates the human to the vegetal!, See Zurbrugg, N., Beckett 
and Proust (1988) Gerrards Cross, Bucks: Colin Smythe, 166.       
have at this point been piecing together.15 We only have to reflect on the way in which 
Schopenhauer positions the human body in terms of the ‘will’ being perceived objectively 
(viewing the body as the outward expression of an interior ‘will’) in order to realize just how 
much Proust’s own words act to consolidate the Schopenhauerian vision.     
In fact it appears that Beckett’s own reading of Schopenhauer, has allowed him to take up a 
position in relation to Proust which would have never seen the light of day in ‘Rudmose 
Brown’s French literature classes. It appears to me that throughout Proust, Beckett is leading 
with the thought that A la recherche is in someway just as much an artful response to 
Schopenhauer, as let’s say, Tristan und Isolde.16 Only in this instance Beckett’s assessment of 
the work is almost wholly approving.  It would seem that because Proust’s art points 
towards a form of contemplative stasis, in which the ‘will’ is subdued, Beckett adjudges that 
we are altogether dealing with a much higher grade of Schopenhauerian art, than that 
delivered by the unrestrained passion of Wagner’s opera.17   
Another good example of the way in which Beckett appears to be using Proust to underline a 
vital structure of Schopenhauerian thinking, while at the same time alluding to the 
philosophical source, which he suspects is driving the Proustian agenda forward, is seen in 
Beckett’s own examination of ‘habit’ and ‘boredom’:        
    
  
   The respite is brief. ‘Of all human plants,’
  writes Proust, ‘Habit requires the least 
  fostering, and is the first to appear on the seeming
  desolation of the most barren rock.’ Brief, and
  dangerously painful. The fundamental duty of
  Habit, about which it describes the futile and
  stupefying arabesques of its supererogations,
  consists in a perpetual adjustment and readjust-
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15 The Letters of Samuel Beckett 1929-1940, op.cit., 36.    
16 !Thomas Mann used to say that this interfusion of Wagner and Schopenhauer was the supreme 
example in the whole of Western culture of a symbiotic relationship between a truly great creative artist 
and a truly great thinker. I agree with that. But this does not mean that one has even to be familiar with 
Schopenhauer"s ideas, let alone accept them, to experience Tristan as a work of art. On the contrary, it 
must surely be the case that most of the people who have responded deeply to this work have little idea, 
if any at all, of Schopenhauer"s philosophy. These ideas have been ingested and absorbed into the work 
itself, which then relates to the audience entirely on its own terms.! Magee, B., Wagner and Philosophy 
(2000) London: Penguin Books., 224.  These words could equally apply to Beckett"s own work.   
17 “Who is Wagner?”  said Belacqua. “Yes” said Liebert testily “who is he anyhow?” “He is a roaring 
Meg” said Belacqua “ against melancholy.” D.F.M.W., 38.  
  ment of our organic sensibility to the conditions
  of its worlds. Suffering represents the omission
  of that duty, whether through negligence or in-
  efficiency, and boredom its adequate perform-
  ance. The pendulum oscillates between these
  two terms: Suffering- that opens a window on
  the real and is the main condition of the artistic
  experience, and Boredom- with its host of top-
  hatted and hygienic ministers...
                                                            (P., 28.)
      
In this passage we can observe quite clearly the way in which Beckett addresses the subject of 
‘habit’ in the kind of biological shorthand which is common to much of Schopenhauer’s 
writing, but more importantly there is an attempt on Beckett’s part to draw the identity of 
‘habit’ within the broader reaches of ‘boredom’. And as we have already shown above, 
‘boredom’ is a key note within the philosophical repertoire of Schopenhauer, but not only this, 
we also witness Beckett assembling Schopenhauer’s very own customized pendulum 
swinging back and forth between pain and boredom:18
  Hence its [animal or human] life swings like a pendulum to
  and fro between pain and boredom, and these two are in fact its       
  ultimate constituents.
                           (W.W.R.1., 312.)
Also there are further, less conspicuous details that reinforce this Schopenhauerian 
perspective, such as the fact that Beckett is clearly in agreement that suffering, is real, 
something positive and therefore offers a concrete foundation on which to erect art. And just 
like Schopenhauer he sides with the view that boredom is an insubstantial proposition, it has 
no substance to it; for just like pleasure it resides in the context of pain’s absence.
One of the most explicit Schopenhauerian passages in Proust, signals, I believe, what I have 
already gone someway to espouse in my previous chapter on Dream; that Beckett’s decision 
to move the novel’s language towards a musical register, was itself a Schopenhauerian 
impulse:
    A book could be written on the significance 
  of music in the work of Proust, in particular  
  of the music of Vinteuil : the Sonata and the
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18 See, Pothast, U., The Metaphysical Vision,op.cit., 135.   
  Septuor. The influence of Schopenhauer on
  this aspect of the Proustian demonstration is
  unquestionable. Schopenhauer rejects the Leib-
  nitzian view of music as ‘occult arithmetic,’ and
  in his aesthetics separates it from the other arts,
  which can only produce the Idea with its con-
  comitant phenomena, whereas music is the Idea
  itself, unaware of the world of phenomena,
  existing ideally outside the universe, appre-
  hended not in Space but in Time only, and 
  consequently untouched by the teleological 
  hypothesis. This essential quality of music is
  distorted by the listener who, being an impure
  subject, insists on giving a figure to that which
  is ideal and invisible, on incarnating the Idea
  in what he conceives to be an appropriate para-
  digm. Thus, by definition, opera is a hideous 
  corruption of this most immaterial of all the
  arts : the words of a libretto are to the musical
  phrase that they particularize what the Ven-
  dôme Column, for example, is to the ideal
  perpendicular. From this point of view opera is
  less complete than vaudeville, which at least
  inaugurates the comedy of an exhaustive en-
  umeration. 
                         (P., 91-92.)
This passage I believe tells us a great deal about the motivation behind Beckett’s Dream; 
firstly it is unmistakably Schopenhauerian in its content, despite what appears to be 
some confusion surrounding the identity of music with the ‘Idea’ itself, rather than the ‘will’ 
itself. But putting this slight anomaly aside, it seems Beckett fully wants to side with 
Schopenhauer in the thought that music, unlike the other arts, exists outside phenomenal 
consideration, as well as concurring with the idea that music (and therefore the will) is not 
apprehended in space, but is purely temporal, sidelining any teleological postulate. 
So, it is crucial in my view to appreciate the role of music in Dream, alongside Beckett’s own 
attempts to impart a musical hybridity to the novel’s language, as primarily a strategy geared 
up towards promoting this indispensable strand of Schopenhauerian thinking. For I suspect 
Beckett in Dream, wants to think of music, not arising in the form of a logical schematic ( that 
is to say not the ‘occult arithmetic’ of Leibnitz)  but instead in the Schopenhauerian sense, in 
which music is cast as an exact likeness of our own inner reality; a view which is also taken 
up by James Knowlson and John Pilling. In their collaborative publication Frescoes of the 
Skull they also bring to bear a Schopenhauerian reading of music when examining Beckett’s
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first completed theatrical offering, Eleuthéria:
  In the course of his visit to his parents’ home to see his dead father, 
  Victor had explained himself to the servant, Jacques, in a way ‘that 
  was something like music’. (Here one may safely presume that it 
  was the Schopenhauerian Idea incarnate, rather than the Leibnizian 
  ‘occult arithmetic’ that Beckett had in mind, to adopt a distinction 
  made by Beckett in Proust.)19         
                
 And, what is more, it appear that Belacqua’s fervent dismissal of Wagner in Dream, does in 
some way bear out Beckett’s own calculation that opera can never be used to uphold 
Schopenhauerian principles; for as Beckett asserts in Proust, opera undermines the anti-
mimetic profile of music by hitching it to an impure divisive memetic subject.20
I suspect, as I have mentioned in this thesis before, that Beckett singled out Wagner in 
Dream because he had the temerity in Beckett’s eyes, to position his opera as an ‘answer’ to 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy, when in fact, Wagner’s music does little in the way of impeding 
the ‘will’. Before we leave this passage altogether I think it is also worth mentioning, that 
Beckett’s own reference to vaudeville could in all likelihood still be reverberating with a 
distinct Schopenhauerian inflection. I say this because in Schopenhauer’s examination of 
music in Die Welt, he himself is eager to accentuate the genre of vaudeville:  
   Music, on the other hand, gives the innermost kernel preceding all 
  form, or the heart of things. This relation could very well be expre
  -ssed in the language of the scholastics by saying that the concepts 
  are the universalia post rem, but music gives the universalia ante rem, 
  and reality the universalia in re. Even other examples, just as arbitrarily
  chosen, of the universal expressed in a poem could correspond in the
  same degree to the general significance of the melody assigned to this
  poem; and so the same composition is suitable to many verses;
  hence also the vaudeville.
                                   (W.W.R.1., 263.)
It could very well be that the initial impetus for Beckett’s later exploitation of the vaudeville 
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19 Knowlson, J. and Pilling, J., Frescoes of the Skull (1979) London: John Calder (Publishers) Ltd., 31. 
20 !Money came from the blue eyes of home, and he spent it on concerts, cinemas, cocktails, 
theatres[...] But not on opera, never under any circumstances on opera, unless he was dragged, nor, 
after a bit, on brothels. Liebert forced him to see the. . . the Valkyrie à demi tarif. Une merveille  !  Only 
to be turned away. Belacqua laffed and laffed." D.F.M.W., 37.     
tradition was indeed, consolidated by his reading of Schopenhauer.21 Though the subject of 
vaudeville in Die Welt is raised only once, Schopenhauer clearly wanted his reader to take 
note of the genre, seeing it as no less worthy of discussion than opera or indeed  pantomime, 
which is itself mentioned in connection to opera. He emphasizes that ‘the universal language 
of music’ never becomes truly bound to the events unfolding on stage, but only stands to them 
‘in the relation of an example, chosen at random, to a universal concept.’22 And if one were 
still in need of further evidence of the way in which Schopenhauer dominates Beckett’s own 
critical assessment of Proust, we have only to consider the manner in which Beckett brings to 
a close his essay:
 
  The narrator-unlike Swan who identifies the 
  ‘little phrase’ of the Sonata with Odette, spatialises 
  what is extraspatial, establishes it as the national an-
  them of his love-sees in the red phrase of the
  Septuor, trumpeting its victory in the last move-
  ment like Mantegna archangel clothed in 
  scarlet, the ideal and immaterial statement of 
  the essence of a unique beauty, a unique world,
  the invariable world and beauty of Vinteuil,
  expressed timidly as a prayer, in the Sonata,
  imploringly, as an inspiration, in the Septuor,
  the ‘invisible reality that damns the life of the
  body on earth as a pensum and reveals the
  meaning of the word : ‘defunctus’.
                                                            (P., 93.)        
As we can see, Beckett is determined to see the narrator’s [Proust’s] victory over Swann in 
terms of his own ability to grasp the true significance of music, for unlike Swann, Proust can 
appreciate that reality, like music, is extraspatial; he fully recognizes that Swann’s attempts 
to deform the music of Vinteuil in order that it should denote the particularized subject of 
Odette is a clear and open confession of his failings as an artist.  Beckett depicts the ‘artist’ 
 here in terms which are not at all removed from Schopenhauer’s own conception of ‘genius’; 
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21 !For Schopenhauer, ![the possibility] of a relation between a composition [music] and a perceptive 
expression [words] [...] is due [...] to the fact that the two are simply quite different expressions of the 
same inner nature of the world" (WWR, I, 263). It is precisely in this connection, or rather in preparation 
of this judgement, that Schopenhauer speaks, for once and once only, of !vaudeville, a form which is 
implicitly situated by him at the opposite end of the spectrum to the position occupied by opera. Beckett 
had obviously remembered that Schopenhauer had alluded to vaudeville [...]! see, Pilling, J. !Proust and 
Schopenhauer" Bryden, M., Samuel Beckett and Music (1998): New York: Oxford University Press, 176.   
22 See, W.W.R.1., 263.  
in both cases the status of the artist rests upon an ability to see beyond the world of 
phenomenal division into a reality which is itself an expression of the ‘absolute’ space and 
undivided character of music. In order to consolidate this Schopenhauerian  picture, we have 
only to read Beckett’s own closing line to Proust: ‘the invisible reality that damns the life of 
the body on earth as a pensum and reveals the meaning of the word : ‘defunctus’.’ For as we 
have already seen from Beckett’s correspondence with McGreevy in 1930, ‘defunctus’ is a 
phrase which Beckett enthusiastically borrows from Schopenhauer:
  Life is a task to be worked off; in this sense defunctus is a fine 
  expression.     
                      (P.P.2., 300.)
It is not just defunctus that Beckett borrows in this instance; the whole idea relating to life as 
‘a task to be worked off’ is itself being carried over; for as we can see, Beckett enlists the 
services of the German word Pensum (work load/ quota); thus ensuring the integrity of the 
original Schopenhauerian setting.23 Having established what is most certainly a piece of 
writing whose shape has been significantly determined by Beckett’s own personal reading of 
Schopenhauer, I feel it is certainly worth exploring the possibility that such an influence 
extends to areas of Proust, passages which on first appearance seem to concede nothing to 
Schopenhauer’s writing. Take for instance Beckett’s own defensive stance over Proust’s 
writing style:
                                                     For Proust, as for the
  painter, style is more a question of vision than       
  of technique. Proust does not share the super-
  stition that form is nothing and content every-
  thing, nor that the ideal literary masterpiece 
  could only be communicated in a series of 
  absolute and monosyllabic propositions. For
  Proust the quality of language is more import-
  ant than any system of ethics or aesthetics. In-
  deed he makes no attempt to dissociate form
  from content. The one is a concretion of the
  other, the revelation of a world.
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                                        (P., 87-88)      
At first glance, Beckett’s remarks seems to be endorsing Proust’s own privileging of literary
style over his novel’s capacity to retain and exhibit a conscious document of events; that the 
innate truth of the novel is born out of style, rather than content:
    
  ‘You see, I believe that it is really only to involuntary memories that 
  the artist should go for the raw material of his work. First, precisely
  because they are involuntary and take shape of their own accord,
  drawn by the resemblance of some identical moment, they alone bear
  the hallmark of authenticity. Then, they bring things back to us in 
  exact proportions of memory and oblivion. And finally, since they
  give us to enjoy the same sensation in quite other circumstances, they
  release it from it all contingency, they give us its extratemporal essence,
  which is the very content of good style, that general and necessary 
  truth that the beauty of a style alone can reveal.’24 
        
As we can see, Beckett’s own account of style versus content in Proust fits comfortably with 
the author’s own estimation of style; in fact it is in this very summary of Du côté de chez 
Swann by Proust, that there appears to be an unswerving alliance between the opening 
paragraph of Beckett’s comments on style, and Proust’s closing remarks on Swann: 
  ‘Style is not at all a prettification as certain people think, it is not 
  even a matter of technique, it is- like colour with painters-  a quality 
  of vision, the revelation of the private universe that each one of us can 
  see and which others cannot see. The pleasure an artist affords us is
  to introduce us to one universe the more.’25
  
Just as Proust uses the dais of the artist’s palette to dispense his counterclaim, that style is not 
a matter of technique, we have Beckett also discussing style in an equally painterly manner, in 
which technique is also traded for vision. So when it comes to interpreting such a passage, it 
would appear that we need not look any further than Proust himself. But what I would say,
having already looked at the possibility that Beckett was seeing in Proust an emerging 
symbiosis with Schopenhauer, is that we could try to bring a Schopenhauerian dimension to 
this picture. In fact Beckett’s own focus on Proust avoiding the distinction between form and 
matter, alongside his insistence that the quality of language was more important than any 
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24 Proust, M., Against Sainte-Beuve And Other Essays, trans. Sturrock, J. (1988) London: Penguin 
Books Ltd., 235-236. 
25 Ibid., 236.  
system of ethics, could be regarded in one sense as an aesthetic reconfiguration of the ‘will’. 
There is a parallel here between the way in which Beckett represents the 
language of Proust, that is, as something which permits of no demarcation between what it 
represents and that which it is textually, and Schopenhauer’s depiction of ‘will’, which is also
 blind to the distinction between what it represents and what it is. 
Also, as we can appreciate with Schopenhauer’s model of the ‘will’, there is simply no 
legroom for ethics outside the limited scope of minimizing suffering. As Christopher Janaway 
states, ‘In Schopenhauer’s view, the ethical sphere parallels the aesthetic in that prescriptive 
rules, and conceptual thought in general, are not the essential thing’.26 
But there is indeed, I believe, a further consideration to be made in our attempt to draw 
Beckett’s examination of literary form and content into the orbit of Schopenhauer; it all 
comes down to the fact that Beckett closes his book of criticism, with the phrase ‘defunctus’. 
For with this Schopenhauerian ‘signing off’ from Proust there can be no mistaking the fact 
that Beckett had been consulting Schopenhauer’s collective body of essays used in support of 
‘the main work’: Parerga und Paralipomena. And it is also the case that among the many 
essays making up Parerga und Paralipomena, there is one with the underwhelming title: On 
Authorship and Style; its opening sentence reads:       
 First there are two kinds of authors, those who write for the sake
 of the subject and those who write for the sake of writing.
                                                                                  (P.P.2., 501.)
With this opening sentence, Schopenhauer goes on to explain to the reader what in essence 
comprises a worthy book, but in order to answer this he asserts one should first come to 
appreciate where the value of the book is located; and for Schopenhauer it is simple, either it 
is the subject-matter or it is the form. It is precisely the same debate that Beckett raises in 
relation to Proust, for with Schopenhauer, like Beckett and Proust, it is form which supports 
the true artistic character of the book, conveying ‘intelligence, judgement, wit and vivacity’ 
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whereas subject-matter is merely empirical stuffing:27
  If, therefore, a book is famous, we should carefully note       
  whether it is so on account of the subject-matter or of the form.
  In virtue of the subject-matter, quite ordinary and shallow men
  may produce very important works, since to them alone was
  such matter accessible; for example description of distant 
  countries, rare natural phenomena, experiments, historical
  events which they witnessed or in connection with which they
  spent much time and went to a great deal of trouble in searching
  and specially studying the sources. On the other hand, where it 
  is a question of the form, since the subject-matter is accessible 
  or even very well known to every-one; and thus where only the 
  essence of the thought concerning the matter can give value to 
  the work, then only the eminent mind is capable of producing 
  something worth reading.
                                                  (P.P.2., 506.)  
           
As we can see from the essay, Schopenhauer links a book’s subject-matter with everything 
that epitomizes worldly phenomena, its measurable objectivity, its geography, its history; that 
is to say, everything that Schopenhauer identifies with the illusory nature of the world. So it 
is therefore clear that the subject-matter of a book from Schopenhauer’s perspective is equally 
insubstantial. Whereas form for Schopenhauer encompasses what appears to be the opposite 
of a book’s subject-matter, namely the essence of the author’s thoughts; something which is 
capable of communicating the essential character of the author.
Knowing that Beckett had read Parerga und Paralipomena from the indelible mark it has left 
on Proust, it would be quite astonishing to think, when it came to composing this passage on 
‘form’ and ‘content’, that his thoughts remained solely on Proust. For I suspect that an essay 
written by Schopenhauer, which is explicitly on this subject, would most certainly have 
featured in his thinking. Therefore, the way in which Beckett has gone about constructing 
Proust, leads me to think that in Beckett’s mind Proust himself was in some way becoming 
an artistic warrant for Schopenhauer. The extent to which Beckett had been directly affected 
by this seemingly innocuous essay, I believe cannot be overestimated, for I would 
suggest, that we for just one moment turn our attention to a series of earlier paragraphs from 
the same essay:
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  The characteristic feature is to be found in the object; and 
  so the book can be important whoever its author may be.    
  On the other hand, with regards to the What of a book,    
  the characteristic feature is to be found in the author, the subject.
  The matter dealt with can be those that are accessible and 
  known to everyone; but the form of interpretation, the What of  
  the thinking, here imparts value to the book and is to be found
  in the subject (the author). And so if from this point of view a
  book is excellent and incomparable, so too is its author.  It
  follows from this that the merit of an author who is worth 
  reading is the greater, the less this is due to the subject-matter
  and hence the better known and more hackneyed this is. Thus,
  for instance, the three great Greek tragedians have all worked
  at the same subject-matter.
                                          (P.P.2., 506.)       
In this tightly-knit passage we have the appearance of what I believe can be described as the 
sub-cellular apparatus, which will later give rise to Beckett’s own distinct approach to 
literature, and indeed to his art as a whole. Let us for a moment, follow Schopenhauer’s 
instructions, namely that the book we intend to produce should be withdrawn from the usual 
pressure to fill it with an assorted range of descriptive subject-matter; and instead, our efforts 
should be refocused towards revealing the imaginative undercurrent driving the authorial 
process. 
This it would seem is what Schopenhauer is trying to get at; for when reading Parerga und 
Paralipomena we should always be put in mind of the fact, that these essays are not just a 
ragtag collection of intellectual musings, but are intended by the author to support and 
supplement his main opus; Die Welt. Schopenhauer always intended Parerga und 
Paralipomena, to be read in full knowledge of Die Welt, in the expectation that his reader 
would be in a position not only to comprehend what he was saying about a particular subject, 
be it political, social or artistic; but that each and every subject dealt in Parerga und 
Paralipomena, should itself be further addressed in relation to what coincides with Wille, and 
what coincides with Vorstellung. So, once we become attuned to this programme, we can, I 
believe, in full confidence identify subject-matter with ‘Vorstellung’ and style, with ‘Wille’.   
Already we can see the first murmurings of what could be described as a ‘Beckettian’ 
overture to the novel, in which the novel is completely taken over by a duty to strip out, or 
deride anything that that is vaguely attached to objective, material investment, including, one 
presumes, that most vigorous nod to causality, the book’s own plot. As we have already 
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established, Schopenhauer’s philosophical aesthetic approach is never about contemplating 
‘the where, the when, the why, and the whither in things, but simply and solely the what.’  
And as we can see from On Authorship and Style, it is also the what of the book which should 
be the primary concern for any author; for unlike the ‘when’, the ‘why’ and the ‘whither’, the 
what as Schopenhauer says, ‘ceases to follow under the guidance of the form’s sufficient 
reason’. Instead of trying to look outside ourselves for the subject of the book, we should 
instead go no further than ourselves, for the what is to found in the very subject: the author. 
So the very idea of a book training its focus on the what, is itself a consolidated effort not to 
allow, in Schopenhauer’s words, ‘abstract thought, the concept of reason’ [to] ‘take
 possession of our consciousness, but, instead, devote the whole power of our mind to 
perception’.28 By drawing attention to this essay, we can see precisely how 
Schopenhauer chooses to characterize literature, and where he sees its true value lying; 
something which I suspect can tell us a great deal about Beckett’s own revised approach to 
the novel, particularly with his ongoing struggle to strip back, all that he deemed as 
superfluous to the novel. But it is also the very character of the language in the essay which I 
believe has just as important a bearing on Beckett’s literature. For instance, it cannot 
have escaped our attention that ‘what’ as a linguistic stress is given privileged stature within 
Beckett’s own oeuvre; and in some cases such as What Where and Watt actually comprise the 
title of the work itself. In fact it is quite possible in my view that Beckett’s own decision to 
call his novel Watt, was largely keyed as a response to Schopenhauer’s own characterization 
of the ‘novel’, that its value should reside in the what; for we would be hard pushed to think 
of a more fitting title for a novel which was intent on flaunting its Schopenhauerian 
credentials.29 The Schopenhauerian grain which emerged from underneath the Mauntherin 
patination covering the rungs of Arsene’s ladder, can be applied just as equally to the Kantian 
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29 !The present philosophy, at any rate, by no means attempts to say whence or for what purpose the 
world exists, but merely what the world is. But here [in Die Welt] the Why is subordinated to the What, 
for it already belongs to the world, as it springs merely from the form of its phenomenon[...]", W.W.R.1., 
82.        
construction of Watt.30 Only in this instance it is Schopenhauer who forms the patination over 
Kant. For as we will remember in the introduction to this thesis Schopenhauer himself makes 
no distinction between a Kantian philosophy and a Schopenhauerian one, for him there is only 
a ‘Kantian-Schopenhauerian’ philosophy; leading Brian Magee to remark ‘the clearest way to 
explain Schopenhauer is to begin with Kant.’31 And so I believe, rather than revealing the 
Kantian dimension of Watt, in terms which relate purely to Kant, as for instance we see with 
J.P Murphy (Watt is a Kantian novel32) we should instead appreciate Kant in this much 
broader Schopenhauerian context; in which Kant’s presence actually reveals the full extent to 
which Watt is  truly Schopenhauerian. But as I hope we are now beginning to appreciate, in 
order to be fully ‘Schopenhauerian’, there can be no direct ownership over any philosophical 
position. For Schopenhauer it is not about adding anything new, but rather participating in 
what is already there.33 So, with Schopenhauer, it is not so much about swapping Kant’s 
philosophy for his own, but rather allowing Kant to emerge, fully aware that one will 
eventually have to acknowledge a point at which even Kant’s philosophy will fall silent, 
and that any attempt to move the philosophy further forward in a quest for answers will result 
in deformity, not clarity. It is at the point in which Kant falls silent that we can say 
Schopenhauer emerges from underneath him. As Brian Magee insightfully suggests in his 
account of Schopenhauer’s philosophy (or we could say more appropriately 
Schopenhauer’s approach towards philosophy) ‘a central characteristic of Schopenhauer’s 
writing is that he is not only himself aware of the status and limitations of whatever 
arguments are available, and also of the one he happens to be using, but he keeps the reader 
well reminded of them too. In general he is a scrupulous and interesting arguer, and he argues 
everything, not taking anything on trust and not expecting us to do so either.[...] The central 
point here, put badly, is that no argument can add to our information[...] valid arguments and 
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30 Oppo, A., Philosophical Aesthetics and Samuel Beckett (1994)Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang, 13-14.   
31  Magee, B., Wagner and Philosophy (2000) London: Penguin Books Ltd., 152.
32 Oppo, A., op.cit., 13. 
33 !They [clear arguments] are prodigiously useful, because they enable us to catch and hold all the 
implications of whatever we start out from, but they do not add empirically to what we start out from." 
See, Magee, B., The Philosophy of Schopenhauer (1983) New York: Oxford University Press, 38.  
proofs are the empty vessels of reason.’ So in order to genuinely appreciate what is 
Schopenhauerian in Beckett’s writing we have to look beyond what is masquerading as a 
formal theoretical construction, whose philosophical tag lines are at time displayed just as 
shamelessly as the reproductive organs of Proust’s flowers,  and instead, take note of the 
conditions and circumstances in which we find them. For instance the fact that we have 
‘Kant’ as it were, in the presence of so much music in Watt, should alone tell us that this 
is no straight-forward ‘Kantian novel’. For just as Schopenhauer had taken the unusual step of 
including a printed musical score in his philosophical treatise (something which to Magee’s 
best knowledge had never previously been done before by any of the other philosophical 
‘greats34’), Beckett takes upon himself a similarly inspired  move with Watt; allowing the text 
of his novel to coexist with the notes and staves of musical notation.  So, to return briefly to 
Schopenhauer’s essay On Authorship and Style, we can now relate this title to what I see as an 
even stronger consolidation towards Schopenhauer. As one might expect from Schopenhauer, 
his opinion of the ‘book’ does not just rest with its contents, it encompasses its whole identity, 
including the title: 
  What the address is to a letter, the title should be to a book;
  and so its primary object should be to bring the book to the
  notice of those members of the public who may be interested in
  its contents. The title should, therefore, be descriptive; and as
  it is essentially brief, it should be concise, laconic, pregnant,
  and if possible, a monogram of the contents. Accordingly, those
  titles are bad which are lengthy, meaningless, ambiguous,
  obscure, or even false and misleading, which last may involve 
  their book in the same fate that overtakes a wrongly addressed        
  letter.
                   (P.P.2., 505.)
Again if we compare Schopenhauer’s instruction with the manner in which Beckett 
approaches his own book titles, there appears to be a clear unity between the two positions. 
For instance Schopenhauer’s idea that a title should be concise, laconic, pregnant, and if 
possible a monogram of the contents, fits Beckett’s titles to the letter. Also Schopenhauer’s 
own emphasis on the necessity of making the title brief, could not be better realized than in 
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the works of Beckett, we just have to think of such titles as: Murphy, Watt, First Love, 
Mercier and Camier, Molloy, Mallone Dies, The Unnamable, Imagination Dead Imagine, to 
see how unaltered this pattern remains throughout his writing career, not just in novels, but 
in his dramatic work also, for instance Waiting for Godot, Endgame, Rockaby and Not I. If we 
were to imagine a book having a postal address which takes you directly to its central 
location, then Beckett delivers on this brief every time. Even when we take into account 
Beckett’s first novel with what seems, compared to the later titles, the relatively long Dream 
of Fair to Middling Women, it does in fact sum up the book’s meaning in a very exact way. 
So, returning to the title of Watt, there is in my own opinion no better example of a book 
meeting these Schopenhauerian criteria, for let’s just think about this for one moment. A book 
called Watt is itself a monogram of the entire book, it not only names the main character, it 
actually points to both the Ding an sich and the very approach which will always be doomed 
to misrepresent it.35 For ‘What’ is the thing-in-itself, but at the same time it is the very 
question which will remove you from its reality. It is both you, and not you in the same 
breath; you are it, while not it in any corporeal sense. So in every ounce of the term we have 
both the ‘Not I’ as well as the Weltknoten- the knot of the world.36 For Watt is an incarnation 
of both subjectivity, possessing no corporeal reality, and the flip side, pointing in the opposite 
direction, straight towards an acting material body. Therefore one could view the title as a 
performance of Schopenhauer’s ‘miracle par excellence’ albeit in form of a pun. Also, when it 
comes to Beckett’s own characterization of Watt’s relationship with Mr Knott, I believe it is 
Schopenhauer’s Weltknoten that provides the overarching commentary on such a relationship; 
for just think of his evasive landlord’s name: Knott!:
        
      
  Watt had no direct dealings with Mr Knott, at this
  period. Not that Watt was ever to have any direct dealings   
  with Mr Knott, for he was not.
                                             (Watt., 64.) 
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Dong" the interchangeable identity of the !Will! in terms of both Ding an sich (Ding) and music (Dong).   
36 ![...] the world is an absolute !Not I", and its relation to it an originally hostile one." Helen Zimmern 
quoting Schopenhauer, see Zimmern, H., Arthur Schopenhauer, op.cit., 234. 
So even on the level of the novel’s title I believe there can be a case made in support of the 
notion that Schopenhauer’s thinking is in some way being openly acknowledged by Beckett.
Having looked at the way in which Beckett uses his examination of Proust in order to make a 
Schopenhauerian declaration towards art, I would like to further move this consideration 
towards the idea that Beckett, in Proust, actually lays out a Schopenhauerian-inspired 
programme, in which all art must have a direct path to the suffering subject:
    
  The Proustian world is expressed metaphor
             -ically by the artisan because it is apprehended 
             metaphorically by the artist: the indirect and 
             comparative expression of indirect and compa
             -rative perception. The rhetorical equivalent of 
             the Proustian real is the chain-figure of the 
             metaphor. It is a tiring style, but it does not tire 
             the mind. The clarity of the phrase is cumulative 
             and explosive. One’s fatigue is a fatigue of the 
             heart, a blood fatigue. One is exhausted and angry
  after an hour, submerged, dominated by the 
  crest and break of metaphor after metaphor:
  but never stupefied. 
                           (P., 88.)
For I would like to propose that in this passage from Proust, Beckett is deliberately saddling 
universal suffering, in the form of the ‘artisan’, with that which stands in relation to the artist, 
which in the Schopenhauerian and Proustian sense falls directly upon the idea of aesthetic 
‘apprehension’. Therefore in relation to this construction the ‘body’ expresses suffering in its 
most direct form, and the artist who is bound to the artisan, is able to apprehend it in a way 
capable of breaking its indomitable chain of cause and effect. In one sense Beckett is 
revisiting the ‘artisan poet’, readily evoking the likes of Leopold Bloom or even Hans 
Sachs; but clearly from Beckett’s point of view the very thought of connecting this ‘artisan 
poet’ to the production of symphonic art, is the last thing on his mind. For the art Beckett is 
clearly pursuing is not at all symphonic, in fact its purpose is to reverse the symphonic trend 
which is so conspicuous both in Wagner’s and Joyce’s work. Instead, as we can see in Proust, 
Beckett wants his art to correspond to the entire depletion of desire, leaving behind only the 
pure subject. Another interesting way in which we can contrast Beckett’s own ideas relating to 
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the synthesis of ‘artisan’ and ‘artist’ in Proust is by bringing to bear another celebrated 
example, in which the artistic ideal is raised in connection to the complete circumvention of 
the ‘author’s’ innate passions: T.S. Eliot’s essay Tradition and the Individual Talent. In this 
essay Eliot describes the artist’s mind as being analogous to a catalyst, facilitating a chemical 
reaction without itself being changed in the process:
 
   The analogy was that of the catalyst. When the two 
  gasses previously mentioned are mixed in the presence of a              
  filament of platinum, they form sulphurous acid. This
  combination takes place only if the platinum is present;
  nevertheless the newly formed acid contains no trace of
  platinum, and the platinum itself is apparently unaffected:
  has remained inert, neutral, and unchanged. The mind of
  the poet is the shred of platinum. It may partly or exclu-
  sively operate upon the experience of the man himself; but,
  the more perfect the artist, the more completely separate in
  him will be the man who suffers and the mind which
  creates; the more perfectly will the mind digest and trans-
  mute the passions which are its material.37      
As we can see from Eliot’s description of the ‘poet’ there is an attempt to locate the most 
accomplished ‘poetry’ in response to a contraction and even complete separation of suffering 
in the subject creating the work. As Beckett writes in Proust ‘The rhetorical equivalent of the 
Proustian real is the chain-figure of the metaphor. It is a tiring style, but does not tire the 
mind.’(ref ?) Both Beckett and Eliot, it seems, want to envisage a mode of artistic production 
which remains immune to mental expenditure. But whereas Eliot constructs an artistic 
identity which ‘digests’ and ‘transmutes’ the passions, allowing the subject to divorce him- or 
herself  from the world of the ‘artisan’, there is, I believe, with Beckett no such attempt to 
address suffering by way of an alchemical route in which the artist is in a position to break 
down or change the fundamental character of suffering. Instead, as we have already 
established in Proust, Beckett’s own approach to suffering rests upon the idea of ‘perception’ 
and therefore there can be no ‘manipulation’ of suffering, or to be more precise, the reality 
which embodies suffering. For Beckett, in my view, never actually entertains the idea of 
removing suffering in relation to the artistic identity; in fact in many ways I see him doing the 
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very opposite to Eliot. For it appears to me that what Beckett is actually describing in Proust 
is the ‘artist’  (the ‘artist’ epitomized by Marcel staring at the apple blossom) conjoining with 
the ‘artisan’; that is to say Beckett is describing a vision of art in which the ‘artist’ is brought 
directly within the location of suffering. But crucially with Beckett’s aesthetic scheme, 
suffering or the reality pertaining to suffering is brought under the ‘perception’ of the ‘artist’ 
who is capable of seeing beyond the illusion of causal necessity.  Therefore, for me, Beckett’s, 
artistic vision has more to do with evoking Schopenhauer’s description of suffering as a part 
of nature which resides beyond the framing of the principium individuationis, than with 
Eliot’s idea of breaking down the fundamental structure of suffering, which latter idea I 
suspect Beckett would have viewed as not only impossible, but even naive: 
                                                        At the same time, we reflect that 
  each of these masterpieces, itself of short duration, has already      
  been produced afresh an infinite number of times, and that never-
  theless each specimen of its kind, every insect, every flower, every
  leaf, still appears just as carefully perfected as was the first of its
  species. We therefore observe that nature by no means wearies or
  begins to bungle, but that with equally patient master-hand she
  perfects the last as the first. If we bear all this in mind, we become
  aware first that all human art or skill is completely different, not
  merely in degree but in kind, from the creation of nature, and also
  that the operating, original force, the natura naturans is immediately
  present whole and undivided in each of its innumerable works, in 
  the smallest as in the largest, in the last as in the first. From this it
  follows that the natura naturans, as such and in itself, knows nothing
  of space and time. Further, we bear in mind that the production of 
  those hyperboles of all the works of skill nevertheless costs nature
  absolutely nothing[...]
                              (W.W.R.2., 322)
As we can see, Beckett’s own description in Proust, of ‘a tiring style, but it does not tire the 
mind’ also plays directly into Schopenhauer’s own description of nature never wearying or 
bungling; for like Schopenhauer, Beckett only regards the individual organism becoming 
unstuck (‘One’s fatigue is a fatigue of the heart, a blood fatigue’) rather than nature as a 
whole.  What is more, if we read further on in relation to this particular passage, the whole 
issue relating to the ‘natural’ conception of writing is further reinforced by our knowledge 
that Beckett moves straight from the subject of literary style and into botanical framing.        
For when it comes to addressing Proust’s detractors, Beckett seems to be implying that their 
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frustration with A la recherche, is born out of an inability to bring to the work the required 
‘artistic’ frame of mind. For Beckett, they lack the ability to remove from their 
own reading of Proust a desire to construct the work in terms of personal objectives, and so 
inevitably view the book’s disinvestment in willful motivation, especially as it is summed up 
in the character of Marcel, as symptomatic of the novel’s weakness, rather than its undoubted 
strength. Also I would further suggest that the usual criticism levelled at 
A la recherche’s exasperating length, unjustifiably promoting ‘an involved style, full of 
periphrasis’38, is itself an emphatic signal to Beckett, that such critical thinking remains bound 
to an aesthetic appreciation which is remorselessly in the grip of the principium 
individuationis. It is now with this same unappreciated artistic vision, the vision Beckett saw 
being woefully misreported by the detractors of Proust, that I would like to turn to Beckett’s 
first completed play, Eleuthéria.        
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                                                        CHAPTER TWO
               
             
                               The Will and its Theatrical Interrogation
  ‘Beckett asked me what I was currently teaching at the university. 
  As it happened, that day I had been conducting a seminar on the theatre 
  of Jean-Paul Sartre. So I talked about Sartre’s philosophy, arguing from 
  my own perspective, we were too firmly en situation ( too limited by our situation) 
  for the existentialist’s emphasis on human freedom to have a lot of meaning. 
  Beckett agreed enthusiastically with this objection, saying that he found the actual 
  limitations on man’s freedom of action (his genes, his upbringing, his social
  circumstances) far more compelling than the theoretical freedom on which
  Sartre had laid so much stress.’          
                                                       James Knowlson.
When it comes to the subject of freedom in Beckett, what better place to begin than his first 
completed  play, whose title is taken directly from the ancient Greek word for freedom; 
Eleuthéria. Originally written in French in 1947,1 and published only in 1995;2 Beckett’s 
early attempts to exploit the potential of the theatre had by all accounts arisen from his need 
to relieve himself from, as he puts it, ‘the awful depression the prose led me into.’3 
So having named his play ‘Freedom’, could it be that the title was intended to evoke his 
own attempts to escape the depression he was encountering with his prose?  For in this 
context we can appreciate the idea of freedom not with reference to ‘existential projection’ but 
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1 In 1945 the first and second volume of Jean-Paul Sartre!s Le Cheminis de la Liberté (Roads to 
Freedom) trilogy was published by Gaston Gallimard, the same publisher of Nausea (1938), but also 
importantly the same publisher behind Les Temps Modernes (established by Sartre and Simone de 
Beauvoir) the literary journal who Beckett himself regularly contributed to, including extracts from his 
own Trilogy. See, respectively Priest, S., Jean Paul Sartre: Basic Writings (2001) London: Routledge, 
334. and Shane Weller "Post-World War Two Paris!,Uhlmann, A., Samuel Beckett in Context, op.cit., 
161-163.     
2 As Katharine Worth states “Following the success of Waiting for Godot, Beckett withdrew Eleutheria, 
refusing requests to publish it or produce it. After his death, to great controversy, it was published in 
1995 in the original French (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit) and in an English translation, Eleuthéria, by 
Michael Brodsky (New York: Foxrock Inc.).” Worth, K., Samuel Beckett!s Theatre: Life Journeys (1999) 
New York: Oxford University Press, 180.      
3 Bair, D., Samuel Beckett : A Biography (1990) New York: Summit Books Inc., 361. 
rather simply as the omission of suffering. Eleuthéria responds explicitly to the obstacles 
which Beckett raises in relation to the limits imposed on human freedom, that is to say genes, 
upbringing, and social circumstances. For unlike Beckett’s later plays, Eleuthéria is in part 
disconcertingly held within the normative spatial framing of a drawing-room play; as 
Knowlson remarked about the first Act: ‘Beckett tends to rely more on parodying the 
mechanics of bourgeois comedy than than on parodying the characters themselves, whom he 
sketches in with only the thinnest of caricatural lines.’4  The characters which were intended 
to grace the stage had deliberately been given a low resolution, for the lack of formal 
definition he sought in Dream of Fair to Middling Women would have appeared to him, in my 
view, equally appropriate for the stage. In fact, it seems to me clear that Beckett wrote 
Eleuthéria with the express purpose of making it as ‘sketchy’ or as ‘light’ as possible. So in 
the first act, as we have established, Beckett openly complies with the conventional 
arrangement of bourgeoise naturalistic theatre.5 There is for instance, the familiar ‘drawing’ or 
as Beckett describes ‘morning’ room in which the scene is set to receive the usual filial 
hierarchy (M., Mme., Mademoiselle, and even the good Doctor, who is related to the family)  
and so it is in this sense that we have all the explicit elements which Knowlson’s conversation 
with Beckett picks up on: genes, upbringing and social circumstances. These constraining 
factors on human freedom are very much in play in Eleuthéria, a burden which is further 
extenuated by the family Christian name: Krap. For it seems that Beckett has deliberately 
chosen the name in order to represent family legacies in general as a form of fecal production; 
amounting literally to nothing more than what the name implies on its basest level. Having 
identified the way in which this bourgeoise picture has already faltered, there is of course one 
conspicuous omission from this scale of filial ascent, namely the son, whose whole role is 
vital if this ‘Krap’ legacy is to have any future. Though having said M. Krap’s son is absent, 
his absence relates only to one part of the stage: the part which is assigned to social 
respectability and naturalistic representation; the ‘morning-room’. The son Victor, though not 
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4 Knowlson, J. and Pilling, J., Frescoes of the Skull ( 1979) London: John Calder (Publishers) Ltd., 27. 
5 !The opening scene, in which three middle - age women recount their afflictions, recalls the Human 
Wishes fragment[...]" See Cohn, R., Just Play,op.cit.,167.   
physically partitioned from the morning-room, takes up residency on the other side of the 
stage, where there appears to be no such  adherence to period detail, an area consisting of 
simply a bare floor and wall on which a nondescript folding bedstead is located. So it would 
clearly appear that Beckett is using the stage to articulate both mimetic and anti-mimetic 
values. 6 In Eleuthéria, one could say, mimesis arrives in the form of bourgeois theatrical 
observance, and anti-mimesis in the form of everything that stands to undermine all those 
naturalistic practices which come immediately attached to bourgeois theatrical standards.7 
Such theatrical practices anticipate a character’s development in relation to an accepted social 
and historical background, and, in turn, the motivation of that character will unfold with 
explicit reference to such a background. As we can see in  Eleuthéria, Victor has, unlike the 
rest of his ‘family’, become completely detached from such a programme: 
 VICTOR    What?
                     (Michel turns on the light)
 GLAZIER  I am asking you what merit you
                     have rotting in this hole 
 
 VICTOR     I do not know.
 GLAZIER  I do not know, I do not know. Ah!
                     go hide in a corner.
 VICTOR    I would like to.
 GLAZIER  (To Michel) Give me the tape
                     measure.
 
 MICHEL   But you are the one who has it,
                     Monsieur.
 GLAZIER  (Thunderingly) No, I am not the
                      one who has it! (To Victor) Where
                      do you draw the courage and
                      strength to evict old ladies, with
                      the pokes of an umbrella?
 VICTOR     I look out for my welfare, when I
                      can.
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6 As Katharine Worth points out !Beckett"s note in the text spells out the importance to him of the 
awkwardness and oddity of the divided set. He intends it to be seen as a serious exploration of !real 
space"[...]" see, Worth, K., Samuel Beckett!s Theatre, op.cit, 32. 
7 As Shane Weller adroitly remarks !Eleutheria is at once a history and a rejection of the theatre of 
representation", Weller, S., A Taste for the Negative: Beckett and Nihilism (2005) London: Modern 
Humanities Research Association and Maney Publishing, 118.      
 GLAZIER  Your welfare! What welfare?
 
 VICTOR    My freedom.
 GLAZIER  Your freedom! It is beautiful your
                        freedom. Freedom to do what?
                        
 VICTOR    To do nothing.
                                          (E., Act 11., 88-89.)             
 
Again we appreciate that from Beckett’s point of view, this ‘detachment’ represents another 
form of freedom, one  which is deserving of the notion of a ‘victory’, hence the thinking 
behind his stage character’s name ‘Victor’. But crucially it is also a victory which can only 
be fully understood in relation to Beckett’s own Schopenhauerian thinking. For instance, what 
is it about the ‘morning-room’ which is so at odds with the space that Victor has managed 
to secure for himself ? If we start by addressing the most obvious difference, the space in 
which Victor resides is stripped of all material investment. There are no personal possessions,
 no furniture apart from a solitary folding bedstead, whereas by contrast the morning room, 
possesses an ornate table, four period chairs, an armchair, a floor lamp and a sconce. Knowing 
about Beckett’s own close reading of Schopenhauer, and the degree to which such reading had 
evidently entered into both his thinking as well as his writing, then clearly the ‘morning-
room’ is being positioned as a catchment area which extols the value of the phenomenal. As 
its name suggests, it is a room emblematic of ‘light’ and ‘day’ and therefore, in a 
Schopenhauerian sense, it supports that most unreliable apparatus, the human senses. On the 
other hand, we can see that Victor does everything in his power to ensure that the room he 
occupies remains in state of perpetual gloom, and as a living space it has nothing to offer the 
senses.8 It is the ‘morning-room’ which holds to the phenomenal character of the world, its 
identity being a reflection of the spatial and temporal division that has spawned generation 
after generation, and whose movement remains bound to an incessant programme of cause 
and effect, and, by extension, suffering. The world of Victor’s family is positively at sea with  
‘where’s’, ‘when’s’ and ‘why’s’, a series of interrogatory items which implicitly represent the 
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8 According to realism, the world is supposed to exist[...] see, W.W.R.2, 9-10.  
very subject which Victor refuses to be drawn on. For in a Schopenhauerian context, where 
these very semantic items come under symbolic scrutiny, we can understand precisely why 
Victor is so unwilling to provide the Glazier with answers as to why he has chosen to isolate 
himself from his family and withdraw completely from all social responsibility. Victor is even 
prepared to do this, when this insistent questioning is backed up with threats of torture, not 
only from other characters on stage, but also at the hands of the audience, who are themselves 
portrayed by Beckett, as just as exasperated by Victor’s refusal to justify his actions as any of 
his fellow-characters. For if Victor genuinely wants to embody the Schopenhauerian ideal, 
then his refusal to speak up does not just rest in relation to his efforts to spurn society, but 
more fundamentally, it is a complete refusal to participate in what he sees as the underlying 
structure of the ‘will’s’ causal identity, even on the level of language itself.9 For what is 
crucial to both Beckett and Victor, is not that he holds back from divulging a specific question 
in relation to his personal identity, but that he holds back from the questioning, because the 
questioning itself carries with it the identity of the ‘will’. And so, as I see it, Victor’s refusal to 
engage with his ‘interrogators’ is part and parcel of  his own effort to withdraw from the 
‘will’.10 All the deflected ‘whats’, ‘wheres’, ‘whys’ and ‘whens’ are to my mind a measure of 
Victor’s own show of resistance towards his own ‘will’. At this point in our examination of 
Eleuthéria I feel it is important that we should look more closely at the scene in which the 
audience appeals directly to Victor, urging him to reveal why he exists the way he does:
 VICTOR                           It’s a life-
 AUDIENCE MEMBER  Sorry. One moment. You’re speak-
                                            ing now of your very own life? Not
                                            of ours nor that of the bees?
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9 !The nature of man consists in the fact that his will strives, is satisfied, strives anew, and so on and 
on[...]", W.W.R.1., 260.  
10 Outside its Schopenhauerian identity, as an image the !interrogation! supports a wider series of 
images connected with the interrogations synonymous with the Gestapo, but also importantly to the 
arrests and debriefings undergone by the !Gloria" resistance network whom Beckett was a part of during 
the Second World War. “It was on the basis of his involvement in Gloria SMH that Beckett was 
interviewed at the War Office in April 1945 [i.e. two years before writing Eleuthéria.] The details of his 
“interrogation” remained classified until 2003[...]” see, Laura Salisbury “Resistances: Samuel Beckett"s 
language of power in war and peace” The Times Literary Supplement (6 September 2013), 14-15.       
 VICTOR                           Of mine.
 AUDIENCE MEMBER  Capital.
 VICTOR                           It’s a life eaten up by its freedom.
 GLAZIER                        What if we killed him? How would
                                            that do for curtains?
 AUDIENCE MEMBER  Let’s be patient a little longer. (To 
                                            Victor) Go on.                         
 VICTOR                           It won’t take a minute. I’ve always
                                            wanted to be free. I don’t know
                                            why. Nor do I know what it means,
                                            to be free. You could tear out all
                                            my fingernails and I still couldn’t 
                                            tell you. But far away from the words I
                                            know what it is. I’ve always desired 
                                            it. I still desire it. I desire only 
                                            that. First I was the prisoner of 
                                            others. So I left them. Then I was 
                                            the prisoner of self. That was 
                                            worse. So I left myself. (Wanders)
                                            (A silence)
 AUDIENCE MEMBER  But this is enthralling. How does
                                            one leave oneself?
 VICTOR                           What? 
                                               (E., Act 111., 162-163)
As we can see, having exhausted the patience of the glazier the audience is still determined 
to extract an answer from Victor as to why he refuses to participate in an active sense towards 
the play, though when it comes to an eventual reply, it only prompts further questions from 
the audience. But if we take the trouble to look at Victor’s response, we can trace a path 
through his explanation which chimes directly with Schopenhauer’s own portrayal of genius 
moving beyond the realm of plurality and change:
  Now as this demands a complete forgetting of our own person 
  and of its relations and connexions, the gift of genius is nothing but 
  the most complete objectivity, i.e., the objective tendency of the 
  mind, as opposed to the subjective directed to our own person, i.e., 
  to the will. Accordingly, genius is the capacity to remain in a state 
  of pure perception, to lose oneself in perception, to remove from the 
  service of the will the knowledge which originally existed only for 
  this service. In other words, genius is the ability to leave entirely out 
  of sight our own interest, our willing, and our aims, and consequently 
  to discard entirely our own personality for a time, in order to remain pure
  knowing subject, the clear eye of the world; and this not merely for
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  moments, but with the necessary continuity and conscious thought
  to enable us to repeat by deliberate art what has been apprehended,
  and “what in wavering apparition gleams fix in its place with thoughts
  that stand for ever!”11
                           (W.W.R.1., 185-186.)  
As we can see in both the Beckett and Schopenhauer extracts above, the ‘victory’ which is 
held out to the human subject centres on an idea of being able to leave behind his or her 
individual recognition, and extricate themselves from all colloquies relating to time, place, 
cause and effect. Also, as we can gauge from Victor’s response, Beckett moves his idealized 
freedom outside a linguistic response ( ‘But far away from words I know what it is.’) and 
therefore, like Schopenhauer, he does not make the mistake of assuming that the reality 
pertaining to the indivisible structure of the world prompts one to say anything on the subject. 
This ‘victory’ only be realized through what Schopenhauer describes as ‘pure perception’ 
rather than what we understand by common perception, which is immediately susceptible to 
abstract manipulation, thus making itself, as it were, instantly amenable to the ‘glazier’s tape 
measure’ i.e. the formal geometry of the phenomenal world.12        
As always with the subject of ‘desire’ in a Schopenhauerian context, it seems to be the point 
at which everything unravels, for it is desire which delivers the subject over to a programme 
of ‘willful’ suffering, desire is the ‘will’ brought into an objectified focus. So somewhat 
paradoxically we can see that Beckett frames Victor’s idealized vision of breaking through the 
principium individuationis in terms of a desire; which in itself appears to undermine his 
whole aesthetic scheme. 
Interrogating the Will under Stage Lighting. 
Victor’s attempt to reject the formal geometry of the phenomenal world insists that his vision 
alone of a world without that geometry is the only desire he possesses; it thus purports to be 
an unspeakably isolated act of  defiance, which does not constitute a chain of desire, because, 
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11 Schopenhauer quoting from Goethe!s Faust, Bayard Taylor!s translation. 
12 "He accepts regretfully the sacred ruler and compass of literary geometry. But he will refuse to extend 
his submission to spatial scales[...] "., P., 12.  
however many times it is repeated, it stands alone. In other words it is not a desire in any 
common sense. Once again, though, I feel this is yet another instance in which Beckett is 
pointing to a clever obfuscation, on the part of a character, which still nonetheless fails to 
wrestle itself free from the knotty reality of the ‘will’. The abandonment of this play by the 
author might lead us to associate its failure with the bourgeois aesthetics which are 
deconstructed by it, and to place it in a special category of experiment or early failure, a dead-
end, not to be repeated.  After all, consider the apparent mismatch between vehicle and theme: 
Beckett’s makes a decision in this play to use the bourgeois stage for the purpose of 
interrogating a character, to such an improbable extent that a torturer is introduced to the 
character ( ie the ‘Chinaman’ Tchoutchi, who is seemingly willing to remove Victor’s 
fingernails with pincers). If we were only thinking about the mismatch (the ‘failure’) of the 
representational form and the theme, we might be tempted to think, that this practice was 
abandoned by Beckett in his subsequent attempts to address the problem of stage-
representation. But in truth the structure of the interrogation remains an integral aspect to all 
of Beckett’s later theatrical work.13 For instance let us take Eh Joe,14 a work which Knowlson 
rightly in my opinion, identifies as occupying the same space as Victor, stressing that the 
‘man [Victor] sitting alone on a bed in his room echoes the situation of the television play 
Eh Joe.’15 The similarity I believe does not end there, for in the television play we have an 
equally ruthless interrogation taking place, it is just that in the instance of Eh Joe the 
interrogator is not known to the audience in the same way as Victor’s interrogators.16  Despite 
there not being a visible figure standing over Joe with pincers, Joe’s interrogator is also 
capable of meting out suffering on a scale every bit the match of Mr Tchoutchi:  
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13 “The element of inquisitorial cruelty in the creative process itself is a recurring theme.” see, Worth, K., 
Samuel Beckett!s Theatre, op.cit., 55.   
14 Eh Joe, written in April-May 1965, see Tonning, E., Samuel Beckett!s Abstract Drama: Works for 
Stage and Screen 1962-1985 (2007) Bern: Peter Lang AG, 104.      
15 Knowlson, J., and Pilling, J. Frescoes op.cit., 25.
16 “[...] this association of Voice with an external perspective (which if taken literally, would mean 
something like a ghost, watching him and sometimes addressing him) does not quite seem to fit the 
conception that emerges from the text of Joe as !throttling the dead in his head"” Tonning, E., Samuel 
Beckett!s Abstract Drama, op.cit., 105.  
 
  You know that penny farthing hell you call your mind....
  That’s where you think this is coming from, don’t you?...
  That’s where you heard your father...Isn’t that what 
  you told me?...Started in on you one June night and 
  went on for years....On and off....Behind the eyes....
  That’s how you were able to throttle him in the end....
  Mental thuggee you called it....One of your happiest
  fancies....Mental thuggee....Otherwise he’d be plaguing
  you yet...Then your mother when her hour came....
  ‘Look up, Joe, look up, we’re watching you’....Weaker
  and weaker till you laid her too....Others....All the
  others....Such love he got....God knows why...
  Pitying love....None to touch it....And look at him
  now...Throttling the dead in his head.
                                                         (E. J., Camera move 2., 363)       
   
As we can see, Joe’s interrogator resides not in any corner of his room, but instead subsumes 
the whole of his interiority; it is a voice which cannot be suppressed through any effort on his 
part, though it is telling that the voice at the beginning of this section of the play immediately 
throws doubt on the idea, that what Joe, and indeed the audience are hearing, is to be in 
anyway construed as Joe’s interior conscience. For I believe Beckett’s intention was not to 
plague Joe with his own internal conscience, but rather to provide a portrait of the human 
subject (Joe of course denoting ‘average Joe’) beset by his or her own ‘will’ , in the 
Schopenhaurian sense which we have identified above as externally represented in Eleutheria.  
Here, however, in ‘Eh Joe’, that ‘will’ makes itself felt by both actor and audience, despite 
every effort on the subject’s part to ensure that the space it occupies, internally as well 
as externally, has no footing from which it can launch its assault.17 This template I believe 
remains unaltered throughout Beckett’s subsequent work; its perspective invariably changes, 
but the structure and substance of the interrogation remains constant in respect to not only 
Victor and Joe, but also Winnie, Vladimir, Estragon, Clov, the ‘mouth’ in Not I, in fact the 
entire length of Beckett’s corridor of constituent suffering and boredom. Having suggested 
that a template such as this exists in Beckett’s theatrical work, citing his first completed play 
Eleuthéria as laying out the cardinal model, I feel that we should look to Beckett’s last 
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17 For a standard psychological account of Joe being plagued by an interior voice in his head see, 
Pountney, R., Theatre of Shadows: Samuel Beckett!s Drama 1956-1976 (1998) Guernsey Press Co. 
Ltd., also  See, Gontarski, S.E., The Intent of Undoing in Samuel Beckett!s Dramatic Texts (1985) 
Bloomington Indiana:  Indiana University Press: Bloomington., 144. 
contribution to the stage, What Where, first premiered in New York in 1983.18 What is 
immediately obvious to the audience is that Beckett has literally chosen to build the 
entire performance around the idea of an interrogation:
        
 BAM:  Well?
 BOM:  [head bowed throughout.] Nothing.
 BAM: He didn’t say anything?
 BOM:  No.
 BAM:  You gave him the works?
 BOM:  Yes
 BAM:  And he didn’t say anything?
 BOM:  No.
   
 BAM:  He wept ?
 BOM: Yes.
 BAM:  Screamed ?
 BOM: Yes.
 BAM: Begged for mercy?
 BOM: Yes.
 BAM: But didn’t say anything?
 BOM: No.
 V:  Not good.
                (W.W., 472.)
Despite the stark, reductive aspect of Beckett’s staging of the interrogation, we can see 
instantly the similarities which it shares with Victor’s interrogation. For regardless of the 
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television station entitled Was Wo. Beckett “went to elaborate lengths to dehumanise the performers by 
representing only their lighted faces against a black background, with the rest of their bodies unseen. 
The performers! heads were conformed to the same shape by the addition of prosthetic masking, their 
ears were made invisible and their voices were electronically slowed down.”, Bignell, J., Beckett on 
Screen: The Television Plays (1988) Manchester: Manchester University Press, 74. [Erik Tonning places 
Beckett"s television adaptation earlier in 1985, see Samuel Beckett!s Abstract Drama, 259.]       
pressure applied, it seems in both instances the interrogators fail to retrieve to their 
satisfaction the correct answers they are looking for. What I would like to propose, is that the 
interrogation we see being enacted in What where, is in its very nature identical to Victor’s. In 
fact I would go so far as to say, that what we witness in Eleuthéria, is actually Beckett’s first 
attempt to allegorize what is being given expression through his staging of What Where: that 
is a human subject endeavouring to break free of their own ‘will’. If we look to the way the 
interrogation develops in What Where, especially in relation to the language, then I believe we 
can begin to reveal its Schopenhauerian undercurrent:19
 
 BAM:  You gave him the works?
 BIM:  Yes.
 BAM:  And he didn’t say where?
 BIM: No.
 BAM: He wept?
 BIM:  Yes.
 BAM: Screamed.
 BIM:  Yes
 BAM:  Begged for mercy?
 BIM:  Yes.
 BAM:  But didn’t say where?
 BIM:  No.
 BAM: Then why stop?
 BIM:  He passed out.
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19 Interestingly from Erik Tonning!s perspective What Where is part of a Leibnizian examination 
continuing from A Piece in Monologue, Rockaby and Ohio Impromptu, see Tonning, E., Samuel 
Beckett!s Abstract Drama, op.cit., 250. But as we have already revealed in the introduction, the 
presence of Leibniz should not in anyway undermine the Schopenhauerian stake in What Where, as 
Schopenhauer is fundamentally about perspective: “Consequently we can parody in the following way 
the above-mentioned saying of Leibniz, in the sense of our higher view of music, for it is quite correct 
from a lower point of view: Musica est exercitium metaphysices occulum nescientis se philosophari 
animi”( Music is an unconscious exercise in metaphysics in which the mind does not know it is 
philosophizing) W.W.R.1., 264. As we can see Schopenhauer does not dispute Leibniz apart from 
Leibniz!s philosophical orientation being "high" rather than "low!. “[...] the optimism of Leibniz conflicts 
with the obvious misery of existence[...]” W.W.R.2., 184.                 
 BAM:  And you didn’t revive him?
 BIM:  I tried.
 BAM: Well?
 BIM: I couldn’t.
 BAM:  It’s a lie. [Pause.] He said where to you. [Pause.] Confess
            he said where to you. [Pause.] You will be given the works
            until you confess.
V:  Good.
            (W.W., 474-475)
On first appearances the interrogation seems to promote the idea that the information these 
anonymous figures are trying to extract from their suspect, relates to a hidden location, where 
something valuable can be traced; the classic ‘X -marks the spot’ scenario. It would appear 
that there is something which the interrogators are desperate to lay their hands on, and what 
this thing is remains firmly hidden from the audience ,that is to say, if you follow the 
interrogation in terms of a programme of disclosure. As David Pattie stresses in his critical 
guide to Samuel Beckett: ‘In What Where, Beckett stages a cycle of torture and confession 
that is nearing its end, not because the truth is about to be revealed, but because the number of 
participants has shrunk to almost nothing. The information that is required (the ‘what where’ 
of the plays title) will never be revealed; instead, the process will, with the chief interrogator, 
Bam, standing alone on stage.’20 But I would argue that this pressure on Beckett’s work to 
reveal itself in terms of something which it cannot reveal, is present because that work 
represents the human subject as somehow deficient, and always will be deficient of such 
information. In fact, the notion of such ‘information’ is merely another representation of the 
formal geometry we spoke of earlier.21 For what I actually feel is going on here has nothing to 
do with disclosure, or indeed the lack of it, but is Beckett’s representation of an individual 
subject turning away from their own ‘will’. Knowing, as we do, the way Schopenhauer has 
represented an individual’s ‘will’ in terms of its capacity to open itself up to a range of 
questioning, the purpose is not any meaningful disclosure, but rather simply to strengthen the 
80
20 Pattie, D., The Complete Guide to Samuel Beckett (2000) Oxford: Routledge., 92-93.
21 [!...] the what of the phenomenon, which can never be referred to the form of the phenomenon" 
W.W.R.1., 125.  
underlying causal structure of the  ‘will’. So at the risk of repeating the passage, I feel we 
need to consult  the paragraph from Die Welt which states: ‘Raised up by the power of the 
mind, we relinquish the ordinary way of considering things, and cease to follow under the 
guidance of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason merely their relations to one 
another, whose final goal is always the relation to our own will. Thus we no longer consider 
the where, the when, the why, and the whither in things, but simply and solely the what.’22  It 
is not that the interrogation is set up to reveal or disclose anything in the the context of hidden 
information. It is simply a matter of getting the interrogated subject to articulate the ‘where’ in 
general; the purpose being to open the identity of the subject up in a way which forces them 
to replay the mode of thinking thus validating the interrogation in terms of a process of 
disclosure. Once placed in a Schopenhauerian context, we can see that the reluctance of the 
interrogated subject to entertain the idea of the ‘where’ is all part of his or her own attempts to 
free themselves of causal necessity, or as Schopenhauer puts it, ‘the forms of the principle of 
sufficient reason’.23 Inevitably when we view the work in this context, there arises another 
tension within Beckett’s play, namely the individual characterization of the interrogators, for 
what at first appears as an external threat to the subject, now becomes internalized, it becomes 
an interrogation within the subject itself. But as I have suggested before, this is no simple 
psychological internalization merely limited to the domain of the ‘skull’.24 For what I see in 
What Where is Beckett re-enacting something much more extraordinary, for if we return to the 
last part of the quoted passage, it becomes apparent that one of the interrogators’, Bim, also 
becomes the target of Bam’s interrogation. For Bam, having heard that the suspect has passed 
out under Bim’s enforced questioning, and that Bim was unable to revive ‘him’ (thus ruling 
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22 W.W.R.1., 178. 
23 As James Acheson declares ,Bam!s preoccupation with "what! and "where! is consistent with having 
spent a lifetime asking himself questions. Significantly, though, he seems little interested in "why!, 
"when!, "how! and !who"[...]! Acheson, J., Samuel Beckett!s Artistic Theory and Practice: Criticism, Drama 
and Early Fiction (1997) Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd, 206.      
24 Interestingly when it comes to the interrogatory structure of Beckett!s plays Eric Tonning identifies that 
"Beckett!s own "Analysis! of his first draft [ie of Not I] refers to an "interrupter!, a term which seems to lie 
half-way between textual effect and external figure. This suggests that "Auditor" in that play may not 
have originated as a physical figure, but rather a structural principle of interrogation.! Tonning, E.,Samuel 
Beckett!s Abstract Drama, op.cit., 111.     
out the entire prospect of divulging the ‘where’), this knowledge brings about a state of 
indignation, prompting him to dismiss what Bim is reporting. Bam then as we can see, turns 
the same interrogation process onto Bim, who is told that ‘he’ will also be given the ‘the 
works’ if he does not confess.25 So once more for Bam the possibility of the ‘where’ finds a 
new footing, it now finds a possible outlet in part of ‘his’ own interrogation team. And again 
as we can appreciate from the text, V which Beckett designates as ‘the voice of 
Bam’ (represented separately from the figure of Bam) replies with the word ‘Good’ once the 
suggestion has been made that Bim should be given ‘the works’, thus implying that somehow 
things are back on track. From our Schopenhauerian perspective, V’s response would indicate 
that the ‘will’ has once again located for itself a new opening in which it can channel 
suffering; it is once again ‘open for business’.26 In fact, from the beginning of the play, 
Beckett represents not one, but two interrogations, for as well as the interrogation Bam has 
just carried out on the suspect, there is of course Bim’s report to Bam, which itself takes on 
the character and appearance of a further interrogation. So what Beckett is able to recreate 
brilliantly on the stage, and within the text of the work, is an interrogation within an 
interrogation; in fact within a multitude of interrogations. Therefore despite representing 
individual characters on stage, their integrity as divisible denominations is brought under 
increasing pressure as the performance is played out. Like Schopenhauer’s own representation 
of the human subject, it appears that Beckett’s subjects also arise as permutations of conflict, 
within a broader indivisible structure. And like Schopenhauer’s ‘will’ it seems that Beckett is 
also implying with What Where that the location of the suffering is irrelevant, with regards to 
the performance,  be it the ‘suspect’, be it Bim, be it Bom or indeed Bam; what matters is that 
there remains an outlet for it. So you could say, that without the prospect of suffering (or its 
82
25 Katharine Worth refers to “the Jokiness of the dated gangster-style idiom” of What Where (!give him 
the works"). But it could be the case that under the immediate surface of such language Beckett is 
referring to !works" as in the !complete works". Therefore Beckett could be flagging his own creative 
output, or indeed in the context of sustained suffering he could even be referencing Schopenhauer"s 
complete !Werkes", in which we find Beckett connecting his last staged performance to the same space 
as the !What book" of Human Wishes. For reference to the “gangster-style idiom in What Where see, 
Worth, K., Samuel Beckett!s Theatre, op.cit., 55.   
26 !From without, the will can be affected only by motives; but these can never change the will itself, for 
they have power over it only on the presupposition that it is precisely such as it is. All that the motives 
can do, therefore, is to alter the direction of the will"s effort, in other words to make it possible for it to 
seek by a path different from the one it previously followed...," W.W.R.1., 294.    
representation) there is no performance to speak of, which is precisely the direction in which 
Beckett’s play takes us:
  V:  Good.
          I am alone.
          In the present as were I still.
          It is winter.
          Without Journey.
          Time passes
          That is all.
          Makes sense who may.
          I switch off.
          [light off p.
           Pause
           Light off v.]
                         (W.W., 476.)
As Beckett’s play approaches its final stages, the only active role in the performance is V, 
Bam’s voice who makes the pronouncement ‘I am alone’; for at this stage all of the other 
characters have exited from the ‘playing area’. But what I believe to have enormous 
significance in relation to What Where is the fact that V seems to be contradicting ‘his’ 
original position. For why should V respond with the word ‘Good’ now that there is no 
prospect of retrieving the ‘where’ from any subject? The answer I suspect rests with Beckett’s 
own understanding of the way in which the ‘will’ in an individual subject will officiate over 
suffering in terms of the life-affirming body; so, instinctively, the ‘will’ will always reply 
‘Good’ to the prospect of renewed suffering. But as Schopenhauer stresses in Die Welt, there 
can arise a situation in which the ‘will’, in a particular ‘knowing’ subject, can be made to 
contradict its own natural instinct, through what Schopenhauer describes as the ‘denial of the 
will to life’. As Janaway reminds us, ‘In ‘denial of the will to life’ one turns against the 
particular manifestation of will to life found in oneself, which means turning against the body, 
and against one’s own individuality. Thus one ceases, as much as possible, to strive for one’s 
own egoistic ends, ceases to avoid suffering or to seek pleasure, ceases to desire propagation 
of the species, or any sexual gratification- in short, one looks down on that willing part of 
nature which one is, and withdraws from one’s identification with it.27 This last development, 
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27 Janaway, C. Schopenhauer, op.cit., 92.
which Janaway marks in relation to the subject’s denial of the will to life, where there is a 
complete withdrawal from our own personal identification with individual willing, has special 
significance in relation to Beckett’s play. For the way in which he arranges his performance, 
has to my mind been deliberately designed to take the audience right up close to the 
possibility of such a withdrawal. As we can see Beckett exploits the naked mechanism of the 
interrogation, without preserving any markers of its interior justification, as in the case of ‘Eh 
Joe’. So from the audience’s perspective, the apparent causal strands which hold up the 
performance, appear weaker and weaker with each exchange of information between Bam 
and his interrogators. For all the interrogation can bring to light is an aimless process, which 
can either be made to go on indefinitely, or, something I suspect Beckett wants his audience to 
embrace as the preferred option, be simply allowed to run out of momentum, through the 
withdrawal of the source of its investment, namely, the action on stage. Though I personally 
believe, that this withdrawal is intended to take place not just at the end of the performance, 
but presumably, as Beckett no doubt intended the play to be viewed more than once, during 
the active course of the play’s performance. Therefore I suggest that the repeated viewing of 
the play becomes the means by which the causal detachment becomes more and more 
pronounced, until it is hoped, I believe from Beckett’s point of view, that the stage movement 
ceases to take on in the audience’s mind any ‘positive’ construction; thus the performance 
itself brings about its own stasis.  So the representative withdrawal of the interrogation on the 
stage, becomes, through a process of repeated viewing, an internalized re-staging of what is 
potentially taking place within the ‘mind’ of the audience; or what at least Beckett hopes to be 
taking place. In this sense, through the staging of What Where, Beckett is able to locate his 
performance not just directly in front of his audience, but also within the audience itself. As I 
see it, both the performance on stage, and what the audience is potentially experiencing are 
themselves being aligned to one another, and so as a result the theatrical space does not just 
become an external consideration, it becomes an internal one as well. Ultimately though, I 
believe that it was anticipated on Beckett’s part, that, through successive performances of 
What Where, the dichotomy of the internal and external setting would for the audience begin 
to diminish; for Beckett’s own careful alignment of the interior and exterior space of his play 
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is, in my view, an attempt to articulate one indivisible performance between audience and 
stage. So we could say that the performance Beckett creates is in fact being played out within 
its own dramatically generated version of ‘absolute space’.28 In effect the theatrical 
experience becomes detached from the ‘where’, leaving behind the indissoluble ‘what’; and 
as a result the stage no longer needs to declare any fidelity towards the phenomenal 
partnership between time and space. Instead Beckett and the audience are left with a 
performance which becomes the expression of pure temporality without the intrusion of 
space; for as Bam’s Voice declares: ‘It is winter. Without journey. Time passes.’ So here we 
have at the close of What Where, not only the abandonment of summer, the highest avowal 
towards life, but also the disclosure of a reality which remains free from phenomenal 
disturbance, comprised solely of time. For the whole idea of time without ‘journey’ is to my 
mind a  direct invocation of  Schopenhauer’s own exposition of the ‘will’’s being purely 
temporal as opposed to spatio-temporal.29 And therefore the picture we are left with is 
essentially the ‘will’ being availed of its ‘knots’ rather, than being destroyed outright.  
I have gone into some detail regarding Beckett’s own extraordinary achievement, in respect to 
the way in which he has been able to bring to the stage a play, which locates its performance 
not just directly in front of its audience, but also, simultaneously, inside it. Now, I would now 
like to return to my original suggestion that What Where is in truth a replay of the 
interrogation in Eleuthéria, albeit on a much more refined level. For I would argue that the 
intended purpose behind the interrogation in Eleuthéria remains essentially no different from 
the interrogation in What Where; that each marks an attempt by Beckett, to represent 
theatrically the will turning against its own self- interest. Clearly, in the instance of 
Eleuthéria, Beckett is a young playwright who is still working largely within an inherited 
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28 !It is to the will in this capacity that freedom, and to be sure even absolute freedom, that is 
independent of the law of causality (as a mere form of appearances), properly belongs[...]" 
Schopenhauer, A., On the Freedom of the Will, trans. Konstantin Kolenda (1985) Oxford: Blackwell, 97.   
29 In Erik Tonning"s own assessment of What Where he identifies the elliptical structure of Schubert"s 
Winterreise cycle carrying the movement of the play. But interestingly when Tonning describes the final 
movement of Schubert"s Lieder the language becomes discernibly Schopenhauerian: !The final 
encounter with the old man hints at the possibility of a certain detachment from suffering through art; 
perhaps the protagonist will, by transforming his experience into song, be able to imitate the hurdy-gurdy 
man in his apparent attitude towards bitter cold and neglect as negligible and even illusory phenomena 
compared with the frail tune he is playing." Tonning, E., Samuel Beckett!s Abstract Drama, op.cit., 254.  
bourgeois theatrical tradition; so not surprisingly critics have been tempted to receive 
Beckett’s own efforts to dismantle these earlier restrictive practices as in someway building 
upon a similar dramatic experimentation as one sees with Pirandello, Cocteau and Vitrac.30 
For instance we only have to think about the way in which Beckett takes apart the ‘fourth 
wall’:      
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER   (Standing up in a stage-box) Stop!
                                            (He straddles stiffly the side of the  
                                            stage-box and comes down cau-
                                            tiously onto the stage. He ad-
                                            vances toward the bed) I am sorry
                                            for this intrusion.
 GLAZIER                          You’ve been elected ?
 AUDIENCE MEMBER  No, not precisely.  But I’ve been at
                                            the bar, in the lobby, and I have
                                            been chatting with relatives,
                                            friends. I even came across a
                                            critic, at the first intermission.
  
 GLAZIER                          Was he on his way in or on his way
                                             out?
                           
 AUDIENCE MEMBER   He was on his way out.
 GLAZIER                         In a word you’ve been seeing
                                             which way the wind lies.
 AUDIENCE MEMBER  There you go!  
                                                               (E., 136)
As this section of the play reveals, Beckett’s decision to cast one of his characters as a 
member of the audience, who directly appeals to the actors on stage, has all the appearance of 
a Pirandellian theatrical conceit; as we can see, the effect of this outside intervention alters the 
whole perspective of the play, for the stage no longer denotes the limits of the performance, 
instead it extends right into the auditorium of theatre, even pushing its way into the bar and 
lobby of the theatre, where it can envisage its own critical drubbing. But apart from the 
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30 See, Bradby, D., “A joke which still goes on” - Le Kid, Eleuthéria, Waiting for Godot (Journal of Beckett 
Studies) 62~Vol 13, No 1. Fall ( 2003): 63.  
theatrical reflexivity, which is not only suggestive of Pirandello, but of course inhabits the 
stage craft of Shakespeare and Aristophanes, there remains I believe something else at work.  
For I would like to propose that Beckett’s own reshaping of this well-established theatrical 
tradition is in many respects a first attempt at staging a performance which is capable of 
alluding to an indivisible structure, the kind of which I have already suggested exists in What 
Where: 
 AUDIENCE MEMBER  [...] But basically I had just
                                            to listen to myself. For I am not
                                            one audience member, but a
                                            thousand, all slightly different
                                            from each other. I’ve always been
                                            like that, like an old blotter, of
                                            extremely variable porosity.
                                            
 GLAZIER                        You can’t be one to get bored silly.
 AUDIENCE MEMBER  (With high seriousness) Actually,
                                             yes, it can happen.
                                                                      (E., 136)
As is indicated by the ‘audience member’ their presence is not an individual characterization, 
but is representative of a much larger collective body, far outstripping the seating capacity of 
the theatre; and so it is in this context that I want to lodge the idea that Beckett is depositing 
within this extended theatrical dimension a much broader reflection centering on the 
indivisible nature of the ‘will’.31 For not only do we have the audience being orchestrated by 
Beckett into one indivisible whole, but the voice of such a collective entity drops all 
semblance of joviality as soon as the subject of boredom is raised. This for me confirms that 
what Beckett is presenting reaches much further than a theatrical deconstructive exercise, but 
is in fact signaling the grievous weight attached to boredom in Schopenhauer’s  
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31 Also we can see in Katharine Worth!s suggestion that Victor!s act of breaking the window at the start 
of Act 2, could in itself be demonstrating an "effort to look beyond rooms of any kind, into unknown 
space.” It could therefore also support the idea that the phenomenal construction of reality, held in 
relation to division and demarcation holds no truth in relation to the "will!, see Worth, K., Samuel 
Beckett!s theatre, op.cit., 33.     
thinking.32 And so I would go far as to say that the indivisible characterization we see in 
Eleuthéria is itself playing to the identity of the ‘will’. If we just look to the way both the 
audience and the stage characters collectively gang up upon Victor, and contrast it with the 
kind of victimization we see being levelled at Clov by Hamm, or that between Joe and the 
‘voice’ or even the mime artist and the ‘shrill whistle’ in an Act without words I, I would 
suggest that what we are looking at essentially boils down to the same thing; the ‘will’ turning 
against its own self interest.  It is an act which for Schopenhauer, and I believe, also for 
Beckett, represented the greatest single achievement open to any individual, as well as the 
only act which is truly capable of personifying freedom. 
Suicide: Bringing down the Curtain?
As I see it the collective physical haranguing of Victor by the rest of the cast and ‘audience’, 
is a first attempt by Beckett to bring to the stage a representation of an individual subject, 
pitched against their own ‘will’, desperately attempting to fight their corner without recourse 
to any values or tactics which facilitate or strengthen the ‘will’ including that most 
backhanded commendation towards the ‘will’, the active termination of life itself.
  
 DR. PIOUK               Here it is. I would prohibit repro-
                                     duction. I would perfect the
                                     condom and other appliances and
                                     generalize their use. I would
                                     create state-run corps of abortion-
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32 !Let us transport ourselves to a very lonely region of boundless horizons, under a perfectly cloudless 
sky, trees and plants in the perfectly motionless air[...] Such surroundings are as it were a summons to 
seriousness, to contemplation, with complete emancipation from all willing and its cravings; but it is just 
this that gives to such a scene of mere solitude and profound peace a touch of the sublime. For since it 
affords no objects, either favourable or unfavourable, to the will that is always in need of strife and 
attainment, there is left only the state of pure contemplation, and whoever is incapable of this is 
abandoned with shameful ignominy to the emptiness of unoccupied will, to the torture and misery of 
boredom. To this extent it affords us a measure of our own intellectual worth, and for this generally the 
degree of our ability to endure solitude, or our love of it, is a good criterion. !W.W.R.1., 203-204. 
As we can see Victor"s own self imposed solitude in a Schopenhauerian context is a display of 
intellectual self-worth, whose inner reality touches upon the sublime. And for those incapable of entering 
such sublimity there remain only mental agitation and boredom, such as we see with the supporting cast 
and audience of Beckett"s play.                      
                                     ists. I would impose the death
                                     sentence on every woman guilty of
                                     having given birth. I would drown
                                     the newborn. I would campaign in
                                     favor of homosexuality and myself
                                     set the example. And to get things     
                                     going, I would encourage by every
                                     means the recourse to euthanasia,
                                     without, however, making it an
                                     obligation.33. Here you have the
                                     broad outlines
     
 MME. KRAP            I was born too soon.
M. KRAP                  Much too soon.
                                                       (E., 43.)
Rather than seeing the doctor’s horrific prescription as a life-denying tonic, it is in truth from 
a Schopenhauerian perspective  its very opposite.34 For just like the way Beckett I believe 
views Richard Wagner as an ill-informed Schopenhauerian (the symphonic excess and sensual 
abandonment of of Wagner’s music-drama being in many ways the ultimate breeding ground 
for the ‘will’ to blossom35) I equally suspect that the intention behind the creation of Dr Piouk 
is to give his own comic representation to an equally misconceived appreciation of the 
Schopenhauerian message.36 Even in the bewildered response of Mme. and M. Krap to the 
doctor, Beckett manages to parody the Schopenhauerian sentiment; that not to be born is 
infinitely preferable to being born; what is more I would also say that the way Beckett 
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33 In many ways the impassioned speech of Dr Piouk can also be considered as an inverted parody of 
the Catholic conservatism which was championed by the Irish state during the period in which Beckett 
grew up in Ireland. !While still a student at Trinity College, Dublin, Beckett published a satirical dialogue 
titled !Che Sciagura! deriding the recent ban on the sale and advertising of contraceptives by reiterating 
the eunuch"s cry from Voltaire"s Candide, !What a misfortune to be without balls". Bixby, P., !Ireland: 
1906-1945." Uhlmann, A., Samuel Beckett in Context, op.cit., 71.        
34 !For denial has its essential nature in the fact that the pleasure of life, not its sorrows are shunned. 
The suicide wills life, and is dissatisfied merely with the conditions on which it has come to him. 
Therefore he gives up by no means the will-to-[life], but merely life, since he destroys the individual 
phenomenon." W.W.R.1., 398.   
35 In an attempt to describe to McGreevy what the very qualities are which meet his approval in a small 
number of poems (unnamed in the letter) Beckett himself composes in 1932, he says. “I cannot explain 
very well to myself what they have that distinguishes them from the others, but it is something 
arborescent or of the sky, not Wagner, not clouds on wheels written above an abscess and not of a 
cavity, a statement and not a description of heat in the spirit to compensate for pus in the spirit.” The 
Letters of Samuel Beckett 1929-1940, Vol 1., op.cit, 134.      
36 “It is in this spirit [curtailing the will-to-[life]] that Dr. Piouk in Eleutheria offers the practice of 
homosexual sex as an answer to the problem of humanity.” See Stewart, P., Sex and Aesthetics in 
Samuel Beckett!s Work (2011) New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 101.    
exploits the comical notion of postponing birth, especially alongside the doctor’s programme 
of human eradication, serves to further highlight the philosophical mismatch between not 
wanting to have been born in the first place, and that which involves throwing in the towel 
once we already have made our ill-fated appearance. So it would seem that Dr Piouk, is by 
and large, a philosophical counter-point to Victor’s much more appreciative understanding of 
what it actually entails to make real inroads in turning away from life, rather than the shadow-
boxing advocated by the ‘good’ doctor. Again the fact that Victor eventually recognizes the 
philosophical porosity attached to the doctor’s prescription of a suicide pill, moves further to 
consolidate the idea that Victor’s position towards life is in some way a reflection of Beckett’s 
own Schopenhauerian sympathies:37
 DR. PIOUK                 So what? I have no objection to
                                       the curtain’s being rung down on
                                       something senseless, besides,
                                       that’s what most often happens. In
                                       any case, I see that for you that’s
                                       not the point. I will therefore not      
                                       insist. I want quite simply to reply.
                                       You want to impose on this -
                                   
                               
                                     how shall I put it- this sem-
                                     blance of a life a manner of justifi- 
                                     cation, so that both the one
                                     leading it and those it grieves may,
                                     in your oh so pretty phrase, be put
                                     up with. That’s more or less it?
                                     Good.[...]
 GLAZIER                 Yes but you reason like a swine.
 DR. PIOUK              It is so you may follow me better.
                                    Let’s see. I offer him (he pats his 
                                    vest) my little candy bar. He
                                    refuses. All right. Why? No matter.
                                    He wants to live. That’s enough. It
                                    is a meaning. A little vague, if you
                                    like, but sufficient. People tell
                                    each other- I am poaching on 
                                    preserves- The poor young 
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37 “Given that Beckett follows Schopenhauer in his reaction against the procreative nightmare of sexual 
intercourse, it would therefore be reasonable to assume that he might follow Schopenhauer in his 
assertion that one effective, if momentary, way of overcoming the will is through the aesthetic attitude 
and aesthetic creation.” Stewart, P., Sex and Aesthetics in Samuel Beckett!s work, op.cit ., 150.    
                                    man! So near giving away! Saw the
                                    light at the last minute! At the
                                    very edge of the abyss! One of
                                    ours once more! They won’t ask
                                    for anything more, believe me. Or
                                    then again, he accepts Meaning?
                                    he has had enough. Why? Of no 
                                    importance whatsoever. He wants
                                    to die, thats enough.     
                                                           (E., 118-119.)
As we can see, Victor’s condition has been diagnosed by the doctor in terms of the classic 
‘suicide’, life has simply reached the point in which it no longer offers any positive return; 
there is even mention of light at the end of the tunnel, where one may glimpse on the edge of 
the ‘abyss’ that life is indeed not as bad as one originally thought, all of which enforces a 
view, which, from the Schopenhauerian point, dangerously misconstrues life as being able to 
withhold, that which it never held in the first place. If we just look to the beginning of the 
quoted section, the doctor says something very interesting in relation to Beckett’s overall 
approach to the theatre, when he declares ‘So what? I have no objection to the curtain’s being 
rung down on something senseless, besides, that’s what most often happens.’ For despite what 
the doctor says, this certainly is not what we see from Beckett’s later approach to 
the theatre, for there is every attempt during the course of his later theatrical delivery to 
ensure that there remains not the slightest possibility of any curtain coming down upon the 
events on stage, preferring instead to opt for the more ambiguous ‘Fade out’. Again it would 
seem that the finality of the curtain is something which Beckett is determined to cast-off in 
relation to his own theatrical vision. It could very well be, as Knowlson proposes in Frescoes 
of the Skull, that the reason surrounding Beckett’s own reluctance to publish Eleuthéria was in 
part due to the fact that ‘the later works have overtaken it and made it appear 
uncharacteristically clumsy and over-explicit’. But I personally believe that Knowlson’s 
additional suggestion regarding his thought that Beckett would have also ‘felt uneasy about 
the way in which the central issues, such as whether or not life is worth living and the validity 
or otherwise of suicide or euthanasia, emerge as deeply felt personal questions’ is largely 
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misplaced.38 For I am of the opinion that the issues which Knowlson cites in relation to 
Eleuthéria such as, suicide and euthanasia, and whether life is worth living at all, are not in 
anyway taken up as serious legitimate options, but are, as I have already suggested, part of 
Beckett’s own Schopenhauerian critiquing of the inadequacies of an art form (in this case 
theatrical drama) which is constantly in the service of phenomenal refurbishment and 
renewal.39 In fact if we return to my initial proposition that a play such as What Were can 
be considered as a much more refined attempt at portraying what is essentially being played 
out in Eleuthéria, then the struggle which one’s ‘will’ is embroiled in, is itself set up in 
relation to its own phenomenal resolution: 
 GLAZIER                 Explain yourself, no I am not 
                                     saying that, I did not put it right.
                                     Define yourself, there. It is time
                                     that you defined yourself a little.
                                     You are around like a sort of-
                                     what is the way to say it? -like a 
                                     sort of ooze. Like a sanies, there.
                                     Take on a little contour, for the
                                     love of God.
 VICTOR                    Why.
 GLAZIER                 So that all this may look like it
                                     holds water. You have been impos-
                                     sible up until now. Nobody will be
                                     able to believe in it. Why, my
                                     friend, you are quite simply noth-
                                     ing, poor fellow.
 VICTOR                    It is perhaps time that somebody
                                     was quite simply nothing.
                                                                      (E., 81-82.)
       
So the fact that at the close of the performance of What Where, you have no material 
presence, only the ‘voice’ of Bam reciting a series of lines which ends with the words ‘I 
switch off’, leads me to propose that this is in some way acknowledging what little victory 
one can speak of in terms of letting go of all phenomenal representation. For as we know in 
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38 Knowlson, J., and Pilling, J. Frescoes op.cit., 24.
39 !Victor"s world begins to collapse as soon as seeing oneself dead is known for what it is: one more 
moment within the theatre of representation.! Weller, S., A Taste for the Negative, op.cit, 121.    
the context of Die Welt phenomenal abandonment goes someway to bringing about what 
Schopenhauer himself describes as a quieting of the ‘will’(rather than any ill-conceived 
effort directed at its complete eradication) which I believe is precisely the meaning behind 
the ‘voice’s’ incantation of the words ‘In the present as were I still.’40 The language of the 
‘voice’, has reached the point where it no longer needs phenomenal reassurance; so what was 
once an indication of an individual standing alone, where he, or she, remains perfectly still, 
refusing to relinquish their spot (essentially Beckett’s own image of Dante’s Belacqua in 
Dream ‘clinging to his rock’) in my view switches tenor. Having let go of this phenomenal 
investment, I suggest that Beckett saw the potential for the language to acquire a very 
different meaning; for the word ‘present’ will subsequently struggle, in the absence of all 
phenomenal pressure to retain any indication as to position, or location. Instead it becomes 
pure presence, that which is always present, leaving the word ‘still’ to abandon its spatio-
temporal attachment, and likewise emerge purely in terms of ‘stillness’. So from this newly 
awakened perspective, I believe we can begin to appreciate the ‘voice’ in What Where on a 
completely different level; one which eventually indicates to its audience a ‘stillness’ in the 
presence of the ‘will’ or to put it another way a ‘stillness’ in the presence of ‘presence’ itself.
 So if we take the idea of phenomenal abandonment, and see it as part of Beckett’s own 
address towards the ‘will’ and its representation in the theatre, then I believe we can attribute 
a similar ‘victory’ over phenomenal representation. Admittedly,  in the case of Eleuthéria, this 
is not anywhere near displaying the kind of refinement which we see being exercised over 
What Were, with its soluble language, as well as its complex illumination of character, but 
nonetheless there remains in my view an attempt by Beckett in the early piece to initiate his 
own limited ‘victory’ over phenomenal representation. For Beckett’s decision to engineer a 
scene in Eleuthéria, in which half of the stage collapses into the orchestra pit, is to my mind a 
crude, but also visually effective, means of indicating a loss of faith in the phenomenal 
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become a quieter of all willing." W.W.R.1., 232-233.
characterization of drama, since it literally denotes the removal of the supportive ground on 
which the whole material projection of the play rests. 
Having established I believe, a strong continuity between Beckett’s earliest theatrical work, 
and what I consider to be amongst his most refined and technically accomplished approaches 
towards the stage, I want finally to consider how this early theatrical offering connects to 
Beckett’s first novel, Dream. It is has been suggested by David Pattie that ‘Eleuthéria is 
Dream imagined for the stage (a first rehearsal of themes and preoccupations, more 
successfully incarnated in later work)’ but, as Knowlson is right to remind us, it is wrong to 
think of Eleuthéria as ‘lacking in the qualities that characterize Waiting for Godot and 
Endgame.’41 The French is fluent and idiomatic throughout, and shows a keen sensitivity to 
tone and register. Whole stretches of the dialogue move along rapidly and smoothy, in short, 
crisp répliques, interspersed with a judicious use of silence. The text is enlivened by word-
play and wit, and, above all perhaps, by surprise and conflict.’42 So clearly one should be 
cautious not to exaggerate the extent to which Beckett’s Eleuthéria is a clean departure from 
Godot and Endgame, for let us not forget there are only two years separating Eleuthéria from 
En Attendant Godot; so I would suggest we can dismiss all those images we have of  
Eleuthéria  as being in someway prentice work. But the idea that Eleuthéria has strong 
thematic ties with Dream, is from the perspective of this thesis a crucial point to establish, 
especially when we have already brought into focus the Schopenhauerian impetus behind 
Beckett’s Proust and the manner in which this literary exposition would itself participate in 
the formulation of Dream. Having previously explored the Schopenhauerian dimension of 
music, which plays out in such an explicit fashion in Dream, then, can we establish any 
similar emphasis on music in Eleuthéria?:
 GLAZIER                 Music (He walks back and forth
                                     in front of the door) How may
                                     crimes! How many crimes! (He
                                     halts) Music! I see it from here.
                                     Life, death, freedom, the whole
                                     kit and caboodle, and the disillu-
                                     sioned little laughs to show they
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                                     are not taken in by the big words
                                     and the bottomless silence and
                                     the paralytic gestures to signal
                                     that that’s not it, they say that but
                                     that’s not it, it’s a different matter,
                                     an altogether different matter,
                                     what can you do, language isn’t
                                     made to express those things. So
                                     let’s keep quiet, decency, a little
                                     decency goodnight, let’s get to
                                     bed, we who senselessly dared to 
                                     speak of something other than
                                     staple rationing. Ah, I hear it,
                                     your music. You were all plas-
                                     tered, naturally.
                                                        (E., 134.)
There can be no mistaking that this interpretation of music by the Glazier, has indeed been 
born out of Beckett’s own unique and personal engagement with Schopenhauer’s writing. For 
we can see instantly from the way the Glazier regards music in terms of being a metaphysical 
duplicate of the world: ‘Music I see it from here. Life, death, freedom, the whole kit and 
caboodle’ that Beckett is in fact using his character as a means of exposing to his audience the 
central aesthetic principle of Die Welt: that ‘music is as immediate an objectification and copy 
of the whole will as the world itself’.43 Moreover, it is important to note,that the Glazier 
launches into his speech on music after his own considerations are leveled at life, which he 
views in terms of a repeated series of crimes ‘How many crimes! How many crimes! this 
again is a further Schopenhauerian consensus on life; as it evidently reinforces the 
Calderònian notion that Pues el delito mayor de hombre es haber nacido. (“For man’s greatest  
offence Is that he has been born,”).44 The speech which Beckett plants in the mouth of the 
Glazier, crucially underpins the foundations of his own dilemma as writer, for it is here, in the 
context of Schopenhauer’s theory of will, that he is locating the inability of language to 
meaningfully connect to a reality which moves outside phenomenal framing. Becekett’s 
character explicitly raises the point that a medium, which exploits something as arbitrary and 
as limited as language, will always ultimately be confronted with its own failure to articulate 
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anything of ‘real’ significance. For, as the Glazier professes, he hears ‘the disillusioned little 
laughs to show they are not taken in by the big words and the bottomless silence and the 
paralytic gestures to signal that that’s not it, they say that but that’s not it, it’s a different 
matter, an altogether different matter, what can you do, language isn’t made to express those 
things.’ Language for Beckett is not just too blunt an instrument to locate the underlying 
contours of reality or even its outer edges, it simply has nothing to say on the subject; for it is 
all there in the Glazier’s words: ‘So let’s keep quiet, decency, a little decency, goodnight, let’s 
get to bed, we who senselessly dared to speak of something other than staple rationing.’ 
Beckett is also locating language as possessing a significantly limited vocabulary, as 
compared to music; ‘Ah, I hear it, your music’ certainly leaves me in no doubt as to the 
Schopenhauerian origins of the Glazier’s speech. But more importantly, having identified the 
way in which Beckett moves Schopenhauer’s philosophy into the same proximity as his own 
considerations towards language, then when it comes to Beckett’s characterization of 
‘silence’, and his aesthetic fabrication of the ‘void’ we can see, that his intention was never to 
appeal to any loose ‘existential’ sense of freedom, in which there is literally nothing there; 
leading our own sense of individual autonomy to build to an unbearable pressure. For the idea 
that somehow Beckett just like Sartre, aimed to represent, as Esslin puts it,  the ‘human 
condition as a recognition that at the heart of our being there is nothingness, liberty, and the 
need of constantly creating ourselves in a succession of choices’ makes little sense in the face 
of the Glazier’s speech in Eleuthéria; especially once we understand the Schopenhauerian 
policy which lies behind the words.45 I would suggest that the ‘void’ we confront as an 
audience in relation to Beckett’s work is not empty at all, it is rather that the reality which is 
‘present’ (and forever present) falls outside all phenomenal considerations, and so only 
appears empty. This is a far cry from the existential chasm, which we ourselves must in 
someway take individual responsibility over; for there is literally nothing to ‘play’ with here; 
we are, as it were, already spoken for. As Beckett writes in Eleuthéria ‘we are not taken in by 
the big words and the bottomless silence’ which is to imply that all such textual space is in 
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some way an illusion. There is often the temptation amongst critics to regard Beckett’s 
engagement with Schopenhauer as an early dalliance; an idea which David Pattie identifies as 
having its roots in the first decade of Beckett criticism. For it was during this period that there 
arose a general philosophical model in response to Beckett’s work, one which Pattie describes 
as a synthesis of Cartesianism, Occasionalism, Existentialism and Schopenhauerian 
‘pessimism’ which he says  ‘created a composite image for the Beckettian universe: in which 
the isolated self split from the world and from his own physical existence, attempted to come 
to terms with the absence of any meaning, in a cold, inhospitable, grotesque, absurd and 
damaging world.’46 But as a result of having looked at Schopenhauer’s writing in some detail, 
we can see immediately how this model of an isolated split between the self, the world, and 
our physical existence bears no relation to Schopenhauer’s own philosophy; for the picture we 
receive from Die Welt is showing us the complete reverse; as Schopenhauer himself proposes, 
the self and the world are one and the same undivided reality It seems not only does this 
brand of early criticism point to an apparent inability to raise the philosophical dimension of 
Beckett’s work beyond inaccurate generalizations, but also we see in the current, revised 
attitude towards this early criticism, an equally ill-judged display of what Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy actually entails. For instance despite Pattie’s own awareness as to the way in 
which this early philosophical composite sits together somewhat unconvincingly, there is still  
a less than satisfactory account of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. For when it comes to Beckett’s 
own philosophical influences he is quite happy to group together the names of Descartes, 
Sartre, Camus, Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer, and to say with full certainty that the 
‘similarities between these philosophical traditions are clear: each one begins with the idea 
that the self and the world are split; each one places great emphasis on the mind’s ability to 
form the world; and each one places the development of the self at the heart of the human 
condition.’47 In fact the awkward philosophical synthesis which Pattie, picks up on in relation 
to the earlier construction of the ‘Beckettian universe’ is ironically being repeated here, 
through the mistaken assessment that Schopenhauer’s philosophy upholds not only the idea 
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that the world and the self are split, but also that the mind is ultimately responsible for the 
world.   Despite having correctly identified the importance of music to Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy there is still an obvious misreading in reference to the mind: 
     
  Early critics also came to note the pervasive influence of Arthur
  Schopenhauer on Beckett’s writing. Schopenhauer (mentioned 
  by name in Proust and in the early poem ‘Dortmunder’) opposed the
  world as it appeared to the individual (‘the representation’) to the world
  as it actually was (the expression of the ‘will’- the world as blind force,
  existing beyond the control of the mind). In other words, the external
  world (including the body) existed outside the mind’s control; any order
  that seemed to exist in the external world only existed in the mind of 
  the individual perceiving subject.48
                                                         
As we can see, Pattie’s account of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is constantly edging towards 
the view that Schopenhauer wanted somehow to represent human consciousness as being 
closed off from the will, which as I have shown in the introduction to this thesis, is never 
actually entertained in Die Welt. Having seen the way Beckett uses music in order to expose 
the limitations attached to theatrical representation, and the manner in which he portrays 
music as an undivided reality encompassing the whole of existence; it becomes apparent that 
the Schopenhauerian influence of music is equally as strong in Eleuthéria as it is in Dream.49 
So, returning to the initial proposition  that Eleuthéria is in effect Dream, assuming a 
theatrical vocabulary, then it is important to see whether the play’s dramatic, and crucially 
Schopenhauerian take on suicide; is replicated in Dream. Before we can begin answering this 
question we first of course have to make a strong case in support of the argument that the 
theme of suicide in Eleuthéria is primarily used by Beckett to initiate a specific 
Schopenhauerian dialogue, rather than what has been previously framed in a much more 
personal and biographical context.50 
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If we ask the question: which of the themes in Eleuthéria is the most dramatically charged? 
then I would imagine the unanimous response would be the theme of suicide:
   
 VICTOR                    (Reading) Aspirin du Rhône. You 
                                     must think I’m a complete idiot!
                                       
DR. PIOUK                (Rushing over) What? (he hastily
                                     takes back the tablets, looks at it)
                                     He’s right! What a birdbrain! (He
                                     hits his head) This one’s for me.
                                     (He swallows it) The old, the
                                     cowardly, the bastards, the scum
                                     of the earth, the washouts, for
                                     them the aspirins. But for you-
                                     (He digs around in his pocket)-
                                     for you the young, the pure, the
                                     lads of the future- (takes out
                                     the tablet, the good one)- we
                                     have something different- (He
                                     displays the tablet)- something
                                     altogether different! By your
                                     leave. (He takes Victor’s hand,
                                     places the tablet in it) Delightful
                                     moment! Such a warm hand, so
                                     alive (Solicitously) You have a
                                     temperature?
                   
 VICTOR                   (Looking at the tablet) It’s swal-
                                    lowed?
                                          
DR. PIOUK               It’s not a suppository, Monsieur.
                                                                              (E., 182.)        
At this crucial point in the play’s development Beckett concedes to his audience a degree of 
conventional dramatic tension, but as is clear from the doctor’s ‘suppository’ remark there is 
no intention to uphold the solemnity of the drama for any sustained length of time. Yet 
nonetheless it is the classic structure of the Will he? Won’t he? scenario common to many a 
playhouse, which Victor’s potential suicide bid actually hangs upon. So, purely from a 
standard dramatic angle it seems that the subject of suicide remains the central focus of the 
play. And in response to whether the subject of suicide has an unusually strong 
Schopenhauerian feel about it, there are I believe two key indicators which make it so. The 
first and less obvious indicator as to Beckett’s distinctly Schopenhauerian take on suicide is 
revealed in Dr Piouk’s valedictory speech applauding Victor’s initial embrace of his 
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prescription. For as we can see in the doctor’s address, the action of suicide is a youthful 
vigorous stance, it is an investment in the future; even in the description of Victor’s hands 
(‘Such a warm hand, so alive’) we are given a sense that suicide is being aligned to life at its 
very peak. All of this I believe is pointing towards the underlying Schopenhauerian principle, 
that suicide is not life being roundly slapped in its face, but rather an open ended embrace 
directed towards its very core. The second indicator as to Beckett’s own Schopenhauerian 
positioning of suicide is something, which I have previously touched upon in this 
chapter, namely the fact that Victor is soon brought into an awareness as to the superficiality 
surrounding the action of suicide:
  
 VICTOR                    What’s the guarantee?
 
 DR PIOUK                Of what?
 VICTOR                    Of effectiveness.
 DR PIOUK                The word of a professional, Mon-
                                     sieur, and of an honest man. Look
                                     at me! (Victor looks at him)
                                     You’ve looked into these eyes?
                                     There’s your guarantee. 
 VICTOR                    I believe you.
 DR PIOUK                Thank you.
VICTOR                    You could pay dearly.
DR. PIOUK              What difference can that make to
                                    you?
VICTOR                   None obviously, I seek to under-
                                   stand.
GLAZIER                He too! Some hash!
DR PIOUK              (Angrily) Oh you’re all the same!
                                  give that back to me. (He extends
                                  his hand)
            
 VICTOR                 I’m keeping it. I’m going to think 
                                  it out. (Pause) No, I’ll be frank
                                  with you, it’s all thought out. I 
                                  don’t need it. I’m keeping it all
                                  the same.
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It is this sudden rejection of suicide, that I want to propose is Beckett own Schopenhauerian 
prescription. Rather than the explicit rejection of suicide being somehow a defense of life, as 
many critics and stage directors are keen to press upon their audience, it is in reality, I believe, 
a whole-hearted rejection of life; for just as for Schopenhauer, suicide for Beckett is also 
incapable of calling life into question. It appears what Victor actually wants to achieve by 
continuing to exist, is a kind of self-advertisement, in which he can appreciate up close the 
real design to which life has always been intended to serve; in order that he, like 
Schopenhauer’s ascetic may genuinely turn away from life as positive state of self- 
affirmation. For it does indeed appear that Victor wants to ‘look down on that willing part of 
nature which he is, and withdraw from one’s identification with it.’:51   
 
VICTOR                 (Jerky delivery) I’ve changed my 
                                  mind. (A silence) Two years, it’s
                                  too little. (Pause) A life, it’s too
                                  little. (Pause) My life will be long
                                  and horrible. (Pause) But less
                                  horrible than yours. (Pause) I’ll
                                  never be free. (Pause) But I’ll feel
                                  myself ceaselessly becoming so.
                                  (Pause) My life, I’m going to tell
                                  you with what I’ll be using it up:
                                  with grating my chains against
                                  each other. From morning to 
                                  night and night to morning. That
                                  useless little sound, that will be my
                                  life. I don’t say my joy. Joy, that I
                                  leave to you. My calm. My limbo.
                                  (Pause) And you come to speak to
                                  me of love, of reason, of death!
                                  (Pause) Hey, look, go away, go
                                   away!
                                        (E., 185.)
                           
As Victor indicates to Dr Piouk he can never be free, but he will through his own form of 
abnegatio sui ipsius52, be able to achieve a weakening of the bondage he feels constantly 
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oppressed by; something which he now realizes the doctor’s pill can never remedy. The idea 
that freedom can never be attained through an individual act of choice, is precisely, I believe, 
Beckett’s message here, for there is no freedom to be had on any individual level in 
Eleuthéria, even in the action which normally constitutes the ultimate act of freedom: 
suicide. It is this indestructible vision that Victor finds himself hostage to, which I believe 
carries Beckett’s own personal response to the arresting portrayal of the self-conscious subject  
in Die Welt as hostage to its own underlying nature: the Wille zum Leben. This peculiarly 
Schopenhauerian bind is particularly well illustrated by Christopher Janaway who states ‘That 
I am a being that wills life and must strive for other mediate goals, and hence must suffer, 
does not issue from my choices. Furthermore, no contrivance of rationality, no episode of 
conscious willing, no steps I take, even when successful, can make it the case that the willing 
in me ceases.’53 Victor’s own inability to give up on life, is part of his own Schopenhauerian 
understanding, that such a choice was never his to begin with. For, as Victor declares, ‘I’ll 
never be free’ or to put it in its true Schopenhauerian context, I can never escape that which I 
am; unauthorized ‘freedom’. Having put forward the suggestion that Beckett was primarily 
using the theme of suicide in Eleuthéria in order to highlight the indestructible nature of 
‘willing’ rather than appropriating it as a serious question  directed towards life; then the same 
should be true of Dream. If we are to think of Beckett’s first novel and play as being 
essentially a repeat performance of one another; one taking place on the page, the other on 
stage, as Pattie suggests; then the action of suicide will evidently display the same 
philosophical bankruptcy in Dream as it does in Eleuthéria.  Indeed, as we can see from the 
way the narrator reproaches Belacqua in this passage from Dream, it becomes apparent that 
the same self-destruct button which threatens Victor’s legitimacy, is doing likewise to 
Belacqua’s:   
  How could the will be abolished in its own tension? 
  or the mind appeased in paroxysms of disgust?    
  Shameful spewing shall be his portion. He remains, for all   
  his grand fidgeting and shuffling, bird or fish, or, worse
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  still a horrible border-creature, submarine bird, flapping
  its wings under a press of water. The will and nill cannot
  suicide, they are not free to suicide. That is where the
  wretched Belacqua jumps the rails. And that is his wretch-
  edness, that he seeks a means whereby the will and nill
  may be enabled to suicide and refuses to understand that
  they cannot do it, that they are not free to do it.
                                                                   (D.F.M.W., 123-124.)         
In fact clearly, when it comes to Beckett’s own ‘derailment’ of suicide as an authentic 
response to the world it is the ‘will’ which remains the single barrier to activating such an 
option, not that life is in someway worth clinging to on any moral grounds. As Beckett and 
narrator says ‘How could the will be abolished in its own tension?’  This single line 
encapsulates the Schopenhauerian objections to suicide down to the very letter. For here 
Beckett is literally setting out the Schopenhauerian position, that what discounts suicide 
above anything else is the fact that the action does not shut down the will, but remains fully 
serviceable to the will; as the narrator puts it how can ‘the will be abolished in its own 
tension?’In fact it seems from the evidence provided in Dream that one could say with some 
justification that Beckett’s own attitude towards suicide is at this point exclusively 
Schopenhauerian, for, as this particular passage reveals, Beckett actually turns 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine on suicide into a form of mantra ‘The will and the nill cannot 
suicide, they are not free to suicide’. Also we can appreciate in this passage the way in which 
‘freedom’ itself becomes for Beckett an intractable problem in the context of the ‘will’. It 
would seem that Dream edges the explicit Schopenhauerian stakes over Eleuthéria merely by 
the way it declares such an open hand in relation to the will; for it appears with Eleuthéria 
that there is a switch of emphasis from the ‘will’ onto ‘freedom’ but nonetheless I see both 
works pulling in the same direction. If it is the case that Beckett’s earliest attempts to exploit 
the stage carry such an explicit response to Schopenhauer’s philosophy, then are we to assume 
that this is also true of Waiting for Godot and Endgame? In the last two remaining chapters I 
want to look at the possibility that Beckett does not actually retract his Schopenhauerian 
stance, but in truth evolves it into an even more highly-attuned aesthetic dialogue. But before 
we proceed any further in this direction, one really needs to spend some time gaining a sense 
of what actually constitutes Schopenhauer’s writing, allowing us to see not only the 
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philosophy, which will be examined at length, but the way in which the philosophy connects 
to a much broader aesthetic landscape which not only had at its disposal what seems to be the 
back catalogue of the whole of Western (and in part Eastern) culture, but also a style of 
writing which unusually for a ‘philosopher’ is often poetic as well as playful.  
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                                                CHAPTER THREE
                     The Unitary Metaphysics of Arthur Schopenhauer                                    
                          
               
                      We want to know the significance of those representations; 
                      we ask whether this world is nothing more than representation.
                      In that case, it would inevitably pass by us like an empty dream,
                      or a ghostly vision not worthy of consideration. Or we ask whether
                      it is something else, something in addition, and if so what that 
                      something is.
                                        Arthur Schopenhauer              
Schopenhauer’s philosophical writing not surprisingly by the early 19th century had to 
navigate the newly created slipstream of philosophical speculation raised by  Immanuel 
Kant’s epistemological enquiry Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason). 
Published in 1781, Kant’s critique was (and still is today) regarded as a Copernican revolution 
in Western philosophy. The nature of this revolution lay in Kant’s decision to do something 
quite unexpected, especially in an age of growing scientific accomplishment which sought to 
expand the frontier of human enquiry; namely to delimit the knowable world. What Kant sets 
out to demonstrate is that the perceivable world, is not self-identical nor present to itself; 
which is to say, the world as we perceive it is not commensurable with an object at all. 
Kant’s genius was to recognize, that what we humans apprehend is itself dependent on a 
process of representation; and therefore the object of our attention will always be in someway 
a reflection of our inherent physiological makeup, rather than the object as it is in itself. The 
fact we cannot dissociate our reality from a predetermined biology, i.e. brain, and central 
nervous system ensures that the world we orientate ourselves towards, is itself a precondition 
of our physiology. One effective way of thinking about this entrenched problem, as Magee 
explains,  uses the analogy of the camera and the sound recorder: ‘A camera can produce a 
visual image of a scene, but it cannot produce the smell of it. A sound recorder can give us the 
sound of it but not a visual image. Parallel things are true of our personal bodily apparatus: 
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each piece of it can do whatever it can do, but cannot do other things, and it yields its 
deliverances to our consciousness in forms that are determined by its nature. Our visual 
experiences come to us in terms made possible by our eyes and what lies behind them, our 
aural experiences in terms made possible by our inner ears; and without those physical sense 
organs (or substitutes from them made artificially for the purpose) there would be no seeing 
or hearing. And so it is for all the other ways in which we apprehend or experience: there 
could no more be thinking without a brain than there could be digestion without a stomach. 
The sum total of everything we can conceivably apprehend in any way at all is the sum total 
of what the apparatus at our disposal can do or mediate, whatever that may be at any given 
time, and regardless of whether or not we ourselves know what its limitations are.’1  So it 
becomes evident, as human beings we are all held to a view of the world that runs parallel to 
our own predetermined physiological makeup. The world with its characteristic depth and 
surface comes about not as a result of some external integrity which it has in itself, but rather 
because our ‘biological wiring’ is calibrated in the way it is. Therefore the reality which we 
map in relation to our perceived autonomy in the world, cannot independently exist outside 
the interior operation of the senses. This is not to disclaim the idea that there cannot be a 
reality outside the sensory fixtures which participates in this process of representing the 
world, it just means that any speculative move in the direction of such a reality has to 
abandon the dialectic of presence and absence. To speak of something falling outside our own 
physiological comprehension is to pose a reality that has no form of representation open to it; 
for there is literally nothing to register. As Kant says in his critique ‘Representation has 
nothing to represent. It is subsumed by absence, since there is nothing else’. (ftnote, Kant ref) 
It is important to recognize that, when Kant speaks of absence being subsumed, the whole 
notion of something being present or absent is completely negated. Kant is not talking about 
the the removal of something, because that in itself needs to be supported by a positive 
evaluation. The dialectic of presence and absence comes into force as soon as we initiate the 
process of removal. What Kant is alluding to is a much more comprehensive grasp of the 
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concept of absence, one which loses its negative connotation in terms of the absence of 
presence; that is to say, an absence which does not partake in the arithmetic mechanism of 
deduction. It is in this context, of an irreducible absence, that Kant is able to then infer that 
the two respective props which uphold all modes of representation are themselves firmly 
pitched within the sensory limits of human experience: namely space and time.  For if one is 
to accept that objective, formal presence, is inextricably bound up with spatial and temporal 
considerations, then in this newly revised context, space and time can no longer be cognized 
via the object, because, as Kant shows, the concept of presence has no ultimate foundation in 
the thing-in-itself. Instead in Kant’s philosophical critique, space emerges as the void and 
time is to be thought of as infinite, which somewhat paradoxically stretches the identity of 
time beyond normal temporal recognition, it ceases to be marked by the division of the 
pendulum. Infinite time as opposed to syncopated time cannot be subject to any degree of 
measurement, be it a nanosecond or even a light year; for all forms of measurement are 
redundant in the face of the infinite. Indeed the existence of infinite time precludes ‘space’ 
and ‘time’ all together. It is in reality the absence of dimensional space as well as measured 
time. This in many ways is the crux of Kant’s Copernican revolution, for Kant throws out the 
consciously ingrained idea that space and time are the two unshakable preconditions 
underwriting the possibility of all ‘things’:     
                                     
                            ‘We cannot say all things are in time, because with the 
  concept of things in general abstraction is made from every kind of in-
  tuition of them, but this is the real condition under which time belongs
  to the representation of the objects. Now if the condition is added to the
  concept, and the principle says that all things as appearances (objects of
  sensible intuition) are in time, then the principle has its sound objective
  correctness and a priori universality.
  Our assertions accordingly teach the empirical reality of time, i.e.,
  objective validity in regard to all objects that may ever be given to our
  senses. And since our intuition is always sensible, no object can ever be
  given to us in experience that would not belong under the condition of 
  time. But, on the contrary, we dispute all claim of time to absolute re-
  ality, namely where it would attach to things absolutely as a condition
  or property even without regard to the form of our sensible intuition.
  Such properties, which pertain to things-in-themselves, can never be
  given to us through the senses.’2                             
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Thus by showing that the data we receive through our senses cannot be matched to the world 
as it is in itself, Kant is able to create a rift between our conscious identity and the world at 
large; bringing an end to the pretence that the picture we have of the world can be thought in 
any way as independent. For not only does Kant show the existence of a mismatch between 
the world as it comes to be represented through our senses, and as it is in itself, but that, in 
order to qualify as truly independent the world must by definition lie outside any conceptual 
and imaginative undertaking. That is to say an independent world, must in truth have no 
accordance with any category of human thought or apprehension. So, in Kant’s mind the 
material world of objects in time and space, should be regarded more as a map of our 
own cognition, rather than the world as it exists in itself; for it is the world of our senses that 
we experience, and not the world. How can an epistemological object both be the thing it 
represents to our senses, while at the same time be completely independent of such sensory 
arrangements? Once we see the question laid out in this fashion then the self-contradictory 
nature of such an enquiry becomes much more evident, than if we were to simply lay the 
charge ‘But why shouldn’t things actually be as they appear to us?’.3 And yet despite this 
contradiction our minds seem to have a built in tendency to bypass this reality, in a way which 
fully suggests that our own mental capacity is not equipped in biological terms to police this 
distinction. What Kant asks of his reader is not to imagine what this reality could be like, but 
rather to accept that there is nothing here for the imagination to run with. The reality of such 
cognitive limits is not just something which is conveniently papered over in theological 
circles , but it also seems to receive inadequate recognition in science. One particularly good 
illustration of this lies in the field of cosmology, where one is regularly asked to imagine an 
event before time and space existed, i.e. the moment just shortly before the ‘Big Bang’, but 
this itself implies that time and space has some external reality outside human cognition, it 
completely ignores the fact that it is the inner structure of human consciousness that bears the 
signature of time and space rather than the exotic fabric of the early universe.    
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This brings us to Kant’s further startling conclusion, that the chain of events such as those 
resulting in the formation of stars and galaxies are in themselves a magnification of the inner 
workings of human  consciousness. That is to say, the order and structure which we ascribe to 
objects in space and time can only arise in consciousness due to causality. Kant therefore was 
able to further infer, that because the objects in space and time were themselves forms of 
cognitive sensibility, one would also have to accept that any emerging pattern, which the 
epistemological objects were party to, also had to stand in relation to sensible intuition. So 
from this Kant deduced that the phenomenal pattern of cause and effect was just as much a 
sensible imposition as either space or time. As a result Kant concluded that the world as we 
know it has a clear and necessary structure, but without the categories of space, time and 
causality there would be a no empirical world to speak of. Importantly, though, Kant also 
concluded that, as these categories do not exist in the world as it is in itself, there can be no 
possibility of ever penetrating the essential character of the world, what Kant coined as the 
Dinge an sich (things-in-themselves). So as we can see, Kant’s philosophical legacy has a 
dual character, casting reality into two irreconcilable halves, the world which we encounter as 
sensory Beings, in the world of appearances Erscheinungen; and secondly the world as it is in 
itself, Dinge an sich.  
The Schopenhauerian Completion of Kant. 
        
Having laid out the bare bones of Kant’s Critique we are now suitably poised to enter the 
main body of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, which he himself positioned somewhat remarkably 
not as a separate ‘Schopenhauerian philosophy’, but rather as a completion of Kant’s own 
philosophy which he believed had already set out almost all that could be said on the subject 
of rational philosophical thinking, and as such any philosophical contribution he himself 
could make would inevitably rest upon Kantian foundations, a point which Schopenhauer 
himself  expresses in terms of ‘The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason; 
which he sets out in his first significant philosophical publication of the same name.      
The basic assertion behind The Fourfold Root supports the Kantian view that our own 
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everyday world is representational rather than substantive in character, and that any rational 
principles governing the world initiate no inference to a reality outside the initial framework 
of representation. Schopenhauer in the Fourfold Root divides Kant’s Erscheinungen into four 
classes of representation. The first class of representation is intuitive empirical representation, 
such things as table lamps and desks; the second class are concepts, i.e. abstractions created 
by the faculty of reason which exist solely in the intellect, while the third class represents the 
sensory fixture of time and space. But it is the fourth class which for Schopenhauer will 
change entirely the rational complexion of the Kantian project, the class that represents 
the individual self. It is here in this fourth class of Schopenhauer’s devising, that his thinking 
takes on a distinctly un-Kantian character, for Schopenhauer the selbst or ‘self’ does not 
adhere to a subject of knowledge, but rather it arises in the form of active volition; as a 
subject of willing. For Schopenhauer argues, that given that all knowledge is known through 
objects, that is to say objects in the Kantian sense, be it a desk or a trapezoid, to know is by 
definition, to know objects. Therefore to know ourselves as Schopenhauer points out, is to 
make a very peculiar claim, for it places upon the ‘self’ in question an unusual degree of 
pressure which seemingly does not apply to any of the other objects. That is to say, in order to 
construct the ‘self’ as a knowing entity, it has to reveal itself as both object and subject; it 
somehow has to present itself in consciousness as that which is, and that which is not, the 
focus of its own conscious activity. As a result of identifying a non-representative aspect of 
the ‘self’, that which can never be represented to itself, Schopenhauer was able to conclude 
that the ‘self’ was neither purely objective nor purely subjective, but somehow falls between 
the two. This for Schopenhauer exposed a weakness in the Kantian division which 
sealed off permanently the world of appearances, from the world as it is in itself, for it 
overlooks that the ‘self’ unlike the other classes of sufficient reason ‘looks’ inwards as well as 
outwards. We as subjects do not only perceive ourselves as external bodies in space and time, 
but we also perceive ourselves internally as a series of motives, or as Schopenhauer puts it 
‘causality seen from within’.4  It would be this duality of perspective that would persuade 
Schopenhauer that Kant had constructed the Dinge an sich in false terms. Firstly when we 
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look at the division itself between Erscheinungen and the Dinge an sich it implies that the 
plurality which is applicable to ‘the world of appearances’ is also applicable to the ‘world as it  
is in itself’ for given the gap between the two realities ultimately has to be supported by a 
notion of plurality, there are so to speak two worlds in Kant’s view. So if  ‘the world as it is in 
itself’ can have a pluralistic setting then it would also have to be subject to space and time, for 
in order to present something as separate they both, not just ‘the world of appearances’ have 
to occupy space and time. But as we know from Kant, space and time are nothing more than 
the structural characteristics of experience, so from Schopenhauer’s perspective it is entirely 
wrong to present the Dinge an sich as being separate from Erscheinungen, as they have to be 
linked in someway. Also another grave error that Schopenhauer identified in Kant’s 
philosophy was his assertion that the Dinge an sich actually causes us to experience the 
phenomenal world, but as Schopenhauer correctly points out in The Fourfold Root, according 
to Kant’s own Critique, it is only within the phenomenal world that the law of causality can 
have any legitimacy at all; outside phenomenal reality, nothing can rightly be called the cause 
of anything. So when it came to looking for an alternative explanation, one which is capable 
of upholding the integrity of the Dinge an sich, Schopenhauer turned to his model of the 
selbst with its dual perspective, looking both inwards as well as outwards. In it, Schopenhauer 
identified the way in which the Dinge an sich could support both the phenomenal world as 
well as the ‘noumenal’ world, without having recourse to the adulteration of the original 
premise on which Kant’s Dinge an sich rested. Instead of presenting Erscheinungen and the 
Dinge an sich as two separate realities, Schopenhauer re-drew Erscheinungen and the Dinge 
an sich in terms of perspective; they would now in Schopenhauer’s mind come to represent 
two different ways of perceiving the same thing. So ultimately, Schopenhauer’s model did 
not have to succumb like Kant’s, to the trauma of spatial and temporal division; for there 
would only be one reality in Schopenhauer’s newly emerging philosophical scheme, but one 
which could be viewed in two different ways. For Schopenhauer the world’s reality would 
now fundamentally be read in terms of the ‘self’, its nature would not just mirror the ‘self’s’ it  
would actually be indistinguishable from it. The world, in a very unKantian stroke would 
become for Schopenhauer the macrocosm of the ‘self’, and conversely the ‘self’ would 
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become the microcosm of the world, but ultimately both would be expressions of the same 
reality:        
  Everyone finds himself to be this will, in which the inner nature of 
  the world consists, and he also finds himself to be the knowing
  subject, whose representation is the whole world; and this world
  has an existence only in reference to the knowing subject’s con-
  sciousness as its necessary supporter. Thus everyone in this twofold
  regard is the whole world itself, the microcosm; he finds its two
  sides whole and complete within himself. And what he thus recognizes
  as his own inner being also exhausts the inner being of the whole
  world, of the macrocosm. Thus the whole world, like man himself,
  is through and through will and through and through representation,
  and beyond this there is nothing.
                                             (W.W.R.I., 162) 
As we can see, the world and the self are capable of collapsing into one another under 
Schopenhauer’s revision of Kant’s critique, while at the same time holding onto the main 
foundation of Kant’s transcendental idealism, for as Schopenhauer puts it ‘the knowing 
subject, whose representation is the whole world; and this world has an existence only in 
reference to the knowing subject’s consciousness as its necessary supporter.’ Whereas On the 
Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason is essentially a treatise which spells out 
the representational nature of our everyday world, Schopenhauer’s main opus, Die Welt als 
Wille und Vorstellung or The World as Will and Representation attempts to do the very thing 
which Kant’s Critique displays little inclination towards, that is, to reflect on the actual nature 
of what Kant himself chose to call the Ding an sich. As we can see from the aforementioned 
extract from The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer himself promptly abandons 
the opaque language of Dinge an sich in order to replace it with a much more immediate 
language seemingly tailored to the body, that of the ‘will’ or Wille. 
So, by merely changing the terms of the Dinge an sich, Schopenhauer in actual fact rolls back 
Kant’s own ruling out of the possibility of gaining access to the ‘thing in itself; for it is the 
inner identity of the self, something which is immediately transparent to every conscious 
being, which occupies the realm of the Dinge an sich and not something which is at all 
remote or unattainable. But having said that Schopenhauer’s Wille is much more orientated 
towards the body than Kant’s Dinge an sich, it soon becomes apparent in Die Welt that our 
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bodies are in fact just one of a series of manifestations generated by the Wille. The human 
body as a biological material entity does not in fact achieve any special status in Die Welt, it is 
just like any other objective phenomenon tied to the a priori forms of representation; 
space, time and causality, but crucially for Schopenhauer, unlike other phenomena it remains 
open to its own inner nature: 
 
  In fact, the meaning I am looking for of the world that stands before 
  me simply as my representation, or the transition from it as mere 
  representation of the knowing subject to whatever it may be besides 
  this, could never be found if the investigator himself were nothing 
  more than the purely knowing subject (a winged cherub without a body). 
  But he himself is rooted in that world; and thus he finds himself in it as 
  an individual, in other words, his knowledge which is the conditional 
  supporter of the whole world as representation, is nevertheless given 
  entirely through the medium of a body, and the affections of this body 
  are, as we have shown, the starting-point for the understanding in its 
  perception of this world. For the purely knowing subject as such, this 
  body is a representation like any other, an object among objects. Its 
  movements and actions are so far known to him in just the same way 
  as the changes of all other objects of perception; and they would be 
  equally strange and incomprehensible to him, if their meaning were 
  not unravelled for him in an entirely different way.
                                                                                   (W.W.R.I., 99)
  
          
 This ‘entirely different way’ of appreciating the movement and action of the phenomenal 
world, arises initially in the form of a one word answer to a riddle, which Schopenhauer 
builds in terms of: What is the inner nature of things, which the orderly relations among 
representations themselves do not reveal?5 
For Schopenhauer that one word is ‘will’, the strident characteristic of all humans which 
propels them towards a localized telos; be it expressed in the form of a biological prerequisite 
such as nutritional acquisition or sexual reproduction, or indeed, dare I say, something as 
prosaic as completing an academic thesis, can of itself be attributed to ‘will’. So, for 
Schopenhauer, the self essentially becomes a focal point in which the world can be seen from 
both sides. It is not that the human self takes up a unique position in the world, it is only that 
the tiny portion of the world that it does take up can be viewed both internally and externally; 
what is unique is the experience afforded by the self to inhabit its own inner nature, and by 
doing so, offer a glimpse into the inner nature of reality as a whole. For if we regard the 
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scientific explanation of the world as incomplete, or one sided, as invariably Schopenhauer 
did, then any further intelligibility the world has to offer can only come about if I myself 
make no separate distinction between my own inner nature and that of the world’s as a whole. 
It was precisely this mode of thinking which galvanized the idea for Schopenhauer that the 
only plausible candidate for the Dinge an sich or as Schopenhauer also referred to it der 
inneren Wesen der Dinge  ‘the inner nature of things’ would have to be in someway 
commensurate with the human ‘will’. Using this platform Schopenhauer began to work with 
the notion that the whole of reality was governed by ‘will’ or that is to say a force which bore 
the outline of human streben (‘striving’) which ultimately manifests itself as ‘will’. For it is 
important to realize at this point, that Schopenhauer does not presuppose that the ‘will’ as it is 
recognized in humans, exerts itself in an identical fashion throughout all of reality. 
For instance the ‘will’ which Schopenhauer infers is exerting itself in humans, is not, despite 
being the same ‘will’ possessive of conscious recognition when it manifests itself in plants, or 
indeed any other living entity which is not human; also it is true to say that Schopenhauerian 
will is not just restricted to living entities:
 
  In the first place, I wish the reader to recall those remarks        
  with which we concluded the second book, and which were oc-   
  casioned by the question there raised as to the will’s aim and object.
  Instead of the answer to this question, we clearly saw how, at all
  grades of its phenomenon from the lowest to the highest, the will
  dispenses entirely with an ultimate aim and object. It always strives,
  because striving is its sole nature, to which no attained goal can 
  put an end. Such striving is therefore incapable of final satisfaction;
  it can be checked only by hindrance, but in itself it goes on for 
  ever. We saw this in the simplest of all natural phenomena, 
  namely gravity, which does not cease to strive and press towards an
  extensionless central point, whose attainment would be the annihila-
  tion of itself and of matter; it would not cease, even if the whole
  universe were already rolled up into a ball. We see it in other simple
  natural phenomena. The solid tends to fluidity either by melting or
  dissolving, and only then do its chemical forces become free: rigidity
  is the imprisonment in which they are held by cold. The fluid tends
  to the gaseous form, into which it passes at once and as soon as it is
  freed from all pressure. No body is without relationship, i.e., without
  striving, or without longing and desire, as Jacob Boehme6 would say.
  Electricity transmits its inner self-discord to infinity, although the
  mass of the earth absorbs the effect. Galvanism, so long as the pile
  lasts, is also an aimlessly and ceaselessly repeated act of self-discord
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  and reconciliation. The existence of the plant is just such a restless,
  never satisfied striving, a ceaseless activity through higher and higher
  forms, till the final point, the seed, becomes anew a starting-point;
  and this is repeated ad infinitum; nowhere is there a goal, nowhere
  a final satisfaction, nowhere a point of rest.
                                                               (W.W.R.1., 308-309)                                      
So, in fact what Schopenhauer is expressing is that the ‘striving’ which he identifies in 
humans, is itself a reflection of what takes place throughout the entire fabric of the universe, 
be it on a sub-atomic level in which the ‘striving’ is expressed as gravity, ceaselessly 
compressing and drawing apart matter, or in the form of electromagnetism ensuring sufficient 
tension arises between opposing particles in the atom, not to mention the fact that the passage 
expresses itself in terms of the intermolecular forces bearing down upon the whole process of 
chemical deterioration. What is also revealed from this key passage in Die Welt, is that the 
‘striving’ or ‘will’ is used by Schopenhauer to dramatically illustrate the pressing futility 
behind biological reproduction, using in this instance the biological model of plant-
germination and seed-production. Just like the ‘striving’ force underlying gravity, so too we 
see the same ‘striving’ exhibited in Schopenhauer’s own description of the life cycle of a 
plant, each stage of its development being described as a magnification of restless 
dissatisfaction, until eventually it culminates, not in resolution, as one would conventionally 
interpret the production of new life, but rather as it were, a falling in on oneself through sheer 
exhaustion; which in turn results in having to return to the exact same position which initiated 
the whole process in the beginning; a fate which is repeated ad infinitum. Nor can we see in 
Schopenhauer’s delineation of the plant’s life-cycle a point in which the organism achieves a 
state of rest; for his own emphasis is one of ceaseless activity. So, far from the conventional 
understanding of ‘will’ as it is normally applied to an idea of independent human volition: the 
power or faculty of choosing or determining; the act of using this power; volition; choice or 
determination7 Schopenhauer’s ‘will’ seemingly appears to be divested of all previously held 
ideas of independence and choice; as it requires no conscious apparatus to initiate its activity. 
Schopenhauer, it seems, uses the word ‘will’ in order to convey a strong notion of desire 
attached to an undivided inner nature, but clearly any association with individual freedom, 
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involving a process of conscious deliberation, misses the mark completely.  
And yet, despite firmly rejecting a conception of ‘will’ which is invested in an idea of 
individual freedom,  free ‘will’ is something which remains evidently on the Schopenhauerian 
table:
  my exposition does not eliminate freedom. It merely moves it out, namely,
  out of the area of simple actions, where it demonstrably cannot be found, up
  to a region which lies higher, but is not so easily accessible to our knowledge.
  In other words, freedom is transcendental.    
                                                                (O.F.W., 99)
For Schopenhauer true freedom has to break from all association with necessity if it is to 
assert genuine autonomy, and, as everything in the phenomenal world is subordinate to the 
principles of sufficient reason, then in reality individual human volition must be illusory. For 
unlike other grades of reality, I as a human subject, am in the unique position of being self- 
conscious, which provides evidence of what I ‘will’ as well as revealing to me my own ability 
to act in accordance with such ‘will’, but to regard this as being free is for Schopenhauer a 
grave error. For what I ascertain as being free in myself is nothing more, in Schopenhauerian 
terms, than an awareness of being able to ‘will’, rather than consciously manipulating or 
taking ownership of such ‘will’.     
The important question for Schopenhauer is whether I as a human subject could have ‘willed’ 
otherwise? Raising serious doubts as to whether we as human beings have ultimate control 
over our conscious actions is something which Schopenhauer achieves with an 
uncharacteristic degree of logical precision in his prize-winning essay submitted to the Royal 
Norwegian Scientific Society entitled Auf der Freiheit des Wille or On the Freedom of the 
Will; the outline of which Christopher Janaway carefully maps out in his essay ‘Will and 
Nature’8:
 1.  Freedom of the individual human will must be distinguished 
     from freedom of action (the ability of X if one wills to do 
      X).
 2.  There is freedom of will only if occurrences of the individ-
     ual’s willing enjoy absence of all determination or necessity.
 3.  An agent’s self-consciousness can provide no answer to the
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     question of whether the agent’s act of will are necessitated
     by a ground that determines them.
 4.  But an objective account of the occurrence of acts of will
     shows that they must be grounded in causes that necessitate
     their occurrence.
 5.  Hence there is no freedom of the individual agent’s will in 
     this sense: no acts of will can be without a ground that ne-
     cessitates them.
 6.  This conclusion does not remove the sense one has of be-
      ing responsible for one’s deeds, which must be accounted for
      from a different standpoint.     
        
Interestingly, as one can see from Schopenhauer’s conclusion, despite his own logical 
deduction pointing to an emphatic ‘no’ when addressing the question ‘Is it possible to prove 
the freedom of the human will from from the evidence of self-consciousness?’, he does not 
take it upon himself to argue that our own feelings of responsibility are in anyway unfounded.  
So in a Schopenhauerian context human consciousness is not the seat or locus of the ‘will’: it 
is merely one of the many numerous ways in which it can exert itself. Just as it can exert itself 
as an unconscious striving in a germinating seed, so the ‘will’ also exerts itself as a series of 
conscious motives being acted upon by a human subject; but ultimately for Schopenhauer the 
‘will’ in both instances remains the same. Just like the water flowing through the tributaries of 
a river delta, Schopenhauer would have us believe that our conscious behavior channels the 
‘will’ in a similarly dendritic fashion, one in which, the motives of the conscious subject are 
seen to affect the ‘will’ only in so far as they can change temporarily the course of its 
direction, delaying what will always inevitably be the same conclusion. Importantly though 
from Schopenhauer’s point of view, regardless of what conscious journey the ‘will’ endeavors 
to take, the ‘will’ in itself remains unchanged:
   
  What the man really and generally wills, the tendency of his innermost 
  nature, and the goal he pursues in accordance therewith these we can 
  never change by influencing him from without, by instructing him, 
  otherwise we should be able to create him anew.[...]From without, the 
  will can be affected only by motives; but these can never change the 
  will itself, for they have power over it only on the presupposition that it 
  is precisely such as it is.  All that the motives can do, therefore, is to alter 
  the direction of the will’s effort, in other words to make it possible
  for it to seek what it invariably seeks by a path different from the one
  it previously followed.
                               (W.W.R. 1., 294)         
Despite not being able to influence the ultimate destination of the ‘will’  there is in the 
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Schopenhauerian scheme of things one aspect, which we as humans genuinely have the power 
to change; that is knowledge, particularly the knowledge relating to the ‘will’. It is this 
capacity which above all binds humans to a uniquely tragic position in the world; for unlike 
animals, humans can deliberate over the consequences of the will, but without pressing upon 
it any real change. Thus ‘Man’ is revealed to ‘himself’ as a realm of conflict, or better still a 
contradiction, or even an error.  As Schopenhauer says ‘Repentance never results from the 
fact that the will has changed - this is impossible- but from a change of knowledge. I must 
still continue to will the essential and real element of what I have always willed; for I am 
myself this will, that lies outside time and change. Therefore I can never repent of what I have 
willed, though I can repent of what I have done[...]’9 so, as we can see the ‘will’ which is 
ubiquitous throughout the world only reaches a point of self-recognition once it is expressed 
in terms of humanity, but none the less it does not change the fact that it is the ‘will’ which 
has sovereignty, and not the individual human subject. The picture which arises from 
Schopenhauer’s own systematic interrogation of what actually constitutes ‘willful’ freedom, 
especially once it is vetted in relation to Kant’s categorical prerequisites, controversially 
raises no prospect of active volition; for ‘willful’ action as Schopenhauer sees it, is not 
something we do, but rather what we are. For the whole question of what we are becomes for 
Schopenhauer an inroad into the underlying structure of the world in general; on the one hand 
we are subjects of knowledge, we are that which knows the world objectively, our bodies 
notwithstanding, while on the other we emerge as willful action, subjects of ‘willing’. But for 
Schopenhauer any dichotomies which arise from such considerations should in themselves 
carry the status of an illusion, as they depend entirely on the structure of ‘sufficient reason’.  
For let’s us not forget that the ‘will’ unlike human cognition, is not constrained by space, time 
or causality and in this sense any partition erected in the presence of the ‘will’ must be in 
someway an illusion. So the human subject in Schopenhauer’s philosophy has no clear 
resolution on an individual level. Instead Schopenhauer is inclined to think about human 
individuality in terms of a knot in the undivided fabric of the ‘will’:   
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  Now the identity of the subject with that of  knowing 
  by virtue whereof (and indeed necessarily) the
  word “I” includes and indicates both is the knot of the 
  world (Weltknoten) and hence inexplicable. For to us only
  the relations between objects are intelligible; but of these
  two can be one only insofar as they are parts of a whole.
  Here, on the other hand, where we are speaking of the
  subject, the rules for the knowing of objects no longer
  apply, and an actual identity of the knower with what is
  known as willing and hence of the subject with the object,
  is immediately given. But whoever really grasps the inexpli-
  cable nature of this identity, will with me call it the miracle
  “par excellence.”  
                       (T.F.R.O., 211-212) 
In this sense there is no genuine breach separating us, the subject, from our perceived world; 
plurality (what Schopenhauer labels the principium individuationis) remains ultimately 
foreign to the ‘will’ and as Schopenhauer says in Die Welt ‘It is not a case of there being a 
smaller part of will in the stone and a larger part in man, for the relation of part and whole 
belongs exclusively to space, and has no longer any meaning the moment we have departed 
from this form of intuition or perception. More and less concern only the phenomenon, that is 
to say, the visibility, the objectification.  There is a higher degree of this objectification in the 
plant than in the stone, a higher degree in the animal than in the plant; indeed, the will’s 
passage into visibility, its objectification, has gradations as endless as those between the 
feeblest twilight and the brightest sunlight, the loudest tone and the softest echo.’10 
The Will to Life.
When considering the higher degrees of ‘willful’ objectification, such as those that reach the 
point of biological representation, Schopenhauer identifies two defining threads of ‘willful’ 
movement, one which is directed towards survival and the other directed towards 
reproduction; each in their own turn come together to forge collectively what Schopenhauer 
describes as Wille zum Leben or ‘will to life’.  As Janaway reminds us, the usual translation of 
Wille zum Leben, and indeed the translation which Payne  himself settles for is ‘will to live’ 
rather than the less linguistically correct translation ‘will to life’. But for the purposes of 
conveying the essential meaning behind Schopenhauer’s philosophy of ‘will’ it is necessary 
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to use a word which supports a much broader conception of living than simply one which 
upholds individual preservation. Instead it should evoke the whole struggle which all 
biological organisms orientate themselves towards, not just individual preservation but rather 
the preservation of the entire species, engendering life and protecting offspring, and it is for 
this reason that the more inclusive ‘will to life’ captures a greater sense of the original 
intention behind  Wille zum Leben, than merely ‘will to live’. For as Janaway, explains 
coming up with the concept of Wille zum Leben was Schopenhauer’s bold attempt to seek out 
‘a single hypothesis  to explain the ways in which all life forms grow, function and behave.’11
Again though, one should understand that Schopenhauer’s Wille zum Leben has no conscious 
intention behind it, for it is simply a manifestation of the same undivided striving which 
stands outside the structure of sufficient reason, only that in this instance it seeks to exert 
itself in terms of organic life. Therefore Schopenhauer wants to present the biological impetus 
which propels life forward as a mechanism which sets in motion a cycle of willing and 
attainment, and that life is effectively the means by which the ‘will’ ensures that all species 
find themselves somewhere on this cycle of willing and attaining. But because the ‘will’ itself 
is free from spatial, temporal and causal consideration, there can be no particular instance of 
willing or attainment held with within the cycle, which is capable of fully eliminating or 
satisfying the ‘will’. So when Schopenhauer is directed back to the question what are we? The 
answer for him lies within this cycle of desire, humans like all living organisms are in essence 
Wille zum Leben:
 
  Awakened to life out of the night of unconsciousness, the will 
  finds itself as an individual in an endless and boundless world, 
  among innumerable individuals, all  striving, suffering  and 
  erring; and, as if through a troubled dream, it hurries back to the
  old unconsciousness. Yet till then its desires are unlimited, its claims
  inexhaustible, and every satisfied desire gives birth to a new. No 
  possible satisfaction in the world could suffice to still its craving, set
  a final goal to its demands, and fill the bottomless pit of its heart.
                                                                                                      (W.W.R.2., 573)                        
For Schopenhauer all life must imply striving, and this applies to humans as it does to any 
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organism, but it appears, from Schopenhauer’s point of view, that the satisfactory attainment 
of a particular desire should not be assigned positive value, for it partakes in a limitless field 
of desire where satisfaction can at best only be temporarily sustained, before it is forced to 
orientate itself towards further permutations of desire. In animals this desire manifests itself 
primarily in the way of hunger and a need to reproduce, but as conscious achievements they 
have no legitimate status:
            
  But we see at once from the instinct and mechanical skill of animals 
  that that the will is also active where it is not guided by any knowledge. 
  That they have representations and knowledge is of no account at all 
  here, for the end towards which they work as definitely as if it were a 
  known motive remains entirely unknown to them. Therefore, their 
  action here takes place without motive, is not guided by the represent
  -ation, and shows us first and most distinctly how the will is active 
  even without any knowledge. The one-year-old bird has no notion of 
  the eggs for which it builds a nest; the young spider has no idea of the 
  prey for which it spins a web; the ant-lion has no notion of the ant for 
  which it digs a cavity for the first time[...]
                                                     (W.W.R.1., 114)
So, for animals the goals to which they orientate themselves have no conscious direction, they 
remain outside any cognitive framework, whereas in the case of humans the same willful 
behavior, though no different in character becomes drawn into a evaluative judgement, the 
human subject to which the ‘willing’ applies, seeks to interpret this unchosen goal in terms of 
individual well-being. Life then as a result takes on the false appearance of being open to 
rational choice. For what we have in reality, in relation to ourselves  as human subjects, is not 
that we will life as a deliberate conscious goal, but rather we will life because we are that very 
thing, the Wille zum Leben. George Simmel, expounding on this very issue, asserts that in the 
Schopenhauerian context that ‘I [the human subject] do not will by virtue of values and goals 
that are posited by reason, but I have goals because I will continuously and ceaselessly from 
the depth of my essence.’12 So, from Schopenhauer’s perspective, we as humans do not will 
from choice, because in essence we are that ‘will’ the ‘will to life’. And in relation to its 
objectification it finds itself expressed primarily (like all living organisms) in terms of hunger 
and sexual desire:
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  Therefore the parts of the body must correspond completely to the 
  chief demands and desires by which the will manifests itself; they 
  must be the visible expression of these desires. Teeth, gullet and 
  intestinal canal are objectified hunger; the genitals are objectified 
  sexual impulse; grasping hands and nimble feet correspond to the 
  more indirect strivings of the will which they represent. Just as the 
  general human form corresponds to the general human will, so to 
  the individually modified will, namely the character of the individual, 
  there corresponds the individual bodily structure, which is therefore 
  as a whole and in all its parts characteristic and full of expression.
                                                                                                           (W.W.R.1., 108)          
In this sense Schopenhauer brings forth a picture in which all biological functions are a 
manifestation of the ‘will to life’; including therefore the brain. But unlike most philosophical 
and scientific reflection on the human subject, Schopenhauer does not centralize willful 
control in the region of brain, in fact the brain in Schopenhauer’s philosophy develops as a 
subsidiary offshoot to the will. For, as Janaway emphasizes, ‘The structure of knowledge and 
of its objects depend on the kind of manifestation of will to life which its subject happens to 
be. Everything the reader was told at the outset about the world of representation, the forms of 
space, time, and causality which govern the objects of our experience, and the concepts and 
judgements which we can obtain from them by abstraction- all of this is merely surface 
beneath which lurks the driving force of our nature, the will. We grow into creatures who can 
perceive, judge, and reason, in order to fulfill the ends of life: survival, nourishment, and 
reproduction.’13 Therefore Schopenhauer does not put the intellect, before the ‘will’. Quite the 
reverse, if anything it is the intellect which does the ‘will’s’ bidding: 
  The brain with its function of knowing is nothing more than a guard 
  mounted by the will for its aims and ends that lie outside. Up in the 
  watch-tower of the head this guard looks round through the windows 
  of the senses, and watches the point from which mischief threatens 
  and advantage is to be observed, and the will decides in accordance with
  its report. This guard, like everyone engaged on active service, is 
  in a state of close attention and exertion, and therefore is glad when
  it is again relieved after discharging its duties of watching, just as 
  every sentry likes to be withdrawn from his post. This withdrawal
  is falling asleep, which for that reason is so sweet and agreeable, 
  and to which we are so ready to yield. 
                                                        (W.W.R.2., 241)
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As we can see from this dramatic characterization of the ‘will’s’ relationship with the 
intellect, Schopenhauer portrays the intellect as a down-trodden sentry forced to fall in line 
with the instructions given by its senior command, namely the ‘will’. It is clearly a 
relationship in which the intellect is subordinate to the ‘will’. So rather than the familiar 
picture of the intellect being synonymous with a command centre, in Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy the reverse is actually true.  In fact when it comes to visualizing a locus for the 
human will, Schopenhauer decides there can be no better candidate than the genitals, for not 
only do they embody the key tenants of Wille zum Leben, but they also crucially remove any 
suggestion of conscious motivation:
    
  The sexual impulse is the most vehement of cravings, the desire of 
  desires, the concentration of all our willing. Accordingly, its satis-
  faction, corresponding exactly to the individual desire of anyone, thus
  to a desire directed to a definite individual, is the summit and 
  crown of his happiness, the ultimate goal of his natural endeavours, 
  with whose attainment everything seems to him to be attained, and
  with the missing of which everything seems to have been missed.
  In just the same way we find, as the physiological correlative of all
  this, in the objectified will, and thus in the human organism, the
  sperm or semen as the secretion of secretions, the quintessence of all
  humours, the final result of all organic functions, and in this we have
  once more proof of the fact that the body is only the objectivity of the
  will, in other words the will itself under the form of representat-
  tion.
               (W.W.R.2., 514)
It soon becomes apparent in Schopenhauer’s writing that any amorous love or sexual desire 
displayed between two individuals is in reality an extension of the illusory nature of the will’s 
phenomenal appearance. For the desire lovers display towards one another is not in fact 
trained on their romantic opposite, but rather on something, which has yet to make its 
phenomenal appearance; that of the unfertilized offspring:        
               
 
  The ultimate aim of all love-affairs, whether played in sock or buskin, 
  is actually more important than all other aims in man’s life; and there
  -fore it is quite worthy of profound seriousness with which everyone 
  pursues it. What is decided by it is nothing less than the composition 
  of the next generation. The dramatis personae who will appear when 
  we have retired from the scene are determined, according to their exist
  -ence and their disposition, by these very frivolous love-affairs. Just as 
  the being the existentia, of these future persons is absolutely conditioned 
  by our sexual impulse in general[...]
                                                           (W.W.R.2., 534)
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Another illustration of Schopenhauer prising back the phenomenal cover in order to reveal the 
true purpose behind those countless expressions of shared desire and love, addresses the 
familiar bond displayed between loving couples:                      
      
  The quite special and individual passion of two lovers is just
  as inexplicable as is the quite special individuality of any person,
  which is exclusively peculiar to him; indeed at bottom the two are
  one and the same; the latter is explicite what the former was implicite.
  The moment when the parents begin to love each other- to fancy 
  each other, as a very apposite English expression has it- is actually 
  to be regarded as the very first formation of a new individual, and
  the true punctum saliens of its life; and, as I have said, in the meet-
  ing and fixation of their longing glances there arises the first germ
  of the new being, which of course, like all germs, is often crushed
  out.
                (W.W.R.2., 536)
         
In fact what Schopenhauer is encouraging his reader to anticipate is the way in which, the 
human subject is constantly at the beck and call of his or her own species, and by extension 
their ‘will’. The image which Schopenhauer vividly creates, is one which alludes to the idea 
that there is no cut-off between human subjects,  as the ‘will to life’ manifests itself through 
and beyond any single individual. Therefore the will’s focus and concentration in the stirrings 
of human sexual desire, despite there not yet having been an act biological insemination, is 
enough in itself to summon from the infinite depths of the ‘will’ a noumenal disturbance, 
which has the potential to surface as a perceived phenomenal division, that of a child.
So in the philosophical context of ‘will’ there can be no action which marks you as separate or 
unique from the world, your action is always an undivided continuation of the world’s 
unfolding. For Schopenhauer there is no fundamental distinction between a desire indicated 
by hunger or a desire indicated by the human libido, or, come to that, a desire which 
motivates one to write a play or indeed compose a thesis. It is only its phenomenal realization, 
and the degree to which it is expressed that shows it in a different light. As we have already 
established the human subject in its internal identity is nothing but ‘will’ and this same ‘will’ 
in humans is always expressed phenomenally in terms of the ‘will to life’. So in returning 
back to question what are we, there seems to be a further degree of movement on the subject; 
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though by no means a clear answer. In order to press even further with this question we must 
return back to the initial structure, which characterizes all of life as essentially being held 
within a circular holding pattern of desire and attainment. For Schopenhauer life itself is just 
one way employed by the ‘will’ to maintain an indestructible strand of desire, a pattern which 
in Schopenhauer’s mind plays to the entire gallery of existence. Schopenhauerian ‘will’, as 
we have already seen has no need for any conscious attributes. Its character is purely internal 
and therefore, unlike varying states of consciousness, it is not party to ‘sufficient reason’; it 
is as Schopenhauer himself describes ‘blind’. Therefore the ‘desire’ which arises from the 
‘will’ is not in any way an indication of conscious awareness, nor either some form of rational 
directive, but instead a simple measure of deficiency within a particular part of the will, which 
we so happen ascribe to ourselves. Simply put, ‘desire’ derives from a need, and that need in 
turn derives from a deficiency in oneself, but because the will which Schopenhauer identifies 
in us, is infinite, (it is not applicable to space, time and causality) there can never be an 
instance when we are fully liberated from its influence, for no matter how many ‘goals’ we 
obtain in the course of our lives we can never eliminate what is infinite, namely that which 
fuels the source of all desire; the ‘will’. So in Schopenhauer’s philosophical scheme we all 
will by virtue of the fact that the ‘will’s’ desire is infinite and can never be satisfied. This like 
everything else, Schopenhauer believed is the governing principle behind all behaviour, 
including, that is, conscious behavior. The phenomenal occurrence which we stretch out in 
terms of an individual identity, along with all our personal ambitions and achievements; be it 
the political and economic hegemony of an entire nation, or the much less vaunted and noble 
achievement of growing a perfectly proportioned carrot, all, once stripped of their surface 
appearance, display the exact same structural mechanism at work; the ‘will’ blindly 
measuring its own deficiency, through a reflexive impulse to open itself up to an endless 
chain of desire, temporary fulfillment, and further desire. But what is crucial to this overall 
view of existence, is the way in which Schopenhauer adopts an almost identical view of 
desire as Buddhism and Brahmanism. That is to say- all of existence is a form suffering and 
the cause of suffering is itself ‘desire’. As Brian Magee explains, though Schopenhauer did in 
later life explore Eastern religion (it is even said that he kept a copy of the Veda texts close to 
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his bedside such was his high regard for them), he ‘did not know about Indian religions when 
he began to write. It was only in his day that translations of their main scriptures into the 
languages of Western Europe began to appear in significant numbers. Hitherto the 
intellectually serious ideas of those religions had been scarcely known to Europeans, except 
perhaps for a small number of Far East travellers, and a handful of specialist scholars.’14 
Indeed, Magee goes on to say ‘it was  only because Schopenhauer’s mother introduced him 
personally to one of those scholars when he was in his middle twenties that he discovered 
Indian religions as early as he did. The man in question was Friedrich Majer, a key figure in 
introducing the religions of India to the German-speaking world.’15  In fact Schopenhauer saw 
his own position on suffering not just being mirrored in the teachings of  Buddhism and 
Brahmanism, but he also identified it at the heart of the New Testament:  
    
  For not only the religions of the East, but also true Christianity 
  has throughout this fundamental ascetic character that my phil- 
  losophy explains as denial of the [will-to-life], although Protestantism, 
  especially in its present-day form, tries to keep this dark. Yet even
  the open enemies of Christianity who have appeared in most recent
  times have attributed to it the teaching of renunciation, self-denial,
  perfect chastity, and generally mortification of the will, which they
  quite rightly describe by the name of “anticosmic tendency”;  and         
  they have thoroughly demonstrated that such doctrines are es-
  sentially peculiar to original and genuine Christianity. In this respect
  they are undeniably right; but they set up this very thing as an
  obvious and patent reproach to Christianity, whereas just in this are
  its deepest truth, its high value, and its sublime character to be 
  found.
                    (W.W.R.2., 615-616)
     
Though if any reader were to conclude from this, that Schopenhauer was in some way 
attempting to manoeuver his philosophy towards some vague divinity, then they would be 
clearly mistaken.  The ‘will’, far from being some species of pantheism, has actually more in 
common with the selective pressure Darwin later envisaged acting ceaselessly throughout the 
whole of nature, than say Spinoza’s divine substance:
  Thus everywhere in nature we see contest and struggle and the fluc-
  uation of victory[...]  Every grade of  the will’s objectification fights for  
  the matter, the space and the time of another. Persistent matter must 
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  constantly change the form, since under the guidance of causality, 
 mechanical, physical, chemical and organic phenomena, eagerly striving
  to appear, snatch the matter from one another, for each wishes to reveal
  its own Idea. This contest can be followed through the whole of nature;
  indeed only through it does nature exist[...] Yet this strife is only the
  revelation of that variance with itself that is essential to the will. This
  universal conflict is to be seen most clearly in the animal kingdom.
  Animals have the vegetable kingdom for their nourishment, and within
  the animal kingdom again every animal is the prey and food for some other.
  This means that the matter in which an animal’s Idea manifests itself must
  stand aside for the manifestation of another Idea, since every animal can
  maintain its own existence only by the incessant elimination of another’s.
  Thus the [will-to-life] generally feasts on itself, and is in different forms its
  own nourishment, till finally the human race, because it subdues all the 
  others, regards nature as manufactured for its own use.
                                                                                      (W.W.R.1., 146-147)
It’s remarkable to think that Schopenhauer penned these words long before Darwin’s own 
publication of The Origin of Species, for what we have in this passage is a description of 
nature, which like Darwin’s theory does not partake in a divine programme, in fact one could 
legitimately claim, that the theory which Darwin reenacts in The Origin deviates very little 
from this presentation of the natural world in Die Welt. Also the appointed view, that 
Schopenhauer was in fact little more than a misty-eyed metaphysician, far removed from the 
scientific rigor underpinning Darwin’s enquiry, can in my view be instantly dismissed:
                                      
  Many insects (especially the ichneumon flies) lay their eggs on the 
  skin, and even in the body, of the larvae of other insects, whose slow 
  destruction is the first task of the newly hatched brood. The young hydra, 
  growing out of the old one as a branch, and later separating itself 
  therefrom, fights while it is still firmly attached to the old one for the 
  prey that offers itself, so that the one tears it out of the mouth of the 
  other (Trembley, Poly-pod. 1l, p. 110, and 111, p 165). But the most 
  glaring example of this kind is afforded by the bulldog-ant of Australia, 
  from when it is cut in two, a battle begins between the head and the tail. 
  The head attacks the tail with its teeth, and the tail defends itself bravely by
  stinging the head. The contest usually lasts for half an hour, until
  they die or are dragged away by other ants. This takes place every
  time. (From a letter by Howitt in the W. Journal, reprinted in 
  Galignani’s Messenger, 17 November 1855.)
                                                                 (W.W.R.1., 147)
        
This passage, as we can see, stands testimony to Schopenhauer’s own ability to examine and 
evaluate some of the most up-to-date entomology journals available at the time of publishing 
his expanded edition of Die Welt. In fact, Schopenhauer’s early educational background, is 
awash with scientific learning, for while studying at Berlin university he regularly attended 
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lectures on a broad range of scientific subjects, indeed at one point of his university education 
he thought seriously of taking up medicine, such was his scientific inclination at the time. 
Even after opting for a philosophical career, Schopenhauer still remained an active participant 
in the sphere of science; undoubtably the most famous example of this is his collaboration 
with Goethe on optics. So, having hopefully deflated many of the exaggerated claims that 
often surfaces in relation to the ‘will’, one can finally move away from the spectral vision, or 
phantasmagoric entity harboring a quasi-intelligence that so often interferes with 
Schopenhauer’s philosophical reception. 
Suffering and Boredom. 
Thus we come now to the matter of connecting Schopenhauer’s theory of suffering to his 
broader philosophy of ‘will’. As we have established the engine fueling this model of ‘desire’ 
is dependent upon the ‘will’s’ undivided and infinite nature being constrained to a false 
individualistic impression of itself, namely arising through a process of phenomenal 
objectification; which amongst its many configurations includes the human subject. 
Importantly though, as Schopenhauer repeatedly outlines in his philosophy, the ‘will’ in any 
objectified state remains at odds with its true identity; for having no option other than to will, 
and yet, as we can see in a way which plays to a ‘false’ objectified schema (such as 
ourselves), then invariably its striving will be less than straight-forward, i.e. the ‘will’s’ most 
efficient path of expression will be closed off to it. It is this hindrance encountered by the 
‘will’, which ultimately for Schopenhauer constitutes suffering: 
                          We call its [the will] hindrance through an obstacle 
 placed between it and its temporary goal, suffering; its attainment  
 of the goal, on the other hand we call satisfaction,  well-being,     
 happiness. We can also transfer these names to those phenomena of
 the world-without-knowledge which, though weaker in degree, are
 identical in essence. We then see these involved in constant suffering
 and without any lasting happiness. For all striving springs from 
 want or deficiency, from dissatisfaction with one’s own state or 
 condition, and is therefore suffering so long as it is not satisfied. No
 satisfaction, however, is lasting; on the contrary, it is always merely 
 the starting-point of a fresh striving. We see striving everywhere
 impeded in many ways, everywhere struggling and fighting, and
 hence always as suffering. Thus that there is no ultimate aim of striv-
 ing means that there is no measure or end of suffering.
                                                                               (W.W.R.1., 309)            
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In this context suffering is not only unavoidable through life, but it is revealed to be the very 
foundation on which it rests, for Schopenhauer the phenomenal deformity that is the human 
self, despite its cognitive elevation, remains principally just one more obstacle or ‘kink’ for 
the ‘will’ to negotiate. Even when Schopenhauer’s inspection falls upon the transitionary 
moment held between the satisfactory attainment of a goal, and a renewed striving, there is 
still no let up from human unrest. For what we would assume would be one’s own private 
little oasis, no matter how brief, in which all restless agitation could be vanquished; we have 
in exchange for ‘paradise’ an unescapable boredom warping what little victory we may raise 
to ourselves: 
                                                                  Finally, the same thing is 
 also seen in the human endeavours and desires that buoy us up with the  
 vain hope that their fulfilment is always the final goal of willing.
 But as soon as they are attained, they no longer look the same, and
 so are soon forgotten, become antiquated, and are really, although not
 admittedly, always laid aside as vanished illusions. It is fortunate
 enough when something to desire and to strive for still remains, so
 that the game may be kept up of the constant transition from desire
 to satisfaction, and from that to fresh desire, the rapid course of
 which is called happiness, the slow course sorrow, and so that this
 game may not come to a standstill, showing itself as a fearful,
 life-destroying boredom, a lifeless longing without a definite object,
 a deadening languor. 
                              (W.W.R.1., 164)
 So even the idea of missing a stitch in the inevitable chain of suffering, brings with it only a 
false hope of escape, in fact, for Schopenhauer, boredom, in the context of human existence, 
presents itself as the returning pendular swing of suffering; hence he writes ‘life swings like a 
pendulum to and fro between pain and boredom, and these two are in fact its ultimate 
constituents. This has been expressed very quaintly by saying that, after man had placed all 
pains and torments in hell, there was nothing left for heaven but boredom.’16                              
Such a picture of humanity inevitably strips the subject of their entitlement to justify to 
themselves that what they will is in anyway connected to a greater moral or ‘absolute good’; 
for as we can see all willing is simply an attempt to bring an end to a particular desire, but 
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crucially as we have learnt from Schopenhauer’s own description of the ‘will’, in order for 
there to be any movement in this direction, we always have to locate the action in terms of 
further renewed desire, for without desire in Schopenhauer’s philosophy there is no 
movement, or life to speak of. So morality, or the lack of it in Schopenhauer’s philosophy is 
inseparably bound up with the ‘blind’ nature of the ‘will’:
  All willing springs from lack, from deficiency, and thus from 
  suffering. Fulfillment brings this to an end; yet for one wish that is   
  fulfilled there remain at least ten that are denied. Further, desiring 
  lasts a long time, demands and requests go on to infinity; fulfillment
  is short and meted out sparingly. But even the final satisfaction itself
  is only apparent; the wish fulfilled at once makes way for a new one;
  the former is a known delusion, the latter a delusion not as yet 
  known. No attained object of willing can give a satisfaction that
  lasts and no longer declines; but it is always like the alms thrown
  to a beggar, which reprieves him today so that his misery may be
  prolonged till tomorrow. Therefore, so long as our consciousness is
  filled by our will, so long as we are given up to the throng of desires
  with its constant hopes and fears, so long as we are the subject of
  willing, we never obtain lasting happiness or peace. Essentially it is
  all the same whether we pursue or flee, fear harm or aspire to
  enjoyment; care for the constantly demanding will, no matter in 
  what form, continually fills and moves consciousness; but without
  peace and calm, true well-being is absolutely impossible. Thus the
  subject of willing is constantly lying on the revolving wheel of
  Ixion, is always drawing water in the sieve of the Danaids, and is
  the eternal thirsting Tantalus. 
                                          (W.W.R.1., 196)
For Schopenhauer, there is simply no room for divine assimilation with the ‘good’, what is 
‘good’ is by virtue what one wills. So the ‘good’ in the context of Schopenhauerian thinking 
cannot be delivered over to a virtuous setting; it is bled of standard moral significance, for 
ultimate goodness, what he refers to as summum bonum, would have to rest with the 
elimination of willing altogether. 
Suicide: No Exit.
This inevitably takes us neatly to the question of suicide, for is it not obvious in the way in 
which Schopenhauer constructs his world vision, that the most effective solution to his 
summum bonum would be simply to end one’s life? And should not the human species 
therefore have the upper hand over their animal counterparts, by being able to summon upon 
this newly awakened Schopenhauerian consciousness, and act swiftly and decisively in 
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bringing an end to ones life? Hopefully having now fleshed out the broad mechanistic 
framework of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of ‘will’ one can instantly see the error attached to 
any decision to end one’s life in the form of suicide? For any person who thinks they can 
bring closure to his or her ‘will’ by simply destroying the body along with its brain function is 
sadly deluding themselves, for what the suicidal subject attacks is merely the phenomenal 
manifestation of the ‘will’ not the ‘will’ itself, which as we know wills in perpetuity:            
  If, therefore, a person fears death as his annihilation, it is just 
  as if he were to think that the sun can lament in the evening and say:    
  “Woe is me! I am going down into eternal night.” Conversely, who-
  ever is oppressed by the burdens of life, whoever loves life and 
  affirms it, but abhors its torments, and in particular can no longer 
  endure the hard lot that has fallen to just him, cannot hope for 
  deliverance from death, and cannot save himself through suicide.
  Only by a false illusion does the cool shade of Orcus allure him as a
  haven of rest. The earth rolls on from day into night; the individual
  dies; but the sun itself burns without intermission, an eternal noon.
  Life is certain to the will-to-live [life]; the form of life is the endless pres-
  ent; it matters not how individuals, the phenomena of the Idea, arise
  and pass away in time, like fleeting dreams.
                                                              (W.W.R.1., 280-281)
The emblematic image of the sun is one which Schopenhauer uses to great effect in order to 
convey the illusion of death, for just like the sun appearing to extinguish all trace of its light 
each time night descends, so too, death appears to curtail the ‘will’ which had once surfaced 
in the individual subject. Whereas in fact the ‘will’ just like the sun ‘burns bright’ without 
intermission,17 ceaselessly striving, without being drawn to the  illusion of plurality. So for 
Schopenhauer all attempts at suicide are a false move in relation to the ‘will’ for not only does 
it allow one’s ‘will’ to continue unabated, but it also shows itself in the form of a desire, 
(which in many instances as we are aware can be ratcheted up to extreme proportions) and 
thus feeds directly back into the self-asserting strength and vitality of the ‘will’.  Also, we can 
deduce from this passage, that Schopenhauer sees a further delusion attached to the action of 
suicide, relating to the misleading terms and conditions, under which the ‘suicide’ writes off 
his or her life. For the passage which reads ‘who ever is oppressed by the burdens of life, who 
ever loves life and affirms it, but abhors it torments, and in particular can no longer endure the 
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hard lot that has fallen to just him’ tells us clearly in Schopenhauer’s mind that the ‘suicide’ 
does not hold life in low esteem. Quite the reverse, in fact it seems that they display 
an actual reverence towards life; what they do not like, are the conditions on which life has 
been delivered to them. If only, life had not delivered so many burdens and inconveniences, 
then one would have never plunged for such an apparently desperate option, they would 
presumably so to speak have let life off the hook? But crucially for Schopenhauer the whole 
premise of ‘letting life off the hook’ smacks of philosophical dishonesty, for unlike his own 
position the ‘suicide’ has grossly misread life, seeing it only through the lens of their own 
individual welfare, whereas in truth, from a Schopenhauerian prospective, there would be no 
human life to speak of if it were not for the perpetual regeneration of suffering. Life for 
Schopenhauer equates with suffering, so any life which attempts to cut out its own suffering is 
itself a contradiction in terms. Interestingly, Schopenhauer does not impose a moral injunction 
on suicide, say for instance like Kant, who perceived it running in opposition to his own 
categorical imperative (as he could not conceive of willing suicide in terms of a universal 
law). For Schopenhauer, this holds no water; for if death were genuinely achievable through 
suicide, his resistance to the idea would most certainly dissipate:
 
  If criminal law condemns  suicide,  that  is  not an  ecclesiastically 
  valid reason and is, moreover, definitely ridiculous; for what punish-
  ment can frighten the man who seeks death? If we punish the
  attempt to commit suicide, then we are simply punishing the
  want of skill whereby it failed.
                                             (P.P..2., 307)
So, as Schopenhauer’s essay On Suicide makes quite explicit, there are no conventional moral 
objections, holding him back from condoning suicide, it purely rests on the fact that as an 
action it makes no significant inroads into the philosophical problem attached to life, which is 
that all life is predicated on suffering. 
Schopenhauer’s Vorstellung.  
In Schopenhauer’s mind, all individual life must correspond in some way to an act of 
fabrication, for this idea of the ‘will’ perceiving itself under the wrong terms, leads inevitably 
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to what Schopenhauer describes as Weltknoten (‘World-knot’); the world simultaneously cast 
in terms of both subject and object, the ‘I’ and the ‘not-I’.18 In an attempt to bring further 
resolution to this philosophical dilemma, Schopenhauer brings forth a view of the ‘world’ 
which allows it to participate both in terms of subject and object. What Schopenhauer cleverly 
assembles within the title of his principal work Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, is a picture 
of the world which is both ‘will’ and ‘representation’ but unlike the dichotomy between, say, 
the Cartesian res cogitans and res extensa, or the Kantian Ding an sich and Phenomena, this 
dualism rests upon an illusion. For a ‘representation’ or Vorstellung is  by definition a non-
substantive thing, it is a reflection of a reality, rather than being ‘that’ reality; what 
Schopenhauer would describe as a ‘Platonic shadow’. But if we speak of definitions, it is in 
my opinion essential to point to the inherently unstable nature of Schopenhauer’s concept of 
Vorstellung, especially when trying to wrestle from it a single definition. 
English translations of Schopenhauer’s principal work chart just how unsatisfactory the 
attempts to pin down Vorstellung have been. In fact the very essay which is seen to deliver 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy out of relative obscurity (an English essay no less, published in 
The Westminster Review ‘Iconoclasm in German Philosophy’), which remarkably, had a 
greater impact in Germany than did the original publication of Die Welt19) is reluctant to 
second guess, at all, at a single definitive translation of Vorstellung. John Oxenford, the 
unsigned author of this eloquent counterblast to Hegelianism, feels so uncomfortable with his 
own efforts to translate Vorstelllung, that he decides in the end to highlight his chosen term 
‘visible existence’ with the proviso ‘we have been obliged to make use, here and there, of 
paraphrastic expressions to avoid an attempt to translate the untranslatable word, 
“Vorstellung.”20 Even John Oxenford, the first acclaimed English translator of Eckermann’s 
Conversations with Goethe admits defeat in the presence of Schopenhauer’s Vorstellung. So, 
when it comes to English translations of Die Welt, the decision to exchange Vorstellung for 
its pallid surrogate, inevitably becomes a moment in which the translator is thrown onto the 
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defensive:
  Vorstellung is important for it occurs in the German title of this work. 
  Its primary meaning is that of “placing before”. and it is used by 
  Schopenhauer to express what he himself describes as “an exceed-
  ingly complicated physiological process in the brain of an animal, the
  result of which is the consciousness of a picture there.” In the present
  translation  “representation”  has been selected as the best English    
  word to convey the German meaning, a selection that is confirmed by
  French and Italian versions of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. 
  The word “idea” which is used by Haldane and Kemp in their English
  translation of this work clearly fails to bring out the meaning of
  Vorstellung in the sense used by Schopenhauer. Even Schopenhauer
  himself has translated Vorstellung as “idea” in his criticism of Kant’s
  philosophy at the end of the first volume, although he states in his 
  essay, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, 
  that “idea” should be used only in its original Platonic sense. More-
  over, confusion results in the translation of Haldane and Kemp from
  printer’s errors in the use of “Idea” with a capital letter to render the
  German Idee in the Platonic sense and of “idea” for the translation
  of Vorstellung as used by Schopenhauer. In the present translation
  Idee has been rendered by the word “Idea” with a capital letter.    
                                                                                               (W.W.R.1., [ix])
As we can see from Payne’s introduction to his own translation of Die Welt, he feels duty 
bound to shrug off his predecessor’s attempts to label Vorstellung as “idea” in order to access 
the broader potential which Schopenhauer’s concept offers. R.B. Haldane and John Kemp 
who in joint partnership attempted the very first English translation of Die Welt brokered what 
is still for many, the most familiar rendering of Schopenhauer’s title; The World As Will and 
Idea21. And rightly, as Payne points out Schopenhauer does  use the German word Idee in Die 
Welt in order to express something quite different from Vorstellung; namely, as he says, a 
Platonic idea. But rather than identify Haldane and Kemp as guilty of what seems like an 
blatant omission, I suspect the true intention behind their decision is partially answered in 
Payne’s own outlining of the neurological aspect of Vorstellung. For it is more likely that 
Haldane and Kemp were just as concerned to evoke “the exceedingly complicated 
physiological process in the brain” which Payne reiterates in relation to Vorstellung, but they 
do this, not by drawing upon a Platonic notion of “Idea”, rather as I see, being typical 19th 
century English translators, they do it in the full spirit of British Empiricism. For I suspect 
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that Haldane and Kemp are attempting to locate the meaning of Schopenhauer’s Vorstellung 
somewhere in the range of Locke’s revised conception of Idea; as being in part a monograph 
of sensory perception22. But having made such allowances for Haldane and Kemp, it still 
remains the fact that borrowing from an earlier Empirical framework, leaves ‘Idea’ at best 
only partially equipped to address the full implications of Schopenhauer’s Vorstellung. 
Evidently both ‘Idea’ and ‘representation’ are compromised attempts to stabilize Vorstellung, 
in fact there seems to be with each new translation an added degree of soul-searching, which 
leads the translator to pour over a greater range of nuances, as if to make up for past 
omissions. And yet despite all this, deep down they know personally, that there will remain an 
aspect of Schopenhauer’s Vorstellung which will forever evade their translation. For if we 
take the latest translation of Die Welt by Richard E. Aquila, the ground on which Vorstellung 
rests has shifted once again, this time away from ‘representation’ and onto ‘presentation’. 
Again in the all important preface to the translation, the reader is left in no doubt as to the task 
Aquila has embarked upon, for it sets out just how fraught with difficulty, if nigh on 
impossible a project of this kind is: 
  Now, if even German editors are not able to follow Schopenhauer’s 
  instruction in a satisfying manner, how much more must this be         
  the case regarding translations of the editions of his works. For as
  Schopenhauer explains in his essay “On Language and Words,” any 
  translation is “necessarily defective”; “We are hardly ever able to trans-
  late from one language into another any characteristic, pregnant, and
  significant passage in such a way that it would produce the same effect
  on the reader in a precise and complete manner. The reason for this 
  lies in the fact that concepts often do not correspond with each other in
  different languages (so, writing this, I am aware that the concept of 
  “concept” does not correspond exactly to the German Begriff, and 
  neither does “idea”). Thus even “the very best translation will at most
  be related to the original as the transposition of a given piece of music
  into another key is to the given piece itself”; and as Schopenhauer adds,
  “those who understand music know what that means.”23   
Though Aquila’s translation of Die Welt is limited like both its predecessors, what I find 
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particularly valuable about Aquila’s contribution to the English reception of Schopenhauer’s 
work, is the way in which he not only illuminates Vorstellung from a different angle, but also 
the way in which his own introduction portrays, Vorstellung as an unusually commodious 
kind of ‘concept’, requiring more than one attempt at unpacking. In fact as Aquila points out 
there is a degree of slippage between ‘concept’ and its German counterpart Begriff; the two 
are by no means stringent copies of one another. Unlike the conventional stamp of a concept, 
the Begriff of Vorstellung seems a much more open proposition. It is not so much a concept 
which can be instantly grasped or taken into one’s possession, allowing, the concept (or idea) 
to be held in one’s mind as if it were some mental talisman. Instead Aquila brings forth an 
aspect of Vorstellung which seems in the case of Haldane, Kemp and Payne largely put to one 
side, an aspect of the ‘concept’ which relates to performance.  For Aquila the motivation 
behind his adoption of ‘presentation’ for Vorstellung, is largely prompted by an attempt to 
escape the possessive aspect attached to a pronoun such as ‘idea’ or ‘representation’ so that he 
may run with what he describes as ‘the central intention in Schopenhauer’s use of the term: 
not possession by, but presentation of objects to, a cognizant subject’:   
  With respect to this central sense, it may also be useful to note that 
  the term Vorstellung is commonly used to refer to theatrical presenta-  
  tions. Several times, Schopenhauer in fact calls the side of the world
  that he calls meine Vorstellung a Schauspiel or a “show” (or “play”): a
  show that is “mine” in the sense that I am its spectator. But as it turns
  out, it is also mine in another sense. Just as with the corresponding
  English term, Vorstellung can refer either to what is presented or to
  the process or action of presenting it. Thus we may say that Hamlet is
  “our” presentation for the evening; but we may of course also speak of
  the evening’s presentation of that play, and of the doings of its various 
  characters. It is just here, however, that a decisive step is taken. For 
  what we soon learn in Book One of this work is that what always does
  the “presenting”- what actually sets (stellt) the world as presentation
  before (vor) one-  is just that very spectator, the cognizant subject
  (erkennendes Subjekt) itself. And even this falls short of fully captur-
  ing the radical character of Schopenhauer’s view. For one might still
  suppose that, even if what does the “presenting” is the cognizant subject
  itself, what is presented is at least normally an independent existing 
  reality. But for Schopenhauer: “No object without subject.” And so, as
  it turns out, a still more apt analogy would be another upon which he in 
  fact dwells at greater length: what gets presented to one in a dream.24
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An appreciation of Vorstellung which opens onto a ‘theatrical’ footing, where one is now 
setting up Schopenhauer’s ‘concept’ in terms of both that which is presented to, and that 
which is performed by the cognizant subject, provides a further crucial dimension to the 
object-subject relationship enacted by the ‘will’. For, as Aquila adroitly emphasizes, all flat 
labeling, such as ‘idea’, ‘representation’, and even his own suggestion of ‘presentation’ 
remains frustratingly cut off from this vital ‘space’ that remains so integral toVorstellung’s 
identity. So when Schopenhauer articulates one ‘side’ of the world in terms of Vorstellung, he 
is not doing so, purely in the form of neurological projection; but also, importantly, in terms 
of that which is put in front of the subject, or alternately one could say ‘staged’ in front of the 
subject. But as Aquila rightly points out, Schopenhauer’s own radicalization of Vorstellung 
entails that the subject not only performs in front of an audience, but that very audience is in 
fact themselves. Therefore in Schopenhauer’s philosophy the stage, on which we all perform, 
is erected in front of ourselves, we are  simultaneously expressed as both performance and 
audience, in much the same way we think of dreaming:
  According to realism, the world is supposed to exist, as we know it, 
  independently of this knowledge. Now let us once remove from it,
  all knowing beings, and thus leave behind only inorganic and vege-
  table nature. Rock, tree, and brook are there, and the blue sky; sun, 
  moon and stars illuminate this world, as before, only of course to
  no purpose, since there exists no eye to see such things. But then 
  let us subsequently put into the world a knowing being. That world
  then presents itself once more in his brain, and repeats itself inside
  that brain exactly as it was previously outside it. Thus to the first 
  world a second has been added, which although completely separated
  from the first, resembles it to a nicety. Now the subjective world of 
  the perception is constituted in subjective, known space exactly as
  the objective world is in objective, infinite space. But the subjective
  world still has an advantage over the objective, namely the knowl-
  edge that the external space is infinite; in fact, it can state before-
  hand most minutely and accurately the full conformity to law of all
  the relations in that space which are possible and not yet actual, 
  and it does not need to examine them first. It can state just as
  much about the course of time, as also about the relation of cause
  and effect which governs the changes in outer space. I think that,
  on closer consideration, all this proves absurd enough, and thus leads
  to the conviction that that absolutely objective world outside the
  head, independent of it and prior to all knowledge, which we at first
  imagined we had conceived, was really no other than the second 
  world known subjectively, the world of the representation [Vorstellung],
  and it is this alone which we are actually capable of conceiving.
  Accordingly the assumption is automatically forced on us that the
  world, as we know it, exists only for our knowledge, and conse-
  quently in the representation [Vorstellung] alone, and not once again 
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  outside that representation [Vorstellung]. In keeping with this assumption, 
             then, the thing-in-itself, in other words, that which exists independently of our 
             knowledge and of all knowledge, is to be regarded as something quite different 
             from the representation [Vorstellung] and all its attributes, and hence from     
 objectivity in general.
                                       (W.W.R.2., 9-10)        
 
In this passage from Die Welt we can see the way in which Schopenhauer constructs the 
phenomenal word in terms of a rudimentary stage, from which he attacks ‘realism’ stressing 
the absurdity relating to the idea that an objective, independent world should match up exactly 
to a second subjective world (the parameters of our own sensory totality) generated in our 
brains. That in reality the ‘stage’ we recognize as being a exact reflection of an objective 
world, is in fact, nothing more, than our own undivided subjectivity turned back on itself; just 
as in a dream.It is interesting to note that the Schauspiel aspect of Vorstellung which Aquilla 
so rightly identifies, is something which David Luke, a translator of German himself 
immediately homes in upon. But where as Aquilla is addressing Schopenhauer directly, 
Luke’s Schopenhauerian address is through the work of Thomas Mann; a writer whose  
novels and short stories are in part a personal response to the Schopenhauer he encounters in 
the music of Wagner, but also interestingly a writer who in 1938 is delivering papers on both 
composer and philosopher whilst lecturing in America.25 Luke it seems has none of the 
difficulty, that Kemp, Haldane and Payne, seem to experience when it comes to opening out 
the ‘stage’ like quality of Vorstellung; for when the ‘concept’ of Vorstellung arises in Thomas 
Mann’s work, Luke immediately lines up both ‘idea’ and ‘representation’ for instant 
dismissal, preferring to opt instead for ‘illusory show’. In his description of Mann’s short 
story Gladius Dei, Luke outlines the manner in which Mann uses a prismatic projection of 
Schopenhauerian philosophy in order to re-stage his own ‘burning of the vanities’:
  The visual arts are being attacked here because they are the wrong sort 
  of art-because they are allied to immediate life, naive vitality, unreflecting 
  sensuality; and literature (‘these luxurious volumes of love poetry’) comes 
  under the same condemnation in so far as it, too, is content to be a mere 
  ‘seductive stimulus’, an ‘insolent idolatry of the glistering surface of things’. 
  Such art asserts and celebrates life at the merely empirical level, its subject-
  matter is no more than what Schopenhauer called ‘the world as Vorstellung’: 
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  his word has been rather misleadingly translated as ‘idea’ and as ‘representation’ 
  but means something more like ‘illusory show’, that which appears to the senses as
  the manifestation of the universal underlying life-will.26
                                                                                  
So as we can see Vorstellung, but particularly Schopenhauer’s Vorstellung is dealt a rough 
hand when it is asked to compress itself within the restrictive confines of a concept such as 
‘idea’, ‘representation’ or in fact  ‘presentation’.  Indeed it looks as if the whole notion of 
Vorstelllung as a ‘concept’ or more accurately a Begriff is utterly unsustainable once 
Schopenhauer moves Vorstellung into the space of the Schauspiel. In our attempt to get closer 
to the true nature of Vorstellung we were able to disregard the early translation of ‘idea’ with a 
capital ‘I’ as an appropriate surrogate, stating clearly that Schopenhauer explicitly uses 
throughout the development of Die Welt the word Idee or ‘Idea’ in order to convey something 
very different from Vorstellung. So what, if not Vorstellung, was Schopenhauer’s own 
motivation for using the word Idee?  In Schopenhauer’s writing the different grades of the 
‘will’s’ objectification are understood in relation to Plato’s own conception of Ideas, as he 
remarks later in the same passage the ‘will reveals itself just as much in one oak as in 
millions. There [...]number, there [...] multiplication in space and time[...] and who are 
themselves multiplied and dispersed therein. But that same plurality of these individuals again 
applies not to the will, but only to its phenomenon[...]Those different grades of the will’s 
objectification, expressed in innumerable individuals, exists as the unattained patterns of 
these, or as the eternal forms of things. Not themselves entering into time and space, the 
medium of individuals, remains fixed, subject to no change, always being, never having 
become. The particular things, however, arise and pass away; they are always becoming and 
never are. Now I say that these grades of the objectification of the will are nothing but Plato’s 
Ideas’.27  So, for Schopenhauer, the phenomenal variation which we see all around us in the 
worlds hould be regarded no differently from Plato’s own metaphysical approach to  forms or 
types, where each object appearing in the world should not in truth be appreciated on an 
individual level, that is, as a particular thing in its own right, but rather, as an embodiment of 
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a universal idea. It is correct to say that for Schopenhauer, Plato plays just as much a pivotal 
role in the formulation of his philosophy as does Kant. In fact Christopher Janaway is able to 
point to an early manuscript remnant in which Schopenhauer asserts quite clearly that Plato’s 
Ideas and Kant’s Dinge an sich should be regarded as one and the same. Although this idea 
never resurfaced in any of his major publications, there is undoubtably a strong commitment 
towards an understanding of Kant and Plato which enters the view that both their 
philosophical positions amount in the end to same thing:       
 
  If Kant’s teachings, and, since Kant’s time, that of Plato, had ever
  been properly understood and grasped; if men had truly and earnestly       
  reflected on the inner meaning and content of the teachings of the two
  great masters, instead of lavishly using the technical expression of 
  the one and parodying the style of the other, they could not have 
  failed long ago to discover how much the two great sages agree, and
  that the true significance, the aim, of both teachings is absolutely the
  same.
                  (W.W.R.1., 173) 
    
Though as Janaway explains, Schopenhauer did eventually come to regard the positions of the 
two philosophers as distinct from one another, but crucially ‘the fusion in his mind had 
acquired an energy of its own. He believed that empirical consciousness, limited as it was to 
the phenomena of space, time, and causality, was something inferior which we should aspire 
to escape from, if possible: ‘Only if there was a ‘better’ consciousness, could human beings 
find anything that was of true value.’28  This attitude which Schopenhauer displays towards 
regular human perception, as being in some way retrograde; and the notion that true insight is 
only within the gift of an exceptional mind, which can see beyond the rudimentary framework 
of space, time, and causality, clearly has its roots in a strong Platonic legacy. For not only did 
Plato commit himself to the idea of their being two realms- the real world, represented by the 
Ideal forms or types, which can be accessed by what Plato called  the clarity of knowledge, 
and the dream world of everyday appearances, which he proposed was supported by an 
ambivalence of belief; but he also, which is essential to Schopenhauer’s own thinking, 
encouraged one to think of the gap between the ‘true’ and ‘false’ worlds as as essentially 
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being a mental gap, and in this sense access to the ‘true’ world depends upon a mental 
perceptive shift, rather than any physical one:   
    If we compare life to a circular path of red-hot coals having a 
 few cool places, a path that we have to run over incessantly, then
 the man entangled in delusion is comforted by the cool place on
 which he is just now standing, or which he sees near him, and sets  
  out to run over the path. But the man who sees through the prin-
 cipium individuationis, and recognizes the true nature of things-in-
 themselves, and thus the whole, is no longer susceptible of such
 consolations; he sees himself in all places simultaneously, and with-
 draws.
        (W.W.R.1., 380)           
Here we have Schopenhauer, just as we do with Plato in the Republic, creating his own 
allegory about the false and misleading appearance pertaining to the world, and as with 
Plato’s ‘Cave allegory’29, it is its common inhabitants who are held in bondage by worldly 
delusion. But as we can see Schopenhauer’s own misinformed worldly inhabitants are not 
immobilized like Plato’s bound captives, they are apparently free to run, they can indulge in a 
sense of movement, be it nonetheless in a repetitive circular holding pattern. In fact it is 
Schopenhauer’s enlightened figures who withdraw entirely from the prospect of movement, 
what little freedom they appear to have, they choose to reject outright. But of course as we 
know in relation to Schopenhauer’s philosophy a freedom represented by movement is always 
an illusive prospect, as movement  itself is bound up with the three key imposters: space, time 
and causality. In many ways the principium individuationis performs the same function in 
Schopenhauer’s allegory as does the wall erected in Plato’s ‘Cave’, for just like the Platonic 
wall it too screens off the world as is in itself, and it is only by going beyond the barrier, in the 
case of Schopenhauer seeing through it, that genuine enlightenment can arise. Schopenhauer 
himself quite early on in the third book of Die Welt returns to the ‘Cave’ allegory in order to 
reinforce in the reader’s mind that the Idee or Idea of his own philosophy resides on the same 
level as Platonic Ideas:      
  “Time, space, and causality are not determinations of the thing-in
  -itself but belong only to its phenomenon, since they are nothing but 
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  forms of our knowledge. Now as all plurality and all arising and 
  passing away are possible only through time, space and causality, it 
  follows that they too adhere only to the phenomenon, and by no 
  means to the thing-in-itself. But since our knowledge is conditioned 
  by these forms, the whole of experience is only knowledge of the 
  phenomenon, not the thing-in-itself[...]What has been said extends 
  even to our own ego, and we know that only as phenomenon, not 
  according to what it may be in itself.”  This is the meaning and 
  content of Kant’s teachings in the important respect we have considered. 
  Now Plato says: “the things of this world, perceived by our senses, have 
  no true being at all;they are always becoming, but they never are. They have 
  only a relative being; they are together only in and through their relation
  to one another; hence their whole existence can just as well be called
  a non-being[...] As long as we are confined to their perception, we 
   are like persons sitting in a dark cave, and bound so fast that they 
  cannot even turn their heads. They see nothing but the shadowy outlines 
 of actual things that are led between them and a fire which burns behind 
  them; and by the light of this fire these shadows appear on the wall in 
  front of them. Even of themselves and of one another they see only the 
   shadows on this wall. Their wisdom would consist in predicting the 
  sequence of those shadows learned from experience. On the other hand 
  only the real archetypes of those shadowy outlines, the eternal Ideas,the origi-
   nal forms of all things, can be described as truly existing[...].            
                                                                                 (W.W.R.1., 170-171)
This substantial extract from Die Welt allows us to see precisely the way in which 
Schopenhauer compresses together both Kantian and Platonic ideas, literally sandwiching one 
on top of the other in order to suggest that the two schools can be revealed like sedimentary 
layers of rock, each belonging to two very different time periods but none the less sharing the 
same fault line. For what Schopenhauer effectively creates through this piece of textural 
layering is a ‘geological’ seam which runs through the entire course of Kantian and Platonic 
thinking. After reading this extended passage we can be in no doubt as to the way in which 
Schopenhauer consciously wants his own philosophy to connect up to the idealism of Plato, 
drawing out a commonality of distrust directed at the senses, and thus at the representation 
performed by the senses. But not only is there an attempt to assimilate Platonic maxims such 
as the often recited they are always becoming, but they never are; there is also a much broader 
structural response to Plato, which appears to inform the way in which Schopenhauer 
expresses his philosophy, especially in a work such as Die Welt. For what instantly strikes the 
reader of Die Welt, is the way in which Schopenhauer draws regularly upon allegory in order 
to set out his own philosophical position. Schopenhauer’s philosophy unlike that of his 
contemporaries, displays enormous flair for literary invention, as a writer his command of 
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German was like no other seen in his field, in fact Brian Magee goes so far as to suggest that 
Schopenhauer was one of the greatest stylists in the German language, pointing to the fact 
that although Schopenhauer ‘revered Kant as a philosopher above all others, except possibly 
Plato, he saw him as a careless, unclear and hopelessly inartistic writer- intellectually honest, 
unlike those charlatans [Fichte, Schelling and Hegel] who dubbed themselves his successors, 
and genuinely profound, but also dry, and unnecessarily difficult.30  Schopenhauer’s writing 
by contrast is full of wit, and even word play; it effortlessly draws upon a breathtaking range 
of classical sources, middle and far Eastern doctrine (most notably Hindu and Buddhist), 
biblical theology, scientific treatise (ancient and modern), not to mention what seems to be 
an exhaustive knowledge of known Western philosophy, literature, music and art, in order to 
create an extraordinary synthesis between his own philosophical vision, and the ideas which 
he sees embedded within such sources. What also remains an exceptional feat is the way in 
which Schopenhauer, is able to put to work this vast array of sources in order to adjust the 
pitch and resolution of his own philosophy. This beguiling display of literary proficiency is 
something which in Schopenhauer’s mind serves as a conscious assault upon, what he regards 
as the convoluted and labyrinthine confusion of his German contemporaries, epitomized 
particularly by Hegel.  For Schopenhauer the very worst ontological aspects of Aristotle’s 
philosophy, were incubated and colonized in Hegel’s phenomenology, an intellectual 
development which he positions as toxic to philosophical clarity, as well as suffocating- 
German prose:
  The method of consideration that follows the principle of sufficient 
  reason is the rational method, and it alone is valid and useful in 
  practical life and in science, The method of consideration that looks 
  away from the content of this principle is the method of genius, which 
  is valid and useful in art alone. The first is Aristotle’s method; the second 
  is, on the whole, Plato’s. The first is like the mighty storm, rushing along 
  without beginning or aim, bending, agitating, and carrying everything away 
  with it; the second is like the silent sunbeam, cutting through the path of 
  the storm, and quite unmoved by it. The first is like the innumerable viol
  -ently agitated drops of the waterfall, constantly changing and never for 
  a moment at rest; the second is like the rainbow silently resting on this 
  raging torrent. Only through the pure contemplation described above,
  which becomes absorbed entirely in the object, are the Ideas
  comprehended; and the nature of genius consists precisely in the 
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  preeminent ability for such contemplation.
                                                             (W.W.R.1., 185)
     
Instantly from this passage one can recognize the way in which Schopenhauer not only 
expresses his affinity with Plato, over Aristotle, Idealism over Rationalism, but just as 
importantly the way he consciously positions his own writing style in terms of something 
approaching a moral choice. For Schopenhauer, it would seem, raising his own philosophical 
address to a form of high art, in which poetry can stand shoulder to shoulder, with genuine 
penetrative philosophical insight, serves to undermine even further the rationalistic doctrine 
advocated by Hegelian thinking. In fact it could be argued that Schopenhauer perceived in his 
own writing style a reflexivity, which was simply not available to Hegel or any of his 
immediate contemporaries, a style which worked as a guarantor against the enclosed logic, 
barricading and cocooning itself from the the world’s broader creative reach.
Art and Suffering.
As we become quickly aware during the course of reading Die Welt, it is the arts not the 
sciences which take precedence in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, this itself, even today, never 
mind in the early 19th century marks the work as highly unusual, which is made even more 
unusual by the fact that Schopenhauer’s own early intellectual interests had a strong scientific 
trajectory, and, as we have already demonstrated, he remained resolutely determined to keep 
abreast of the latest scientific advancements. In fact as Cheryl Foster comments in her essay 
‘Ideas and Imagination, Schopenhauer on the Proper foundation of Art’, Schopenhauer 
eventually concluded ‘that studies of animal behavior and the functional connections of 
organisms lent support to the core of his philosophical view.’31 So why does Schopenhauer, as 
Foster reminds us, devote one quarter of Die Welt to aesthetics? The answer to this question 
already lies partially on view in his evocative summary of Aristotelian and Platonic thinking.  
For as we can see it is Schopenhauer’s belief that Platonic thinking circumvents the agitated 
and bruising ricocheting taking place between Aristotelian form and matter, by appealing to a 
contemplative state of pure objectivity; which for Schopenhauer is analogous  to ‘the silent 
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sunbeam cutting through the path of the storm’.  It is this aim of bringing a halt to the tireless 
agitation which the world is constantly open to, of a need to evoke a sense of calm and 
stillness; or put in a more Schopenhauerian context, to escape the willful criteria of existence, 
that remains for Schopenhauer the ultimate instruction of his philosophy. As we have already 
determined escaping the ‘will’s’ influence is not simply a matter of slipping a noose around 
one’s neck or pressing a revolver against one’s temple, such recourse only sustains the ‘will’s’ 
vitality. There has to be in Schopenhauer’s mind a different means of address, which does not 
involve launching a futile assault on the ‘will’s’ phenomenon.  For Schopenhauer, this 
redirected ‘assault’ on the ‘will’ uses art, rather than the conventional trap-door triggered by 
suicide. In order to appreciate why Schopenhauer genuinely believed that it was art, rather 
than science which could make significant inroads into the ‘will’s‘ underlying nature, we first 
have to look at the way science ultimately expresses itself.  What we can say regarding 
science, is that, as a form of structured enquiry it cannot depart from a goal-orientated model. 
That is to say all scientific conclusions reside in the form of goals that are reached by modes 
of striving; essentially speaking, the methodology is a replication of the will’s underlying 
nature; it does not escape the diktat of the ‘will’.  And as Christopher Janaway judiciously  
identifies, ‘Just as our intellects are organs developed to subserve the will, so all the usual 
connections which we employ in order to understand objects are will-governed[...]’32, so it 
seems that science as a disciplinary practice will  unavoidably keep in play such ‘will’ driven 
thinking. It is indeed the fact that science is a goal orientated practice, that makes it so 
unsuited for Schopenhauer’s purposes, for what he wants above all, on a philosophical level, 
is an understanding of the totality of existence, not a particular thread of it, which is just a 
blind reinforcement of its nature. For as Schopenhauer comments ‘whoever is great 
recognizes himself in all and on the whole, and is therefore concerned about the totality of all 
things’.33 It is therefore the way in which science reveals itself as a continuation of the ‘will’, 
that for Schopenhauer, rules it out of contention when comes to offering up a universal 
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appreciation of existence. As we know already it is art which Schopenhauer looks to in order 
to turn this situation around, so what  precisely is it that the arts have over the sciences?:
  Then, in-stead of the restless pressure and effort; instead of the constant
  transition from desire to apprehension and from joy to sorrow;
  instead of the never-satisfied and never-dying hope that constitutes
  the life-dream of the man who wills, we see that peace that is higher
  than all reason, that ocean-like calmness of the spirit, that deep
  tranquility, that unshakable confidence and serenity, whose mere
  reflection in the countenance, as depicted by Raphael and Correggio,
  is a complete and certain gospel. Only knowledge remains; the will
  has vanished. We then look with deep and painful yearning at that 
  state, beside which the miserable and desperate nature of our own 
  appears in the clearest light by the contrast.
                                                                 (W.W.R.1., 411)
 
Primarily for Schopenhauer, it is all down to the way in which we as intelligent subjects 
receive and process art, that through a contemplative engagement with art, the ‘particular’ 
becomes absorbed into its own objective character, it ceases in Schopenhauer’s view to 
partake in a goal-motivated framework. Therefore what we are accessing does not exert itself 
in terms of a subjective desire, instead we momentarily enter a will-less state. If we just pause 
to think about what is actually being stated here, it would suggest that art in Schopenhauer’s 
mind has the remarkable capacity of preventing the human subject from appealing directly 
to the ‘principle of sufficient reason’; time, space and causality, no longer impose themselves 
between us, the subject and the world: 
    
  Raised up by the power of the mind, we relinquish the ordinary
  way of considering things, and cease to follow under the guidance  
  of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason merely their relations
  to one another, whose final goal is always the relation to our own
  will.Thus we no longer consider the where, the when, the why, and
  the whither in things, but simply and solely the what. Further, we do
  not let abstract thought, the concepts of reason, take possession of
  our consciousness, but instead of all this, devote the whole power
  of our mind to perception, sink ourselves completely therein, and let
  our whole consciousness be filled by the calm contemplation[...] we forget
  our individuality, our will, and continue to exist only as pure subject,
  as clear mirror of the object, so that it is as though the object alone
  existed without anyone to perceive it, and thus we are no longer able
  to separate the perceiver from the perception, but the two have be-
  come one, since the entire consciousness is filled and occupied by a
  single image of perception.
                                       (W.W.R.1., 178-179)       
              
This passage is an ideal summary of the way in which the subject’s mind has the opportunity 
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through art to depart from a will-orientated structure; to slip from underneath the temporal, 
spatial, and causal bonds, that secure the subject in terms of a breached identity; object-
subject, perceived-perceiver. Instead through aesthetic contemplation the subject is able to 
deliver themselves over to an experience of pure perception; thus, momentarily, we can 
encounter a state of existence which is no longer susceptible to the deformity of plurality. In 
such a state, Schopenhauer believes we are briefly afforded a moment in which it is possible 
to achieve clear objective knowledge capable of gauging the world eternally. Importantly 
though, being lifted free from the causal mesh which plagues worldly existence, via aesthetic 
contemplation does not actually destroy the ‘will’ (nor is it ever inferred as doing so) rather, 
as Schopenhauer describes, it is ‘quietened’ through bringing to bear upon the subject’s own 
‘will’ the undistorted knowledge of the whole:   
  Thus, whoever is still involved in the principium individuationis, 
  in egoism, knows only particular things and their relation to his 
  own person, and these then become ever renewed  motives of his 
  willing. On the other hand, that knowledge of the whole, of the 
  inner nature of the thing-in-itself, which has been described, becomes 
  the quieter of all and every willing. The will now turns away from life; 
  it shudders at the pleasures in which it recognizes the affirmation of life. 
  Man attains to the state of voluntary renunciation, resignation, true 
  composure and complete will-lessness. At times, in the hard experience 
  of our own suffering or in the vividly recognized suffering of others, 
  knowledge of the vanity and bitterness of life comes close to us who 
  are still enveloped in the veil of Maya.
                                                               (W.W.R.1., 379)
      
As we can see, art shares in Schopenhauer’s philosophy a close proximity to the aims of 
asceticism, especially in the manner in which it attempts to negate the willful character of 
existence, and subsume the individual ego.  The way in which the ascetic attitude subdues the 
‘will’, clearly involves a much more protracted route than that which is undertaken by 
aesthetic contemplation. It would seem by Schopenhauer’s account that it involves fighting 
fire with fire, in that the ascetic consciously locates his own identity within a realm of 
continued suffering, but in the process delivers himself over to the knowledge, that their 
inner being is identical with that of all things in the world. But clearly there are dangers 
attached to any attempt to mortify the ‘will’ by such direct and individualistic means. For one 
has to ensure that the adopted method devised to break down the ‘will’ is not in anyway taken 
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up in a zealous fashion, as this would immediately play into the hands of the ‘will’. As 
Christopher Janaway observes: ‘Voluntary abstention from sexual activity- that most powerful 
manifestation of the will to life- is accompanied by intentional poverty, non-avoidance of 
injury or ignominy from others, fasting, self-castigation, and self-torture. Since all these 
occurrences are pursued as deliberate ends, asceticism cannot be identical with total will-
lessness. The later must occur unpredictably as the ‘sudden gleam of silver’34 arising out of 
suffering; one can deliberately engineer suffering, but true salvation does not come about by 
intention or design.’35 So as we can see Schopenhauer’s philosophy stays well clear of 
advocating that the subjects should in anyway reach an apotheosis with the world by 
deliberately ‘nailing oneself to the cross’. Instead for Schopenhauer one has to revisit the 
positive character attributed to the world in general, what does it mean to talk about happiness 
in the context of a world which is predicated on suffering? As we have asserted already, any 
picture which raises the prospect of sadomasochism instantly plays into the hands of the 
‘will’; what is required is that happiness itself loses all association with the acquisition of
‘something’ positive. Importantly though, this is not to simply turn a positive into a negative, 
a negative that is viewed in terms of the complete reverse of happiness; unhappiness. Rather it  
involves something along the lines of Kant’s own revision of space, in which all traces of a 
positive or negative distinction are diffused from its assessment, so in the case of happiness, 
or pleasure, they both arise for Schopenhauer in form of an absence of suffering. Therefore, as 
a result of ‘happiness’ revealing itself in terms of suffering’s absence, it is suffering that 
assumes the ‘positive’ identity, and so true ‘happiness,’ for want of a better word, is always 
dependent upon the presence of suffering; for in order to withdraw from suffering, there has 
to be suffering in the first place. So if we return back to aesthetic contemplation, the 
‘pleasure’ or ‘happiness’ generated through such an experience, must entail leaving behind 
happiness and unhappiness as it is commonly registered:   
  For at the moment when, torn from the will, we have given ourselves up 
  to the pure, will-less knowing, we have stepped into another world, 
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  so to speak, where everything  that  moves  our  will, and thus violently 
  agitates us, no longer exists. This liberation of knowledge lifts us as wholly 
  and completely above all this as do sleep and dreams. Happiness and 
  unhappiness have vanished; we are no longer the individual; that is forgotten; 
  we are only pure subject of knowledge. We are only the one eye of the world 
  which looks out from all knowing creatures, but which in man alone can be
  wholly free from serving the will. 
                                  (W.W.R.1., 197-198)
Visual aesthetic contemplation in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, if achieved properly, requires 
the subject to lay aside the subordinate forms of the phenomenon. So when one is looking at 
the depiction of a tree, let’s say, in a painting by Alberto Giacometti, the tree itself should not 
persist as an individual representation of a particular tree, which once grew in Paris. Instead 
we should, in the Schopenhauerian sense, engage the ‘tree’ as a representation of a general 
form, that of being object for subject. Therefore it becomes, hopefully in our ‘eyes’ what 
Schopenhauer describes as the most adequate objectivity of the ‘will’. In other words 
Giacometti’s ‘tree’ emerges as a ‘Platonic Idea’. All genuine aesthetic contemplation, within 
the visual field, must in someway involve the extraction of the universal, from the particular, 
in order that it can arise in the fullness of the whole, without reference to ‘the principle of 
sufficient reason’ and hence without engendering suffering. This palliative aspect to art, is for 
Schopenhauer, one of the key reasons why it holds such a prime position within his 
philosophy.
Having addressed the visual aspect of art (which I will return to at greater length in the next 
chapters), it is now time to turn to its non visual counter part represented through music, 
which for many commentators remains the most compelling aspect of Schopenhauer’s 
aesthetic theory. Music for Schopenhauer has a unique profile amongst all the other arts, in 
that he regarded it, not as representative of the world through a series of Ideas, but rather as a 
direct copy of the ‘will’, which is itself capable of circumventing the Ideas:
                                                          
  As our world is nothing but the phenomenon or appearance of the 
  Ideas in plurality through entrance into the principium individuationis 
  (the form of knowledge possible to the individual as such), music, 
  since it passes over the Ideas, is also quite independent of the phenom
  -enal world, positively ignores it, and, to a certain extent, could still 
  exist even if there were no world at all, which cannot be said of the 
  other arts.
                  (W.W.R.1., 257)
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Therefore, in the Schopenhauerian scheme of things music falls outside all formal 
representation, including language itself. Schopenhauer is adamant throughout Die Welt that 
music is an entirely independent art form, which does not require the additional words of a 
song, or choreographed action of a opera in order to attain its ends; stressing that ‘[m]usic as 
such knows only the tones or notes, not the causes that produce them.’ As well as further 
adding ‘even the vox humana is for it originally and essentially nothing but a modified tone, 
just like that of an instrument; and like every other tone, it has the characteristic advantages 
and disadvantages, that are a consequence of the instrument producing it.’36 As we can see 
from Schopenhauer’s writing, musical expression is conceived precisely in the same manner 
as the ‘will’s, for it is music, and not the human subject, which possesses the body and depth 
consistent with reality;  it is music, which above all speaks authentically, rather than us, the 
subject. Schopenhauer’s reading of music, takes the art form into a metaphysical domain 
where it is interchangeable with both the ‘will’ and the world, each ultimately presenting two 
sides of the same reality. So in Schopenhauer’s philosophy it is just as legitimate to present 
the world as music, as it is to present it as ‘will’. In order to grasp this seemingly improbable 
statement one has to first become acquainted with the melodic structure of music. Music itself 
as a tonal progressive chain is entirely dependent upon a series of chordal structures which are 
by necessity incomplete. The movement which music engenders on a tonal basis, can only 
come about as a necessity to complete or ‘finalize’ such chordal arrangements, thus bringing 
about tonal resolution, or what is technically referred to as a ‘tonic chord’. But due to the 
inherent structure of music, tonal resolution itself, brings to an end the possibility of 
movement, it therefore requires the music to once again present itself in terms of being 
structurally inadequate, requiring further resolution in order for it to undertake further tonal or 
hormonic shifts. Once music is examined in this technical context one can instantly begin to 
draw out the ways in which melodic movement, and the movement perpetuated by the ‘will’ 
both operate in relation to a sustained tension arising from a need to bring to a close a state of  
‘want’, but which can only be achieved at the expense of the movement itself. So the actual 
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achievement of ‘satisfaction’ in reference to music and the ‘will’ cannot be held onto, both are 
forced to re-open themselves further to ‘want’ if they are to continue as a modes of 
expression:   
  Now the nature of man consists in the fact that his will strives, is
  satisfied, strives anew, and so on and on; in fact his happiness and  
  well-being consists only in the transition from desire to satisfaction,
  and from this to a fresh desire, such transition going forward rapidly.
  For the non-appearance of satisfaction is suffering; the empty long-
  ing for a new desire is languor, boredom. Thus, corresponding to
  this, the nature of melody is a constant digression and deviation from
  the keynote in a thousand ways, not only to the harmonious intervals,
  the third and dominant, but to every tone, to the dissonant seventh,
  and to the extreme intervals; yet there always follows a final 
  return to the keynote. In all these ways, melody expresses the many
  different forms of the will’s efforts, but also its satisfactions by 
  ultimately finding again a harmonious interval, and still more the
  keynote.
                    (W.W.R.1., 260)
In terms of perceiving music as the world and not just the ‘will’ Schopenhauer considers the 
way in which the four voices or parts of harmony; bass, tenor, alto, and soprano, or 
alternatively as he so describes, the fundamental note, third, fifth, and octave can be made 
analogous to the four grades of existence, set out in relation to the mineral, plant and animal 
kingdom, alongside ‘mankind’. So the phenomenal gradation of the ‘will’ in Schopenhauer’s 
aesthetic theory has its direct counterpoint in music, but with the crucial distinction that 
unlike the phenomenal grades or Ideas, musical gradation does not express itself in terms of 
the ‘will’s’ objectification, but instead engages the ‘will’ directly, having no need for the 
illusive trappings associated with worldly material endorsement:
  Therefore, for us the ground-bass is in harmony what inorganic 
  nature, the crudest mass on which everything rests and from 
  which everything originates and develops, is in the world.[...] 
  Those nearer to the bass  are the lower of  those grades, namely 
  the still inorganic bodies manifesting themselves, however, in 
  many ways. Those that are higher represent to me the plant and 
  animal worlds. The definite intervals of the scale are parallel to 
  the definite grades of the will’s objectification, the definite
  species in nature. The departure from the arithmetical correctness 
  of the intervals through some temperament, or produced by the
  selected key, is analogous to the departure of the individual from
  the type of species. In fact, the impure discords, giving no
  definite interval, can be compared to the monstrous abortions
  between two species of animals, or between man and animal.
                                                                               (W.W.R.1., 258-259)                   
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Unlike Aristotle, Schopenhauer clearly identified music in terms of being anti-mimetic and 
non-descriptive, for as  Brian Magee notes; music is ‘the self-expression of something that 
cannot be represented at all, namely the noumenon. It is the voice of the metaphysical will. 
That is why it seems to speak to us from the most ultimate depths, deeper by far than those 
accessible to other arts, while remaining itself something wholly unamenable to language, or 
to the understanding by the intellect.’37 Surprisingly, as Magee comments, Schopenhauer 
regards the role of the intellect as essentially redundant, during the subject’s reception of 
music, this is because unlike the visual arts, music is perceived to bypass the Ideas which 
would normally enter our consciousness; and so there remains no cognitive imprint. Through 
music, in the Schopenhauerian context the listener is granted immediate entry to the ‘will’ 
without having to register the experience in terms of worldly locality, its temporality is 
therefore engaged without spatial representation. It is this, which, for Schopenhauer raises 
music to supreme heights in his  aesthetic scheme. For despite its carrying the exact same 
profile of the ‘will’, music, in terms of its reception, does not engage its subject in relation to 
common ‘desire’; there is no, so to speak, individualized ‘suffering’ as the ‘will’s pain cannot 
be localized, having no means of representation at its disposal; i.e. the ‘strivings’ and ‘desires‘ 
are unable to shelter under the cover of the human subject:
      
  Therefore music does not express this or that particular and
  definite pleasure, this or that affliction, pain, sorrow, horror, gaiety,   
  merriment, or peace of mind, but joy, pain, sorrow, horror, gaiety,
  merriment, peace of mind themselves, to a certain extent in the 
  abstract, their essential nature, without any accessories, and so also
  without the motives for them.
                                                     (W.W.R.1., 261)
         
So, within Schopenhauer’s philosophical programme, music, particularly in its purer 
instrumental form retains a unique status amongst the arts, for he is clearly of the opinion that 
music can in fact assemble our inner identity without giving rise to its characteristic suffering. 
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                                                   CHAPTER FOUR                                    
                                   
                                   
                                                Beckett’s Vorstellung
                              Le bonheur n’est pas chose aisée: il est très difficile
                      de le trouver en nous, et impossible de le trouver ailleurs. 
                                                                                                            Chamfort.
Having witnessed the manner in which Beckett tears down the mimetic investment in stage 
realism, rupturing the tangible fabric to which the ‘drawing room’ had previously testified 
with such unstinting loyalty, there seems in the wake of Eleuthéria, a growing sense in which 
the theatre will from now on for Beckett, correspond to a very different space from the one he 
has just comprehensively trashed.         
In fact one could regard Eleuthéria in terms of a theatrical clearance; one in which Beckett 
wanted to assert that the ground on which his subsequent stage efforts would arise would be 
comprehensively removed from what had previously gone before. And so it would be that the 
first play which would try out for ‘size’ this newly erected space would in due course be 
hailed as one of 20th century’s most influential plays; changing in perpetuity the conscious 
landscape of the theatre for an entire generation of stage directors and actors. 
En attendant Godot would be the first of Beckett’s theatrical productions to inhabit 
exclusively an environment which would oppose phenomenal investment, as well as moving 
the action of the play from any affirmative position. It would seem that Victor’s own final 
reproach towards life, would for Beckett be transformed into a new theatrical modus 
operandi, in which all active stage movement becomes a negative inversion of autonomous 
agency. If we just look at the way in which Beckett presents the world of Godot; ‘A country 
road. a tree. Evening.’, we can potentially see the space which had opened up during the 
course of Beckett’s own Schopenhauerian address in Proust finding immediate recognition on 
the stage. For instance the depiction or rather the suggestion of a country road is Beckett’s 
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own way of laying out a predetermined path; for which Estragon and Vladimir are bound. It 
also remains the case that Beckett has chosen a tree to represent the only vestige of stage 
scenery; and as we know from our examination of Proust it is the plant world which 
serves as the dominant expression of the Wille zum Leben; for both in Proust and Die Welt 
plants emerge as the naked expression of the ‘will to life’.  And if we can say anything about 
Beckett’s decision to set both his first and second acts during the evening, it would seem to 
carry the right identity when it comes to the Schopenhauerian distrust targeted at the 
phenomenal world; as if the twilight itself is in someway its own disparaging rebuke leveled 
at the world’s objectivity. In fact we can see the ‘evening’ in the context of Godot as another 
means of barring entry to the kind of illuminated existence which Victor himself is so keen    
to shut out in Eleuthéria.The bare description of Godot’s stage directions; country road, tree 
and evening establishes the abiding pattern which is key to Beckett’s own Schopenhauerian 
movement in Proust: that is, an acceptance that all human ‘will’ possesses a predetermined 
path; that such a ‘will’ is essentially expressed through the ‘will to life’ and that ultimately as 
an ‘artist’ one should reject any attachment towards the world which facilitates its freedom.
As we have seen cutting oneself off from such a world is not as easy as it may first appear; for 
even without evoking direct suffering, the painless suicide does nothing to impact on the 
will’s movement as it is simply in truth a misguided assault on the ‘will’s’ phenomenal 
appearance; not the ‘will’ in itself. As with Eleuthéria, so it is with Godot that the subject of 
suicide also challenges dramatic recognition; but unlike the weight it is potentially assigned in 
Eleuthéria, there is in this newly delivered space of Beckett’s little prospect of suicide 
registering anything beyond a comically inflated gesture towards life’s unremitting 
boredom and suffering: 
 VLADIMIR:  [...] What do we do now?
 ESTRAGON:  Wait.
 VLADIMIR:  Yes, but while waiting.
 ESTRAGON:  What about hanging ourselves?
 VLADIMIR:  Hmm. It’d give us an erection!
 ESTRAGON:  [Highly excited.] An erection!
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 VLADIMIR:  With all that follows.  Where it falls,
               mandrakes grow. That’s why they shriek when you
               pull them up. Did you not know that?
 
 ESTRAGON:  Let’s hang ourselves immediately!
 VLADIMIR:  From a bough? [they go towards the tree.] I
         wouldn’t trust it.
 ESTRAGON: We can always try.
 VLADIMIR:  Go ahead.
 ESTRAGON:  After you.
 VLADIMIR:  No no, you first.
 ESTRAGON:  Why me?
 VLADIMIR: You’re lighter than I am.
 ESTRAGON: Just so!
 VLADIMIR:  I don’t understand.
ESTRAGON:  Use your intelligence, can’t you?
           [VLADIMIR uses his intelligence.]
 
 VLADIMIR: [Finally.] I remain in the dark.
 ESTRAGON: This is how it it is. [he reflects.] The bough...
          the bough . . . [Angrily] Use your head, can’t you?
 
 VLADIMIR: You’re my only hope.
 ESTRAGON: [With effort.] Gogo light - bough not break - 
           Gogo dead. Didi heavy - bough break - Didi alone.
            Whereas - 
 VLADIMIR:  I hadn’t thought of that.
 ESTRAGON: If it hangs you it’ll hang anything.
                                                                  (W.G., 9-10.)   
         
As we can see, suicide as the ultimate archetype of human freedom has not only been 
rejected, as it has in Eleuthéria, but it is also rendered ridiculous, amounting to what is 
essentially a tightly-executed vaudeville routine.  But if we care to look at the way in which 
the suicide is being presented in Godot, it is the tree; the incarnation of the ‘will to life’ which 
supports both Estragon and Vladimir’s imagined suicide bid. So, it would seem by way of 
drawing upon the many recorded accounts of involuntary muscular activity taking place after 
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a person had been hanged; Beckett is in fact vividly reasserting the Schopenhauerian position, 
that suicide strengthens the Wille zum Leben. For just as the language of Dr Piouk is carried 
with a life-affirming passion while advocating to Victor that suicide should be the preserve of 
youth at the height of their energy; there is in Estragon and Vladimir’s exchange also the 
implicit suggestion that their own suicide would be an equally life affirming gesture.  In fact 
when we reflect that Schopenhauer’s own characterization of the ‘will to life’ has its locus, 
not in any conscious aspect of the human subject but is instead explicitly located in the 
genitals; then I believe we can begin to see why Beckett has deliberately chosen to represent 
both the hangman’s noose and the erectile member as one consolidated position; for both in 
the Schopenhauerian scheme amount to the same reinvestment in the ‘will’.1 But what is 
more, Beckett uses suicide or rather the idea of suicide, in order to bring to Godot a further 
Schopenhauerian requisite; that of desire. For not only does suicide play to the false hope of 
ending Estragon and Vladimir’s suffering, but it becomes just like their continuously deferred 
meeting with Godot the focus of an unattainable ambition. So, it would seem that all Estragon 
and Vladimir’s desires associated with suicide, sexual vigor, and the emergence of Godot, all 
collectively in some way hang upon the emblematic embodiment of the ‘will’; the tree of 
life.2 For it transpires that the tree which Estragon and Vladimir envisage themselves 
swinging from, is also the agreed rendezvous point for their meeting with Godot: 
 
ESTRAGON:  Charming spot. [He turns, advances to front,
           halts facing auditorium.] Inspiring prospects. [He 
           turns to VLADIMIR.] Let’s go.
 
VLADIMIR:  We can’t.
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1 ! [...]Beckett"s aesthetic creation is shadowed by natural forms of procreation, and all the attendant 
horrors.! See Stewart, P., Sex and Aesthetics in Samuel Beckett!s Work, op.cit., 196.   
2The act of procreation is further related to the world as the solution is to the riddle. Thus the world is 
wide in space and old in time, and has an inexhaustible multiplicity of forms. Yet all this is only the 
phenomenon of the will-to-[life]; and the focus concentration, the focus of this will is the act of 
generation. Hence in this act the inner nature of the world most distinctly expresses itself[...] Therefore 
that act, as the most distinct expression of the will, is the kernel, the compendium, the quintessence of 
the world. Hence we obtain through it a light as to the true nature and tendency of the world; it is the 
solution to the riddle. Accordingly, it is understood by the “tree of knowledge”; for, after acquaintance 
with it, everyone begins to see life in its true light, as Byron also says: The tree of knowledge has been 
pluck"d  - all"s known. Don Juan[...] W.W.R.2., 570.                 
 ESTRAGON:  Why not?
 VLADIMIR: We’re waiting for Godot.     
 ESTRAGON:  [Despairingly.] Ah! [Pause.] You’re sure it
           was here?
 VLADIMIR:  What?
 ESTRAGON: That we were to wait.
 VLADIMIR:  He said by the tree. [They look at the tree.] 
           Do you see any others?
 ESTRAGON: What is it?
 VLADIMIR:  I don’t know. A willow.
 ESTRAGON: Where are the leaves?
 VLADIMIR:  It must be dead.
 ESTRAGON:  No more weeping.
 VLADIMIR:  Or perhaps it’s not the season.
 ESTRAGON:  Looks to me more like a bush.
 VLADIMIR:  A shrub.     
 ESTRAGON: A bush.
                                 (W.G., 6)
The remarks of Estragon which set out the ground on which both he and Vladimir rests, could 
to all intents purposes be considered a theatrical device of economy, in which a virtually bare 
stage is being offered to the audience as a naturalistic landscape; ‘inspiring prospects’. But it 
quickly becomes apparent that this stretch of the imagination in which the audience may feel 
obliged to participate, is itself being constantly undermined by the action of Godot’s two 
protagonists. For having identified the rendezvous point as the tree they then take it upon 
themselves not only to question the species of tree; but to raise questions as to whether they 
are actually in the presence of a tree at all; Vladimir preferring the idea of a shrub over 
Estragon’s idea of a bush. This inability to secure the stage in terms of an objective reality is 
deliberately calculated as a response to the Schopenhauerian distrust directed towards the 
phenomenal world. It is clear from stage environment as well as the language which 
accompanies the characters in Godot that Beckett’s assault on the mimetic expression of the 
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theatre has been substantially refined in comparison to his earlier attack surmounted in 
Eleuthéria. Whereas Eleuthéria sets up the stage, or at least part of the stage under the 
recognized terms of domestic realism, in order to reenact its own demolition; Godot’s 
response is to remain completely outside any such theatrical point of reference, its movement 
being registered within an entirely different space; one which even defeats the initial 
‘positive’ assessment drawn up in relation to the stage demolition seen in Eleuthéria.  
The act of demolition not only reverberates with the action of suicide, but it also has a 
historical profile as well. For it could be the case that by omitting the destruct button from 
Godot, Beckett is not just offsetting suicide, but to my mind is finding a way to preclude the 
release mechanism which enables the advancement of history; the ‘events’ and ‘days’ which 
have elapsed cannot reside in the same unchanged state if history is to have any real 
purchase 3.  And yet even the option of doing away with one’s self in an attempt to change the 
inevitable complexion of one’s daily existence is not available to Beckett’s protagonists. In 
many ways the rejection of suicide in Godot is not only a phenomenal rejection, but also as I 
see it, an historical rejection as well.4 For in Godot it can be said that both Estragon and 
Vladimir are ultimately in wait for a handover that never takes place; and so in this very 
important respect Beckett’s play bars any historical movement which rests upon an abrupt and 
dramatic fluctuation in human events; something which clearly fits well with the 
Schopenhauerian agenda:    
  To the man who has properly grasped this, and is able to distin-
  guish the will from the Idea, and the Idea from its phenomenon, the  
  events of the world will have significance only in so far as they are
  the letters from which the Idea of man can be read, and not in and 
  by themselves. He will not believe with the general public that time
  may produce something actually new and significant; that through it
  or in it something positively real may attain to existence, or indeed
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3 In David Addyman!s Bergsonian address to En attendant Godot he describes a dramatized setting in 
which Beckett!s characters fail to grasp the "melody! of action which he sees explicitly linked to the 
space of the play. See David Addyman "En attendant Godot: A New Philosophical Landscape! Fifield, P. 
and Addyman, D., Samuel Beckett: Debts and Legacies New Critical Essays (2013) London: 
Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 77.   
4 In adopting such a view one would also have to reconsider what it would mean to "historicize! Beckett!s 
work, something which Theodor W. Adorno put readily into practice For Adorno, Beckett!s is essentially 
a post-Holocaust art, corresponding to conditions after the catastrophe! . See Weller, S., A Taste for the 
Negative, op.cit., 130-133.  
  that time itself as a whole has beginning and end, plan and develop-
  ment, and in some way has for its final goal the highest perfection 
  (according to their conceptions) of the latest generation that lives for
  thirty years. Therefore just as little will he, with Homer, set up a 
  whole Olympus full of gods to guide the events of time, as he will,
  with Ossian, regard the figures of the clouds as individual beings. For,
  as we have said, both have just as much significance with regard to 
  the Idea appearing in them.  In the many different forms and aspects
  of human life, and in the interminable change of events, he will con-
  sider only the Idea as the abiding and essential, in which the will-to
  [life] has its most perfect objectivity, and which shows its different
  sides in the qualities, passions, errors, and excellences of the human
  race, in selfishness, hatred, love, fear, boldness, frivolity, stupidity,
  slyness, wit, genius, and so on. All of these, running and congealing 
  together into a thousand different forms and shapes (individuals),
  continually produce the history of the great and the small worlds,
  where in itself it is immaterial whether they are set in motion by nuts
  or by crowns.
                  (W.W.R.1., 182-183.)
 
As we can see Schopenhauer makes no distinction between the clashes of great empires and 
the petty squabbling arising over the last turnip; both events are indistinguishable from one 
another once examined on the level of the ‘will’. What matters to Schopenhauer is not the 
outward phenomenal expression of these two events, but rather the unchanging universal Idea 
which they both embody. For it is only in the Idea that we achieve a true understanding as to 
why Napoleon brought down the Holy Roman Empire, or that one person should see fit to 
take the last turnip. From Schopenhauer’s point of view there is no ‘higher goal’ attaining to 
the course of history than what is essentially a pettifogging relating to the circulation of 
‘nuts’. As this passage from Die Welt makes all too clear, Schopenhauer never buys into the 
Hegelian proposition that the history of the human race is in some way building up towards to 
some ultimate vindication in logical clarity. Instead Schopenhauer is committed to the idea 
that it does not matter how long you run the reel of time in relation to the history of ‘Man’ 
there will never appear the enlightened subject par excellence which Hegel originally 
surmised. In fact from Schopenhauer’s point of view the historical record will give precisely 
the same reading where ever you decide to stop it. Time for Schopenhauer is never expressed 
in terms of having a beginning or an end; it remains an unbroken expression of what is 
fundamentally an undivided reality. And in this respect both history and time partake in the 
same identical structure which is incapable of modification.
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Endgame: A Will of two Halves?
At this juncture I would like to broaden the theatrical point of reference, by setting out this 
newly created space not only in respects to Godot, but also Endgame, Beckett’s own 
translation of Fin De Partie (1957) which follows directly from Godot. For rather than 
looking at these plays separately, it is important to emphasize the way in which the space of 
Godot does not shift in relation to Endgame (indeed any of his subsequent plays) but rather it 
is the perspective which changes. With regards to the Schopenhauerian model of history as a 
reflection of the invariable character of the ‘will’, Beckett’s Endgame provides what is 
unmistakably an image which plays to all the aforementioned strengths of such model: 
 HAMM:  Is it working? [Pause. Impatiently.] The alarm, is it
          working?
 CLOV:  Why wouldn’t it be working?
 HAMM:  Because it’s worked too much.
 CLOV:  But it’s hardly worked at all.
 HAMM:  [Angrily.] Then because it’s worked too little!
 CLOV:  I’ll go and see. [Exit CLOV. Brief ring of alarm off.
          Enter CLOV with alarm-clock. He holds it against HAMM’S
          ear and releases alarm. They listen to it ringing to the end.
          Pause.] Fit to wake the dead! Did you hear it?
 
 HAMM:  Vaguely.
 CLOV:  The end is terrific!
 HAMM:  I prefer the middle. [Pause] Is it not time for my pain-
         killer?
 CLOV:  No! [He goes to the door, turns.] I’ll leave you. 
 HAMM:  It’s time for my story. Do you want to listen to my 
         story?
 CLOV:  No.
                 (ENDG., 34.)            
This image of Hamm and Clov pressing their ears to an alarm-clock, as its wound spring is 
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released to initiate its ringing, provides what is for me a supreme example of how Beckett has 
delivered to the stage a reassessment of spatial representation; in which the movement and 
appearance of subjects on stage are themselves located in terms of absolute space. For I 
would like to propose that within this compressed space of action, in which Clov raises the 
ringing alarm-clock to Hamm’s ear, Beckett presents to his audience a performance which 
locates the reality ascribed to both protagonists; as mutually dependent upon one another.
A reality which is capable of locating Hamm’s performance within Clov, and Clov’s 
performance within Hamm. As both listen attentively to the ringing of the alarm-clock they 
participate in the entire history of mankind; both on the level of the individual and as the 
entire human race.  For what we have in Clov’s raising of the alarm-clock to Hamm’s ear, is a 
movement on stage which openly registers desire, enacted through the mechanism 
of suffering: (the beating down of the hammer5) whilst revealing in the same action that it is 
this very mechanism which transmits ‘Man’s’ unalterable future, along with both ‘his’ past 
and present. What I believe is being represented is life’s collective journey in which one may 
attempt to draw solace from ‘this’ or ‘that’ particular moment in one’s life. Hamm seemingly 
opts for the ‘middle’ period in one’s life in which one presumably reaches the pinnacle of 
what life has to offer in strength and unchallenged vigor; whereas Clov opts for the final death 
knell ‘The end is terrific!’ But as a result of Beckett throwing into focus both human existence 
as it stands in relation to the macrocosm and the microcosm; we can see that even Clov’s 
positioning of his own demise as something that can be distinguished from the other hammer-
blows does not actually hold up. Clov it would seem is just as guilty as Hamm in trying to 
retrieve from life some scrap of positive value; even if like Clov it simply rests in the actual 
moment the curtain falls on the whole exhausted performance. For what the alarm-clock 
shows is precisely what Schopenhauer advocates, that the entire span of a human life bears no 
distinction from beginning to end; each hammer blow marking its passage like the arm of 
Schopenhauer’s pendulum swinging ‘to and fro between pain and boredom’.6 
Within such framing there can be no justification in trying to make a case for human existence 
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5 [...] the glare of will and hammer strokes of the brain[...] See, Ackerley., C.J. and Gontarski, S.E., The 
Grove Companion to Samuel Beckett (2004) New York: Grove Press, 389.  
6 See, W.W.R.1., 312.   
on the grounds of these ill conceived scraps of comfort which Hamm and Clov jokingly 
single out; for it is clear that both Schopenhauer and Beckett remain resolutely determined to 
pull away from any eudaemonistic practice:
             Here I take the idea of wisdom of life entirely in the immanent      
  sense, namely that of the art of getting through life as pleasantly 
  and successfully as possible, the instructions to which might also
  be called eudemonology. Accordingly, they would be instruc-
  tions on how to have a happy existence. Such might perhaps be
  again defined as one that, considered purely objectively or
  rather with cool and mature reflection (for here it is a question
  of a subjective judgement), would be definitely preferable to
  non-existence. From this conception of it, it follows that we
  should be attached to it for its own sake and not merely from
  the fear of death; and again from this that we would like to see
  it last for ever. Now whether human life does or ever can
  correspond to the conception of such an existence, is a question
  that as we know, is answered in the negative in my philosophy;
  whereas eudemonology presupposes an answer in the affirma-
  tive.
                (P.P., 313.) 
        
Again it is precisely this inversion of eudemonology which Schopenhauer performs in 
relation to his own thinking that we also see being enacted by Beckett:
       
  And many a time, having strayed for one reason or another from 
  the place where the meal had been brought to me, I couldn’t find it 
  again, when I felt the desire to eat. Then I searched high and low, 
  often with success, being fairly familiar with the places where it was 
  likely to have been, but often too, in vain. Or I did not search at all, 
  preferring hunger and thirst to the trouble of having to search without 
  being sure of finding, or of having to ask for another tray to be brought, 
  and another basket, or the same, to the place where I was. It was then 
  when I regretted my sucking-stone. And when I talk of preferring, for 
  example, or regretting, it must not be supposed that I opted for the 
  least evil, and adopted it, for that would be wrong. But not knowing 
  exactly what I was doing or avoiding, I did it and avoided it all 
  unsuspecting that one day, much later, I would have to go back over 
  all these acts and omissions, dimmed and mellowed by age, and drag 
  them into the eudemonistic slop.7
                                                           (MOL., 55.)       
            
As we can see from Beckett’s Molloy, a work which was published in 1950, two years before 
Godot [was written in French,] human desire is clearly being assigned to the basic 
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7 Rather than access the inverted Schopenhauerian identity of !eudemonology", Matthew Feldman cites 
a much less corrupted  Aristotelian identity. See, Matthew Feldman !Philosophy", Uhlmann, A., Samuel 
Beckett in Context, op.cit., 308.         
requirements of eating and drinking; something which remains equally perfunctory to both 
Godot and Endgame. So regardless of what one picks out in an attempt to exonerate one’s 
life; nothing can be done to detach these achievements from their fundamental causal 
structure; that of suffering. But crucially Beckett, just like Schopenhauer dismisses any 
suggestion that one should resort to suicide, instead it would seem that the answer lies with 
providing one’s suffering with a much more acute definition, in order that the suffering itself 
may be perceived as the universal condition of all life and not just something which comes 
about through individual misfortune. Any action which is set up to satisfy a particular hunger 
or desire specific to one’s individual needs, remains entrapped within the illusion of the 
principium individuationis; and it is for this reason I feel Clov refuses to administer Hamm’s 
painkillers. For if Clov, is moving towards a position in which he can break through the 
principium individuationis then he must begin to recognize the true nature of ‘things-in-
themselves’ seeing himself in all places simultaneously. For it is only then that Clov will 
recognize the futility in trying to remedy the situation by momentarily suppressing the pain 
peculiar to this or that isolated representation of life, as it does nothing in the way of 
addressing the true scale and dimension of suffering. Clov, unlike Hamm can fully appreciate 
that there is no line of demarcation separating his own reality from that of his master; their 
suffering does not have a cut-off point, as they are both a product of universal suffering rather 
than any misappropriated notion of individual suffering; the kind of which Hamm strongly 
remonstrates towards.8 Following on from Clov’s dismissal of Hamm’s request for his 
painkiller, Hamm then invites Clov to listen to his story, which Clov once again promptly 
declines. The story, like the painkiller is being offered up by Beckett as yet another sedative 
which Clov is equally unwilling to entertain. For there is clearly I suspect an attempt by 
Beckett to reveal literary narrative as being analogous to the dissonant structure of the ‘will’; 
in which the stories’ mechanism, similar to the modal pressure of music, relies upon an 
alternating process of expectation and resolution. So, as a result of Beckett asserting a 
connection between what he perceives as the causal expression of the ‘will’ and his own 
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8 See, Pothast for an alternative account of Schopenhauerian suffering which resides on a much more 
divided level: “All characters have their own way to suffer[...]”, Pothast, U., op.cit., 203.     
literary narrative, I believe we can begin to establish why Beckett looked to alternative ways, 
such as the theatre in order to escape the inadmissible nature of the novel. For having in his 
own mind made such a connection it would be obvious, that as a novelist who set out to derail 
the ‘will’, the very idea of initiating a narrative as the means of doing so, would inevitably 
turn out to be a self defeating exercise; otherwise one would have to devise a way of bringing 
the entire construction of the novel to its very knees, whilst claiming to have abandoned the 
very thing one was in the midst of perpetuating:     
 
  I am the absentee again, its his turn again now, he who neither
  speaks or listens, he who has neither body or soul, its something
  else he has, he must have something, he must be somewhere, he is
  made of silence, there’s a pretty analysis, he’s in the silence, he’s
  the one to be sought, the one to be, the one to be spoken of, the
  one to speak, but he can’t speak, then I could stop, I’d be he, I’d
  be the silence, I’d be back in the silence, we’d be reunited, his
  story the story to be told, but he has no story, he hasn’t been in
  story, it’s not certain, he’s in his own story, unimaginable, unspeak-
  able, that doesn’t matter, the attempt must be made, in the old
  stories incomprehensibly mine, to find his, it must be there some-
  where, it must have been mine, before being his, I’ll recognise it,
  in the end I’ll recognise it, the story of the silence that he never
  left, that I should never have left, that I may never find again, that
  I may find again, then it will be he, it will be I, it will be the place,
  the silence, the end, the beginning, the beginning again, how can
  I say it, that all words, there all I have, and not many of them,
  words fail, the voice fails, so be it[...]
                                                        (T.U., 417. )             
In many ways this is the essential crux of the Schopenhauerian dilemma, how does one 
ultimately escape what one is, while at the same time having no adequate means of 
representing that something, and hence what one is ultimately trying to escape:  
      
  Philosophy has its value and virtue in its rejection of all 
  assumptions that cannot be substantiated, and in its acceptance      
  as its data only of that which can be proved with certainty in the
  external world given by perception, in the forms constituting our
  intellect for the apprehension of the world, and in the consciousness
  of one’s own self common to all. For this reason it must remain
  cosmology, and cannot become theology. Its theme must restrict itself
  to the world; to express from every aspect what this world is, what it
  may be in its innermost nature, is all that it can honestly achieve.
  Now it is in keeping with this that, when my teaching reaches its
  highest point, it assumes a negative character, and so ends with a
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  negation. Thus it can speak here only of what is denied or given up;
  but what is gained in place of this, what is laid hold of, it is forced
  (at the conclusion of the fourth book) to describe as nothing; and
  it can add only the conclusion that it may be merely a relative, not
  an absolute, nothing. For, if something is no one of all the things
  that we know, then certainly it is for us in general nothing. Yet it
  still does not follow from this that it is nothing absolutely, namely
  that it must be nothing from every possible point of view and in
  every possible sense, but only that we are restricted to a wholly 
  negative knowledge of it; and this may very well lie in the limitation
  of our point of view.
                            (W.W.R.2., 611-612.)             
    
As we can see Schopenhauer’s own address towards ‘the world’ becomes increasingly 
negative in character the further it advances towards its target, until eventually 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy has to end ‘with a negation’. But it is clear from what 
Schopenhauer says in Die Welt, that the negation does not in itself indicate a ‘void’ in terms of 
dead space, nor indeed a point in which anything is intrinsically lost or destroyed; but instead 
marks the point in which conventional representation ceases to make any positive impact, and 
as a result therefore can only respond in negative terms. The fact that Beckett’s own work 
carries the exact same instinct to lodge its progressive development in terms of a mounting 
negative resolution; I believe comes about through Beckett’s own determination to devise a 
corresponding prose structure which matches this same Schopenhauerian movement towards 
negative expression. For instance when we look to the fact that many of Beckett’s characters 
lose the original function of their limbs or whose body parts are simply cut out of the picture 
all together; it seems that in many ways the  failing body itself is providing a platform from 
which Beckett is taking his cue. For rather than just view Beckett’s characters from the 
limited perspective of some inevitable decline, in which their physical degradation signals the 
growing wretchedness of an aging subject, there is I believe another angle to which Beckett’s 
portrayal of decrepitude is open; namely that it captures a space which only has recourse to 
negative representation. It could be the case that for Beckett the physical wretchedness 
displayed by his characters is in fact a starting point from which he gifts them ‘the lie to the 
body’:9 
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  For just as I had difficulty in sitting on a chair, or in an arm-chair, 
  because of my stiff leg you understand, so I had none in sitting on 
  the ground, because of my stiff leg and my stiffening leg, for it was 
  about this time that my good leg, good in the sense that it was not stiff, 
  began to stiffen. I needed a prop under the ham you understand, and 
  even under the whole length of the leg, the prop of the earth.
                                                                                           (MOL., 71)
We can see from this passage from Molloy that ‘goodness’, as in the goodness of Molloy’s 
leg, does not actually reside in anything substantive; its ‘goodness’, like Schopenhauer’s 
assessment of pleasure, rests in an entirely negative context; it is defined in relation to what it 
is not, rather than what it is. It is this perspective which Beckett brings to his work, which I 
suspect is derived directly from his reading of Schopenhauer; but also importantly I believe if 
Beckett did indeed wants his work to approach the kind of absolute space Schopenhauer 
himself tries to allude to in Die Welt, then he would most certainly have been aware, that as a 
writer he is left only with the possibility of trading in negatives.10 Just as Schopenhauer 
concedes with his own philosophy ‘it can speak here only of what is denied or given up’, so 
it is also true that much of Beckett’s work plays to the same instruction:11
 HAMM:  Sit on him!
 CLOV:  I can’t sit.
 HAMM:  True and I can’t stand.
 CLOV:  So it is.
 HAMM:  Every man his speciality. [Pause] No phone calls?
          [Pause] Don’t we laugh?
 CLOV:  [After reflection.] I don’t feel like it.
 HAMM:  [After reflection.] Nor I. [Pause.]...
                                                              (ENDG., 16)      
                                                                    
 
The fact that Beckett’s work is engaged in a process of denuding itself of the body, whilst 
upholding the prospect that all physical locomotion culminates in its own paralysis, I believe 
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10 [...] the world is an absolute !Not I", Zimmern, H., Arthur Schopenhauer, op.cit., 234.    
11 W.W.R. 2., 612.
is part of Beckett’s way of taking his work to the brink of this boundary, in which all 
remaining movement in the context of both language and physical representation can only be 
advanced in negative terms. For it is within this landscape of ‘negatives’ that Beckett himself 
may have tried to bring about his own literary equivalent of absolute space: 
  
             [...]there I am the absentee again, it’s his turn again now, he who neither   
  speaks nor listens, who has neither body nor soul, it’s something
  else he has, he must have something, he must be somewhere, he is
  made of silence, there’s a pretty analysis, he’s in the silence, he’s
  the one to be sought, the one to be, the one to be spoken of, the
  one to speak, but he can’t speak, then I could stop, I’d be he, I’d  
  be the silence, I’d be back in the silence, we’d be reunited, his
  story the story to be told, but he has no story, he hasn’t been in
  story, it’s not certain, he’s in his own story unimaginable, unspeak-    
  able, that doesn’t matter, the attempt must be made[...]     
                                                                                            (T.U., 417)
      
And yet like Schopenhauer’s own revelation in relation to Kant’s Ding an sich the reality 
which one remains a part of should not be though of as inaccessible, in fact it is fully 
accessible, by virtue of our being; or as Schopenhauer likes to put it ‘causality seen from 
within’.12 But as we have already mentioned in relation to Schopenhauer’s philosophy, despite 
each one of us having direct access to the thing-in-itself we are nonetheless completely ill-
equipped to represent the reality it constitutes. As we can see in the mounting pressure 
on Beckett’s writing, there is a determination to display in his prose an inevitable failure to 
bring a descriptive representation to the reality which his novel, and he himself, ultimately 
share.  At the same time however, that prose is also obliged to represent an unremitting 
striving, which, like Schopenhauer’s own depiction of the ‘will’ is never fully satiated:    
  [...] perhaps they have carried me to the threshold of my story, 
  before the door that opens on my story, that would surprise me, 
  if it opens, it will be I, it will be silence, where I am, I don’t know, 
  I’ll never know, in the silence you don’t know, you must go on, 
  I can’t go on, I’ll go on.
                                           (T.U., 418.)   
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The story which The Unnamable raises like a spectre is no doubt connected to the same story 
which Hamm is so eager to recite to Clov, but as we can see in the instance of Endgame, Clov 
is entertaining none of it; for Clov it would seem ‘can’t go on’. And yet despite Clov’s 
resounding ‘No’ to Hamm’s story, he is actually partaking, be it ‘unwillingly’ in the same 
story, which had previously unfolded on the pages of The Unnamable; for despite his 
protestations Clov remains actively embroiled in the very story he is trying to suppress. 
It would seem Beckett’s Endgame replays on one level precisely what the voice of The 
Unnameable decries throughout its monologue; that the story being told is part of a much 
greater story, but one which is impervious to any editorial input: ‘we’d be reunited, his story 
the story to be told, but he has no story, he hasn’t been in story, it’s not certain, he’s in his own 
story’.13 So in effect what emerges as the Unnameable’s story is a repeat of Clov’s own 
predicament: 
 HAMM:  Did I move?
 CLOV:  No. 
          [HAMM throws down the gaff.]
 HAMM:  Go and get the oilcan.
 CLOV:  What for?
 HAMM: To oil the casters.
 CLOV:  I oiled them yesterday.
 HAMM: Yesterday! What does that mean? Yesterday.
 CLOV:  [Violently.] That means that bloody awful day, long
          ago, before this bloody awful day. I use the words you
          taught me. If they don’t mean anything any more, teach
          me others. Or let me be silent.
          [Pause.]
                  (ENDG., 32.)    
Having said the story remains unaltered, I believe what is actually being delivered to the stage 
which is actually different, is not so much the story, but the perspective on such a story. 
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Beckett I believe wanted to create an art form which could directly respond to the absolute 
character of ‘will’ without sacrificing the contribution of the artist. And it seems having hit an 
impasse with the novel, it is the theatre which offers Beckett a ‘lifeline’ when it comes to 
maintaining his stake as an artist:   
 At the end of my work there’s nothing but dust - the namable. In the last book - L’ Innomable 
- there’s complete disintegration. No “I”, no “have”, no “being”. No nominative, accusa-
 tive, no verb. There’s no way to go on. The very last thing I wrote - Textes pour rien - was
 an attempt to get out of the attitude of disintegration, but failed.14          
In order to understand what kind of ‘lifeline’ the theatre could offer, I believe we have to 
consider what it is about a performance upon stage, which takes Beckett’s work away from 
the inevitable pressure to reveal it self solely in terms of an expanse of negatives, which are 
interspersed with pauses. It has often been put forward that the reason Beckett turned to the 
theatre, was in order to escape the solipsistic imprisonment he engendered with the novel, that 
some how the stage would once more open up the possibility of a broader range of 
interaction, in  an attempt, as it were, to restore the ‘I’ and the ‘being’ to his work. But the 
idea that this restoration would come about by simply introducing the prospect of live 
interaction to his work, or by giving a platform to the human presence in ‘real’ time; that 
somehow his work would once more assert itself in terms of a tangible reality, in which the 
human body, would be able to broadcast not a ‘negative’, but a ‘positive’, I feel is somewhat 
misplaced. For having shown already the way in which Beckett used his previous work as a 
means to seriously explore his own response to Schopenhauer’s writing, the very thought that 
at this stage he would try simply to return to a material setting, in order to make more ‘real’ 
the voices which arose from the pages of his novels; as if to put flesh on the bone, does not in 
any way seem to be appropriate, especially in light of Beckett’s own assault on the body:
  Let us try and get this dilemma clear. Follow me carefully. The stiff leg        
  hurt me, admittedly, I mean the old stiff leg, and it was the other
  which I normally used as a pivot, or prop. But now this latter,
  as a result of its stiffening I suppose, and the ensuing commotion
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  among nerves and sinews, was beginning to hurt me even more
  than the other. What a story, God send I don’t make a balls of it.
  For the old pain, do you follow me, I had got used to it, in a way,       
  yes, in a kind of way. Whereas the new pain, though of the same
  family exactly, I had not yet had time to adjust myself.
                                                                                  (MOL., 76-77)  
Clearly any attempt to reinvest in this phenomenal calamity would be a serious step 
‘backwards’. So, can there be a sense in which turning to the theatre does not necessarily 
restate a claim on the body?
In order to answer yes, one has to imagine a case in which the performance enfolding in front 
of its audience is not as secure as one would initially suspect; its reality cannot take refuge in 
the subject, in fact the action on stage becomes its own disclaimer towards the very subject it 
is representing:  
 CLOV:  Why this farce, day after day? 
 HAMM:  Routine. One never knows. [Pause.] Last night I saw
          inside my breast. There was a big sore. 
 CLOV:  Pah! You saw your heart.
 HAMM:  No it was living. [Pause. Anguished.] Clov!
 CLOV:  Yes.
 HAMM:  What’s happening?
 CLOV:  Something is taking its course.
         [Pause.]
                    (ENDG., 26.)
The language of Endgame occupies the same vexed ground as The Unnamable; so in what 
sense, with respects to Beckett’s work has the theatre been able to offer him a genuine 
lifeline? From my own perspective I believe that it was the theatre, which actually allowed 
Beckett to take his own appreciation and understanding of Schopenhauer to another level, for 
having literally taken the language of the novel in a direction which has no descriptive point 
of reference (the unnamable), where one’s movement is traced in relation to an outpouring of 
negatives, punctuated by pauses; there seems on the face of it nothing left to hand over to the 
theatre. For how can he allow an actor to stand up on stage and proclaim himself to be the 
very thing which could not be expressed in The Unnamable? Instead though, rather than use 
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the stage as platform to present ‘the unnamable’ or ‘thing-in-itself’, what I do believe Beckett 
grasped in relation to the stage is that it could be used to emphasize a very different 
perspective of ‘the unnamable’, not what it is intrinsically, but rather what it is in terms of 
‘representation’ or more acutely Vorstellung. If as I suspect Beckett’s own engagement of 
Schopenhauer’s writing was as far reaching as this thesis is proposing, then there is no doubt 
in my mind that Beckett would have been able to appreciate the way in which Schopenhauer 
had not only moved the Kantian identity of the Ding an sich towards a much more expressive 
identity encompassed by the ‘will’ but also that his adoption of the term Vorstellung opens out  
Kant’s repraesentatio in a way which seeks to highlight the phenomenal world in terms a 
‘presentation’ or ‘show’; that is to say an object for a subject Objekt des Subjekts.15 In fact we 
can see from Schopenhauer’s writing that his own conception of Vorstellung was an attempt 
to rescue Kant’s phenomenal characterization of the world from its unduly abstract 
appearance:   
  An essential difference between Kant’s method and that which 
  I follow is to be found in the fact that he starts from indirect, re-
  flected knowledge, whereas I start from direct and intuitive knowl-
  edge. He is comparable to a person who measures the height of a 
  tower from its shadow; but I am like one who applies the measuring-
  rod directly to the tower itself. Philosophy, therefore is for him a 
  science of concepts, but for me a science in concepts, drawn from 
  knowledge of perception, the only source of all evidence, and set
  down and fixed in universal concepts.         
                                                       (W.W.R.1., 452-453.)
Schopenhauer clearly wants his phenomenal conception of the world to escape the flatness of 
Kant’s indirect formula, as he puts it ‘a science of concepts’, and instead consider the 
phenomenal character of the world as something which we directly inhabit as ‘a science in 
concepts drawn from knowledge of perception’.  So, it is evident from Schopenhauer’s own 
writing that his decision to adopt the ‘concept’ (or Begriff) of Vorstellung rather than simply 
borrow Kant’s repraesentatio was in order to bring home to the reader a sense in which 
worldly phenomena rely upon an onlooker or spectator: 
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  He [Kant] skips over this whole world of perception which surrounds 
  us, and which is so multifarious and rich in significance, and he sticks 
  to the forms of abstract thinking. Although he never states the fact, this 
  procedure is founded on the assumption that reflection is the ec[o]type 
  of all perception, and that everything essential to perception must there
  -fore be expressed in reflection, and indeed in very contracted, and there
  -fore easily comprehensible, forms and outlines. Accordingly what is 
  essential and comfortable to law in abstract knowledge would place in our
  hands all the threads that set in motion before our eyes the many-
  coloured puppet-show of the world of perception.
                                                                   (W.W.R.1., 453.)
In fact, as this passage reveals, Schopenhauer clearly wanted to raise the phenomenal aspect 
of the world in terms of a ‘puppet-show’ and therefore Richard E. Aquila’s suggestion that 
Schopenhauer’s use of the ‘concept’ Vorstellung in the title of his principal work, had been 
deliberately adopted in order to convey this theatrical construction of ‘representation’, or as 
Aquila translates it ‘presentation’ is fully justified . For as we can see from Die Welt 
Schopenhauer wants to impress upon his reader, the need to move away from abstraction and 
instead connect to a much more immediate and less rarified environment than the one Kant 
offers, and it is in this sense that I believe we should as Aquila suggests, view Schopenhauer’s 
Vorstellung not only with reference to repraesentatio but also to bring on board its theatrical 
identity, that which is commonly cited in relation to a theatrical presentation.16  And above all 
it is the staging of a puppet-show which for Schopenhauer encapsulates the essential model 
for worldly participation: 
 
  In short, determinism stands firm; for fifteen hundred years at-
  tempts to undermine it have been made in vain. They have been
  urged by certain queer ideas which we know quite well, but dare, 
  not call entirely by their name. In consequence of it, however, the
  world becomes a puppet show worked by wires (motives) without
  its even being possible to see for whose amusement. If the piece
  has a plan, then a fate is the director; if it has no plan, blind 
  necessity is the director. There is no escape from the absurdity other
  than the knowledge that the being and essence of all things are the
  phenomenon of a really free will that knows itself precisely in them;
  for their doing and acting are not to be delivered from necessity. 
  To save freedom from fate or change, it had to be transferred 
  from action to the existence.
                                      (W.W.R.2., 321.)
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For the stage which Schopenhauer purports the world to be is not one which is given over to 
individual action, in which the players are free to interpret the script in a manner of their own 
choosing. In fact as Schopenhauer sees it, their movements upon the stage are not to be 
construed as action derived from autonomous choice at all, but rather as an unconscious 
expression of their own essential character. As we can the Schopenhauerian stage action is 
derived from a blind director who randomly pulls on wires, bringing about the appearance of 
a motive in each player, but which in truth is simply an amplification of the ‘free will that 
knows itself precisely in them’.  It is clear from the way Schopenhauer speaks of the world in 
terms of a Puppenspiel that he not only wanted Vorstellung to be accessed in terms of 
‘representation’ but also appreciated within the broader context of Schauspiel; the world as 
theatre or even ‘play’.17      
Having already provided evidence that Beckett had indeed accessed Schopenhauer in the 
original German; then the opportunity to recognize the full potential to which Vorstellung 
remains accountable, is inevitably that much more greater than if one where simply relying on 
a translation. In fact as we can see from Beckett’s own notebook composed during the late 
70’s early 80’s (the ‘Sottiser Notebook’) he remains determined to preserve the original 
German ‘Begriff’ as he writes in the entry dated (23.3.81) Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung, 
directly underneath which he pens “meine Wille.”18            
When it comes to fielding an explanation as to why Beckett switched his attention away from 
the novel and onto the theatre, then I believe we should look for our answer in these very 
lines; for the theatre would in the face of Beckett’s own Schopenhauerian leanings present 
himself with an unique opportunity to reveal his art not only through an unending 
performance of suffering and boredom, which ultimately fails to deliver an adequate 
representation of itself; but also importantly register the second philosophical tier that 
Schopenhauer’s writing testifies to: the ‘World as Vorstellung’. By staging his work Beckett 
would most certainly have been able scrutinize Vorstellung in a way which is simply not 
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available to the novel, for now he would be able to bring to the fore the very aspect of 
Vorstellung which remains so elusive to literary translation; the constituent ‘vor’ and 
‘Stellung’ allowing Vorstellung to be realized in relation to its  taking up a position before a 
subject or spectator. For in writing ‘Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung’ in the ‘Sottisier 
Notebook’ Beckett no doubt wanted to remind himself of the opening first lines of Die Welt:
 The world is my representation”: this is a truth valid with reference 
 to every living and knowing being, although man alone can bring it 
 into reflective, abstract consciousness. If he really does so, philosophical 
 discernment has dawned on him. It then becomes clear and certain to 
 him that he does not know a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees 
 a sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world around him is there only 
 as representation, in other words, only in reference to another thing, 
 namely that which represents, and this is himself.
                                          (W.W.R.1., 3.)
If we are to take seriously the idea that Beckett’s work was in someway an attempt to bring to 
fruition an aesthetic which participates in the structural identity of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy, then this opening passage I believe can tell us a great deal about Beckett’s own 
considerations towards the advantages of staging his work in front of an audience, as opposed 
to simply allowing it to rest on the page:   
 
 HAMM:  What’s the weather like?
 CLOV:  The same as usual. 
 HAMM:  Look at the earth.
 CLOV:  I’ve looked.  
 HAMM:  With the glass?
 
 CLOV:  No need of the glass.
 HAMM:  Look at it with the glass.
 CLOV:  I’ll go and get the glass.
         [Exit CLOV.]
 HAMM:  No need of the glass!
          [Enter CLOV with telescope.]
 CLOV:  I’m back again, with the glass. [He goes to window
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           right, look up at it.] I need the steps
 HAMM:  Why? Have you shrunk? [Exit CLOV with telescope.] I
          don’t like that, I don’t like that.
          [Enter CLOV with ladder, without telescope.]
 CLOV:  I’m back again, with the steps. [He sets down ladder
          under window right, gets up on it, realizes he has not the
          telescope, gets down.] I need the glass.
                                                                  (ENDG., 24.)
For here in Endgame Beckett creates a performance which draws into focus the way in which 
the phenomenal appearance of the world has no independence outside the reception of the 
eye, that both the earth and sun ‘in themselves’ remain outside the experience of the subject; 
for Clov, it seems, must fall in line with Hamm’s instruction and view the world through the 
eyepiece his master provides. Clearly what Beckett is emphasizing with the telescope remains 
entirely consistent with the Schopenhauerian position: that without the subject of experience 
the world in an objective sense would cease to exist.19 So we can see in this instance Beckett 
using the stage in order to underline the fact that the world which we receive through our 
senses, is no more real than the world being played out on stage, they are both 
representations. Therefore by working within the context of the theatre Beckett is able convey 
Vorstellung in a way which is both accountable to repraesentatio  as well as its interior 
fabrication of Schauspiel; that of ‘placing and presenting before an audience’. It has often 
been noted that Beckett’s own attempts to demonstrate the perceptual overlap between what 
constitutes as real and the image masquerading under the guise of reality, owes itself 
primarily to Berkeley’s Idealism, for Beckett, having a Trinity College background would 
have possibly felt a close affinity with the Bishop, and indeed while at Trinity it is known that  
he did indeed study Berkeley’s Treatise Concerning the principle of Human Knowledge.20  
But even in the light of giving Berkeley’s Esse est percipi star-billing in the only film Beckett 
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ever scripted, the consideration towards perception remains to my mind still weighted in 
favour of Schopenhauer. This is not to say that I want to repudiate the idea that Berkeley’s 
idealism does not resonate within Beckett’s work; nor do I want to suggest that the inclusion 
of Berkeley is there simply for the purpose of ridicule; but rather that Beckett’s address 
towards Berkeley is an attempt to consciously enter a similar position which Schopenhauer 
himself acknowledges at the opening of Die Welt; that modern philosophical enquiry starts 
with Descartes, but it is not until it is taken up by Berkeley do we arrive at idealism proper:21
  This truth is by no means new. It was to be found already in the
  sceptical reflections from which Descartes started. But Berkeley was  
  the first to enunciate it positively, and he has thus rendered an im-
  mortal service to philosophy, although the remainder of his doctrines
  cannot endure. Kant’s first mistake was the neglect of this principle,
  as is pointed out in the Appendix. On the other hand, how early this
  basic truth was recognized by the sages of India, since it appears as
  the fundamental tenet of the Vedanta philosophy ascribed to Vyasa,
  is proved by Sir William Jones in the last of his essays: “On the
  philosophy of the Asiatics” (Asiatic Researches, vol.1V, p. 164):
  “The fundamental tenet of the Vedanta school consisted not in deny-
  ing the existence of matter, that is, of solidity, impenetrability, and
  extended figure (to deny which would be lunacy), but in correcting
  the popular notion of it, and in contending that it has no essence in-
  dependent of mental perception; that existence and perceptibility are
  convertible terms.” These words adequately express the compatibility
  of empirical reality with transcendental ideality.
                                                                     (W.W.R.1., 3-4.) 
As we can see from the opening of Die Welt, Schopenhauer is at pains to stress that it was 
Berkeley who above any other Western philosopher was the first to truly ‘enunciate’ the 
fundamental character of conscious perception. And it is on this very page stressing 
Berkeley’s ‘immortal service to philosophy’ (that is to say Schopenhauer’s philosophy) that 
we find the identical line from Die Welt which Beckett pens in his ‘Sottisier Notebook’: Die 
Welt ist mein Vorstellung. 
Film: The Thin Veil and the Nail.
The idea that this Schopenhauerian assimilation of Berkeley, is consciously being taken up by 
Beckett is further supported in my view by the knowledge that Film, his only cinematic 
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project, which is explicitly framed in relation to Berkeley’s Esse est percipi, had originally 
been given the title The Eye.22 This alone of course would not stand to shift the weight of 
evidence away from Berkeley and onto Schopenhauer, as Schopenhauer’s theory on optics 
can be easily trumped by Berkeley’s Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision. 
But once we are aware of the importance of the eye, in respects to Schopenhauer’s thinking; 
the way in which the ‘eye’ and ‘I’ collapses into both ‘subject’ and ‘object’ in his writing, 
revealing what he calls ‘a miracle par excellence’ it is evident that Berkeley is not the only 
one in the frame.23 For as soon as we bring the eye ‘singular’ into the context of Berkeley I 
believe Beckett is not only evoking Berkeley, but that he is also carrying the opening 
sentiments of Die Welt, for it is in Die Welt that we see the ‘eye’ and Esse est percipi speak as 
one: ‘the world around him is there only as a representation, in other words only in reference 
to another thing, namely that which represents, and this is himself.‘ Also it is vital to remain 
aware of the fact that Schopenhauer opens Die Welt with the notion that true philosophical 
discernment towards the world begins by disclaiming any knowledge of the earth or the sun, 
‘but only an eye that sees the sun’.  So, it is in this context that I see in a work such as Film 
Berkeley’s own assessment towards vision working hand in hand with Schopenhauer’s; but 
where one takes leave of Berkeley in Film, leaving as it were Schopenhauer behind, relates to 
the causal structure of suffering and how this in itself becomes identified with perception.
One particular frame of Film I would like to consider depicts ‘O’ the ‘object’ (Buster 
Keaton24) being perceived by ‘E’ the ‘eye’ (the camera) face on:
  Cut to E, of whom this very first image (face only, against 
  ground of tattered wall). It is O’s face (with patch) but
  with very different expression, impossible to describe,
  neither severity nor benignity, but rather acute intentness.
  A big nail is visible near left temple (Patch side). 
                                                                                (FILM., 47.)   
I have chosen this frame from Film because I believe, despite his turning to a new medium 
               
177
22 See, FILM., 65.   
23 See, O.T.F.R., 211-212. 
24 For a comprehensive account of Buster Keaton!s participation in Film see Bignell, J., Beckett on 
Screen: The Television Plays (2009) Manchester: Manchester University Press, 133-138.  
such as cinematic film Beckett is still determined to advance a notion of absolute space, 
which we see first arising in Godot and Endgame; but also crucially maintain, the interior 
dimension of Vorstellung; both in terms of ‘E’ and the potential audience which make cinema 
possible. For instance when we consider Beckett’s portrait of ‘O’, head on what Beckett is 
presenting to the ‘eye’ is in fact the same dichotomy represented on the stage in Endgame, but  
which in this instance attempts to accommodate the same vision on one face. The face, not 
uncharacteristically with Keaton, is deadpan, the head remains fixed looking directly into the 
camera, the right eye stares wide open, contrasted with the left which sports an eye patch. A 
long nail is visible near the temple with the the eye patch. In this one frame I believe we have 
the same compressed portrait as we see with Hamm and Clov. ‘O’ just like Hamm and it 
should be said Willie (whose name not only evokes Beckett’s own father’s but also 
Schopenhauer’s Wille) in Happy Days, bears the signature of the handkerchief covering the 
head, which in this particular shot has been removed; just as it is with Hamm’s handkerchief 
at the beginning of Endgame (though in Endgame it covers the entire face).25Hamm is blind 
just as is ‘O’s left eye, which is aligned to a nail. Before attempting to unpack such a densely 
compressed image, I believe it is important that we should first look to some previous 
explantations attempting to elucidate Hamm’s relationship with Clov; the most obvious one 
being that which alludes to a Cartesian parody, between mind and body.26 As it is Clov that 
does all the running there has been a natural tendency in Beckett criticism; to see Clov as 
being representative of the body, and Hamm who supplies the instructive commands to Clov’s 
actions, in turn being representative of the mind; thus setting out the poverty attached to the 
Cartesian vision. Another popular construction is to read Hamm’s and Clov’s relationship in 
terms of a dramatization of the Hegelian dialectic between ‘master’ and ‘bondsman’ where 
Hamm is assigned to the ‘master’ role and Clov, the ‘bondsman’.27 Also there is the 
suggestion by Knowlson that Beckett’s Hamm ‘is like a dying God of whom we have hearing 
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ever since Nietzsche: a God with a demiurge (Clov) who is seeing to the assembly of a dog 
and has not completed this work (is God’s work ever complete? Ever to be complete?) and a 
blind God, moreover, blind and tyrannical, like Fate.28  Each construction as we can see is 
perfectly serviceable with the context of Endgame, in fact I would say there is legitimate 
accommodation for all these competing views, along with the manifold identities of Hamm 
and Clov; the most prominent of which being Noah’s son and Ham’s own male heir. 
Ham who is a direct descendent of Adam, and whose own son Canaan is cursed by Noah as a 
result of Ham witnessing his own father’s nakedness, is clearly being consciously earmarked 
by Beckett in the naming of Hamm:29
  22 And Ham, the father of Ca-
  naan, saw the nakedness of his 
  father and told his two breth         
  ren without.
  23  And Shem and  Japheth
  took a garment, and laid it upon
  both their shoulders, and went
  backward, and covered the
  nakedness of their father; and
  their faces were backward, and
  they saw not their father’s 
  nakedness.
  24 And Noah awoke from 
  his wine, and knew what his
  younger son had done unto 
  him
  25 And he said, Cursed be
  Canaan; a servant of serv-
  ants shall he be unto his breth-
  ren.
                (GENESIS, 9., 15.)30      
  
As we can see from the chapter in Genesis the progeny of Ham is cursed by Noah ‘a servant 
of servants shall be unto his brethren.’ And so by taking up this biblical construction of 
Endgame we can identify Clov as being an amplification of the ‘Curse of Ham’. There is of 
course a very different Ham which Beckett no doubt is deliberately planting in the context of 
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theatre, that which points to ‘sham acting’; and still we cannot end there. For there is also the 
Old English word ‘ham’ to reflect upon denoting the back of the knee, which is itself derived 
from a Germanic base meaning ‘be crooked’ and so on a completely different level Hamm’s 
own name comes to reinforce his wards acerbic comments summing up both their outlook on 
life:  
 CLOV:  [Sadly.] No one that ever lived ever thought so crooked
          as we.
                 (ENDG.,16)
All these identities can be said to circulate legitimately in Endgame, and no doubt a great deal 
more; but there is to my mind one particular identity which underpins them all, and that is, 
their respective names carry the identity of ‘hammer’ and ‘nail’, clou  being of course French 
for nail; which again is re-played in Hamm’s parent’s names, Nag and Nell. For apart from 
the German allusion to Nagel and its English counterpart ‘nail’ you also have within the 
linguistic marriage of Nag and Nell the very notion of verbal hammering; that is to say 
‘nagging’. This Hammer and nail identity being ascribed to Endgame is one which Hugh 
Kenner feels should be approached with some caution as he remarks ‘Hamm, then, and Clov. 
Ham and clove? And Nagg and Nell:German Nagel, nail, and English Nail? Perhaps. And the 
French for nail is clou, in which case ‘Hamm’ suggests ‘hammer’. As so often we are being 
teased by hints of system, not to be pursued.’31  Personally I feel the ‘hammer’ and ‘nail’ 
occupies Endgame on a much deeper level, in fact I would go so far as to say it evokes the 
essential structure which underlines the whole of Beckett’s work. For the idea that the allusion 
to the hammer and nail is merely a playful tease by Beckett, which ultimately has no 
substance, can I believe be countered by the fact that Beckett depicts a disturbingly large nail 
next to ‘O’s temple when ‘E’ looks at ‘O’ head on, framed against the tattered wall. In this 
frame from Film there can be no mistaking the explicit intention by Beckett to register the 
disconcerting juxtaposition between the exposed nail and ‘O’s temple. This to my mind has 
nothing to do with a misleading jest, it would seem that for Beckett, the nail’s presence is 
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integral to the entire composition. So, in this one frame we can retrieve the signatures of both 
Hamm (the black eye patch) and Clov (the nail) but much more importantly it is what they 
represent in each other’s company. For I believe what Beckett is representing in the respective 
names of Hamm and Clov, is the reality pertaining to Clov (the nail), for the nail cannot exist 
outside the ‘realm’ of the hammer, the reality of the nail is completely dependent upon the 
hammer for shaping its whole identity. But crucially this picture is also dependent upon 
another inescapable factor and that is, if it where not for the ‘hammering’ there would be no 
nail to speak of, as it is actually the structure of the ‘hammering’ which supports the reality of 
the nail; for without the ‘hammering’ there is no Clov to ‘pin down’. For in this context it is 
not just the secret combination to the larder that keeps Clov tied to Hamm, but rather 
something much more intractably linked to the underlying structure of reality; a reality which 
I believe has been fostered by Beckett’s own Schopenhauerian sympathies. For as we have 
already determined in relation to Schopenhauer’s conception of the ‘world’ as Wille; life 
resides in an expression of suffering; its very reality participates in its fundamental structure; 
therefore in this Schopenhauerian sense Clov like all expression of life, has no reality outside 
the condition of suffering. And it is for this reason that I believe ultimately Clov cannot 
remove himself from his master’s presence, despite the fact that he is obviously the source 
of Clov’s suffering:  
CLOV:  If I could kill him I’d die happy.
         [Pause.]
                   (ENDG., 24)
Therefore the signature of the nail and hammer, once added to Esse est percipi shifts the 
emphasis away from Berkeley and back onto Schopenhauer; for now perception does not just 
rest within the context of ‘being’, that is to say ‘being’ in its most anodyne sense, but instead 
‘being’ specifically in terms of suffering. So, rather than take Esse est percipi to simply mean: 
‘to be is to be perceived’ we should now translate the Berkeleian headline of Film as: ‘to be 
suffering is to be perceived’. Once we begin to appreciate suffering as providing the causal 
structure of Beckett’s work, then not only is ‘O’s fraught attempt to escape the ‘eye’ of the 
camera lens an attempt to free himself from the phenomenal conception of being, divided 
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between  ‘object’ and ‘subject’; but ultimately it is one which is driven by the doomed 
ambition to escape suffering altogether. For in this extended context the phenomenal division 
arising from the relationship between ‘object’ and ‘subject’ is itself participating in the same 
fundamental structure as suffering. ‘O’ in his reluctance to be viewed by ‘E’ is driven to the 
false sanctuary of his apartment; having encountered already an elderly couple, as well as a 
single old lady on the stairs leading up to his room. With each encounter ‘E’ fixes upon the 
subjects, capturing their faces in a state of alarm (mouths open) whilst ‘O’ hastily attempts to 
leave ‘E’ further behind. On reaching his apartment, having closed the door, concealed the 
mirror, fish bowl, and parrot cage, ejected both the dog and cat, as well as set about 
destroying a series of photographs (featuring a young couple raising a child, which 
includes a single photograph of ‘O’) and a representation of God the father (a print of a 
‘worm’ like subject with large saucer-shaped eyes), he even goes so far as to take the 
precaution of turning a folder through 90 degrees to prevent it from possessing an eye-like 
appearance. But after all this he still awakes in his rocking chair to the trained eye of ‘E’. No 
matter how effective the effort on ‘O’s part to expunge the presence of the ‘eyes’ in the 
‘subject’; the connection between ‘object’ and ‘subject’ remains unaffected; ‘O’ still remains 
at the mercy of ‘E’. So, after all this there must be something in the nature of ‘O’s relationship 
with ‘E’ which extends much further than a simple ‘object-subject’ binary . 
Clearly what ‘O’s action are unable to account for is the reality which brings together ‘O’ and 
‘E’ into a single identity; in other words ‘O’ and ultimately Film itself is never in a position to 
adequately represent what Schopenhauer himself describes as a ‘miracle par excellence’. 
Beckett portrayal of ‘O’s attempt to launch an assault on the world’s phenomenal identity 
shares in the same futility which we observe in relation to Beckett’s own treatment of suicide; 
for ‘O’s own efforts to edit-out the phenomenal world, in the end only acts to reinforce it.  
As we have seen already in the context of Schopenhauer, an objective assault on the world 
can never be accessed in terms of an act of individual freedom, as freedom itself can never be 
enacted within an empirical setting:
  I have shown in the essay On Freedom of the Will that only on
  its assumption is a person’s action nevertheless his own, in spite of
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  the necessity with which it follows from his character and from the
  motives; but here aseity is attributed to his true being. Now the same
  relation holds good of all things in the world. The strictest necessity,
  honestly carried out with rigid consistency, and the most perfect
  freedom, raised to omnipotence, had to appear simultaneously and
  together in philosophy. But without doing violence to truth, this 
  could come about only by putting the whole necessity in the acting
  and doing (operari), and the whole freedom, on the other hand, in
  the being and essence (esse). In this way a riddle is solved which
  is as old as the world, just because hitherto it has always been held
  upside down, and freedom was positively looked for in the operari,
  and necessity in the esse.
                                     (W.W.R.2., 320.)      
   
                           
So if we apply this Schopenhauerian version of freedom to Beckett’s own depiction of ‘O’s 
flight from ‘E’, it could explain why ‘O’s own attempt to access his autonomous freedom 
through ‘motion’ or ‘action’ is itself a doomed exercise; for it would seem that ‘O’ also falls 
victim to the illusory inversion of another‘O’ and ‘E’  that of ‘operari’ and ‘esse’. As it is with 
many of Beckett’s titles, the decision on his part to finally call his cinematic project Film I 
believe carries with it more than one identity. Far from seeing the title as simply some 
empirical declaration denoting the medium of cinema; as if to say it is what it is on a material 
level; I suspect the true meaning for Beckett rests, not with the idea of transparency, but 
instead is seen as further reinvestment in the illusory aspect of Vorstellung. For the idea of 
‘film’ as a covering, barrier, or  thin sheet, is an image which pervades much of Beckett’s 
work; be it indicated in the sheet which is removed from Hamm, or the handkerchief that rests 
on his face; along with those which cover the heads of both Wille and ‘O’, not forgetting also 
the one retained in the allusion relating to the biblical ‘Ham’.32 There is also a range of 
invisible barriers, ones preventing Watt from encountering Knott, or Estragon and Vladimir 
from encountering Godot, not to mention the barrier which separates Molloy from Moran; 
along with those of a more demonstrative character; such as the railings which separate the 
‘aberdeen’ from Molloy, or the urns forming a barrier around W1, W2 and M in Play. 
Interestingly Beckett’s title Play also has the capacity not only to make an explicit reference 
towards that which it is, as a piece of theatre or performance; but as we have already 
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32 See, Robert Champigny account of clothing in samuel beckett now: Critical Approaches to His 
Novels, Poetry and Plays, ed., Friedman, M.J. (1975) London: The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 
123. 
exposed in relation to Schopenhauer’s own treatment of Vorstellung as ‘show’ or ‘play’ .33 
Therefore it is possible that both the titles of Film and Play are in fact sharing in the same 
identity, that they are both characterizing Beckett’s work in terms of Vorstellung. The idea that 
the title Film is someway alluding to a thin barrier is also picked up by Anthony Uhlmann in 
Samuel Beckett and the Philosophical Image. In his chapter entitled ‘Beckett, Berkeley, 
Bergson, Film: the intuition image’, he alights upon the fact that Bergson in his essay on 
Berkeley ‘has identified an image of matter as a thin transparent film situated between God 
and man’34 thus impressing upon Uhlmann the possibility that Film could in fact be Beckett’s 
own cinematic response to Bergson’s image of Berkeley. But having already expressed doubts 
over the many Bergsonian connections drawn up in respects of Proust (seeing it in part as a 
misappropriation of Beckett’s own reading of Schopenhauer, particular his address to time) I 
also feel that Film in a similar fashion owes a great deal more to Die Welt than any reading of 
Time and Free Will. So now having suggested that the Berkeleian identity of Film is in fact 
feeding back into the Schopenhauerian premise of Vostellung it would seem from this 
perspective that Beckett himself would have sought a ‘cover’ with a much less divine 
provenance than the one being offered by Uhlmann35:
  Accordingly we have to refer the whole world of phenomena to that 
  one in which the thing-in-itself is manifested under the lightest of veils, 
  and still remains phenomenon only in so far as my intellect, the only thing 
  capable of knowledge, still always remains distinguished from me as the 
  one who wills, and does not cast off the knowledge-form of time, even 
  with inner perception. Accordingly, even after this last and extreme step, 
  the question may still be raised what that will, which manifests itself in the 
  world and as the world, is ultimately and absolutely in itself; in other words,
  what it is, quite apart from the fact that it manifests itself as will,
  or in general appears that is to say, is known in general. This question
  can never be answered, because, as I have said, being-known 
  of itself contradicts being-in-itself, and everything that is known is
  as such only phenomenon. 
                                    (W.W.R.2., 197-198)
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33 See, Aquila, R.E., op.cit ., translator!s introduction xiii. 
34 Uhlmann, A., Samuel and the Philosophical Image., op.ct., 121.
35 “In endless space countless luminous spheres, round each of which some dozen smaller illuminated 
ones revolve, hot at the core and covered over with a hard cold crust; on this crust a mouldy film has 
produced living and knowing beings: this is empirical truth, the real, the world.: W.W.R.2., 3.    
As we can see, Schopenhauer in Die Welt presents his reader with a very striking depiction of 
a ‘film’ in the guise of ‘the lightest of veils’. For I suspect in this image of the ‘veil’ (the veil 
of Mâyâ36) lies the true inspiration behind the multifarious sheets and handkerchiefs which 
cover the faces and heads of Beckett’s characters37. The handkerchief, presumably blood-
stained as in the case of Hamm’s serves in my view as the ideal ideogram of the 
Schopenhauerian ‘veil’; for not only does it capture perfectly the image of a light, almost 
insubstantial cover, shrouding what is essentially the preeminent signature of conscious 
perception (the head); but as Beckett makes clear in the stage directions of Endgame, it also 
bears the full weight of human suffering; by the fact that it is ‘blood-stained’. So, unlike 
Berkeley or Bergson, the ‘film’ in this instance, separating ‘Man’ from his non-divisible 
noumenal reality, carries a heavy inscription of suffering, just like the long nail aligned with 
‘O’s’ temple, which inevitably carries an image of Christ’s suffering on the cross.38 Also by 
bringing the performance within the context of ‘absolute’ space, we have a situation in which 
the handkerchief can be simultaneously, a somewhat unremarkable piece of improvised 
protective covering, adding to the phenomenal slew which Beckett attaches to his characters; 
as well as the exact same partition on which is stretched the whole phenomenal identity of 
‘Man’. For I believe by identifying the space of the performance in ‘absolute’ terms Beckett 
makes it possible to transform what is virtually an undetectable blood-stain mottling a 
handkerchief, into the collective marker for an entire human species; while in the same 
instance turn the disheveled figure on whose head the handkerchief rests into the noumenal 
expression of a blind indomitable ‘will’ governing the whole of reality: 
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36 See, W.W.R.1., 253. Also see Mark Nixon !Yet the importance of Schopenhauer to Beckett, and 
especially the passage of the veil of Maya, the manner in which it is lifted and the affect it has on the 
individual who sees through it, reaches far beyond the early critical essay, and profoundly affects his 
personal and aesthetic thinking." Nixon,M., German Diaries, op.cit., 169.    
37 It is interesting also to raise attention to Beckett"s own considerations towards language appearing as 
a veil. See, Beckett, S., Disjecta: Miscellaneous Writing and Dramatic Fragments., ed., Cohn.R. (1983) 
London: John Calder (Publishers) Ltd.,171-172.   
38 See, Gontarski, S.E., The Intent of Undoing in Samuel Beckett!s Dramatic Texts (1985) Bloomington 
Indiana: Indiana University Press: Bloomington., 102. Also see, for an account of Beckettian suffering 
reflected through Christ"s crucifixion Sage, V., Structure and Meaning in the Novels of Samuel Beckett 
(University of East Anglia Doctoral thesis: 1971).  
 
                                                   [...] HAMM stirs. He yawns 
 under the handkerchief. He removes the handkerchief from
 his face. Very red face. Black glasses.]
HAMM: Me - [he yawns] - to play. [He holds the handkerchief 
          spread out before him.] Old stancher! [He takes off his
          glasses, wipes his eyes, his face, the glasses, puts them on 
          again, folds the handkerchief and puts it neatly in the
          breast-pocket of his dressing-gown. He clears his throat,
          joins the tips of his fingers.] Can there be misery - [he
         yawns] - loftier than mine? No doubt. Formerly. But
         now? [Pause.] My father? [Pause.] My mother? [Pause.]
         My ...dog? [Pause.] Oh I am willing to believe they suffer
         as much as such creatures can suffer. But does that mean
         their sufferings equal mine? No doubt. [Pause.]
                                                                             (ENDG., 12.)
 
It would seen that Hamm’s entire demeanor and outward appearance is conspiring on one 
level to present to the audience what is essentially a staged characterization of the descriptive 
monogram which Schopenhauer assigns to the ‘will’: that it is blind, and that it commands the 
entire show through a regimen of suffering. 
Clov Up in The Watch-Tower.
But clearly in order to advance my Schopenhauerian evaluation of Endgame I cannot simply 
build a case out of the fact that Hamm has lost his eye sight, and that he runs his manservant 
ragged getting him to carry out his daily chores. Unusually though for a Beckett play, I 
believe it is possible to identify in Endgame, the outlined attempt to make his stage available 
to a specific image which Schopenhauer himself exploits in order to illustrate the ‘will’s’ 
relationship to the ‘intellect’. But before I move any further in this direction I feel we should 
return to the passage setting out Hamm’s opening profile to the audience. As we can see in the 
description of Hamm’s stirring, once Clov has thrown off the protective dust-sheet, leaving 
Hamm to remove from his own face the handkerchief; the first words he utters on awakening 
leaves one to contemplate a peculiar remark: ‘Me- [he yawns] - to play.’ What is one to make 
of this? Is Beckett indicating to the audience that the ‘play’ is now up and running? On some 
level this must be true; but I personally believe that there is a great deal more going on in 
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Hamm’s statement than the simple indication that the ‘game’ has now commenced. What I 
would like to propose is that within this utterance of Hamm’s, we actually have Beckett 
setting out what he reiterates much latter in his Sottisier Notebook: ‘Die Welt ist meine 
Vorstellung’. For as we have now established, one of Schopenhauer’s preferred translations of 
Vorstellung was in fact ‘play’ or ‘show’, as it offered an alternative to the more theorized 
translation of ‘representation’. Therefore I would suggest that the correct way in which to 
view Hamm’s first utterance should be: Mine- [he yawns] - to Vorstellung; for  now I believe 
we can fully appreciate the way in which Beckett in the opening scene of Endgame has gone 
about erecting the persona of Hamm in terms of the ‘will’ taking on a phenomenal identity.39 
Instead of looking upon the removal of the sheets and handkerchief purely as some kind of 
phenomenal divestment, or as Kenner describes as a striptease ‘first the curtain goes up, then 
the sheets are removed, then the cloth uncovers Hamm’s face, then the black glasses come off 
his eyes: a ritual strip-tease.’40 it can also be regarded as the very antithesis of a striptease. For 
what I believe is being played out in terms of Hamm’s and Clov’s opening appearance on 
stage, which to the audience looks every bit like a disrobing; becomes in the context of 
Beckett’s ‘absolute’ (theatricalized) space the ‘will’ acquiring its phenomenal guise through 
the assistance of the intellect: 
    
 
 HAMM:  Get me ready. [CLOV does not move.] Go and get the 
          sheet. [CLOV does not move.] Clov.
                                                               (ENDG., 13.)
It is the causal structure arising from the toing-and-froing of Clov’s activity (including 
throwing off the dust-sheets) that can be considered as a major part of the phenomenal 
costume which the ‘will’ slips into through the assistance of the the intellect. After having 
made two concerted efforts to promote Clov as the intellect, rather than what many critics 
have previously assumed is Hamm’s designated role, I feel it is now time to look at the 
passage from Die Welt which I believe has been directly shadowed by Beckett in the stage 
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39 Quite extraordinarily we seem to be back in the exact same space as Human Wishes: !You are 
knotting, Madam, I perceive."   
40 Kenner, H., Reader!s Guide to Samuel Beckett op.cit., 122.
design of Endgame:
 
  The brain with its function of knowing is nothing more than a guard 
  mounted by the will for its aims and ends that lie outside. Up in the 
  watch-tower of the head this guard looks round through the windows 
  of the senses, and watches the point from which mischief threatens 
  and advantage is to be observed, and the will decides in accordance 
  with its report. This guard, like everyone engaged on active service, is
  in a state of close attention and exertion, and therefore is glad when
  it is again relieved after discharging its duties of watching, just as
  every sentry likes to be withdrawn from his post. This withdrawal
  is falling asleep, which for that reason is so sweet and agreeable,
  and to which we are so ready to yield. On the other hand, being
  roused from sleep is unwelcome, because it suddenly recalls the
  guard to his post. 
                        (W.W.R.2., 241.)
        
As we can see from Schopenhauer’s own description of the ‘intellect’ working in partnership 
with the ‘will’ it is the ‘intellect’ which he envisages doing all the running, rather than the 
‘will’. Also importantly we can see that the way Schopenhauer positions the ‘intellect’ (brain) 
as a guard who is unable to be discharged from his duties while in the active service of the 
will; and whose discharge can only come about through the prospect of sleep (for on awaking 
the ‘sentry’ is suddenly recalled to ‘his’ post), has a direct correspondence to the way in which 
Beckett characterizes the regimented behavior of Clov, as he goes about his daily ritual of 
waking up his master. But most strikingly it is the way in which the stage itself in Endgame, 
has been deliberately arranged with the intention of carrying the spatial monogram of a head; 
its two large windows serving as ‘eyes’. This of course is not unique to Beckett; as it could be 
argued that the theatre has always in some way ever since Plato been viewed as a surrogate 
interior for the human head. But clearly once we locate Clov’s own ancillary task of 
conveying directly to his blind master what he sees from the vantage point of each window 
(while perched on top of a stepladder, with his eye pressed up against Hamm’s telescope); 
within this licensed conceit of the head; then it becomes apparent just how much this 
innocuous slapstick routine in Endgame actually owes to Beckett’s private reading of 
Schopenhauer: 
 
 HAMM:  No need for the glass!
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           [Enter CLOV with telescope.]
 CLOV:  I’m back again, with the glass. [He goes to window
         right, looks up at it.] I need the steps.
 HAMM:  Why? Have you shrunk? [Exit CLOV with telescope.] I
           don’t like that, I don’t like that.
            [Enter CLOV with ladder, but without telescope.]
 CLOV:  I’m back again, with the steps. [He sets down ladder
          under window right, gets up on it, realizes he has not the 
          telescope, gets down.] I need the glass.
          [he goes towards the door.]
 HAMM:  [Violently.] But you have the glass!
 CLOV:  [Halting, violently.] No I haven’t the glass!
         [Exit CLOV.]
 HAMM: This is deadly.
         [Enter CLOV with telescope. He goes towards ladder.]
 CLOV:  Things are livening up. [He gets up on the ladder, raises the
          telescope and lets it fall.] I did it on purpose. [He gets down,
          picks up the telescope, turns it on auditorium.] I see . . . a
          multitude . . . in transports . . . of joy. [Pause.] That’s what 
          I call a magnifier. [He lowers the telescope, turns towards
          HAMM.] Well? Don’t we laugh?
 HAMM:  [After reflection.] I don’t.
 CLOV:  [After reflection.] Nor I. [He get up on ladder, turns
         the telescope on the without.] Let’s see. [He looks, moving
         the telescope.] Zero . . . [he looks] . . . zero . . . [he looks]
         . . . and zero.
               
 HAMM: Nothing stirs. All is-
 CLOV:  Zer - 
 HAMM:  [Violently.] Wait till you’re spoken to! [Normal Voice.] 
          All is . . . all is . . . all is what? [Violently.] All is what?
 CLOV:  What all is? In a word? Is that what you want to know?
           Just a moment. [He turns the telescope on the without,
           looks, lowers the telescope, turns towards HAMM.]
           Corpsed. [Pause.] Well? Content?         
                                                           (ENDG., 24-25.)
As soon as we place this arched exchange between Hamm and Clov, alongside the 
aforementioned passage in Die Welt; portraying the ‘intellect’ as a ‘sentry’ who longs to be 
discharged from his post, while up in a ‘watch-tower’ looking out through ‘the windows of 
the senses’ from where he reports any dangers to the his senior in command (the ‘will’) ; then 
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we would be hard pressed not to recognize on some level that Endgame is an attempt by 
Beckett to dramatize Schopenhauer’s own appraisal of the ‘will’s’ primacy over the 
‘intellect’.  And as to the rest of Clov’s domestic duties, Clov clearly fills out the 
Schopenhauerian costume to a T:
 
Thus the intellect is originally a hireling engaged on a laborious 
 task and kept busy and in constant demand from morning till
 night by its lord and master, the will.
                                                     (P.P.2., 68.) 
  
 The Three Legged Pomeranian.  
 
Once we puncture Endgame’s Schopenhauerian veil as it were; the ‘dark glass’ appears just 
that ever so more revealing. One particular image in Endgame which normally courts a great 
deal of interest; is Hamm’s fluctuating affection towards his dog: 
 HAMM:  Is my dog ready?
 CLOV:  He lacks a leg.
 HAMM: Is he silky?
 CLOV: He’s a kind of Pomeranian.
 HAMM: Go and get him.
 CLOV:  He lacks a leg.
 HAMM:  Go and get him! [Exit CLOV.] We’re getting on.
        [Enter CLOV holding by one of its three legs a black toy
         dog.]
 
 CLOV:  Your dogs are here.
          [He hands the dog to HAMM who feels it, fondles it.]
 HAMM:  He’s white, isn’t he?
 CLOV:  Nearly.
 HAMM:  What do you mean, nearly? Is he white or isn’t he?
 CLOV: He isn’t.
         [Pause.]
 HAMM:  You’ve forgotten the sex.
 CLOV:  [Vexed.] But he isn’t finished. The sex goes on at the 
         end.
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         [Pause.]
                  (ENDG., 30.)
This image of Hamm reviewing the construction of his ‘dog’, through Clov’s reluctant 
assistance; is normally considered as a parody of Genesis; with Hamm being every inch the 
divine creator; and what is more, it certainly has not gone unnoticed that of all the countless 
animals Beckett could have made the focus of Hamm’s ‘handiwork’; he opts for an animal 
which bears the name of ‘God’. So it would appear after all that Beckett even during the 
period of Endgame, had still not fully escaped the shadow of Joyce; that is if we are to believe 
that Beckett’s primary investment in Hamm’s ‘dog’ is the resurrection of Dedalus’s 
‘dogsbody’.41 Indeed there have been efforts to locate the relationship between Hamm and 
Clov; in terms of an inflated self portrait depicting Beckett’s own relationship with the 
visually impaired Joyce; and again no doubt all these consideration have a degree of 
buoyancy; but when it comes to consider what Goethe himself would fittingly describe as 
‘des Pudels Kern’ of Hamm’s toy dog; certainly from my point of view if such a dog were 
ever to be fashioned a collar, the inscription on it would in all likelihood read  ‘Atman’. For 
this stout phonic label is not only the Sanskrit word denoting our true self, extending beyond 
all phenomenal identification; but much more importantly it is also the name which 
Schopenhauer gave to one of his highly prized pet poodles. This on surface would justifiably 
be dismissed as yet another floating corpse of a dog; its significance being that of any other 
canine we could possibly care to mention, for instance Descartes’ own ‘Monsieur Grat’ who 
unusually had been spared his master’s dissection knife. And of course this would be true, if it  
were not for the fact that Hamm’s dog as Clov remarks is ‘a kind of Pomeranian’.42 For there 
can be no doubt in my mind that Beckett himself has Clov refer to Hamm’s mongrel creation 
as ‘a kind of Pomeranian’ in order to obliquely reference ‘Gdansk Pomerania’ or to give it its 
less Polish identity ‘the Hanseatic city of Danzig’. As soon as we are able extract ‘Danzig’ 
from Hamm’s ‘pet project’ then I believe Endgame’s full Schopenhauerian character can be 
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41 Joyce, J. Ulysses (1992) London: Penguin Books Ltd., 58.
42 In the 1967 Berlin production of Endgame (Endspiel) Ruby Cohn remarks on the fact Beckett used a 
toy dog poodle !In homage to the German philosopher Schopenhauer, who loved his poodle, the toy dog 
became a ragged, almost black, almost life size poodle[...]" See, Cohn, R., Just Play, op.cit., 245.    
given further license, for Danzig happens to be the officially recorded birth place of  
Schopenhauer.43 So having identified the one item which Hamm seemingly displays genuine 
affection towards, as having itself a ‘Schopenhauerian kernel’; I would suggest rather than 
attribute the three legs of the dog to an allusion of the holy trinity (the father, the son and the 
holy ghost) as one may be persuaded to do so, having already considered the possibility that 
Hamm’s dog is a parody of divine creation; it should rightfully in my mind be attributed to the 
three religions (Brahmanism, Buddhism and Christianity) which Schopenhauer himself 
personally identified as having each at their core, the same fundamental message as his own 
philosophy:  
                              [...] as for true Christians, the world is a vale 
 of tears, !"#$ %&'µ(). He compares it, as did Plato later, to a 
 dark cave wherein we are confined. In our earthly existence he 
 sees a state of exile and misery and the body is the prison of the
 soul. These souls were once in a state of infinite bliss and reached
 the present perdition through their own fault and sins. Through
 sinful conduct they became even more ensnared in this perdition
 and are involved in the circle of metempsychosis. On the other
 hand, through virtue and moral purity, which also included
 abstinence from animal food, and by turning away from earthly
 pleasures and desires, they can again reach their previous state.
 Hence the same fundamental wisdom, constituting the basic
 idea of Brahmanism, Buddhism and indeed true Christ-
 ianity (by which is not to be understood optimistic, Jewish-
 Protestant rationalism) was also brought home to us by this
 ancient Greek, whereby the consensus gentium concerning it
 was rendered complete. It is probable that Empedocles, whom
 the ancients generally described as Pythagorean, obtained this
 view from Pythagoras, especially as at bottom it is shared even
 by Plato, who is likewise under the influence of Pythagoras.
                                                                                         (P.P.1, 35)           
 
 
For now having conferred upon the dog its Schopenhauerian ‘rosette’ we could infer with a 
degree of confidence, that the reason Clov is so reluctant to ‘nail’ the dog’s sex, is due to the 
fact that Clov, for Beckett, represents a certain advancement in relation to the philosophical 
position of Schopenhauer; namely, that Clov has made a deliberate attempt to step back from 
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his own identity as purposeful ‘willing’ that is to say Wille zum Leben.44 It is Clov, and not 
Hamm who has advanced or raised his ‘game’ in a Schopenhauerian context; for Hamm’s 
annoyance at Clov, for withholding the dog’s ‘sex’ would suggest that it is Hamm who has not  
heeded the instruction which all Die Welt readers confront on entering the ‘main work’; for 
clearly the image of Hamm doting over his toy dog is the very antithesis of what 
Schopenhauer asks of his reader: Sors de l’ enfance, ami, réveille-toi! (“Quit thy childhood 
my friend, and wake up.” Tr. 45) Amongst the two protagonists it is Clov who has left the 
nursery, leaving Hamm to seek solace in the hollow, artificial facsimiles of life. Clov has 
deliberately chosen to withhold the ‘sex’ from the dog, for I believe, he like Schopenhauer’s 
ascetic or genius appreciates that ‘his willing that develops over time is, so to speak, the 
paraphrase of the body, the elucidation of the meaning of the whole and of its parts. It is 
another way of exhibiting the same thing-in-itself of which the body is already the 
phenomenon. Therefore instead of the will, we can also say affirmation of the body. The 
fundamental theme of all the many different acts of will is the satisfaction of the needs 
inseparable from the body’s existence in health; they have their expression in it, and can be 
reduced to the maintenance of the individual and the propagation of the race.’46In another 
instance in Endgame, there is a very different depiction of Clov resisting his master’s efforts 
to shape his identity in terms of his sexual appetite: 
 
 HAMM:  This is slow work. [Pause.] Is it not time for my
          painkiller?
 CLOV:  No. [Pause.] I’ll leave you, I have things to do.
 HAMM:  In your kitchen?
 CLOV:  Yes.
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44 Beckett!s refusal to pin down the sex of many of his characters is also examined by Paul Stewart 
"Beckett!s ambiguous use of nonreproductive sexuality severs the link between the sex object and the 
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further suffering[...]" See Stewart, P., Sex and Aesthetics in Samuel Beckett!s Work,op.cit, 196.  
45 W.W.R.1., 2. 
46 W.W.R.1., 327.  
 HAMM: What I’d like to know.
 CLOV:  I look at the wall.
 HAMM:  The wall! And what do you see on your wall? Mene,
         mene? Naked bodies?
 CLOV:  I see my light dying.
 HAMM:  Your light dying! Listen to that! Well, it can die just as
         well here, your light. Take a look at me and then come
         back and tell me what you think of your light.
         [Pause.]
                  (ENDG., 16-17.)
As we can see, once we locate the way in which Hamm’s identity can be flagged up in 
relation to Schopenhauer’s ‘will’ then we can begin to appreciate the way in which Beckett is 
positioning Clov’s own resistance towards Hamm’s sexual innuendo ‘Mene, mene? Naked 
bodies’ ; as well as refusing the offer of pain-killers, as a reflection of his own inner struggle 
waged against the ‘will’. It seems that by refusing Hamm’s pain-killers (for we should not 
forget that in the context of the ‘will’ both Hamm and Clov are in fact one inseparable entity) 
Clov is using his own suffering to turn the ‘will’ against its natural state of self-affirmation. It 
is this same ‘willful’ mortification which I personally feel is being represented in Clov’s 
answer to Hamm’s libidinous query about what he gets up to in his kitchen - ‘I see my light 
dying’. So taking all this into consideration we can now see why Beckett positions suicide, or 
more to the point why the killing of Hamm remains ‘off the board’ as an legitimate move for 
either Clov or Hamm. For the ‘endgame’ is as Hamm points out ‘slow work’, there are no 
easy exit strategies available to this Schopenhauerian ‘game’ they both appear to be in the 
process of playing.  Endgame, like Godot preceding it, I believe on a fundamental level is all 
about the prospect of waiting for death; let’s not forget that, just like the ‘god’ in Joyce’s dead 
dog, there is also death to be found in Beckett’s own mirrored construction of the divine; a 
German death no less: Go[dot] ‘tod’. But in my view the Schopenhauerian dimension of 
Beckett’s work means that the ‘waiting game’ can never take up a position in which it can 
welcome death with open arms; because as we know on a Schopenhauerian level wanting 
death as Clov, Hamm, Vladimir and Estragon all apparently do (that is on the ‘surface’ of 
Beckett’s work) is a reinvestment in the very thing they are all determined to weaken; namely 
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suffering ‘in-itself’. For any shade, or complexion of desire, as Schopenhauer shows 
throughout his work, actually replicates the structure of suffering. It is this intractable 
framework that I feel Beckett was determined to exploit in all his work; for in doing so I 
believe he saw a genuine possibility that his work could ultimately reveal a fundamental truth 
relating to the world in general. But not only this, I suspect as an artist Beckett genuinely 
believed that by using Schopenhauer in this way; he had alighted upon the purest account 
available of the undifferentiated character of both tragedy and comedy. 
Refusing to Jump the Rails.
One example of the way in which Beckett refines the expressive space in which this same 
intractable sentiment between the desire to move one’s identity away from a perpetual 
reinvestment in suffering; while knowing at the same time that any abrupt shift to break one’s 
ties with its causal structure will defeat the whole project involved in the rejection of 
suffering, is brought into extraordinary focus in Beckett’s Rockaby:
 let down the blind and stopped 
 time she went down
 down the steep stair
 time she went right down
 was her own other 
 own other living soul
 so in the end
 close of a long day
 went down
 let down the blind and down
 right down
 into the old rocker
 and rocked  
 rocked
 saying to herself 
 no
 down with that
 the rocker
 those arms at last
 saying to the rocker
 rock her off
 stop her eyes
 fuck life
 stop her eyes
 rock her off
 rock her off
           [Together: echo of ‘rock her off’, coming to rest of rock, 
            slow fade out.]
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                             (ROCK., 441-442.)
As we can see from Beckett’s depiction of the ‘woman’ in the rocking chair there is no 
attempt to ‘jump the rails’47; for just like Clov she is determined to see out life’s course. And 
yet it seems the very thing she is determined to see out, is the very thing she rejects: fuck life.  
But this abruptly issued rejection of ‘life’ by the recorded voice accompanying the action of 
the rocking ‘women’ for me personally sums up what Beckett himself actually set out in 
Dream: that the will cannot ‘be abolished in its own tension’.48
For here we have Beckett characterizing the ‘woman’s’ rejection of life, in a manner which in 
Schopenhauerian terms endorses the very thing one is desperate to undermine. Far from 
pushing one away from the ‘will’ as it is manifested in the human subject it is in fact bringing 
the subject closer to it. For in the expression ‘fuck life’ Beckett captures the ‘will’ at the point 
of its highest resolution in all living creatures; the moment of sexual reproduction; while at 
same time showing that any attempt to reject the will in terms of its individual appearance in a 
particular subject will inevitably just serve to strengthen it; such as we see with Vladimir and 
Estragon both imagining themselves achieving erections through a joint suicide pact. In fact 
the expression ‘fuck life’ is in one context a form of verbal suicide, but more importantly 
though in relation to Rockaby, it is I believe being used by Beckett to tersely spell out the 
intractable problem relating to ‘the willing and nilling’. As we can see, unlike the recorded 
voice issuing the violent rejection of life, the ‘woman’ in the chair has no intention of 
delivering her own will (which as we know from Schopenhauer’s writing is most clearly 
defined in terms of the will-to-life) a victory in terms of suicide; for instead of throwing in her 
proverbial towel it is ‘she’ and not the recording, who issues the words ‘More’:
 time she stopped
   [Together: echo of ‘time she stopped’, coming to rest of
    rock, faint fade of light.
    Long pause.]
 w:  More.
            [Pause. Rock and voice together.]
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47 D.F.M.W., 123-124.
48 D.F.M.W., 123. 
v:  so in the end
     close of a long day
     went down 
     in the end went down
                                 (ROCK., 440.)
So, just as it is possible to see in Clov’s own attempt to take on his master, as being 
representative of a ‘subject’ attempting to turn his ‘will’ against itself; I believe it is also 
possible to see the same struggle being enacted between the ‘women’ and the ‘voice’ in 
Rockaby. For just like the repeat of Hamm with his own sarcastic putdown of life ‘Can there 
be misery - [he yawns] - loftier than mine?’ the ‘voice’ in Rockaby has again all the 
appearance of wanting to frame life in an equally disparaging way, and yet as I have shown, 
I believe this same ‘voice’ is being brought forward by Beckett as the ironically strong 
guarantor of ‘life’. The issued instruction of ‘More’ by the ‘woman’ in the rocking chair 
captures the resolve of a subject who is determined to make a defiant stand against their own 
‘will’ as an expression of continuous suffering. Beckett shows that, despite the ‘voice’ 
appealing to the ‘woman’ to ‘stop’ (which in the case of Endgame has its parallel in Hamm’s 
appeal to Clov to kill him; or alternatively his persistent ‘nagging’ to have his ‘pain-killers’; 
which like Doctor Piouk’s prescription to Victor in Eleuthéria all seem to be offering an easy 
solution to suffering) ‘she’ takes it upon herself to continue to inhabit the ‘life’ which ‘she’ is 
so patently rejecting. Importantly though; there seems to be carried in this action the 
recognition that suicide as such holds no answer to ‘suffering’. For as we know in a 
Schopenhauerian sense ‘suicide’ has only recognition on a phenomenal level. In the context of 
the ‘will’s’ undifferentiated reality ‘suicide’ brings us full circle, back to the point in which 
the ‘will’ once again finds an opening in which it can blindly push forward in yet another 
bid to assert itself in terms of ‘suffering’. Again I feel, because Beckett himself, like 
Schopenhauer is choosing to address the undifferentiated character of the ‘will’; his work in 
one sense is about showing the failure attached to portioning out suffering in ‘this’ or ‘that’ 
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individual as a means of containment.49 In fact it would seem that the ‘woman’ in Rockaby is 
on the point of reaching the stage in which her own ‘will’ is recognized as being one with the 
world in general; where her own object-subject distinction is losing all definition:
 time she went down
 down the steep stair
 time she went right down
 was her own other
 own other living soul
                             (ROCK., 441.)
The ‘voice’ of the recording, for me, is Beckett’s own way of addressing the staging problems 
of trying to represent a reality which in itself has no phenomenal recognition; and in this 
sense is an advanced step in relation to allowing the ‘will’ to be staged in terms of what is still 
in relation to Endgame a visual parody of the ‘will’.50 Also there is a clear attempt by Beckett 
with the more intensely concentrated performances, such as Rockaby to move away from 
using the stage in an attempt to re-inhabit specific metaphorical imagery which Schopenhauer 
himself exploits throughout his writing.
The  Stamp of a forced Condition with Strings Attached.
 
Having said this I expect one would naturally ask oneself if this method of addressing certain 
problems of staging is present in Endgame how is it 
not present in Beckett’s earlier theatrical offering; Waiting for Godot? In fact though not as 
sharply defined as Endgame’s ‘watch tower’ I believe Godot does indeed have its own 
equivalence; it being the very image which for so many critics, quite understandably had been 
drawn into a visual souvenir of what seems to be the legacy of Auschwitz and Bergen-
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49 Unlike my own undifferentiated characterization of Hamm and Clov, Ulrich Pothast presents each 
character representing a different individualized approach to suffering: !All characters have their own 
way to suffer[...] When Gogo or Didi, or Hamm and Clov, or Nagg and Nell briefly forget about their 
different afflictions and when nothing else does happen which attracts their attention the are bored. It is 
as if they exist to be examples of Schopenhauerian tragicomic figures! Pothast, U., The Metaphysical 
Vision., op.cit., 203-204.       
50 See, Wulf for a much more psychologically constructed assessment of the taped voices interaction 
with the subjects in Beckett"s plays, Wulf, C., op.cit., 99-101. 
Belsen51:
         Enter POZZO and LUCKY. POZZO drives LUCKY by
         means of a rope passed round his neck, so that
         LUCKY is the first to appear, followed by the rope,
         which is long enough to allow him to reach the 
         middle of the stage before POZZO appears. LUCKY
         carries a heavy bag, a folding stool, a picnic basket
         and a greatcoat. POZZO a whip.]
 POZZO:  [Off.] On! [Crack of whip. POZZO appears. They
            cross the stage.LUCKY passes before VLADIMIR and
            ESTRAGON and exits. POZZO at the sight of
            VLADIMIR and ESTRAGON stops short. The rope
          tautens. POZZO jerks it violently.] Back!
                                                                  (W.G., 14.)
Pozzo is driven forward by his manservant Lucky by way of a  connecting rope which is 
passed around his neck, forming a rein or tether-like arrangement which his master holds onto 
while being dragged forward. It is also clear from Beckett’s stage directions that Pozzo cracks 
a whip in order to propel his manservant forward. It strikes me, having been involved in a 
close reading of Die Welt, that there is one particular image which Schopenhauer creates of 
the ‘will’ driving its ‘subject’ forward that bears a remarkable similarity to Pozzo and Lucky’s 
disposition in Godot:
  And as it is with the persistence in life, so is it also with its action and 
  movement. This is not something freely chosen; but whereas everyone
  would really like to rest, want and boredom are the whips that keep
  the top spinning. Therefore the whole and each individual bear the
  stamp of a forced condition. Since everyone is inwardly indolent and
  longs for rest, but must never the less go forward, he is like his planet,
  that does not fall into the sun only because a force driving it forward
  does not allow this to happen. Thus everything is in permanent ten-
  sion and forced movement, and the course of the world goes on, to
  use an expression of Aristotle (De Coelo, ii, 13), !! "#$%&, "''# ()*
  (motu non naturali, sed violento). Only apparently are people
  drawn from in front; in reality they are pushed from behind. It is
  not life that entices them on, but want and trouble that drive them
  forward. Like all causality, the law of motivation is a mere form of
  the phenomenon. Incidentally, here is to be found the origin of the
  comical, the burlesque, the grotesque, the ridiculous side of life; for,
  driven forward against his will, everyone bears himself as best he
  can, and the resultant perplexity and embarrassment often present
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51 See, Hammer, E., Adorno and the Political (2006) London: Routledge., 69. See also, Dan Gunn 
!Samuel Beckett", Poole, A., Joyce, T.S. Eliot, Auden, Beckett: Great Shakespeareans Volume XII (2012) 
London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 179. 
  a ludicrous effect, however serious may be the care and worry under-
  lying them.
               (W.W.R.2., 359-360.)
As we can see, Schopenhauer’s description of the ‘willful’ movement of a subject being ‘the 
stamp of a forced condition’ which is initiated by the ‘whips’ of ‘want and boredom’ would 
alone lend itself someway to Beckett’s own characterization of Lucky’s bondage at the hands 
of Pozzo. Schopenhauer continues in this passage to set out an image of the ‘subject’ who 
‘longs for rest, but must nevertheless go forward’; as well as depicting the phenomenal 
illusion of willful action in terms of being ‘drawn from in front’ when in truth what such an 
illusion is hiding is the reality that ‘people’ are ‘pushed from behind’. Thus this passage from 
Die Welt carries what I believe to be the essential instruction behind Beckett’s own image of 
Pozzo and Lucky; for knowing of Beckett’s own thorough reading of Schopenhauer before 
composing Godot it would be very difficult not to believe that this particular image in Die 
Welt had no bearing on his visual construction of Lucky’s bondage to Pozzo. Also I strongly 
suspect that within this same extended passage, we can also reveal why Beckett has chosen to 
dress up his characters from Godot in what is clearly more than a nod to the music hall 
tradition of slap-stick and burlesque.52 For here in the phenomenal illusion of human volition 
we have Schopenhauer himself pointing precisely to ‘the origin of the comical, the burlesque, 
the ridiculous side of life’. In fact it looks as if when it comes to Godot this same passage can 
provide a feasible explanation as to why in the second act of the play both Lucky and Pozzo 
(now blind) are depicted as being unable stand up under their own weight:
 
 VLADIMIR:  Perhaps we should help him first.
 ESTRAGON:  To do what?
 VLADIMIR:  To get up.
 ESTRAGON:  He can’t get up?
 VLADIMIR: He wants to get up.
 ESTRAGON: Then let him get up.
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52 See, Pilling, J., Proust and Schopenhauer: Music and Shadows; Section 10 of Beckett and Music., ed 
Mary Bryden (1998) Oxford: Oxford University Press., 176. 
 VLADIMIR:  He can’t.
 ESTRAGON:  why not?
 VLADIMIR:  I don’t know.
          [POZZO writhes, groans, beats the ground with his 
           fists.]
                 (W.G., 70.)
The answer to this puzzle as to why Pozzo cannot stand up under his own weight I believe has 
everything to do with the way in which Beckett has chosen to use the theatre in order to 
radically address himself to the concept of Vorstellung which as we have already revealed 
does not only come forth in terms of ‘play’ or ‘show’ but what Schopenhauer himself 
envisages as Puppenspiel:53
 
  Accordingly, we often see a miserable figure, deformed and bent 
  with age, want, and disease, appeal to us from the bottom of his heart 
  for help for the prolongation of an existence, whose end would 
  necessarily appear as altogether desirable, if it were an objective 
  judgement that was the determining factor. Therefore, instead of this, 
  it is the blind will appearing as the tendency to life, the love of life, 
  vital energy; it is the same thing that makes plants grow. This vital 
  energy can be compared to a rope, stretched above the puppet-show 
  of the world of men, on which the puppets hang by means of invisible 
  threads, while they are only apparently supported by the ground beneath 
  them (the objective value of life). But if once this rope becomes weak, the
  puppet sinks; if it breaks, the puppet must fall, for the ground under
  it supports it only in appearance; in other words, the weakening of
  that love of life shows itself as itself as hypochondria, spleen, melancholy;
  the complete exhaustion of that love of life shows itself as an inclina-
  tion to suicide.
                    (W.W.R.2., 359.)
It is this Schopenhauerian projection of the world as Wille und Puppenspiel that I believe can 
explain why Pozzo cannot stand up under his own weight; for just like a puppet whose 
‘invisible threads’ have no tension he resides in a helpless heap on the ground. For as it is 
with Schopenhauer’s description, it is not the ground which supports our  reality, but the 
‘will’ which acts like a ‘rope’ from which are suspended by ‘invisible threads’. And as we can 
see from the way in which Schopenhauer describes in this instance how the ‘rope’ loses its 
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53 It is interesting to note that F.N. Lees raises one possible meaning of Godot!s name in connection 
with the French word "godenot! - denoting "a conjurer!s puppet!: see, Lees, Memoirs and Proceedings of 
the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society, Lees, F.N. (1961-1962) Samuel Beckett., 38.   
tension through the weakening and complete exhaustion for one’s love of life; which can 
eventually shows itself in the subject as ‘hypochondria, spleen, melancholy’ and ‘as an 
inclination to suicide’; it actually lists many of the characteristics which can be directly 
accredited to Beckett’s own characters.
It is well known that Beckett, during theatrical rehearsals would often encourage his actors 
to read Heinrich von Kleist’s essay On The Puppet Theatre, which he felt would be of 
enormous benefit if they could just bring to their performances an understanding of Kleist’s 
own re-evaluation of the theatre:54
  ‘And the advantage that the puppet would have over living dancers?’
  ‘The advantage? In the first place, my dear fellow, a negative one,
  namely this: that it would be incapable of affectation. - For affectation 
  occurs, as you know, whenever the soul (vis motrix) is situated in a 
  place other than a movements centre of gravity. Since the puppeteer, 
  handling the wire or the string, can have no point except that one under
  his control all the other limbs are what they should be: dead, mere
  pendula, and simply obey the law of gravity; an excellent attribute
  which you will look in vain among the majority of our dancers.
  [...] ‘Also,’ he said, ‘these puppets have the advantage of being resistant to
  gravity. Of the heaviness of matter, the factor that most works against
  the dancer, they are entirely ignorant: because the force lifting them into
  the air is greater than the one attaching them to the earth. What 
  wouldn’t our friend G. give to be four or five stone lighter or to have
  such a weight working in her favour in her entrechats and pirouettes! 
  Marionettes only glance the ground, like elves, the momentary lends
  the limbs a new impetus; but we use it to rest on, to recover from the
  exertion of the dance: a moment which is clearly not dance at all in itself
  and which we do nothing with except get it over with as quickly as 
  possible.’55
                     
It is interesting to note that Schopenhauer’s own ‘puppet-show’ in Die Welt bears witness to 
an almost identical description as Kleist’s marionettes. Kleist’s description is one in which the 
‘marionettes only glance the ground’ without actually having to rest upon its surface, while 
Schopenhauer describes the puppets hanging ‘by means of invisible threads, while they are 
only apparently supported by the ground beneath them’. In fact when Schopenhauer resorts to 
an image of the world as puppenspiel in Die Welt it is more likely than not, that he himself is 
drawing upon his own reading of Kleist. For though he does not directly cite Heinrich von 
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54 See, Knowlson, J., and Pilling, J., op.cit., 277-284.
55 Kleist, H., Selected Writing of Heinrich von Kleist., ed., and trans. Constantine, D. (1997) London: The 
Orion Publishing Group Ltd., 413-414.  
Kleist, unlike his poet ancestor Ewald von Kleist56 in Die Welt, it is inconceivable that a 
figure such a Kleist, whose work had been deeply affected by Kant, and who as a writer had 
been taken up by Goethe’s Weimar circle (his play Der zerbrochne Krug had been premiered  
by Goethe in Weimar in in 1808) would have escaped the attention of Schopenhauer.57 So any 
similarity between Schopenhauer’s and Kleist’s description of the ‘puppet’ should in fact hold 
no surprise once we identify a similar Kantian shadow cast over Kleist’s work. So rather than 
just see Beckett ‘s own approach towards his actors as ‘marionettes’ as being one which was 
primarily inspired by Kleist, I feel it should not exclude the possibility that Beckett was in 
fact seeing Kleist as means of providing another front to the theatre as a form of ‘puppetry’ 
one which initially found expression in a vision towards the theatre as ‘Vorstellung’. In this 
sense Beckett’s own interest in Kleist could be better appreciated in terms of an attempt to 
further refine what I believe is essentially Schopenhauerian in origin. Also, one could further 
suggest that Beckett’s decision to bind his characters with ‘rope’, in a fashion which is clearly 
capable of carrying the signature Schopenhauer’s phenomenal illusion of forward motion; 
where one is being pushed from behind, rather than being drawn from in front, would 
justifiably in my opinion lead us to consider that on one level Beckett is positioning the 
manservant Lucky as the ‘intellect’, just as he does with Clov, while his taskmaster he 
positions as the ‘will’, as is true with Hamm.58 But there is another passage which I feel is just  
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56 See, W.W.R.1., 240.!
57 See, Kleist, H., op.cit., 421.   
58 "If a man born blind touches a body of cubical shape, the sensations in his hand are quite uniform[...] 
yet these sensations contain absolutely resembling a cube. But from the resistance felt, his 
understanding infers immediately and intuitively a cause thereof, and through that inference the cause 
now presents itself as a solid body. From the movement of his arms when touching the object, while the 
sensation of the hands remain the same, he constructs the cubical shape of the body in space[...] If he 
did not have it within himself the representation of cause and of a space together with its laws, the 
image of a cube could never result from those successive sensations in the hand. If we let a rope run 
through our closed hands, then as the cause of the friction and of the duration thereof and in this 
position of our hand, the rope will construct a long cylindrical body moving uniformly in the same 
direction. But from that mere sensation in his hand there could never come to him the representation of 
movement, i.e., change of place in space by means of time.# O.T.F.R., 82. (The "friction on the rope# 
passage instantly reminds one of the "rope# Lucky is tethered to. But importantly it is the space in which 
the rope moves in relation to subject, that we can see having deeper Schopenhauerian implications for 
the performance and movement of character.) "The plot for Waiting for Godot, if there is one in the usual 
sense, serves only to show the relationship between Estragon and Vladimir in its strange emptiness and  
furthermore, to show how the relationship between Pozzo and Lucky degenerates to what can be 
communicated by someone blind to someone dumb by whipping or jerking a rope." Pothast, U., The 
Metaphysical Vision,op.cit, 197.         
as worthy of attention when it comes to assigning Lucky and Pozzo to a Schopenhauerian 
inspired construction of the ‘intellect’ tied to the ‘will’:
  For what bridle and bit are to an unmanageable horse, the intellect 
  is to the will in man; it must be led by this bridle by means of instruct
  -ion, exhortation, training, and so on; for in itself the will is a wild and 
  impetuous an impulse as is the force appearing in the plunging waterfall; 
  in fact, it is, as we know ultimately identical therewith. In the height of
  anger, in intoxication, in despair, the will has taken the bit between
  its teeth; it has bolted, and follows its original nature. In mania
  sine delirio, it has completely lost bridle and bit, and then shows
  most clearly its original and essential nature, and that the intellect is
  as different from it as the bridle is from the horse. In this state it
  can also be compared to a clock that runs down without a stop
  after a certain screw is removed.
                                              (W.W.R.2., 213.)
As we can see from this passage, Schopenhauer’s image of the ‘intellect’ harnessed to the 
‘will’ in this fashion (appearing as an ‘unmanageable horse’ with a ‘bridle and bit’ between its 
‘teeth’ spurred on by ‘a wild and impetuous’ force) has in more ways than one its own 
dramatic reflection in Beckett’s presentation of Lucky and Pozzo. For the way Beckett choses 
to present Lucky’s bondage to Pozzo is also in terms of one ‘subject’ being driven by another 
‘subject’ in a way which is clearly suggestive of a ‘man’ taking the reins of a horse and trap. 
Also it is clear from the play, that as soon as Lucky becomes unburdened from his ‘harness’ 
he becomes self-evidently something which is far-removed from a dumb creature; displaying 
an erudition worthy of its own  ‘Copernican revolution’:
 LUCKY:  Given the existence as uttered forth in the public
          works of Puncher and Wattmann of a personal God
          quaquaquaqua with white bread quaquaquaqua
          outside time without extension who from the heights
          of divine apathia divine athambia divine aphasia loves
          us dearly with some exceptions for reasons unknown
          but time will tell and suffers like divine Miranda
          with those who for reasons unknown but time will
          tell are plunged in torment plunged in fire whose fire
          flames if that continues and who can doubt it will fire
          the firmament that is to say blast hell to heaven so
          blue still and calm so calm with a calm which even
          though intermittent is better than nothing[...] for reasons
          unknown in spite of the strides of physical culture the
          practice of sports such as tennis football running
          cycling swimming flying floating riding gliding
          conating camogie skating tennis of all kinds dying
          flying sports of all sorts autumn summer winter
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          winter tennis of all kinds hockey of all sorts penicillin
          and succedanea in a word I resume[...]
                                                           (W.G., 36-37.)
As we can see from this tirade of words pouring from the mouth of Lucky, at times barely 
holding on to any sound comprehension; the fact that his consideration towards the divine has 
Augustinian recognition; being outside of time, as well as not being subject to extension, 
positions the identity of Lucky well outside that of any dumb creature. But it is the manner in 
which Lucky’s knowledge arises as an uncontrollable outpouring that cannot seemingly stop 
of it own accord; which in some way carries Beckett’s own response to Schopenhauer’s 
attempt to envisage what it would be like if the human ‘mind’ could momentarily be 
uncoupled from the burden of the ‘will’ in order to show itself in a very different light. In fact 
the outpouring of all this rarefied theorizing on space and time seems to be spilling out not 
through any conscious delivery as such, but more in the way of a stored pressure-release; as if 
it were just like Schopenhauer’s ‘clock’ running ‘down without a stop after a certain screw is 
removed’. But importantly one should always remember that within the context of the ‘will’ 
the division between  human consciousness and the ‘will’ is never a reality; therefore when it 
comes to appreciating Lucky and Pozzo; just as it is with Hamm and Clov, or even Vladimir 
and Estragon, their division resides on a phenomenal level; on the level of ‘Vorstellung’.59 So 
having found it now possible to identify the way in which Beckett could have been drawn to 
an explicit Schopenhauerian allegorical construction in Godot, as he was with Endgame, we 
can now return back to the idea of Beckett continuing to pursue the theatre in relation 
Vorstellung but particularly Vorstellung in terms of the Puppenspiel; and how this idea finds 
accommodation in Endgame. My own response to the reader would be - follow the trail of the 
‘desert’. But before contemplating how a number of repeated allusions to the ‘desert’ in 
Endgame open upon a vision of the theatre as ‘puppet-show’ I would like to begin first by 
considering how it is that we find the ‘desert’ in the midst of the dark interior of Hamm’s 
household. For despite what we the audience see with our own eyes; namely Hamm and Clov 
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to illustrate Schopenhauer!s claim that in the realm of representation (Vorstellung) the will, failing to 
recognize itself, turns against itself in its blindness. Tormentor and tormented are thus one and the 
same[...] See Shane Weller "Orgy of False Being Life in Common" Barfield, M., Feldman, M. and Tew, P. 
Beckett and Death (2009) London: Continuum International Publishing, 39.     
residing in a dimly lit enclosed room, with two high windows, it would appear much of the 
language in Endgame is directed towards ‘desert’:
 CLOV:  [Fixed gaze, tonelessly.] Finished, it’s finished, nearly
           finished, it must be nearly finished. [Pause.] Grain upon
           grain, one by one, and one day, suddenly, there’s a heap, a
           little heap, the impossible heap.
                                                     (W.G., 12.)
There is also Nagg’s exchange with Nell about the contents of their respective ashbins:60      
 NELL:  it isn’t sawdust. [Pause. Wearily.] Can you not be a little
          accurate, Nagg?
 NAGG:  Your sand then. It’s not important.
 NELL:  It is important.
           [Pause.]
                      (ENDG., 19.)
While also in Beckett’s Endgame there are a number of explicit references to the ‘desert’ 
itself. 
 
 
 HAMM:  What? What’s she blathering about?
          [CLOV stoops, takes NELL’s hand feels her pulse.]
 NELL:  [To CLOV.] Desert! 
          [CLOV lets go her hand, pushes her back in the bin, closes
           the lid.]
 
CLOV:  [Returning to his place beside the chair.] She has no
         pulse.
 HAMM:  What was she drivelling about?
 CLOV:  She told me to go away, into the desert.
                                                                 (ENDG., 22.)
 Having already looked at the possibility of Clov engaging in a form of Schopenhauerian 
asceticism it would seem that in many ways the fit and proper setting for Clov’s asceticism 
should indeed be, as it has been for many an ascetic before him ‘the desert’. 
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60 ![...] Quandt [the art critic Johann Gottlieb von Quandt, the !truest friend! Schopenhauer possessed 
whilst living in Dresden"]   would often remind Schopenhauer [...] !If I ever had at all a good idea," he 
said, !you always asked me where I had read that, as if I picked up all my thoughts out of the dustbins of 
literature."  See, Zimmern, H., Arthur Schopenhauer, op.cit., 95.   
It is this competing image of the desert which as Claus Zilliacus rightly suggests ‘is never far 
from the linguistic investment of Endgame’, citing that ‘A manuscript that Beckett called 
“Avant Fin de partie” foregrounds thirst and dying of thirst’.61  Indeed once we become 
aware of the fact that ‘a very early holograph (1950) from the Fin de partie cluster describes 
the locale of that play as a desert’ then it becomes apparent that the original decision by 
Beckett to follow Endgame with the short mime Act Without Words (Acte Sans Paroles) was 
fully intended to act as a further commentary on Endgame.62 In fact as Zilliacus reveals in his 
paper ‘Act Without Words 1 as Cartoon and Codicil’ Beckett himself actually referred to the 
mime as a ‘codicil to Endgame “in some obscure way” thereby as Zilliacus says ‘prompting 
us to view the mime not as a work in its own right but as a supplement or appendix, a 
heteronomous work whose presuppositions and context should be looked for in Endgame.63 
Therefore as soon as the connection is made between Endgame and Act Without Words (1) the 
so called ‘desert language’ which emerges during the course of Endgame is itself pointing to a 
reality which the phenomenal appearance of Beckett’s play is deliberately failing to back-up. 
But rather than jumping to the conclusion that we should now be of the view that Act Without 
Words (1) is in someway a continuation of Clov’s fate once he leaves the service of Hamm, 
having entirely abandoned his master’s language; as Zilliacus puts it ‘The tyrant has been 
deserted for the desert: his man is gone from refuge’ we should in my view pause for one 
moment and reflect on what this would actually imply:64
 CLOV:  This is what we call making an exit.
 HAMM:  I am obliged to you, Clov. For your service.
 CLOV:  [Turning, sharply.] Ah pardon, it’s I am obliged to you.
 HAMM:  It’s we are obliged to each other. [Pause. CLOV goes
           towards door.] One thing more. [CLOV halts.] A last 
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61 See, Buning, M. and Oppenheim, L. ed., “Beckett in the 1990!s”: Selected papers from the Second 
International Beckett Symposium held in the Hague, 8-12 April, 1992 (Rodopi Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA, 
1993)., 298-299.  
62 Buning, M. and . Oppenheim, L.op.cit.,  298. 
63 Ibid., 298. 
64  Buning, M. and Openheim, L., 299.   
           favour. [Exit CLOV.] Cover me with the sheet. [Long
           pause.] No Good [Pause.] Me to play. [Pause. Wearily.]
           Old endgame lost of old, play and lose and have done with
           losing.
                 (ENDG., 51.)
For any attempt to position the mime as if it were some kind of dramatic follow-on from 
Endgame, picking up from the events which left Clov in his hat and coat, ready to depart from 
his master; falls foul of resurrecting the causal framework which Clov it appears has ‘left for 
dead’. For if we just care to take a look at the way in which the closing scene in Endgame 
enfolds; it appears on the surface that Hamm’s request to Clov to cover him with the ‘sheet’, 
is in someway an indication to the audience that ‘he’ is declaring some form of gracious 
defeat in the face of Clov’s hard-won victory. But this I believe carries the same pitfall as 
does the thinking which constructs Act Without Words in episodic terms.65 For let us just 
consider what we have previously established in relation to ‘uncovering’ and ‘covering’ in the 
wider Schopenhauerian context of absolute space; that is to say, both of these actions 
participate in the same causal structure which can give succur to the ‘will’. And so in this 
context we can regard Hamm’s last request to his manservant, as yet another attempt by the 
‘will’ to get the ‘intellect’ to reinvest in its future; but Clov is clearly all to wise to the old 
scoundrel’s ‘game’ and thus resolutely refuses to ‘play’ along. Again we can see in Hamm’s 
reply ‘No Good’, the implication that this last bid to rescue his phenomenal identity has fallen 
through: the ‘Me to play’ (that is Clov’s own ‘will’s’ capacity to play out in terms of 
‘Vorstellung’) has it seems been completely rescinded by Clov. For the image we are left with 
is not Clov leaving Hamm’s premises, but simply remaining unresponsive to Hamm’s calls; 
for the fact is Clov still remains in the presence of Hamm.66 It is the conscious identity of 
Clov, that has said its adieu; not the ‘will’ that inhabited ‘Clov’, for despite the absence of a 
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65 As Pothast states !Beckett had claimed that causality is one of the will"s instruments to keep the 
person"s world uniform, reliable and, in the last analysis, untrue. True reality for Beckett is only 
accessible to an artistic procedure which is not committed to the following rules of empirical causality.! 
Pothast, U., Metaphysical Vision, op.cit., 196. So, as a result of this adopted view it would seem high 
unlikely that any episodic structure attaching Act Without Words (1) to Endgame was ever envisaged by 
Beckett. Therefore I would personally argue Beckett"s comments specifying that the !desert! was outside 
rather than inside, was in part emphasizing its outward appearance, that which holds to its phenomenal 
characterization, which he himself was out to undermine.            
66 Ibid., 212-213.   
conscious identity, Clov’s ‘will’ in the shape of Hamm still persists: ‘Old stancher! [Pause.] 
You...remain.’67  
This closing scene in Endgame clearly illustrates in my mind Beckett’s own genuine 
commitment towards a vision in which death can never abolish the irrepressible reality of 
suffering. So, having revealed what could be described as Endgame’s Schopenhauerian 
stature, we should I believe in all honesty rule out the suggestion that Beckett would have 
attached an additional dramatic piece to Endgame which would play to the same causal 
structure which he as a playwright seems so determined to leave behind. Therefore I strongly 
suspect that the original addition of the ‘mime’ in Endgame was there to present an alternative 
perspective on the intractable relationship between Hamm and Clov. In this sense it is 
not a continuation of Endgame that Act Without Words (1) attempts to stage through the 
mime; but instead it is more like a recording of Endgame being replayed back to its audience 
under a different frequency setting.68 For there is one clear signature which both Endgame 
and the ‘mime’ raise in complete solidarity with one another; the shrill sound of Hamm’s 
whistle:
   Desert. Dazzling light.
   The man is flung backwards on stage from right wing. He
falls, gets up immediately, dusts himself, turns aside, reflects.
   Whistle from right wing.
   He reflects, goes out right.
   Immediately flung back on stage he falls, gets up
immediately, dusts himself, turns aside, reflects.
   Whistle from left wing.
                                 (A.W.W., 57.)
 
It is evident from the beginning of the ‘mime’ that the shrill blasts from the whistle are in 
someway dictating the boundaries of the action being played out on stage; for with each 
attempt that the ‘man’ tries to fulfill a particular action, such as retrieve a carafe of water, or 
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67 ENDG., 53. During rehearsals for the 1967 Berlin production of Endspiel  Ernst Schröder asked 
Beckett !whether Hamm covers himself to die, Beckett replied: “Nein, nur damit er besser schweigen 
Kann.” See Cohn, R., Just Play, op.cit., 224.   
68 In a letter to Gottfried Buttner (5th Sep 1970) !Beckett characterized Act without Words I as a “vertical 
play” See Gottfried Büttner !Schopenhauer"s Recommendations to Beckett", Moorjani, A. and Veit, C. 
Samuel Beckett Today/ Aujourd hui: Samuel Beckett: Endlessness in year 2000 /Fin sans fin en l! an 
2000 (2000)Amsterdam: Rodopi, 144-122.   
utilize a pair of scissors, the desired outcome always escapes him; as if a metaphysical rug 
was being pulled from underneath his feet. Clearly what the mime artist is lending himself to 
is a reworking of the myth of Tantalus. For just like the fate of Tantalus on the shores of 
Tartarus his hunger is perpetually directed towards a tree which withdraws it branches each 
time he tries to recover its ‘fruit’, while his thirst in the same fashion is equally thwarted:
     
   He turns, sees tree, reflects, goes to it, sits down in its 
shadow, looks at his hands.
     A pair of tailor’s scissors descends from flies, comes to rest
before tree, a yard from ground.
    He continues to look at his hands.
    Whistle from above.
  He looks up, sees scissors takes them and starts to trim his
nails.
  The palms close like a parasol, the shadow disappears.
  He drops scissors, reflects.
A tiny carafe, to which is attached a huge label inscribed
WATER, descends from flies, comes to rest some three yards
 from ground.
    He continues to reflect.
 Whistle from above.
  He looks up, sees carafe, reflects, gets up, goes and stands
under it, tries in vain to reach it, renounces, turns aside,
reflects.
     (A.W.W., 58)
So with each attempt to satisfy a particular desire, the ‘man’ is helpless to prevent the 
foundation on which ‘his’ fulfillment rests to be withdrawn from his grasp.     
The structural character of this mythical fate, can clearly in many ways be considered as 
Beckett’s own attempt to locate the dissonant structure of both the ‘will’, and the ‘will’s’ 
interchangeable face; music, into some form of concrete representation.69 But again we can 
look upon such work as a direct bid, like Godot and Endgame to theatrically traverse the 
landscape of Schopenhauer’s writing. Having already taken sometime to explore the 
imaginative terrain of Die Welt it must be apparent to the reader that the myth of Tantalus 
registered deeply with Schopenhauer’s own inferences towards the ‘will’s’ inexhaustible 
capacity for suffering: 
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69 With Beckett!s insistence that musical score should not be attached to Godot, remarking “I do not 
believe that the text of Godot could bear the extensions that any musical setting would inevitably give it.” 
It would suggest that from Beckett!s own perspective the music of Godot was in someway already 
imbedded deep into the interior fabric of the play. See, The Letters of Samuel Beckett 1941-1956, 
op.cit., 475-476.      
  Therefore, so long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so 
  long as we are given up to the throng of desires with its constant hopes 
  and fears, so long as we are the subject of willing, we never obtain last
  -ing happiness or peace. Essentially, it is all the same whether we pursue 
  or flee, fear harm or aspire to enjoyment; care for the constantly demand
  -ing will, no matter in what form, continually fills and moves conscious
  -ness; but without peace and calm, true well-being is absolutely impossible. 
  Thus the subject of willing is constantly lying on the revolving wheel of
  Ixion, is always drawing water in the sieve of Danaids, and is the eternally 
  thirsting Tantalus.
                                        (W.W.R.1., 196)
Once again I feel it is beneficial to reproduce this ‘Tartarean’ passage from Die Welt in order 
to appreciate just how important the image of Tantalus was to Schopenhauer’s aesthetic 
assessment of his own philosophy.70 So, clearly with this in mind the fact that Beckett had 
originally decided to couple An Act Without words (1), to a play, which, if the general 
evaluation of my thesis is correct, was significantly shaped by Schopenhauerian thinking; 
then we must accept in someway that Beckett’s re-staging of the myth of Tantalus was in fact 
driven by a pressing desire, to consolidate his own aesthetic vision towards a theatrical 
representation of suffering capable of being simultaneously expressed on an individual and 
undifferentiated level.71
Having followed the trail of ‘sand’ I believe the reader is  now in a suitable position to foldout 
their deck-chairs and take stock of the initial question which has led us to where we are: How 
does Endgame accommodate the theatrical conception of ‘Vorstellung’ in terms of  
puppenspiel? Clearly if we are now able to access a dimension of Endgame which Beckett has 
chosen to present in terms of a tightly choreographed performance; which is apparently 
governed in part by a series of lowered and raised ‘ropes’ then it would seem if anything, 
Beckett’s possible allusions to Pozzo’s and Lucky’s ‘puppet’ like behavior in Godot becomes 
an even more explicit consideration in Endgame. 
               
211
70 Note that Beckett!s Whoroscope Notebook includes a detailed reference to both Ixion and Tantalus, 
both of whom Schopenhauer speaks of in the same passage in W.W.R.1: see Ackerley, C.J., Demented 
Particulars: The Annotated Murphy (Journal of Beckett Studies) (1998) Vol 7., 31.        
71 "What Schopenhauer said about the essential nature of in “On Aesthetics” in his Parerga and 
Paralipomena (1851) also holds for Beckett!s two mimes and all of his major plays[...] Büttner, G., 
!Schopenhauer!s Recommendations!,op.cit., 118.     
A Party With an Open Invitation: The Polymorphism of the Will.
It seems that Beckett wants the ‘mime’ to participate in the same space as Endgame, that the 
‘desert’ Beckett’s characters speak of and allude to, is not in anyway outside the confines of 
Hamm’s room; but they themselves are in fact, in the context of the ‘will’s’ polymorphism, 
participating in both spaces. The desert which the mime act confronts in Act Without Words 1 
is in reality the same environment that both Clov and Hamm wake up to each day (Grain 
upon grain[...] the impossible heap); the blasts from the whistle I suspect are the same 
commands issued by Clov’s master; while the on going battle waged by the two protagonists 
(which on one level both characters can be assigned as a single indivisible entity) are marked 
by the individual setbacks which the ‘man’ dusts ‘himself’ down from. As Zilliacus puts it ‘It 
is Clov’s mime and the whistle is Hamm’s.’72 
What the language of ‘desert’ exposes in relation to Endgame, is the way in which on one 
level the language deliberately acts to confound what we witness on a phenomenal level, such 
as the light-starved interior of Clov and Hamm’s dwelling. Thus in one sense the language 
actually limits what we as audience can piece together on a purely visual level; in fact in 
many ways Endgame’s  ‘desert language’ seems to run in a completely antithetical direction 
to the imagery which Beckett makes available on stage. But there is, having said this, one 
image which Beckett makes available to his audience which seems far from out of place in a 
desert setting; and that is the appearance of Hamm’s very red face: [He removes the 
handkerchief from his face. Very red face. Black glasses].73 For as soon as we place the 
contrasting black glasses over Hamm’s red face, suddenly the image which emerges from 
under the handkerchief is one which supports the idea of ‘sun-burn’. And so it would appear, 
that just like Winnie’s ‘parasol’ in Happy Days the intention behind Hamm’s ‘black glasses’ is 
in someway a protective measure against the sun. It would seem that Beckett is allowing the 
meaning underpinning the ‘black glasses’ to run simultaneously in two apparently 
contradictory directions: one which upholds the identity of the glasses in terms of sun-
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72 Buning, M. and Oppenheim, L., op.cit., 298.
73 ENDG., 12. 
glasses; there to protect the eyes from the sun, while at the same time locking their identity 
into an overall representation of Hamm’s blindness; which in this context makes any 
protective measure towards the eyes obsolete.74 The fact that the truth relating to such an 
image can participate in two contradictory directions is, itself, something which I personally 
believe is important to Beckett’s overall attempts at establishing aesthetic criteria for absolute 
space:
 
  I have shown that all empirical perception implies the application 
  of the law of causality. Hence knowledge of this is a condition of all 
  experience, and therefore cannot be given and conditioned through 
  experience, as Hume asserted. Proofs are generally less for those who 
  want to learn than for those who want to dispute. These latter obstinately 
  deny directly established insight. Truth alone can be consistent in all 
  directions; we must therefore show such persons that they admit under 
  one form and indirectly what under another form and directly they deny, 
  i.e. the logically necessary connexion between what is denied and what 
  is admitted[...] For every deduction from concepts is exposed to many 
  deceptions on account of the fact, previously demonstrated, that many
  different spheres are linked and interlocked, and again because their
  content is often ill-defined and uncertain. Examples of this are the
  many proofs of false doctrines and sophisms of every kind. Syllogisms
  are indeed perfectly certain as regards form, but very uncertain
  through their matter, namely the concepts. For on the one hand the 
  spheres of these are often not defined with sufficient sharpness, and
  on the other they intersect one another in so many different ways,
  that one sphere is partly contained in many others, and therefore we
  can pass arbitrarily from it to one or another of these, and again to
  others, as we have already shown.
                                               (W.W.R.1., 67-68.)
As we can see from Die Welt, because empirical perception rests upon the law of causality 
(and as such resides within the context of ‘Vorstellung’) the truth relating to any perceived 
fixture in our conscious field of ‘vision’ is in fact not secure in any real sense; but in reality 
‘can be consistent in all direction’. It is the fact that Beckett transforms his theatrical space 
into a supersaturated field of allusion and counter allusion; in which Hamm not only is 
legitimately registered in reference to the ‘will’ but also all those other identities which have 
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74 Eric Prieto proposes !The “nominalist irony” Beckett mentions as a technique for advancing non-
conceptual literature might be expressed as a radicalized variant of the Schopenhauerian description of 
poetic language in terms of intersecting conceptual spheres: by relating words to one another in such a 
way that individual concepts compete and interfere with each other, the poet might be able to force the 
reader to adopt a mode of interpretation able to participate in this other, higher mode of knowledge 
identified with the realm of Ideas and Kantian noumenon: see, Prieto, E., Listening In: Music, Mind, and 
the Modern Narrative (2002) Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 175.      
previously been unearthed; such as Prospero,75 the Biblical Ham, the Ham from Dickens’ 
David Copperfield, as well as supporting a portrait of the visually impaired Joyce76. Or even I 
would suggest that this same blind misanthrope could be registered as a self-portrait of 
Beckett’s own private relationship with Schopenhauer; for we just have to think of the way 
Beckett presents Hamm’s turbulent affection towards his ‘pomeranian’ project. But 
importantly what arises in such a densely constructed field of allusion, is an inevitable 
overlap, in which both the Schopenhauerian projection of Hamm is overlapped with a whole 
panoply of other Hamms vying for contention, as it does with the formal overlap of 
Schopenhauer’s ‘syllogisms’ which he remarks ‘are indeed perfectly certain as regards form, 
but very uncertain through their matter, namely concepts. For on the one hand the spheres of 
these are not defined with sufficient sharpness and on the other hand they intersect one 
another in so many different ways[...].’ In one sense Beckett’s depiction of Vladimir and 
Estragon quibbling over whether their rendezvous point is a ‘shrub’ or a ‘bush’ when as an 
audience we are first led to believe it is a tree; captures perfectly the dilemma which all 
readers of Beckett’s work experience when it comes to committing oneself to a particular 
allusion over a host of other possible allusions. Importantly though in the context of the 
spatial reality of the ‘will’ they can all co-exist. Therefore what I am proposing is that by 
amassing such a densely over- lapping range of allusions; each capable of pulling in several 
directions simultaneously, that Beckett himself creates a space which is capable of expressing 
the polymorphous phenomenal character indicative of Schopenhauerian ‘will’. And by doing 
so Beckett creates an aesthetic space which can give a much more credible account to the un-
demarcated expression attempted in Dream: ‘He remains, for all his grand fidgeting and 
shuffling, bird or fish, or, worse still, a horrible boarder-creature, a submarine bird, flapping 
its wings under a press of water. The will and nill cannot suicide, they are not free to 
suicide.’77 Having been brought back to the subject of ‘suicide’ it would seem that there is 
still an aspect of Beckett’s ‘mime’ which not only supports a theatrical re-staging of the myth 
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75 see, Dan Gunn !Samuel Beckett", Poole, A., Joyce, T.S. Eliot, Auden, Beckett, op.cit., 158.   
76 See, McDonald, R., The Cambridge Introduction to Samuel Beckett (2006) Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 49. 
77 D.F.M.W., 123.
of Tantalus; but also that it raises ‘suicide’ in relation to one of Tantalus’ unattainable 
‘fruits’:78 
  Whistle from right wing.
  He reflects, goes out right.
  Immediately flung back on stage he falls, gets up
  immediately, brushes himself, turns aside, reflects
 Whistles from left wing.
 He does not move.
 He looks at his hands, looks round for scissors, sees them,
 goes and picks them up, starts to trim his nails, stops, reflects,
 runs his finger along blade of scissors, goes and lays them on
 small cube, turns aside, opens his collar, frees his neck and
 fingers it.
   The small cube is pulled up and disappears in flies, carrying
 away rope and scissors.
 He turns to take scissors, sees what has happened.
 He turns aside, reflects.
 He goes and sits down on big cube.
 The big cube is pulled from under him. He falls. The big cube
 is pulled up and disappears in flies.
                                                   (A.W.W., 59-60.)
              
 
As we can see with Beckett’s ‘mime’ the signature of the scissors changes quickly from one 
of domestic utility to one of suicidal intent. But no sooner does he put down the scissors in 
order to contemplate slitting his throat, that the very ‘object’ on which ‘his’ suicide bid rests is 
hauled up into the flies, along with the ‘rope lasso’ which now inevitably in the mind of the 
audience carries the insuperable signature of a hangman’s noose.  
The fact that Beckett positions ‘suicide’ in terms of something which is not just desirable, but 
also something which is unattainable; moves the performance of the ‘mime’ into clear 
Schopenhauerian territory. 
Happy Days: Raising the Temperature of the Theatre. 
Having identified the rich Schopenhauerian terrain on which an Act Without Words (1) lies, I 
believe we can now attempt to broach the question why it was that Beckett looked towards 
the ‘desert’ in answer to a location, not just for Endgame and an Act Without Words (1), but 
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78 !The normal condition of human persons is that of subjects who live in a word dominated by Time, 
who are incessantly changing with Time, but who long for a reality exempt from Time. Beckett describes 
our longing for this reality by comparing us to Tantalus, but a Tantalus who confirms his thirst in a state 
of thirsting itself - Just as Schopenhauerian subjects confirm their willing nature in the very state of 
willing[...]" Ulrich, P., The Metaphysical Vision, op.cit., 96.  
also the work which follows immediately in the wake of these two plays; Happy Days:  
 Expanse of scorched grass rising centre to low mound. Gentle
 slopes down to front and either side of stage. Back an abrupter
 fall to stage level. Maximum of simplicity and symmetry.
 Blazing light.
                  (H.D., 138.)  
One of the functions of the ‘desert’ in respects to Beckett’s work is to reinforce an 
understanding that his characters are constantly positioning themselves in response to their 
own hunger and thirst; be it simply for food, or that other gnawing preoccupation, death.79 
And so Beckett it would appear is deliberately opting for an environment which has the 
inevitable consequence of bringing to the fore the insurmountable reality which hunger plays 
in giving definition to all life:
 
  HAMM:  Why don’t you kill me?
 CLOV:  I don’t know the combination of the larder.
         [Pause.]   
                  (ENDG., 15.)
There is also the suggestion with Beckett’s characters that hunger serves as its own window 
onto the ‘fathomless’ reality which all living subjects remain open to:         
 
ESTRAGON:  Fancy that. [He raises what remains of the
           carrot by the stub of leaf, twirls it before his eyes.]
           Funny, the more you eat the worse it gets.
 VLADIMIR:  With me it’s just the opposite.
 ESTRAGON:  In other words?
 VLADIMIR:  I get used to the muck as I go along.
 
 ESTRAGON:  [After prolonged reflection.] Is that the 
           opposite?
 VLADIMIR:  Question of temperament. 
 ESTRAGON:  Of character.
 VLADIMIR:  Nothing you can do about it.
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79 We need only think of the way in which Beckett!s own characterization of Samuel Johnson, centered 
upon his preoccupation with death and dying to see his attempt in establishing a common unity of space 
which he never intended to be driven from.     
 ESTRAGON:  No use struggling.
 VLADIMIR:  One is what one is.
 ESTRAGON:  No use wriggling.  
 VLADIMIR:  The essential doesn’t change.   
                                                          (W.G., 13-14.)
As we can see with Estragon and Vladimir’s exchange in Godot it is their own ‘hunger’ which 
they cast in terms of the Ding an sich; seemingly maintaining like Schopenhauer that hunger 
is not just symptomatic of a lack of food, but that we ourselves are a form of objectified 
hunger, which can never be satiated; for as Beckett’s two protagonists conclude it does not 
matter how much we ‘consume’ with respects to our hunger, we all still remain ultimately 
hungry: ‘The essential doesn’t change.’: 
  Thus, although every particular action, under the presupposition 
  of the definite character, necessarily ensures with the presented motive,   
  and although growth, the process of nourishment, and all the changes 
  in the animal body take place according to necessarily acting causes
  (stimuli), the whole series of actions, and consequently every individ-
  ual act and likewise its condition, namely the whole body itself which
  performs it, and therefore also the process through which and in 
  which the body exists, are nothing but the phenomenal appearance 
  of the will, its becoming visible, the objectivity of the will. On this
  rests the perfect suitability of the human and animal body to the 
  human and animal will in general [...] Therefore the parts of the 
  body must correspond completely to the chief demands and desires
  by which the will manifests itself; they must be the visible expression 
  of these desires. Teeth, gullet and intestinal canal are objectified
  hunger; the genitals are objectified sexual impulse; grasping hands
  and nimble feet correspond to the more indirect striving of the will
  which they represent.
                           (W.W.R.1., 108.)
As Schopenhauer sets out in Die Welt our bodies’ constant demand for ‘nourishment’ does not 
primarily arise out a need to fuel some complex organic machine; but that the organism along 
with its anatomical complexity is the inevitable consequence of the ‘hunger’. And so in this 
context we can see a direct correspondence between the way Schopenhauer attributes to 
‘hunger’ a primary significance, one which drives deep into underlying reality of the Ding an 
sich; alongside the collective recognition of both Estragon and Vladimir, that they too are 
ultimately a manifestation of hunger, and as such, there is nothing one can do to correct this: 
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‘One is what one is. No use wriggling.’  Again this idea that one’s appetite opens onto a  
‘fathomless’ reality is reworked in the opening remark of Hamm in Endgame: 
 HAMM:                                                        [...]But does that mean 
                 their sufferings equal mine? No doubt. [Pause.] No, all is 
                 a - [he yawns] - bsolute, [proudly] the bigger a man is the 
                fuller he is. [Pause. Gloomily.] And the emptier. 
                                                                                  (ENDG., 12.)
Just like Schopenhauer, Beckett constructs the human identity in terms of a ‘hunger’ which 
has acquired its own peculiar phenomenal identity; and whose magnitude alone fixes the 
reality of ‘suffering’. For just as we have seen with Schopenhauer; hunger, pain, desire, call it 
what you will, remains ultimately an expression of the same reality; what really distinguishes 
‘suffering’ from ‘hunger’, or even ‘desire’ from ‘pain’ is merely the scale on which they are 
presented. In fact once we locate Estragon and Vladimir’s exchange about the ‘carrot’ in a 
Schopenhauerian context it becomes evident that the fatalism they are venting in relation to 
hunger, also bodes true of suffering as a whole. So what appears to be a whimsically arched 
conversation about ‘hunger’ designed to keep the boredom at bay (which as we know is also a 
strong Schopenhauerian stress) instantly takes on an acerbity that is the equal of any of 
Vladimir’s turnips. For as soon as we bring to the conversation a much more attuned 
Schopenhauerian ear, then it would seem what is actually being conveyed through Estragon 
and Vladimir’s exchange about ‘hunger’ is a resigned view towards the unassailable bind 
between ‘suffering’ and ‘life’: they suffer, because they, like all expression of life are at their 
root an unqualified manifestation of ‘suffering’ as Vladimir says: ‘One is what one is’ (Ding 
an sich).  Once we eavesdrop in this Schopenhauerian fashion, Estragon’s dictum: no use 
‘struggling’ no use ‘wriggling’ becomes in many ways the same message which Clov 
steadfastly adheres to in the face of his own suffering at the hands of Hamm. Also I suspect 
that in this same conversation about the ‘carrot’ there resides not only a message about 
suffering in general, but also an equally important comment about the philosophical 
dishonesty attached to suicide: ‘No use wriggling - the essential doesn’t change.’ Having 
considered the role of ‘hunger’ and ‘thirst’ in relation to the ‘desert’ there remains one abiding 
image which both these signatures of ‘want’ rally around; namely the sun. As an image it 
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presides over not just an Act Without Words, but also Endgame (the window to the right of the 
stage is trained on the ‘sun’ while the window to the left is trained on the ‘world’) as well as 
Happy Days whose stage action takes place under the imagined glare of the sun.80 Importantly 
though from a Schopenhauerian angle it is the image of the ‘sun’ which foreshadows much of 
the debate on suicide in Die Welt:
  Conversely, who-ever is oppressed by the burdens of life, whoever 
  loves life and affirms it, but abhors its torments, and in particular can 
  no longer endure the hard lot that has fallen to just him, cannot hope for
  deliverance from death, and cannot save himself through suicide.
  Only by a false illusion does the cool shade of Orcus allure him as a
  haven of rest. The earth rolls on from day into night; the individual
  dies; but the sun itself burns without intermission, an eternal noon.
  Life is certain to the will-to-[life]; the form of life is the endless pres-
  ent; it matters not how individuals, the phenomena of the Idea, arise
  and pass away in time, like fleeting dreams. Therefore suicide already
  appears to us to be a vain and therefore foolish action[...]
                                                                                 (W.W.R.1., 280-281.)
          
In the context of Die Welt, it is the ‘sun’ which stands to remind oneself of just how 
meaningless suicide is as an attempt to remove an individual’s suffering from the 
undifferentiated suffering which constitutes the world’s reality. From an individual 
perspective the sun appears to take its leave from the heavens each night, only to make a 
renewed entrance the following day; despite the fact we know full well it never leaves the 
celestial stage. It is this illusion which the sun carries, day in and day out, that for 
Schopenhauer sums up his own attitude towards the misconceived intermission which is 
apparently on offer with suicide. For me, Beckett’s own decision to reveal the sun as an 
unchanging constant, both in relation to Endgame and Happy Days, carries the same message 
for his characters as it does for Schopenhauer; that all the exits and entrance points which 
mark themselves in relation to human existence, are appearances, themselves no more 
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80 Importantly we must not forget that as an image it also takes up a significant presence in the novels: 
The sun shone, having no alternative, on the nothing new. As we can instantly appreciate the fact 
Beckett describes the sun having no alternative but to shine, fits very comfortably with the premise of 
the Wille. One would suspect also, as it is with Schopenhauer, that Beckett!s image of the sun plays 
equally to the image of the sun in ISAIAH 60. Arise, shine; for thy light is come, and the glory of the 
LORD is risen upon thee, See The Bible: Authorized King James version with Apocrypha (1998) Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 820.             
substantive than the apparent rising and setting of the sun.  
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                                               CHAPTER FIVE      
                                      
   Sealing Off the Exits: Beckett’s Refinement of Performative Space. 
It would certainly seem from the manner in which Beckett is determined to take his 
performance away from the conventional reliance upon stage entries and exits; there could 
indeed be some Schopenhauerian impetus underlying this development. For when we think of 
a stage character, leaving or entering through the mock registration of a ‘door’, we instantly 
afford to that character a freedom over the space in which they find themselves. Therefore by 
undermining this option in relation to the stage, this same autonomy which we 
were previously willing to imagine in relation to our character is no longer available.  
Through this very decision alone, we can create a situation in which the character no longer 
retains jurisdiction over the space in which they find themselves; they as actors become 
hostage to a stage performance that offers little or no breathing space for autonomous 
movement; which as we can see in the case of Not I almost literally comes to fruition:
                                     Note   
 Movement: this consists in simple sideways raising of arms from
 sides and their falling back, in a gesture of helpless compassion.
 It lessens with each recurrence till scarcely perceptible at third.
 There is just enough pause to contain it as MOUTH recovers
 from vehement refusal to relinquish third person. 
                                                                         (N.I., 375.) 
 
Beckett’s decision to restrict the performative action of Not I to the movement of a single 
mouth, alongside a series of diminishing arm gestures made by a standing djellaba-clad 
Auditor, which by all accounts is barely visible to the eye of the audience, provides what is 
unquestionably a theatrical space whose movement is carried away from the subject and 
placed instead onto the language itself.81 Remarkably Beckett creates a space in which the 
body of the subject is less substantive than the words issuing from its ‘mouth’; for it would 
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81 See, Knowlson, J. and Pilling., Frescoes of the Skull (1979) op.cit., 195. 
seem by restricting the focus of the performance to a solitary mouth, the space of the 
performance has by virtue of this been dispossessed of all entry points which can support the 
appearance of a divided or partitioned reality. And from the way in which Beckett introduces 
the ‘mouth’ to the audience, that is, by synchronizing the sound of the ‘mouth’s’ voice to the 
dimming of the auditorium lights, becoming only intelligible once the stage curtain is fully 
raised; leads one to think, that the reality of this performance, does not actually play to the 
conventional recognition of the stage curtain as a means of subdivision. In fact, as we can see 
with the first intelligible utterance from the script, it is the language of the play which is 
forced to take up the pressure of being divested of its normal points of entry, leaving the 
‘mouth’ or indeed the audience to construct their own imagined ‘doorway’ from which 
Beckett’s character can make its first appearance:
     
 MOUTH: . . . out . . . into this world . . . this world . . . tiny little
             thing . . . before its time . . . in a godfor- . . .what? . . .girl? . .                   
             yes . . . tiny little girl . . . into this . . . out into this . . .
             before her time...godforsaken hole called . . . called . . .
             no matter . . .
                               (N.I., 376.)  
As is evident from the printed monologue of Not I, the intelligible ‘out’ is set in lower case, 
promoting the idea that what we take as the opening remark of Not I, should in fact be 
regarded as part of unending stream of language which has no point of entry or ingress. As the 
dots suggest, the ‘out’ is in fact being represented as the first audible section of a monologue, 
which has long since begun even before the curtain is raised. It seems that the written text of 
Not I allows the reader to appreciate what is being received  as a pause during the play’s 
performance, which should in fact be re-thought in terms of an audible digression; in which 
the ear is failing to track what in reality is undifferentiated; therefore we are left with only the 
representative pressure of the language itself, to create not so much gaps and holes but only 
the appearance of ‘gaps’ and ‘holes’. In many ways one can think of Beckett shadowing 
linguistically, what Schopenhauer himself proposes in terms of the Vorstellung of birth and 
death:
  Now he who thus links his existence to the identity of consciousness, 
               
222
  and therefore desires for this an endless existence after death, should 
  bear in mind that in any case he can attain to this only at the price of 
  just as endless a past before birth. For as he has recollection of an 
  existence before birth, and so his consciousness begins with birth, 
  he must look upon his birth as an arising of his existence out of nothing. 
  But then he purchases the endless time of his existence after death for 
  just as long a time before birth; in this way the account is balanced 
  without any profit to him. On the other hand, if the existence left 
  untouched by death is different from that of individual consciousness, 
  then it must be independent of birth just as it is of death. Accordingly, 
  with reference to it, it must be equally true to say “ I shall always be” 
  and “I have always been,” which then gives two infinities for one. 
  However the greatest equivocation lies in the word  “I,” as will be 
  seen at once by anyone who calls to mind the contents of our second 
  book and the separation there carried out of the willing part of our true 
  inner nature from the knowing part. According as I understand this word,
  I can say: Death is my entire end”; or else: “This my personal phe-
  nomenal appearance is just as infinitely small a part of my true inner
  nature as I am of the world.” But the eye or ego is the dark point in
  consciousness, just as on the retina the precise point of entry of the
  optic nerve is blind, the brain itself is wholly insensible, the body 
  of the sun is dark, and the eye sees everything except itself.
                                                                                (W.W.R.2., 490-491.)
 
          
As Schopenhauer sets out in Die Welt, once the body of the subject is transfered to the context  
of its own ‘will’ (absolute space) its individual significance recedes to an infinitely small 
point, losing all perceptible definition. In this sense, birth is analogous to a distorted field of 
vision in which the resulting ‘I’ is merely a blind spot cut off from its own undivided 
totality; so what we actually attribute to individual recognition is itself part of this distortion. 
As soon as we assemble the individual subject in relation to its own ‘will’ then the foundation 
on which it rests is no more substantive than a shadow; indeed it could be that this same
consideration carries into Beckett’s own reassessment of stage-lighting, which, in respect to 
the ordinance of the later performances takes on a notable complexity. One such work of this 
late period (first published in 1980) which can illustrate the extent to which the stage lighting 
has become a highly complicated structural consideration; so as to allow for the definition of 
a character to fluctuate between objective and non-objective representation, is Rockaby:    
 Light:                                          
 Subdued on chair. Rest of stage dark.
 Subdued spot on face constant throughout, unaffected by
 successive fades. Either wide enough to include narrow limits of 
 rock or concentrated on face when still or at mid-rock. Then 
 throughout speech face slightly swaying in and out of light.
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 Opening fade-up: first spot on face alone, long pause, then light
 on chair.
 Final fade-up: first on face alone, long pause, then light
 on chair.
 Final fade-out: first chair, long pause with spot on face alone,
 head slowly sinks, comes to rest, fade out spot.
                                                                (ROCK., 433.)
In my view the way in which the character of Rockaby is partially illuminated throughout a 
series of successive ‘fades’ allows Beckett to present to his audience a representation of the 
polymorphic environment of the ‘will’ without apparent recourse to material props. For what 
at first is revealed through the performance as an elderly woman rocking away her last 
remaining moments of life, in an attempt to reconnect to the very motion which she had first 
been introduced as a baby; is also carried much deeper as a performance, in which I believe, 
as I have already set out in relation to Rockaby, this piece speaks about the intellect’s efforts 
to subdue the ‘will’.82  What Beckett is able to present through an exquisite piece of lighted 
choreography, is not only a personalized account of a woman’s desperate bid to break through 
the banality of her existence, and connect meaningfully to another living ‘soul’ (‘quiet at her 
window only window facing other windows other only windows all blinds down never  one 
up hers alone up’83) but that her rocking, which partially casts her face into shade also 
participates in the universal transience of the whole of humanity. For in the precise manner 
in which Beckett captures the woman’s face being momentarily cast into shadow as she rocks 
back in her chair, there is I believe transmitted in this very movement the same scene in which 
Clov (the representative of the conscious identity) says his adieu to Hamm; but in this 
instance in which Beckett has achieved another aesthetic refinement in his absolute 
characterization of the ‘will’, he is able to compress this entire scene in one single repetitive 
action. But just as we have explored in relation Endgame, despite the phenomenal departure 
of the intellect; the ‘will’ is still blindly pushing forward, looking ceaselessly for new 
phenomenal avenues. Therefore using the lighting in this structural sense, as the woman in the 
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82 For an alternative account of the of !rocking" in Rockaby devised upon the image of the new born 
baby in Arnold Geulincx Ethics, see Uhlmann, A., Samuel Beckett and the Philosophical Image,op.cit., 
78-85. Interestingly the image of the cradle is used  byGeulinx !to explain the relation of our will to the 
will of God", so as soon as we remove the divinity, we are find ourselves back in the arms of 
Schopenhauer. See Ibid., 79.   
83 Beckett, S., Complete Dramatic Works op.cit., 438. 
chair rocks back into the darkness, she by this very action loses all phenomenal resolution and 
yet still remains just like Hamm (and Schopenhauerian ‘will’) undiminished. It certainly 
seems to me that with this carefully considered use of lighting Beckett is able to move much 
closer to a more fully realized aesthetic vision of the ‘will’ than what has previously been 
attempted with Godot and Endgame. For now as we can see with Rockaby, the ‘will’ as it is 
manifested in the ‘woman’ goes much further in obtaining an undifferentiated identity in 
which both the micro and the macro-worlds are revealed as ultimately sharing in the same 
identity. As Schopenhauer puts it:
 
 Thus microcosm and macrocosm elucidate each other, where-
 by they prove to be essentially the same. This considera-
 ation that is associated with man’s inner nature, penetrates
 and permeates the whole of metaphysics in all its parts and
 cannot again appear separately as psychology.
                                                                    (P.P.2., 19.)
By exploiting the rocking motion of the chair, so that the woman’s head moves in and out of a 
narrowly defined region of light, Beckett I believe is able to re-stage in the blinking of an 
‘eye’ an re-enactment of the ‘will’s’ phenomenal acquisition and ultimate release of the 
human subject; the light and shadow resurrecting and distinguishing the subject in one single 
rocking action; thus capturing life and death as an undifferentiated reflex, rather than a 
punctuated interval in which the subject can enter and leave the stage:
 
  Life is then given out as a gift, whereas it is evident that anyone 
  would have declined it with thanks, had he looked at it and tested it 
  beforehand; just as Lessing admired the understanding of his son. 
  Because this son had absolutely declined to come into the world, he 
  had to be dragged forcibly into life by forceps; but hardly was he in 
  it, when he hurried away from it.
                                             (W.W.R.2., 579.) 
 
 
Beckett has in my view been able to reconfigure in one single action byway of stage-lighting, 
the mind going ‘wombtomb’:
  Torture by thought and trial by living, because it was fake 
  thought and false living, stayed outside the tunnel. But in 
  the umbra, the tunnel, when the mind went wombtomb, 
  then it was real thought and real living, living thought. 
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  Thought not skiv-vying for living nor living chivvying 
  thought up to the six-and-eightpenny conviction, but
  live celebration that drew no wages and emptied no slops.
                                                                          (D.F.M.W., 45.)
As we can see from the Dream passage, the mental acquisition of the ‘wombtomb’ bears all 
the hallmarks of a state of Schopenhauerian aesthetic disinterest, in which the mind seeks to 
remove itself from the attachment of all desire; for as Beckett says of this newly acquired 
state of mind it ‘drew no wages and emptied no slops.’ Therefore the breakdown in object-
subject distinction allowing the ‘woman’ to ‘let down the blind and [go] right down into the 
old rocker’84 is itself not just a dramatic staging of an elderly woman edging towards her own 
demise; but I believe much more importantly it is representing an artistic vision which is 
moving away from willful attachment.85 For as Beckett implies in Dream, true aesthetic 
contemplation irons out all the gains and losses, in an attempt not just to close the gap 
between life and death, but to shut out suffering altogether.  And this would undoubtedly, no 
matter how fleetingly, constitute the ultimate accomplishment in Schopenhauerian terms.    
As we can see in Dream ‘wombtomb’ is literally an attempt by Beckett to close the gap 
between life and death linguistically; so that in the context of his novel it does not present the 
conventional punctuation between life and death, or indeed ‘object’ and ‘subject’. In this 
sense as we have already explored previously with Dream this whole approach to the novel 
brings about an underlying pressure in Beckett’s writing to reveal itself in terms of a reality 
which presents no division; despite all efforts brought by Belacqua to break through its 
surface. So, by directing his attention to the theatre Beckett has been able to remain 
committed to a view of the absolute and undivided character of the ‘will’ and yet still have the 
kind of room necessary for legitimizing his role as an artist, something which he felt (as we 
can appreciate from his interview in the New York Times in 1956) his prose writing was no 
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84 Beckett, S., The Complete Dramatic Works op.cit., 440. As we can see as well as hear, the !verticality!  
of Rockaby takes on greater and greater definition as the performance progresses.    
85 As Chris Ackerley sets out in his essay !The Geometry of the Imagination" the vertical trajectory of 
Murphy mind (or otherwise) starts from a position representative of Nominalism and Realism, that which 
is tied to surface Phenomena and moves away into a space designated to the Noumena. But 
interestingly this vertical movement is also seen to coincide with a signature of illumination: light, the 
half-light and the dark; which as I see it could also be equally applied to Rockaby. See Chris Ackerley 
!Samuel Beckett: Geometry of the Imagination", Fifield, P. and Feldman, M. Samuel Beckett"s: Debts and 
Legacies New Critical Essays (2013) London: Bloomsbury, 98.          
longer capable of delivering. It seems that for Beckett, the theatre not only satisfied his own 
deeply entrenched Schopenhauerian sympathies, but just as crucially it allowed for a spatial 
movement unavailable to the novel. The undivided surface of the novel, becomes utterly 
transformed in the context of Beckett’s theatre, for the same indivisible pressure, as witnessed 
in the novel, is allowed to take on perspective unimaginable to the printed page; in which the 
space of the ‘subject’ can transmit the reality of a ‘character’ in terms of an interior and 
exterior; whose movement ‘permeates all its parts’. So, in the context of the ‘will’, what we 
judge as an individual, cut off and isolated from its fellow subjects (‘sitting at her window 
quiet at her window only window facing other windows’) is in fact no different from the 
retinal blind spot in Die Welt preventing the eye from ever receiving a full picture of itself. 
In fact like most of Beckett’s stage work, the ‘eye’ is never far from his calculations, which in 
the instance of Rockaby it would appear that the subject of the woman’s reality becomes 
literally confined to the ‘eye’ itself as it does in Schopenhauer.86 For I suspect by locating the 
performance of Rockaby within a polymorphic context, Beckett attempts to register      
the ‘micro’ and the ‘macro’ as one indivisible expression, in which the movement of the 
rocking chair bears the stamp of a singular eye blinking; with the ‘blind’ of the woman’s 
room forming the accompanying eye lid, looking out towards other eyes, all of whose ‘lids’ 
are drawn closed:87
 all blinds down 
 never one up 
 hers alone up
 till the day came
 in the end came
 close of a long day
 sitting at her window
 quiet at her window
 all eyes 
 all sides
        (ROCK., 438.) 
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86 See Wulf!s account of the language in Rockaby creating a verbal image which can form "a kind of 
projection screen for our own meditations.! Wulf, C., op.cit., 133.
87 As an image it clearly brings to mind Belacqua in Yellow: “Belacqua made a long arm and switched off 
the lamp. It threw shadows. He would close his eyes, he would bilk the dawn in that way. What were the 
eyes anyway? The posterns of the mind. They were safer closed.” See, Beckett, S., More Pricks than 
Kicks. (1993) London: Calder Publications Ltd., 173.    
Interestingly, if we care to compare Schopenhauer’s image of the ‘eye’ in Die Welt (‘the eye 
or ego is the dark point in consciousness, just as on the retina the precise point of entry of the 
optic nerve is blind’88) with Beckett’s own dramatic reconstruction of the ‘eye’  in Rockaby 
(in which the ‘rocker’ is concurrently being projected as an ‘eye’ moving underneath its 
eyelid) then it is quite plausible to imagine; especially in the context of ‘absolute’ space; the 
exterior and interior reality of the eye folding in on itself, so that the solitary women is now 
held in relation to a projected image, with the backrest of the chair as it were forming the 
retina on which she herself is being projected. And as we have seen already with the 
accompanying stage notes to Rockaby, Beckett himself provides his own retinal blind spot:
 Subdued spot on face constant throughout, unaffected by
 successive fades.
                     (ROCK., 433.)
             
So in a quite remarkable fashion I believe Beckett has been able to register the aged woman in 
Rockaby as yet another form of Vorstellung in which she herself is an ‘image’ housed in her 
own ‘eye’. Also it would seem that the ‘eye’ in Rockaby does not just rest with the woman in 
the rocking chair, but is by extension the ‘eye’ of the audience which ultimately the entire 
performance rests upon. What remains astonishing though, is the way Beckett is able to 
achieve this polymorphic construction without in anyway compromising the space in which 
he locates, what is, a deeply moving portrayal of a woman whose return to infancy is her only 
defense against the ravages of suffering and infirmity, before she passes away in her rocking 
chair. It is precisely the manner in which Beckett is able to hold onto to his personal 
Schopenhauerian assessment of suffering, and the phenomenal insecurity arising from it, 
while at the same time still be able to create a subject whose movement and reaction to life; is 
fully recognizable as human. For the women in Rockaby; though located in the same 
impenetrable space as Dream’s ‘cubic unknown89’ and the Trilogy’s ‘unnamable’, displays its 
phenomenal skepticism in a way which can still accommodate a carefully observed account of 
institutionalized dementia; the kind of which Beckett himself would have been all too familiar 
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88 W.W.R.2., 491. 
89 D.F.M.W., 124.
with, having witnessed his mother’s own degenerative decline with Parkinson’s disease.90         
Beckett, it seems with Not I and Rockaby, has arrived at a position in which he moves 
significantly closer to what I believe, is an attempt to create an undifferentiated aesthetic 
space in which the performance can achieve a dramatic representation of the ‘will’ harnessed 
to the intellect without having to resort to any forced dichotomy, which spills over into 
allegory. As a performance Not I, just like Rockaby and What Where fundamentally shifts 
the ground on which the dramatic subject is able to reveal in one undivided expression its 
own implacable opposition to what it is in terms of language, intellect and ultimately ‘will’:
                               . . .what? . . the buzzing? . . yes . . .all
 the time the buzzing . . . so called . . . in the ears . . . through
 of course actually . . .not in the ears at all . . . in the skull . . .
 dull roar in the skull . . . and all the time this ray or beam
 . . .like moonbeam . . .but. . .probably not . . .certainly not . . .
 always the same spot . . .now bright . . .now shrouded . . .
 but always the same spot . . . as no moon could . . . no . . .
 no moon . . . just all part of the same wish to . . . torment
                                                                                   (N.I., 378.) 
 
It seems that Not I, as a dramatic performance, signals Beckett’s own disquiet at having to 
rely upon a divided image to express what in truth is not a dichotomy at all. For as we can see 
the body can no longer be used as a serviceable address to pinpoint the willful subject, whose 
conscious identity moves between the ears and the skull, like some infuriating insect that 
needs swatting: ‘the buzzing? . . yes . . . all the time the buzzing’. In Not I all this indivisible 
traffic between the subject and the world; ultimately leads to one destination; that of 
suffering:  ‘just all parts of the same wish to . . . torment’. And so in this sense, the idea that 
the reality of the subject is fundamentally operating in the context of one single ‘desire’,  
namely, to create ‘suffering’, remains itself fundamentally Schopenhauerian in its outlook.  
         
Thus we have arrived at a view, in which the stage for Beckett has been a continued assault on 
the systematized geometry of space, leaving the entry and exit points of his plays to be raised 
in connection to a miscalculated assessment towards the world.  It might now be worth 
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90 See !He was profoundly affected by what he described as the !terrible moral and physical distress" 
See Knowlson, J. Damned to Fame,op.cit., 382.   . 
returning to some earlier dramatic territory in order to assess just how it could be that the 
‘absolute’ environment which we see governing the later performances has emerged from this 
attempt to cast all material and intertextual gaps as illusory. We have already begun to 
uncover, the extraordinary way in which Beckett uses allusions in order to achieve a form of 
spatial density, without recourse to the kind of spatial geometry which the Glazier in 
Eleuthéria tries to enforce each time he reaches into his ‘tool kit’. For example, in the case of 
Endgame, despite the fact that we as an audience are allowed to see Clov put on his Panama 
hat and tweed coat, in anticipation of his exit, he does not actually leave Hamm’s household; 
he merely stands away from Hamm refusing to respond to his master’s voice, having said all 
that he is prepared to say:
 CLOV:  This is what we call making an exit.
                                                                  (ENDG., 51.)
So it would seem that the new theatrical space, which Beckett makes available after 
Eleuthéria, radicalizes the theatrical ground plan of the performative stage, in which there is 
no longer available to the performance a spatial retreat which participates in the appearance of 
division. The fact that the performance of Endgame, unlike Godot, is held within one act, and 
not spread over two, could also have played to this same consideration concerning the 
eradication of a divided appearance; which apart from Happy Days, the play which directly 
follows Endgame and Act Without Words (1) becomes the standard approach to all his 
theatrical work. In fact in the television play Eh Joe, which is set in a bedsit, the door itself is 
opened and closed, but it is never accessed in terms of an exit or an entrance. Indeed even in 
the instance when we clearly see the intention of the door being used as a barrier; as in Film it 
soon becomes apparent that any faith in this arrangement does not itself hold out. So, just as 
Beckett’s characters are unable to locate the exit points in their performance, be it through a 
series of imagined doors or verbal pauses in their speech; it also remains ultimately true of 
that other perceived exit point, ‘suicide’; therefore the omission of ‘suicide’ becomes in the 
instance of Beckett’s work, a way of ensuring that even the ‘emergency exits’ are sealed.
And Just like the ‘Beethoven pauses’ in Dream, Winnie’s ‘Amens’ in Happy Days offer an 
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equally unsustainable sanctuary; they like all the ‘pauses’ in Beckett’s work, are in effect only 
illusory sightings of of a cessation which can never come to pass:
 WINNIE:  [Gazing at zenith.] Another heavenly day. [Pause. 
          Head back level, eyes front, pause. She clasps hands to
          breast, closes eyes. Lips move inaudible prayer, say ten  
          seconds. Lips still. Hands remain clasped. Low.] For Jesus
         Christ sake Amen. [Eyes open, hands unclasp, return to
         mound. Pause. She clasps hands to breast again, say five
         seconds. Low.] World without end Amen. 
                                                                    (H.D., 138.) 
As we see with Winnie’s opening prayer of the day, the ‘Amen’ on which she tries to 
conclude does not it itself allow for any sustained pause, instead it would seem it leaves her 
quietly exasperated.91 For once viewed from under its ecclesiastical investiture, Winnie’s 
prayer can be seen as a supplication for some kind of intermission: ‘For Jesus Christ sake 
Amen.’ So I would actually argue that the space which we are confronted by in Happy Days 
remains every inch a copy of The Unnamable: 
                                                                               I’ll recognise it, 
 in the end I’ll recognise it, the story of the silence that he never 
 left, that I should have never have left, that I may never find again, that
 I may find again, then it will be he, it will be I, it will be the place,
 the silence, the end, the beginning, the beginning again, how can I
 say it, that’s all words, they’re all all I have, and not many of them,
 the words fail, the voice fails, so be it, I know that well, it will be
 the silence full of murmurs...
                                      (T.U., 417.)        
   
By using the doxology, Gloria Patri; Beckett has been able to capture the tension between the 
reality which is implicit in the sentence, that there is no ‘worldly’ intermission, alongside 
Winnie’s own desire for an entr’acte: ‘World without end Amen.’ But because Beckett is able 
to achieve this by exploiting an already familiar sentence structure; there appears nothing 
forced about the language; and yet as soon as we observe it outside the assurance of its 
liturgical framing, I believe the words re-enact the very bind which Schopenhauer raises 
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91 “In Humanistic Questism” prayer is the possibility of escaping the confines of language, the “tongue-
tied profanity”: Beckett, S., Disjecta: Miscellaneous Writing and Dramatic Fragments., ed., Cohn, R. 
(1983) London: John Calder (Publishers) Ltd., 68. See also, Mathew Feldman !Agnostic Quietism" 
Kennedy, S and Weiss Samuel Beckett: History, Memory, Archive New Interpretations of Beckett in 
Twenty-First Century (2009) Palgrave Macmillan.       
between ‘desire’ and the world as ‘will’ or as Schopenhauer would say in German: Wille:92 
                           Poor Willie - [examines tube, smile
 off] - running out - [looks for cap] - ah well - [finds
 cap] - can’t be helped - [screws on cap] - just one of
 those old things - [lays down tube] - another of those
 old things - [turns towards bag] - just can’t be cured - 
 [rummages in bag] - cannot be cured - [brings out small
 mirror, turns back front] - ah yes - [inspect teeth in 
 mirror] - poor dear Willie - [testing upper front teeth
 with thumb, indistinctly] - good Lord! - [pulling back
 upper lip to inspect gums, do.] - good God! - [pulling 
 back corner of mouth, mouth open, do.] - ah well -
 [other corner, do.] - no worse - [abandons inspection,
 normal speech] - no better - no worse - [lay down mirror]
 - no change - [wipes fingers on grass] - no pain - [looks
 for toothbrush] - hardly any - [takes up toothbrush] - 
 great thing that - [examines handle of brush] - nothing
 like it - [examines handle, reads] - pure . . . what? - 
 [pause] - what? - [lays down brush] - ah yes - [turns
 towards bag] - poor Willie - 
                                     (H.D., 139.)  
As we can see from Happy Days, Beckett’s own theatrical construction of ‘Willie’s world’ is 
in many respects on a dramatic par with Schopenhauer’s picture of life as a form of 
momentary distraction, : endlessly plagued by boredom, repetition and suffering. In all 
likelihood, any partnership arising in Happy Days (1961) a play which has come straight off 
the back of Endgame (1957), would on some level represent the intellect’s own attempts to 
subdue the ‘will’. As we know from Die Welt, the subject is never in a position to destroy 
his or her own ‘will‘  through an artistic programme of aesthetic disinterest. If there were any 
doubt as to whether to place this aesthetic appreciation in a non- Schopenhauerian camp,  we 
simply need to observe from the way in which Winnie’s verbal reflections fall immediately on 
the prospect of minimizing pain  ‘no pain - hardly - any - great - thing that - nothing like - 
pure . . . what? - what? - ah yes -  poor Willie’.  As we can see, having excluded the 
descriptive action of Winnie going about her daily ablutions, what is revealed, having in one 
sense held back the phenomenal characterization of the play, is in my view Beckett’s own 
meditation on Schopenhauerian aesthetic disinterest:
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to be an aesthetic dialogue between the intellect and the !Wille", carries the same ambition set out in the 
dramatic fragment of Human Wishes, see below introduction.     
  Raised up by the power of the mind, we relinquish the ordinary 
  way of considering things, and cease to follow under the guidance
  of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason merely their relations
  to one another, whose final goal is always the relation to our own
  will. Thus we no longer consider the where, the when, the why, and
  the whither in things, but simply and solely the what.
                                                                         (W.W.R.1., 178.)
In fact when we consider the possibility of locating Beckett’s own meditations on 
Schopenhauerian aesthetics, by essentially cutting free Winnie’s speech from the images and 
action which accompany them on stage, (something which we have already seen in relation to 
the voice recording and woman in Rockaby), then we are in one sense, actually approaching 
the Schopenhauerian instruction, of ceasing ‘to follow under the guidance of the forms of the 
principle of sufficient reason’. Having seen already the way in which on occasion the words 
in Endgame seem at odds with the play’s phenomenal setting, I believe in the case of Happy 
Days there is a further attempt to reform the language (which as we can see with its 
‘hyphens’ appears very differently to Godot and Endgame) in order to move the space of the 
theatre towards a much less differentiated platform, in which the performance can now raise 
the possibility of a dramatic characterization which moves outside the material framing of the 
body. For in one very obvious sense Winnie’s performance is rendered immobile, by the sheer 
fact that in the first act she is buried up to her waist in a ‘mound’ of earth, while in the second, 
she is buried up to her neck, meanwhile her husband Willie is hidden altogether and only 
occasionally does the audience get to glimpse his arms or bald head (which Beckett indicates 
in the script is ‘trickling blood’).93 emerging from behind the mound. So, by deliberately 
incapacitating the phenomenal profile of the stage performance, I believe we can begin to 
establish a trajectory which will eventually take Beckett into the theatrical space reserved for 
Not I, Rockaby and What Were, in which the movement of the performance moves away from 
the subject, and onto the language of the play (in the instance of Rockaby, it is the rocking- 
chair and not the subject which moves). In this sense the ‘will’ of the subject clearly becomes 
conflated with the play’s language; in a way which I believe to be, every bit as insoluble as 
that which we see in Dream or The Unnamable. Having identified the way in which Winnie’s 
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prayer opens onto the same ground as The Unnamable, I believe that this indivisible 
characterization of space, has significant implications for any entropic model of of Happy 
Days which looks to exploit the signature of ‘disintegration’ such as that put forward by 
Knowlson: 
  ‘Certainly hundreds of words are expended on the most humdrum of 
  activities: combing her hair, doing her nails, cleaning her spectacles, 
  inspecting her gums, and reading the words on the medicine-bottle label or on 
  the handle of her tooth brush. Some of these actions merely fill in the 
  time for Winnie but may point to the theme of physical decline and
  decay and suggest that a more universal form of entropy is operating
  as lipstick and medicine both run out.’94     
For if we are to assume that the space of Happy Days bears any resemblance to the 
undifferentiated character of Schopenhauer’s ‘will’, in which both Winnie and Willie are 
inextricably bound to one another, in a manner recalling Hamm and Clov’s own relationship; 
then it would seem that any deterioration mapped in relation to the subject, be it in the 
plurality of language or indeed the ‘objects’ to which such a plurality extends; is itself I 
suspect, being offered as yet another illusion operating in the context of Vorstellung.    
Because of this, the ‘holes’ and ‘gaps’ arising in the worn and tired appearance of the 
language in Happy Days does nothing in the way of silencing the ‘will.’ For, unlike 
Knowlson’s own assessment, which speaks of an ‘attempt to impose some meaning on a 
meaningless world with worn-out words’.95 I believe any such attempts to derive an 
optimistic breathing space from the language Winnie manages to salvage from the empty
commercial packaging, newspapers and liturgy (another form of litter) are sadly mistaken, 
due to the fact that the pluralism underpinning such a lexicon is clearly part of the Principium 
Individuationis, which as we have already examined in relation to Die Welt and Proust is seen 
as a false construction in respect to true art. And yet in a way there is something in what 
Knowlson says, not that a renewed meaning springs from the fragmentation of a disposable 
culture, let’s say, the way Eliot envisioned in The Waste Land, but rather that an impoverished 
language such as we see in Happy Days can itself hold value, in the way its very tiredness 
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participates in a weakening of desire (‘no worse - no better - no worse’). The reason why 
Beckett presents the language of Happy Days as being the product of refuse, is in my view 
precisely because he believed language as a whole plays to a hollow illusion, it holds all the 
promise of piece of empty packaging; honouring all kinds of spurious claims in relation to 
individual empowerment and freedom; when in truth its is nothing more than ‘dressing up’ the 
same ‘old stancher’.96 Where the obscenity lies for Beckett is the way in which this mental 
packaging has been allowed to assume the identity of ‘freedom’ that all of us as a collective 
human species, have on some level bought into this, including, dare I say Beckett himself. For 
in the context of the Ding an sich, if language is to have a ‘positive’ value at all;  (we speak of 
language as the ultimate gift) then in a fully-fledged Schopenhauerian sense, language 
becomes an unavoidable extension of suffering; for the only thing that corresponds to 
anything ‘positive’ is the ‘will’ whose purpose has no meaning other than to generate blind 
suffering, of which ‘desire’ is a part. So, if at this point Beckett has as an artist deliberately 
intended to equate language with suffering, then clearly one needs to be in a position to either 
refrain from language as much as one can; or alternatively suppress the ‘positive’ evaluation 
of the language which lies at the disposition of his art; by moving it fully into the domain of 
Vorstellung which in truth carries neither a ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ (no worse - no better - no 
worse) value. In my view this is truly the language of ‘Not I’, for it is a language which is 
trying to desperately stay clear of any ‘positive’ evaluation which will inevitably drag ‘it’ 
back down into the mire of the ‘will’; and thus open the ‘subjects’ identity up to the limitless 
and imperishable structure of suffering:
  
                                   . . . words were- . . . what? . .
 who? . . .no! . . . she! . . .
                                     (N.I., 379.)
If Beckett’s stress on the ‘what’ is indeed deliberately evoking the what which Schopenhauer 
explicitly connects to the Ding an sich; then it is clear in relation to Not I that the ‘positive’ 
acquisition of the subject, operating in conjunction to a grammatical clause is itself being 
reconfigured by Beckett as a means of providing the ‘will’ with a convenient route into its 
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own suffering. In this more highly attuned presentation  of the ‘will’ what we initially 
encountered in terms of a staged performance, depicting one character assisting another 
character to wake up, as we see in Endgame; is itself I believe, transferred to the insoluble 
space of Not I, so what appears to be an uncontrollable, erratic out-burst from an elderly 
woman, who has fallen from social grace, is in fact charting the phenomenal descent of the 
‘will’ back into the subject.97 For the ‘what?’ (namely the ‘will’ gauging its own phenomenal 
possibility) voices the fateful ‘who’ which leads to the inevitable acquisition of the subject - 
the ‘she’. All of which Beckett frames in terms of suffering: ‘no! . . she!’ This is, I believe, 
Beckett’s own stage refinement of Clov throwing aside Hamm’s dust-sheet; in other words 
what is being depicted is the ‘will’s’ own phenomenal emergence, via the intellect. For in the 
context of Not I, just as it is in Schopenhauer’s Die Welt as soon as the ‘will’ moves into the 
guise of a conscious subject, it has the misfortune of instantly raising the definition of its own 
suffering; so that now the necessity of suffering is linked to its very survival and movement:
 she suddenly realized . . . gradually realized . . . she was not
 suffering . . . imagine! . . not suffering! . . indeed . . . could not
 remember . . . off hand . . .when she had suffered less . . .
 unless of course she was . . . meant to be suffering . . .
 ha! . . thought to be suffering . . . just as the odd time . . . in
 which case of course . . . that notion of punishment . . . for
 some sin or other . . . or for the lot . . . or no particular 
 reason . . . for its own sake . . .
                                       (N.I., 377.)
As the monologue from Not I reveals, suffering is being regarded as the primary state of all 
living and conscious reality, the ‘mouth’ is open to the possibility that ‘she’ is here to suffer: 
‘unless of course she was . . . meant to be suffering’. This is precisely Schopenhauer’s own 
position in relation to his philosophy of ‘will’ that underneath all the ‘window dressing’ the 
only free movement possible is that which locates itself in terms of suffering; and again as we 
can see from the script of Not I, suffering and punishment comes into being ‘for its own sake’. 
As we can gauge from the disclosure of the ‘mouth’, there appears to have temporarily arisen 
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a most unexpected state of being; a state which does not itself engender suffering. But having 
said this, it appears that what Beckett is trying to present, is the difficulty one has in holding 
on to such a fragile arrangement; for as soon as the ‘mouth’ tries to secure ‘its’ own ‘absence 
of suffering’ in conscious terms, it appears to slide. The very realization itself, appears to 
allow the ‘non suffering state’ to fall back towards ‘willful desire’ and eventually suffering 
itself: ‘she was not suffering . . . imagine . . .not suffering! . . indeed . . . could not 
remember . . . off hand. . . when she had suffered less. . . . unless of course she was . . . meant 
to be suffering’.  In fact in many ways, it is the same kind of conscious descent which also 
reverberates in Kleist’s Das Marionettentheater:
 
  It seemed, he replied, taking a pinch of snuff, that I had not read the
 third chapter of Genesis attentively; and a man not familiar with that 
 first period of all human education could not properly discuss those
 following it, let alone the last.
 I said that I was perfectly well aware of the damage done by
 consciousness to the natural grace of a human being.98
                                                                        
  
So from this perspective the phenomenally-deprived vision which Beckett creates in relation 
to Not I is not at all I suspect in any way attempting to summon up an image of hell; that is to 
say, anything more hellish than what had previously been represented through his work.99 In 
fact I feel if anything the phenomenal dispossession which Beckett achieves in relation to the 
performance of Not I has the very opposite intention; but rather to reconfigure a type of 
‘grace’ which Kleist and Schopenhauer touch upon:
  
  Apprehension of an idea, its entry into our consciousness, comes 
  about only by means of a change in us, which might also be regarded 
  as an act of self-denial. To this extent it consists of knowledge turning 
  away entirely from our own will, and thus leaving entirely out of sight 
  the precious pledge entrusted to it, and considering things as though 
  they could never in any way concern the will. For only thus does know
  -ledge become the pure mirror of the objective inner nature of things. 
  A knowledge so conditioned must be the basis of every genuine work 
  of art as its origin.
                      (W.W.R.2., 367.)
              
               
237
98 Kleist, H., op.cit., 414.   
99 “Mouth!s situation is more harrowing, suggestive of an inescapable hell.”: see, Worth, K., Samuel 
Beckett!s Theatre Life Journeys (1999) Oxford: Clarendon Press Oxford., 59.  
Again in such a refined theatrical space, I feel, just as with the previous examination of What 
Where, that Beckett with Not I is actually driving the performance in a direction which 
renders the ‘I’ between the audience and the ‘mouth’ up on stage, as one undifferentiated 
entity; whose movement within such a phenomenally deprived space become inseparably 
bound to each another. In this sense Beckett has transfigured the Kleistian puppetry 
of Schopenhauer’s Vorstellung in which the ‘puppeteer’s’ invisible threads operate not just in 
relation to the actors on stage, but also the audience in their seats; who by having essentially 
no other sensory point of reference other than the ‘mouth’ are forced to align themselves with 
an indeterminate ‘subject’ whose language takes on a density, which is seemingly raised to a 
point, in which it the language, and not the ‘mouth’ is in possession of the real movement 
being represented on stage:
                                         . . . no idea . . . what she was saying
 . . . imagine! . . no idea what she was saying! . . till she began
 trying to . . . delude herself . . . it was not hers at all . . . not       
 her voice at all . . . and no doubt would have . . . vital she
 should . . . was on the point . . . after long efforts . . . when
 suddenly she felt . . . gradually she felt . . . her lips moving
  . . . imagine! . . her lips moving! . . as of course till then she
 had not . . . and not alone the lips . . . the cheeks . . . the
 jaws . . . the whole face . . . all those- . . . what? . . the
 tongue? . . yes . . . the tongue in the mouth . . . all those
 contortions without which . . . no speech possible . . . and
 yet in this ordinary way . . . not felt at all . . . so intent one
 is . . . on what one is saying . . .the whole being . . .hanging
 on its words . . .
                 (N.I., 379.)
As we can see from Not I it is the words issuing from the ‘mouth’ which are obliged to 
literally spell out the mouth; what initially constituted as the ‘subject’, is itself being shown to 
move under the instruction of the language. So just as the puppeteer pulls on the strings to 
register the movement of the limbs of the puppet; Beckett’s script has an equal effect on the 
freedom of movement in relation to the acting. In my view, the recitation about the ‘lips, 
cheeks, jaw, face, mouth, and tongue’ is not about the ‘subject’ taking repossession of its 
body, in which the ‘mouth’ draws upon a heightened physical sense of itself; but rather about 
tracing the indivisible movement under all of these localized divisions; so that the ‘voice’ can 
emerge from underneath the false or illusory assembly of the ‘mouth’. Beckett I believe with 
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Not I is moving the language beyond the subject in order that the ‘mouth’ can bear witness to 
itself, via the audience; so that it too, like the ‘subject’ in Rockaby can be cast as a ‘blind-
spot’ on a undifferentiated reality. In this sense, the later performances really do testify to the 
extraordinary effort on Beckett’s part to radically reorientate the theatre; in a way which 
allows for a performance capable of representing the ‘subject’ on a totally naturalistic level, 
while at the same time; removing the same ‘subject’ from the illusory assessment of spatial, 
temporal and causal freedom. As we can see with Beckett’s Not I and Rockaby, their great 
achievement over Endgame is the way in which Beckett can locate the performance of these 
two plays behind the phenomenal facade of the ‘subject’, without having to compromise the 
space of the ‘subject’ in terms of an extendable reality; the kind to which the head motif in 
Endgame invariably falls foul; due to its ‘box within a box’ construction. Having looked to 
the spatial refinement of Beckett’s latter plays; I feel we should now return to the transitorial 
territory of Happy Days in order to consider what kind of development is in play, which 
could possibly lead us in the direction of the spatial reconfiguration of Not I and Rockaby. 
Clearly with respects to Happy Days the play still remains in the service of a recognizable 
spatial profile; insofar as Beckett locates the identity of Winnie and Wille amongst the 
phenomenal scraps which constitute their domestic existence. But it would seem by this point, 
that for Beckett the decision has been reached that what little objective character he does 
concede to his plays will remain fixed as well as severely restricted in its vocabulary. For as 
we can observe with Happy Days there has clearly been a deliberate attempt by Beckett to 
recirculate the same phenomenal vocabulary as that of Endgame; just think of the 
handkerchief that covers Willie’s head from the unremitting sun, or the optical adjusted 
character of Winnie’s engagement with her immediate environment.100 All of which can trace 
their phenomenal outline to the blood stained handkerchief covering Hamm’s face, and the 
telescope which Clov peers through in response to his master’s instructions.101 It could even 
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be said that the mound which is raised up to Winnie’s neck in act Two of Happy Days is itself 
an attempt by Beckett to dramatically re-present Clov’s own imagined landscape of 
accumulating ‘grain’, eventually resulting in its own ‘impossible little heap’:
 CLOV: [Fixed gaze, tonelessly.] Finished, it’s finished, nearly 
           finished, it must be nearly finished. [Pause.] Grain upon
           grain, one by one, and one day, suddenly, there’s a heap, a
           little heap, the impossible heap. [Pause.] I can’t be 
           punished any more. [Pause.]
                                                 (ENDG., 12.)
So, what I want to convey is the idea that by recirculating the same fixed phenomenal profile; 
Beckett himself imposes upon the dramatic space in which he is working in, a movement 
which does not arise from change initiated by a particular action or individual character; but 
one which arises through altering the perspective of the ‘play’ which in ‘itself’ does not come 
under any revision. It is this which I believe Beckett himself is determined to forge in relation 
to his work; that is to say, to set about creating a drama whose entire movement is premised 
upon perspective; and not causal movement, the source through which all suffering is 
ultimately directed. By doing this I believe Beckett is actually attempting to locate his work 
outside the structure of suffering; in effect to create what Schopenhauer himself thought only 
applicable to the category of music; an art-form which does not play to the structural 
mechanism of suffering. In effect you could say Beckett was out to create genuine ‘music 
drama’ and do exactly what Wagner was unable to do with with his opera; i.e. create an art-
form which is capable of following through with Schopenhauer’s aesthetic agenda; which of 
course is not to magnify the ‘will’ to unprecedented levels as we see with Wagner; but its 
exact reverse to lower its resolution as much as is feasibly possible. But not only is Beckett 
able to locate his art in terms of minimizing suffering, but also just as crucially to the 
Schopenhauerian agenda by recirculating the images of his previous work; he upholds the 
idea that ‘the source of true wisdom lies not in abstract rational knowledge, but in the correct 
and profound apprehension of the world in perception.’102 In many ways it is even possible to 
look upon these reinforced images, which circulate throughout Beckett’s work, in terms of his 
               
240
102 W.W.R.2., 80. 
own theatrical fidelity towards the principle of Platonic Ideas; which as we know are 
fundamentally integral to Schopenhauer’s own philosophy:
 Therefore the twenties and early thirties are for 
 the intellect what May is for the trees; only at that time do the blos-
 soms, of which all the later fruits are the development, begin to
 show. The world of perception has made its impression, and thus
 has laid the foundation of all the subsequent ideas of the individual.
 By reflection this individual can make clear to himself what has been
 apprehended; he can still acquire much knowledge as nourishment
 for the fruit that has once begun to show. He can enlarge his views,
 correct his concepts and judgements, and really become master of
 the material acquired through endless combinations. In fact, he
 will often produce his best work much later, just as the greatest heat
 begins only when the days are already growing shorter. But he has
 no longer any hope of new original knowledge from the only living
 source of perception.
                         (W.W.R.2., 81.)
What the dramatic structure of Happy Days reveals to my mind, is precisely this move to 
stage in front of an audience a performance whose movement ceases to be an issue of active 
freedom; but instead holds out the value of the performance in terms of being able to change 
the tone and resolution of a play that has already had its spatial parameters fixed. In this way I 
believe that the original ambition of Dream’s ‘melodic little book’ is still very much alive 
with Beckett, only that this time it has been transferred to the stage:
  Now the point is that it is most devoutly to be hoped
  that some at least of our characters can be cast for parts in    
  a liu-liu. For example, John might be the Yellow Bell and
  the Smeraldina-Rima the young Liu and the Syra-Cusa the
  Stifled Bell and the Mandarin the Ancient Purification and
  Belacqua himself the Beneficient Fecundity or Imper-
  fect, and so on. Then it would only be a question of juggling 
  like Confucius on cubes of Jade and playing a tune. If 
  all our characters were like that - liu-liu-minded - we
  could write a little book that would be purely melodic,
  think how nice that would be, linear, a lovely Pythagorean 
  chain-chant solo of cause and effect, a one fingered telepho-
  phony that would be a pleasure to hear.
                                                   (D.F.M.W., 10.)
In this sense Beckett’s characters of Winnie and Clov, or even that of Willie and Hamm, all 
move within the same theatrical structure, but rather than representing each character as a 
separate and distinct reality in themselves; they are, I believe essentially the same repeated 
notes, which in the case of Winnie and Clov or Willie and Hamm, change only in relation to 
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the degree of stress placed behind them. In fact not only do I believe that Winnie and Willie 
sound the same notes as Clov and Hamm; but this is I believe also true of the ‘Mouth’ and 
‘Auditor’ in Not I and the ‘Women’ and ‘voice’ in Rockaby; all of these characterizations 
remain ultimately fixed in relation to the ‘intellect’ and the ‘will’. As Schopenhauer says in 
Die Welt ‘He can enlarge his views, correct his concepts and judgements, and really become 
master of the material acquired through endless combinations[...] But he has no longer any 
hope of new original knowledge’. For Beckett I believe that he saw his art only emerging as 
fully legitimate if he could openly remain as a novelist and playwright fully accountable to 
such a judgement:
 
  He took the biscuit carefully out of the packet and laid them face 
  upward on the grass, in order as he felt of edibility. They were the 
  same as always, a Ginger, an Osborne, a Digestive, a Petit Beurre and 
  one anonymous. He always ate the first-named last, because he liked it
  the best, and the anonymous first, because he thought it very likely
  the least palatable. The order in which he ate the remaining three was
  indifferent to him and varied irregularly from day to day. On his knees
  now before the five it struck him for the first time that these pre-
  possessions reduced to a paltry six the number of ways in which he
  could make this meal. But this was to violate the very essence of
  assortment, this was red permanganate on the Rima of variety. Even
  if he conquered his prejudice against the anonymous, still there
  would be only twenty-four ways in which the biscuits could be eaten.
  But were he to take the final step and overcome his infatuation with
  the ginger, then the assortment would spring to life before him, dan
  cing the radiant measure of its total permutability, edible in a hun-
  dred and twenty ways!
                                     (MUR., 57.)
Both these passages from Murphy and Dream are securely on board with the 
Schopenhauerian principle regarding the predetermined deck which one is left to shuffle in 
relation to the Ideas, and the knowledge of those Ideas available to all living subjects.103 Also 
the fact that these limited combinations are recognized in the context of music with Dream, 
and hunger with Murphy, also underlines, that this numbers-game has a distinctly 
Schopenhauerian impression about it. But it would seem having said this, that there is one 
glaring omission which we we cannot ignore in relation to the passage of Dream and that is 
the explicit mention of a ‘Pythagorean chain-chant’. Is it not more correct in this instance to 
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credit the philosophical influence much more towards Pythagoras of Samos rather than 
Schopenhauer? In order to answer this I believe it is helpful to consider James Knowlson’s 
own words when giving an account of the several occasions he spoke to Beckett:      
                                                        
  On several occasions he spoke of his great love for the writing of Schopenhauer, 
  whom he read as early as 1930, and told me (in 1983) that he was currently reading 
  an interesting essay by Karl Jaspers on that philosopher. We also spoke of Pythagoras 
  and of the Pythagorean theory of numbers, with Beckett playing down his knowledge 
  of Greek philosophy and contrasting it with Joyce’s great erudition. Yet notes that he 
  wrote in the mid - 1930’s on Windelband’s History of Philosophy have come to light 
  since his death, showing how fascinated he was in man’s various attempts to explain 
  the universe and how much he did know about Pythagorean thinking.104 
  
It is normally widely emphasized, the philosophical importance, which both Plato and Kant 
have in relation to Schopenhauer’s philosophy, but it is rarely the case that Pythagoras’s name 
is brought up in connection to Schopenhauer in such an unequivocal fashion; and yet though 
one could justifiably say that Pythagoras does not carry the same weight of either Plato or 
Kant in the construction of Schopenhauer’s work, his school of thought is nonetheless very 
important to the way in which Schopenhauer approaches the Vorstellung of birth and death. 
As with all attendees of the Pythagorean school, it is necessary to sign up to the doctrine of       
‘transmigration of souls’ i.e. Metempsychosis:
  We might very well distinguish between metempsychosis as the 
  transition of the entire so-called soul into another body, and
  palingenesis as the disintegration and new formation of the
  individual, since his will alone persists and, assuming the shape
  of a new being receives a new intellect. The individual, there-
  fore, decomposes like a neutral salt whose base then combines
  with another acid to form a salt.
                                               (P.P.2, 276) 
     
As we can see Schopenhauer is determined to ensure that his reader should not in anyway 
make the false assumption that the transmigration he raises in connection to the ‘will’ has 
anything to do with the preservation of a divine entity; but instead he compares it to an 
insensible reaction, akin to chemical decomposition and synthesis. So if we return to 
Knowlson’s account of his conversation with Beckett, it is most likely that the interest 
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Pythagoras did generate, was itself born out of an attempt to to give further definition to the 
kind of space which Schopenhauer reveals in relation to his own writing:105
           
  When we read what is said in scholia to Aristotle (p. 829, 
  Berlin edition) about the Pythagoreans’ philosophy of numbers,  
  we may be led to suppose that the use of the word !"#$% at the 
  beginning of the gospel ascribed to John, a use so strange,
  mysterious, and verging on the absurd, and also the earlier
  analogues thereof in Philo, are derived from the Pythagorean 
  philosophy of numbers, that is, from the meaning of the word
  !"#$% in the arithmetical sense as numerical relation, ratio
  numerica. For according to the Pythagoreans, such a relation
  constitutes the innermost and indestructible essence of every
  being and hence it is the first and original principle, !&'(; where-
  upon ") !&'# $) % !"#$%[106] might be true of everything.
                                                                                               (P.P.1, 38.)           
As we can see with Schopenhauer’s own account of Pythagoras in the first volume of Parerga 
und Paralipomena it is clear that Schopenhauer regards the Pythagorean school as making a 
significant contribution towards our own understanding of the world’s indestructible 
character; and it is the ‘numbers’ which he cites in relation to this view. As we can see from 
Knowlson’s own account this is the very subject that Beckett discusses with him in one of his 
quoted conversations; after ‘having already spoke of his great love for the writing of 
Schopenhauer’107 and had also declared he had been reading a paper by Karl Jaspers on 
Schopenhauer108. For it would seem that, any notes that Beckett did possess on Pythagoras, 
were indeed part of his engagement with Schopenhauer’s writing; having taking them as it 
were second hand from Windelband’s History of Philosophy.109 So rather than the focus 
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Essays and Criticism (1986) New York: Grove Press, 404.             
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entirely being taken up by Pythagoras; I regard Beckett’s Pythagorean expression in Dream is 
itself tied up with a deepening Schopenhauerian conviction towards the word and art. In many 
ways the Pythagorean chain-chant if we care to look at it, not only is connected to music; 
something which unites Schopenhauer with Pythagoras, but it is also expressed in terms of 
being able to adjust or moderate the pitch of cause and effect: ‘a lovely Pythagorean chain-
chant solo of cause and effect, a one fingered telephony that would be a pleasure to hear.’ 110 
It would seem therefore that for Beckett his own treatment of Pythagoras emerges very like 
that of Berkeley, in the sense that the philosophy of Pythagoras does not detract from 
Schopenhauerian thinking, but actually can be seen to enforce it. In fact, having settled upon 
a Schopenhauerian explanation for the Pythagorean chain-chant; where does this leave the 
whole oriental construction of the instrument from which the chain-chant is based?: 
  ‘Supposing we told now a little story about China in 
  order to orchestrate what we mean. Yes Ling-Liun then,
  let us say, went to the confines of the West, to Bamboo 
  valley, and having cut there a stem between two knots and
  blown into same was charmed to constate that it gave forth
  the sound of his own voice when he spoke, as he mostly 
  did without passion. From this the phoenix male had the
  kindness to sing six notes and the phoenix female six other         
  notes and Ling-Liun the minister cut yet eleven stems to
  correspond with all that he heard. Then he remitted 
  the twelve liu-liu to his master, the six liu male phoenix and
  the six liu female phoenix: the Yellow Bell, let us say, the
  Great Liu, the Great Steepleiron, the stifled Bell, the An-
  cient Purification, the Young Liu, the Beneficient Fecun-
  dity, the Bell of the Woods, the Equable Rule, the 
  Southern Liu, the Imperfect, the Echo Bell.
                                                          (D.F.M.W., 10)
Once again I believe it is Beckett’s own reading of Schopenhauer; that has lead him to this 
Chinese formulation of music in Dream, which is capable of being reconciled with 
Pythagoras: 
   ...the Pythagoreans had correctly interpreted under the 
  name !"#$ !%&$'[111] the Yin and Yang of the Chinese. 
  That the metaphysics of music, as I have explained in my
 chief work (vol. I, § 52 and vol. ii, chap. 39), can be regarded
               
245
110 D.F.M.W., 10.
111 [!The ten principles" (of the Pythagoreans).] trans Payne, E.F.J. 
  as an exposition of the pythagorean philosophy of numbers, has
  already been briefly alluded to by me in that work. Here I will
  explain the matter somewhat more fully, but assume that the
  reader has before him the foregoing passages. According to
  these, melody expresses all movements of the will as it makes
  itself known in man’s self-consciousness; in other words, it
  expresses all emotions, feelings and so on.
                                                        (P.P.1., 37-38.)
        
In this opening paragraph on Pythagoras, we have all the necessary components to construct 
Beckett’s liu-liu  instrument. For we have Schopenhauer expressing the view that the 
pythagorean philosophy of numbers is at its core a comprehensive description of his own 
metaphysics of music; but also he sets out the idea in the same paragraph, that the 
Pythagoreans themselves had formulated their own Presocratic version of the Chinese Yin and 
Yang. Crucially also what distinguishes the liu-liu expression of music, is that it is ‘purely 
melodic’112 and as Schopenhauer describes in relation to his own metaphysical model of 
music ‘melody expresses all movements of the will as it makes itself known in man’s self-
consciousness; in other words, it expresses all emotions, feelings and so on.’ [ref here ?] So it 
would appear that in fact Beckett’s own ‘Chinese little story’ is in itself just as much about an 
affirmation of Schopenhauerian ‘will’ as it is about music. Having raised the importance of 
metempsychosis to Schopenhauer’s own assessment of life and death, one would expect that, 
if Beckett was determined to locate his writing and theatre in relation to his own maturing 
Schopenhauerian assessment towards the world, and given that his reading of Schopenhauer 
was indeed as intimate as this thesis is proposing, he would make some kind of aesthetic 
gesture towards this aspect of Schopenhauerian thinking. I propose that Beckett did much 
more than simply raise a gesture towards Schopenhauer’s metempsychosis, and that it would 
in due course serve to open up the imaginative space of the theatre in way which has never 
been equalled by any playwright. That is to say Beckett’s own engagement with 
Schopenhauer’s conception of metempsychosis would itself eventually lead to the dramatic 
spatial reassessment of Not I, Rockaby and What where. But in order to illustrate this I feel we 
should look to a play which sits in-between Not I and Rockaby: that is Foot Falls:
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 M: Mother. [Pause] I heard you in my deep sleep. [Pause.]   
 
 V: Yes, May.
 
 M: Where you asleep?
 V: Deep asleep. [Pause.] I heard you in my deep sleep. [Pause.] 
           There is no sleep so deep I would not hear you there.
           [Pause. M resumes pacing. Four lengths. After first length,
          synchronous with steps.] One two three four five six seven
          eight nine wheel one two three four five six seven eight nine
          wheel. [Free.] Will you not try to snatch a little sleep?
          [M halts facing front at R. Pause.]
          
 M: Would you like me to inject you again?
 V: Yes, but it is too soon.
          [Pause.]
 M: Straighten your Pillows? [Pause.] Change your drawsheet?
          [Pause.] Pass you the bedpan? [Pause.] The warming-pan?
          [Pause.] Dress your sores? [Pause.] Sponge you down?      
          [Pause.] Moisten your poor lips? [Pause.] Pray with you? 
          [Pause.] For you? [Pause.] Again. 
          [Pause.]
 V: Yes, but it is too soon.
                                   (FOOTF., 399-400.)
Reading over this passage from Foot Falls one is reminded at every corner, of Clov’s own 
attendance to his master Hamm. For instance ‘May113’ (whose name not only recalls Beckett’s 
own mother’s, but also somewhat conveniently stands in for Schopenhauer’s own analogy 
of the intellect in its twenties and thirties, having at this point laid down all the subsequent 
ideas open to it ‘what May is for the trees’114) informs the audience that she too, just like 
Clov, was tasked with the chore of administering painkiller injections; as well as attending to 
all her daily needs during her growing infirmity: ‘Change your drawsheet...Pass you the 
bedpan...Dress your sores...Sponge you down.’ All of these chores are precisely the kind of 
chores we expect to be part of Clov’s domestic vocabulary; indeed the drawsheet itself echoes 
Hamm’s own covering. And as we can see the ‘voice’s’ own reply to May’s suggestion of 
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administering the painkillers carries the same deferment as is the case with Endgame: ‘Yes, 
but it is too soon.’ It is as if Beckett is attempting to locate May in the exact same spatial 
position as Clov, while that of her Mother’s ‘voice’ occupies the same seat as Hamm’s. But 
also it seems, especially from the way Beckett layers the dramatic characterization of May 
over her mother’s ‘voice’, that May is in some way positioning herself to to occupy the exact 
same space as her mother; thus bringing about her own dramatic metempsychosis:
  The necessity of death can be inferred primarily from the fact that
  man is mere phenomenon, not a thing-in-itself and thus not
  !!"#$ !!.[115] If he were, he could not perish. But that the thing-in-
  itself at the root of phenomena of this kind can manifest itself
  only in them, is a consequence of its nature.
  What a difference there is between our beginning and our 
  end! the former in the frenzy of desire and the ecstasy of sensual 
  pleasure; the latter in the destruction of all the organs and the
  musty odour of corpses. The path from birth to death is always
  down hill as regards well-being and the enjoyment of life; bliss-
  fully dreaming childhood, light-hearted youth, toilsome man-
  hood, frail and often pitiable old age, the torture of the last 
  illness, and finally the agony of death. Does it not look exactly
  as if existence were a false step whose consequence gradually
  become more and more obvious?
                                                      (P.P.2., 288.)
This is in many ways the very trajectory which Beckett choses to collapse in relation May’s 
relationship to her mother. For she too has reached the point at which each step she takes to 
cross the width of the stage; is itself broadcasting the lie, which Schopenhauer himself sets 
out in terms of ‘a false step’. For just like the vision of Victor pacing up and down in his bare 
room, ‘rubbing his chains together’ in order to gauge ‘That useless little sound’116 that Victor 
says will be his ‘life’; so too does May try to move her entire identity into the little intervals 
of sound she is able to produce with her rhythmic steps: 
  V:[...]Seven eight, nine, wheel. [M turns at L[117], paces one
  more length, halts facing front at R.] I say the floor here,
  now bare, this strip of floor, once was carpeted, a deep
  pile. Till one night, while still little more than a child, she
  called he mother and said, Mother this is not enough.
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  The mother: Not enough? May-the child’s given name
   -May: Not enough. The mother: what do you mean, May,
  not enough, what can you possibly mean, May, not
  enough? May: I mean, Mother, that I must hear the feet,
  however faint they fall. The mother: The motion alone is
  not enough? May: No, Mother, the motion alone is not
  enough, I must hear the feet, however faint they fall.
                                                                                  (FOOTF., 401.)
As May spells out to her ‘mother’ she needs to ‘hear the feet’ for the ‘motion alone is not 
enough; this I believe plays to exactly the same identity as Victor, who is determined to raise 
the resolution of his own suffering; in order that the ‘will’ under which all suffering is 
ultimately perpetuated, will itself in due course turn against its own nature; thus weakening its 
attachment with the subject. It is this same unmovable drama, whose space remains fixed in 
relation to all of Beckett’s characters; each in their own turn will be carried over into the 
other, in order to express exactly the same unrevised movement and expression of their 
predecessors: 
                                                    
  That which dies perishes, but a seed is left behind out of which a 
  new being proceeds; and this now enters existence without 
  knowing whence it comes and why it is precisely as it is. 
  This is the mystery of palingenesis and chapter 41 of volume ii 
  of my chief work  may be regarded as its explanation. It is 
  accordingly clear to us that all beings living at this moment 
  contain the real kernel of all that will live in the future; and so 
  to a certain extent these future beings already exist. Similarly, 
  every animal standing before us in the prime of life seems to 
  exclaim to us: ‘Why do you complain of the fleeting nature of 
  all those who are alive? How could I exist if all those of my 
  species who existed before me had not died?’Accordingly, 
  however much the plays and masks may change on the world 
  stage, the actors in all of them nevertheless remain the same. 
  We sit together, talk, and excite one another; eyes gleam and 
  voices grow louder. Thousand of years ago, others sat in just 
  the same way; it was the same and they were the same. It will be 
  just the same thousand of years hence. The contrivance that 
  prevents us from becoming aware of this is time.
                                                                        (P.P.2., 276.)
 
It is as if May resides in exactly the same spatial position as Clov and that of her mother’s 
‘voice’ seemingly occupies the seat of Hamm. What changes is not the position of Beckett’s 
character, but the degree to which Beckett seeks to raise or lower phenomenal definition of 
the ‘intellect’, along with the strength of its accompanying ‘will’. The fact that the ‘voice’ of 
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May’s mother displays much more noticeable affection towards her ‘daughter’ than seemingly 
does Hamm towards his ward, does not move in anyway the position of their indissoluble 
partnership; what changes is is phenomenal definition; which in the absolute context of the 
‘will’ changes nothing. That is apart from the fact, of course, that the phenomenal definition, 
one is in the position to give to the ‘will’ itself impacts on the ‘will’s’ capacity to connect to 
such a ‘representation’; though not destroy, it can actually weaken it. And it is this balancing 
act that I believe Beckett is performing each time when he commits himself to a particular 
dramatic project. So as I have previously suggested in relation to the the theatrical space from 
which Beckett is starting from, it seems that for him there is no need to move it from the 
position it took up in relation to Eleuthéria. So in this sense Beckett is determined to follow 
through with the Schopenhauerian premise so consummately expressed with the ‘biscuits’118 
in Murphy that as an artist he will set out to ‘become master of the material acquired through 
endless combinations’.119 So having addressed himself to the theatre in this manner, that is by 
locating his characters in exactly the same space as the characters which proceeded them, 
Beckett is able to represent the illusion of movement; or more correctly the Vostellung of 
movement; without in fact registering any movement at all; because in truth the action has not  
moved from its original position; that is to say, from its movement in relation to Beckett’s 
own first depiction of the ‘intellect’s’ struggling to weaken its own ‘will’. In this sense I 
believe Beckett was aiming at something truly remarkable with his plays; to create a work 
which does not engender suffering; namely to operate a dramatic framework which does not 
itself participate in the active causal structure which underlies the mechanism of suffering. 
Beckett is able to present the action of his character as one indissoluble expression, which 
over the course of successive plays does not change in any way from one play to the next. 
Hence he delivers to the audience, again and again, in these performances the open lie which 
time is determined to conceal. The consequence is that Beckett himself is, for want of a better 
word ‘free’ to salvage his role as an artist by moving his identity as a playwright outside the 
very mechanism which initiates drama. That mechanism is a false individual autonomy which 
               
250
118 See, Beckett, S., Murphy., (2003) London: John Calder (Publishers) Ltd., 57. 
119 See, W.W.R.2., 81.  
surrenders all artistic production to willful expression, thus in Beckett’s eyes making it 
redundant. Through that redundancy, the notion of ‘movement’ is finally confined in his plays 
to perception alone.  
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                                                      CONCLUSION
By way of engaging in a full and open reading of Schopenhauer, free from the constraints of 
having to anticipate a sudden break in Beckett’s creative direction, I hope to have shown
that Schopenhauer’s influence extended far beyond the shallows of his early youth, but 
instead served as a source of aesthetic renewal capable of radically reformulating the open 
stage.  For as this thesis has demonstrated throughout, it is perfectly feasible to see in 
Beckett’s own decision to switch his attentions away from the novel and onto the theatre, as 
an attempt to open up a second front in response to the much earlier Schopenhauerian 
dialogue previously uncovered in relation to Proust.
  
As this thesis has been able to establish the theatre, unlike the novel, is ideally positioned 
to create an aesthetic response towards the ‘will’ which endeavours to move beyond its initial 
negative reception in language. For I hope this thesis has gone someway in illustrating 
Beckett’s artistic response to Schopenhauer remained  a constant source of aesthetic 
inspiration throughout  his working career as a playwright as well as novelist, allowing him 
access to a space in which his own intuition the towards the world could move freely without 
apparent contradiction. In this sense Schopenhauer’s writing as I have chosen to present it, did 
not just carry the stamp of worldly pessimism for Beckett, but marked an opportunity to 
register a real shift in performative depth.   
By identifying a significant pressure within Beckett’s own writing to extend the novels’ 
representational capacity beyond conventional genre coherency, we can establish that for 
Beckett the issue of aesthetic representation remained fundamental to his whole endeavour as 
an artist.But as I have been able to chart in relation to the way Beckett’s aesthetic engagement 
in his earliest theatrical work becomes enmeshed in the subject of ‘suffering’, and its 
conscious identity, that this in itself can be read in terms of a much broader artistic response 
to Schopenhauer’s conception of Vorstellung. And as this thesis demonstrates by way of 
252
reconfiguring these cogent themes in response to an altered dramatic setting, it is possible to 
see why in the case of Beckett ‘s own work, the initial expression of music (cited in Proust) 
becomes reformulated in terms of a single undifferentiated theatrical construction.
By using Schopenhauer’s model of Vorstellung we can free up all the disparate philosophical 
allusions from having to adopt individual privileged positions, and instead recirculate them in 
terms of speaking to a single undifferentiated space, whose range of contradiction  
is only registered in relation to their phenomenal appearance. 
Also by raising Vorstellung in terms of an artistic response, we can avoid altogether the need 
to access a description of the world which relies upon the theoretical maintenance of abstract 
concepts. In this sense we can appreciate the way in which this Schopenhauerian model of 
Vorstellung does not itself have to appeal directly to a reductive philosophical strategy. 
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